1/9. The B-Deduction

Transcription

1 1/9 The B-Deduction The transcendental deduction is one of the sections of the Critique that is considerably altered between the two editions of the work. In a work published between the two editions of the Critique, the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant discussed in a footnote the objection of a certain Professor Ulrich who had complained that the transcendental deduction was obscure. Kant effectively grants here that the argument could have better expressed and states now that it could almost follow from the precisely defined definition of a judgment in general. This point has subsequently be taken by some to be key to the second edition version of the transcendental deduction and Kemp Smith, for example, states that it is only in the B-Deduction that a proper connection is made between the categories and the notion of judgment (a view also supported by Beatrice Longuenesse). The vast majority of English-language commentary focuses on the B-Deduction which is also alleged to be much clearer than the A- Deduction, a point that is supported by Kant s own statement in the preface to the second edition where he simply states that the exposition of the argument of the deduction has been made clearer although he adds that what is being argued has not altered (Bxxviii). The B-Deduction opens with a discussion of the manifold of representations pointing back to the conclusions of the Aesthetic about the form of intuition lying a priori in our mode of representation. However, the relationship to the manifold treated in the Aesthetic was only receptive and

2 2/9 this is not sufficient for us to understand how the combination of the manifold comes about. This combination is a product of spontaneity and the power of spontaneity is what is also known as understanding so that Kant treats all combination as an act of understanding. The act in question is what we term synthesis. The point about synthesis is that it refers us to a view of the unity of objects as based on activity of that which cognises them. Combination includes three elements: the manifold and its synthesis plus the unity of the manifold. This unity is a synthetic unity and it is presupposed by all of the categories. Kant opens section 16 by discussing this further: It must be possible for the I think to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me (B131-2). Relationship to the I think is required for a representation to be something for me, a claim that is clearly an echo of the reference to the transcendental unity of apperception in the A-Deduction. Emphasis on the notion of the I think suggests a kind of Cartesian argument but Kant goes on to point out that original apperception is a form of self-consciousness that generates the I think and that the I think is, indeed, a transcendental act. It is from the original combination that is described in the I think that, Kant now puts it, many consequences follow (B133). (Intriguing contrast here with the opening emphasis on time as the formal condition of inner

3 3/9 sense in the A-Deduction as what had to be borne in mind, as quite fundamental.) As with the argument of the A-Deduction so here again Kant contrasts the unity of transcendental apperception with a purely empirical notion of consciousness since the latter would have no essential connection to the identity of the subject of cognition. At this point in the argument, however, Kant makes the additional point that an analytic sense of apperception presupposes the synthetic sense. In a footnote (B133-4n) Kant clarifies this point. Here it is pointed out that to relate to different representations by means of the same concept (say, to relate to many particulars as instances of red ) is to presuppose a synthetic connection between the representations despite the fact that the unity of the concept red is itself analytic. On these grounds Kant points out that the synthetic unity of apperception is thus the highest point of understanding to which all logic and transcendental philosophy refers and that this apperception is effectively the ground of understanding itself (B134n). The principle that the unity of apperception is a necessary unity is itself an analytic proposition but it reveals the need for a synthesis of the manifold in intuition and without that synthesis of intuition the identity that is expressed in the unity of apperception could not be thought. So the analytic proposition of the unity of apperception is itself grounded on a synthetic ability to combine the manifold in one consciousness. The notion of the I is not itself complex, unlike intuition which always refers us to a

4 4/9 plurality (which is why Kant uses the term manifold ). Kant concludes section 16 by making the same contrast between our understanding (which needs to use concepts) and a possible different one which would be purely intuitive (A135) that he has also added to the second edition version of the Aesthetic. Section 17 opens, like section 15 did, with a reference back to the argument of the Aesthetic that indicated that the supreme principle of the possibility of sensible intuition was that the manifold was subject to the formal conditions of space and time. For intuition to be related to the understanding however requires that the manifold of intuition is subject to conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception. Now, for us to be able to make claims of knowledge of objects is for the understanding to relate to determinate representations in such a way that the manifold of intuition becomes united. However, for such unity to be given to representations is for us to become conscious of it. So, the unity in question is the unity of consciousness and this unity is the basis of the relation of representations to an object. So the original synthetic unity of apperception is the first pure part of our knowledge. The comprehension of the form of sensibility we got from the Aesthetic was not itself sufficient for us to be aware of objects of knowledge, only the possible form that any such objects would have to conform to. To comprehend something as within space requires, by contrast, a synthetic combination (example of drawing a line requiring reference to

