The Two-Dimensional Content of Consciousness

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "The Two-Dimensional Content of Consciousness"

Transcription

1 The Two-Dimensional Content of Consciousness [Draft #3] Simon Prosser 1. Introduction For many years philosophers of mind tended to regard phenomenal consciousness and intentionality as posing separate problems whose solutions could be given independently of one another to quite a large degree. Recently, however, this has begun to change. Over the last decade or so there has been a rapidly developing interest in the relation between phenomenal consciousness and intentionality, with a number of philosophers arguing for close connections between the two. Most conspicuous among the theories that have been put forward is representationalism. Let the phenomenal character of a conscious experience be defined such that two experiences differ in phenomenal character if and only if there is a difference in what it is like to have those experiences. Then representationalism is the view that the phenomenal character of an experience depends entirely on its representational content; experience contains no non-representational features. This contrasts with the idea that there are qualia that may or may not act as intermediaries for represented contents but which also contribute intrinsic phenomenological features that do not represent anything. Representationalism has been most notably defended by Michael Tye (1995, 2000, 2002, 2003) and Fred Dretske (1993),

2 but similar views or variants have also been put forward by Sydney Shoemaker (2000), David Chalmers (2004b, forthcoming b), and many others. 1 Another family of views combining phenomenal consciousness with intentionality are higher-order representational (HOR) theories. According to these theories phenomenal consciousness can be analysed in terms of higher-order representational states that represent first-order conscious states. HOR theories have been defended in various forms by David Rosenthal (1986, 1997, 2002), Peter Carruthers (1996, 2000), Daniel Dennett (1978, 1991), David Armstrong (1968, 1984) and William Lycan (1996), among others. In this paper I put forward a version of representationalism that differs from standard versions. In brief, the view is that phenomenal character correlates with a content equivalent to the diagonal proposition in Robert Stalnaker s (1978, 2001, 2004) version of two-dimensional modal semantics for utterances. Consequently I shall call the view diagonal representationalism. As I shall explain, diagonal representationalism can be seen as a very broad generalisation of the non-standard version of representationalism put forward by Shoemaker. It is also a close cousin of Chalmers representationalist theory, though I shall note some possible points of disagreement. Showing that representationalism is true, albeit in a non-standard form, should be of interest in itself. What I take to be of additional interest about diagonal representationalism, however, is that it brings out connections between representationalism, HOR theories and functionalism that, as far as I am aware, have not previously been noticed. In effect it combines elements of all three doctrines within a single theory. 1 A full list of those who have defended representationalism or related views would be very long, but the following is a representative sample: Byrne 2001, Clark 2000, Crane 2003, Egan (forthcoming), Harman 1990, Kriegel 2002, Levine 2003, Thau Not all of these defend reductive claims (see below). 2

3 The structure of the paper is as follows. I start by describing some motivations for representationalism, some varieties of representationalism and the standard objections to it. I accept that at least one of these objections poses genuine problems for standard versions of representationalism. I then show, moreover, that some minimal functionalist assumptions accepted by most philosophers (including even some property dualists) straightforwardly disprove standard versions of representationalism. I then outline Shoemaker s non-standard representationalism and describe a modification of it that I call perspectival representationalism. This is a step in the right direction but falls prey to an objection put forward by Ned Block. I then outline some key features of Stalnaker s two-dimensional semantics before describing diagonal representationalism in detail. I compare diagonal representationalism with Chalmers Fregean representationalism, concluding that the two are quite closely related. I then explain how to deal with a putative objection regarding experiences whose contents are impossible states of affairs. HOR theories are then discussed and it is shown that diagonal representationalism is a kind of HOR theory. At this point a number of different threads from previous sections are drawn together to give a unified account combining representationalism, higher-order representation and a broadly functionalist theory of consciousness. In the final sections I show that standard versions of representationalism are committed to a questionable view of the mind often known as the Cartesian theatre. Diagonal representationalism, by contrast, makes it easy to account for the indeterminacy of phenomenal character implied by the denial of the Cartesian Theatre because there is a corresponding indeterminacy in the representational content that correlates with phenomenal character. Different yet equally good interpretation schemes can be given for both. Finally I make some brief remarks 3