5 5/9 consciousness, B137-8). The key point about this is that the combination in question is not merely a condition I require to know something, it is also a requirement for any intuition to be able to be the basis of an understanding of something to be an object of knowledge. So, as Kant puts it at the beginning of section 18: The transcendental unity of apperception is that unity through which all the manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object (B139). As such the unity in question is an objective unity, i.e., it is the unity under which objects are possible as such. Having focused so consistently on the place of the transcendental unity of apperception in the argument from sections Kant moves on in section 19 to a new topic, treating here the relationship of this unity of apperception to the logical form of judgment. Judgments were declared earlier in the Critique to be what concepts were used for but now Kant adds that a judgment itself is nothing but the manner in which given modes of knowledge are brought to the objective unity of apperception (B141). At this point however an implication of the understanding of this unity becomes manifest which was not evident previously in the argument. This is to the effect that the unity of apperception, as a necessary unity, attaches even to judgments which, in themselves, are only contingent. Kant clarifies this as follows: I do not here assert that these representations necessarily belong to one another in the empirical intuition, but that they belong to one another in virtue of the necessary unity of apperception in the synthesis of intuitions, that is, according to principles of the objective determination of

6 6/9 all representations, in so far as knowledge can be acquired by means of these representations principles which are all derived from the fundamental principle of the transcendental unity of apperception. (B142) What this citation means is that although a specific judgment expresses something that is contingently true, that, even for it to do this requires a unification of representations by reference to principles and that all such principles depend originally on the transcendental unity of apperception. So, even contingent judgments have a necessary form. (Shades of Leibniz!) It is by this means that judgment is contrasted by Kant with association. Association is an only subjective connection whilst judgment is an objective one and gives the relation to representations by which objects become available to be known. At this point Kant summarizes the argument of the B-Deduction to this point (B143) which appears to conclude with the argument that we required in order to answer the question of right with regard to the use of the categories. On this basis some commentators become confused as to why Kant does not stop at this point in his argument. Kant concludes here with reference to the manifold in a given intuition (B143) which seems to indicate that he has justified the view that for any specific given intuition there is a reference to the categories. In some sense, however, he must require more than this since the argument does not stop here. Section 21 is limited, according to its title, to making an observation. In this section Kant repeats the conclusions set out in the

7 7/9 previous section and says that a beginning has been made of the deduction of the pure concepts of understanding. The deduction has involved, he now states, an abstraction from the manifold of empirical intuition in order to focus attention solely on the unity that enters into intuition. What will be given later (in section 26) is what was described in the A-Deduction as a deduction from below which will show, starting from the empirical intuition, that its unity is provided to it by the category as we have seen, from the conclusion in section 20 is required for any intuition in general to be given to a finite cognition. (B145) The deduction given to date accepted that the manifold is given prior to the synthesis and is independent of it. Section 22 next adds a distinction between thinking and knowing (where the latter includes combination of concept and intuition). The point of this is to bring out that the pure concepts of understanding, even when applied to a priori intuitions, yield knowledge only in so far as these intuitions can be applied to empirical intuition (B147). Pure concepts and pure intuitions alone do not then give us knowledge, they only do so through being applied to empirical intuition. It is to the application of categories to objects of the senses in general that Kant turns in section 24. We have seen that the categories relate to objects of intuition in general. Just relating the synthesis of the manifold to the unity of apperception does give us a transcendental act but it is also purely intellectual. To relate the synthesis to the manifold of sensible intuition is distinguishable from this and is termed by Kant a figurative synthesis or the transcendental synthesis

8 8/9 of imagination. The key point about imagination is it is possible, by means of it, to represent in intuition an object that is not present (B151). Imagination is part of our sensibility but its synthesis involves a way of determining sense a priori in accord with the unity of apperception and to carry this out it acts in accordance with the categories. Having reached this point Kant seemingly breaks off to go back to the topic of investigation of the difference between inner sense and apperception. Inner sense is basically the awareness of the flow of representations. The understanding involves simple awareness of the unification of representations but, in relation to sensibility, involves combination of its elements together. Thus the understanding, under the title of a transcendental synthesis of imagination, performs this act upon the passive subject, whose faculty it is, and we are therefore justified in saying that inner sense is affected thereby. (B153-4) Understanding hence produces the combination of temporality that we experience as required for objects to be possible representations at all for us. Section 26 finally turns to the demonstration that it is by means of the categories that objects of sense are combined so that nature itself is made possible. Here Kant refers to the synthesis of apprehension as combination of the manifold in an empirical intuition and hence as that which makes perception possible. For this to happen we have to have not only the forms of intuition but also intuition of the specific manifolds of space and time. Unity of such synthesis of the manifold requires connection

9 9/9 of intuition in general to be applied to our sensible intuition. This occurs by means of the categories. Kant proceeds to specify this (apprehension of a house is dependent on the category of quantity, perception of freezing of water on the category of cause, B162-3). These claims give further sense to the notion of transcendental idealism. We see this in that Kant refers to the distinction between thingsin-themselves and appearances to make clear how nature could be subjected to laws of the understanding. Things-in-themselves would have their laws in themselves (intrinsic). Appearances, which is what we deal with, are representations and are subject to no law of connection save that which the connecting faculty prescribes (B164). It is on the basis of the a priori laws that we can uncover the sense of experience in general and thus what can be known as an object of experience.