4 about externalism and direct realist theories of perception, suggesting that diagonal representationalism is consistent with both. 2. Motivations and standard problems for representationalism G. E. Moore (1903) argued that experience was diaphanous. When one sees a ripe tomato one can focus one s attention on the tomato, or on its redness, but it is not clear that one can focus one s attention on the experience itself without simply focusing once again on the tomato or its redness. Representationalists take this to suggest that all there is to the experience is its content: the ripe red tomato. Whether or not this is a good argument, the relation between content and phenomenology cannot fail to be important in both the philosophy of mind and in epistemology. This relation can be investigated by treating representationalism as a hypothesis, to be rejected only if it is shown to be false. Hence I shall briefly outline some distinctions between different versions of representationalism then I shall begin examining the main objections. For materialists a further reason to try to defend representationalism arises from that fact that some versions are reductive; they hold that phenomenal character can be reduced to representational content. Reductive representationalism holds the appeal of reducing the problem of accounting for phenomenal consciousness to the far more naturalistically tractable problem of accounting for representation. Advocates of reductive representationalism include Tye and Dretske though Tye, at least, includes only what he calls abstract content in his claim. This excludes particular objects or surfaces. This restriction is needed because hallucinatory experiences and experiences of different qualitatively identical objects can all be subjectively indistinguishable while differing in the particulars represented. 4

5 Those who reject the reducibility of the phenomenal to the physical on independent grounds can, however, accept non-reductive versions of representationalism. Within the non-reductive camp we can distinguish two quite different sorts of view. Firstly there are those who regard phenomenal conscious as involving non-physical properties with no metaphysically necessary connection to the physical world. Let us call this dualist representationalism. According to this view there is a nomological correlation between phenomenal character and representational content. Chalmers is an advocate of non-reductive dualist representationalism of this kind, but there is also a substantial disagreement between Chalmers and Tye and Dretske over which representational contents correlate with phenomenal character. In principle, however, dualist representationalists could agree with Tye and Dretske about the correlation between phenomenal character and representational content in the actual world, disagreeing only with regard to worlds differing nomologically from the actual world. Secondly, one could advocate a non-reductive representationalism consistent with materialism by holding the weakened claim that phenomenal character supervenes on representational content. Let us call this supervenient representationalism. According to this view it is metaphysically necessary that no two experiences differ in phenomenal character without differing in representational content, but the converse would not hold. A dualist could make a weaker nomological claim in order to allow a one-many correlation between phenomenal character and content instead of a one-one correlation. Finally, one further alternative would be to restrict the correlation between phenomenal character and representational content to a population, or perhaps to an individual. This would allow the possibility of two subjects having inverted spectra relative to one another without differing in terms of representation. In 5

6 principle reductionists and dualists could accept restricted views, though both would have to explain the ground of the difference between different populations or individuals. I lean strongly toward a reductive version of representationalism, but for the most part I shall present my theory as a general framework that is also consistent with some of the non-reductive variants discussed above. By standard representationalism I shall mean the view that the phenomenal character of an experience depends entirely on its direct externalistically individuated representational content, not including modes of presentation or indirectly represented contents of any kind. For reasons that I hope are clear I shall call this kind of content Russellian. 2 So, for example, when one has a visual experience as of a black cat against a green background, and nothing else, the Russellian content of one s experience is black cat against green background. This content is made up entirely from the objects and properties in the world external to the subject, i.e. black, cat, green, etc. (though for theories that incorporate Tye s restriction to abstract content the Russellian content will not include specific objects). According to standard representationalism it is Russellian content alone that determines the phenomenal character of experience. It is natural to think of this as analogous to Russell s view that denotation alone determines meaning. It seems to me that many of the moves that have been made in the debate about representationalism correspond to moves that were made in the debate over linguistic meaning post-russell, substituting linguistic meaning for phenomenal character. I shall mainly use Tye s theory as an example of standard representationalism, though non-reductive versions of representationalism also count as versions of standard representationalism insofar as they deal only with Russellian content. 2 Cf. Chalmers 2004b, p

7 Now to the objections. If inverted spectra are possible then unrestricted standard representationalism is immediately in trouble. On the face of it, in order to defend a view that was not restricted to individuals one would have to say that when two individuals visual spectra were inverted relative to one another only one of them could have veridical perceptions. This is certainly counterintuitive; if the two individuals were identical in other ways then it is hard to see what could make one perception veridical rather than the other. Moreover it would be hard for a standard representationalist to defend the view that no colour experiences are veridical, given their commitment to the wholly representational nature of experience. The possibility of inverted spectra that make no functional difference is controversial; materialists (myself included) typically do not accept that they are possible. The inverted spectrum objection does not, however, require inverted spectra that make no functional difference. This is best illustrated by Ned Block s (1990, 1995) Inverted Earth thought experiment. Inverted Earth is identical to Earth in every detail except that each Inverted Earth object has the complementary colour to its duplicate on Earth. On Inverted Earth the sky is yellow, ripe tomatoes are green and ripe bananas are blue. If you are wearing a blue hat then you have an Inverted Earth doppelgänger who is wearing a yellow hat, and so on. Now, suppose you were to travel to Inverted Earth but while you travelled colourinverting prisms were placed in your eyes, or perhaps your visual system was rewired such that each colour experience became the complementary colour experience. 3 Suppose that your own bodily colours were also exchanged for their complements. When you arrived on Inverted Earth your experiences would match 3 In later versions of his argument Block (e.g. 1995) has changed some of the details of the scenario in order to avoid some possible objections. For simplicity, since I find Block s argument convincing (with regard to standard representationalism) I shall gloss over this. I 7

8 the experiences you would have had in the corresponding spatiotemporal location on Earth. If you had been asleep during the journey you would not even be aware of being in a new environment. If this happened then it would seem natural to say that upon waking your perceptions would be illusory; the sky would look blue to you when really it was yellow. But if you remained in your inverted state on Inverted Earth for long enough then according to Block it would no longer seem reasonable to say that you would perceive incorrectly. 4 The content of your experiences would shift just as, arguably, the meaning of a word eventually shifts when it is consistently used in the presence of a new object, unbeknown to the speaker. What it took, in terms of phenomenal character, for you to correctly perceive blue would no longer be what it took for you to perceive blue in the past. Consequently it is possible for there to be experiences that differ in Russellian representational content but not in phenomenal character. Hence phenomenal character at most supervenes on Russellian representational content. Worse still, however, there can be experiences differing in phenomenal character that do not differ in Russellian representational content. Suppose that on Earth in your normal state you saw an unripe, green tomato. Years later on Inverted Earth, where ripe tomatoes are green, you saw a ripe tomato. In both cases your experience correctly represented the colour green. But the phenomenal character differed between the two experiences because of the colour inversion of your visual apparatus in the intervening period. Hence, since Russellian shall also make some small changes of my own for ease of exposition, but as far as I can tell nothing important is changed. 4 Inverted Earth is not at all like Kohler s (1961) experiments with spatially inverting goggles. In the latter case one might argue that when subjects learn to compensate for the goggles they return to their original functional organisation and there is then a question as to whether their experiences change along with their functional organisation. On Inverted Earth, by contrast, there is no change in the subject s functional organisation apart from the change initially effected by inserting colour-inverting prisms. 8

9 representational content and phenomenal character can vary independently of one another, even supervenience versions of standard representationalism are false. 5 Not all objections to standard representationalism are as effective as Inverted Earth. Tye (2002, 2003) shows how a number of objections regarding blurry images, after images, hallucinations, aspect switches and other phenomena can be dealt with. In my opinion these responses are largely convincing. But Inverted Earth strikes me as fatal to standard representationalism (as does another of Block s objections, discussed below). So if representationalism is to be saved a nonstandard version is required. 3. Functionalism and representation I shall now show why anyone who accepts even a minimally functionalist theory of phenomenal consciousness should reject standard representationalism. By a minimally functionalist theory I mean any view according to which in the actual world every phenomenal state of an individual has a functional correlate within that individual (i.e. the phenomenal state occurs when and only when the same functional state occurs). In subsequent sections I shall sometimes make the slightly stronger assumption that phenomenal character and functional role correlate across all individuals in all worlds nomologically equivalent to the actual world. In 5 Those who are prepared to assume that phenomenal character correlates with physical state can reach the same conclusion by supposing instead that Inverted-Earthlings are congenitally colour-inverted relative to Earthlings because they are born with colourinverting prisms or appropriate neural cross-wiring. One can then compare Earthling and Inverted-Earthling experiences. This avoids any controversy regarding the assumption that the representational content of the transported Earthling s experiences gradually shifts over time. Michael Tye (2000, pp ) resists Block s objections by trying to make it plausible that the transported Earthling continues to misperceive. I do not find this plausible; but Tye 9

10 fact I believe something still stronger to be true, but this is not needed here. Minimal functionalism involves no commitment to the view that phenomenal consciousness is reducible to functional role or that a specific functional organisation is metaphysically sufficient for consciousness. Even most property dualists count as functionalists in this minimal sense. Note that the minimal functionalism under consideration says nothing about propositional attitudes. In principle one could reject a functionalist account of propositional attitudes while accepting a close connection between phenomenal character and functional role, though one would of course have to explain how the two kinds of states interact. One standard way to capture the notion of a functional role is to use a formalisation derived from the Ramsey sentence of a psychological theory that relates mental states to one another and to inputs and outputs (Lewis 1972). Consider a subject S who has a set of internal states x1 xn whose causal roles in relation to one another and to sensory inputs I1 Im and motor outputs O1 Ok are captured by a theory T: 6 S is in mental state Mi x1 xn [T(x1 xn, I1 Im, O1 Ok) S( xi )] The strongest, materialist form of functionalism requires a strict biconditional; the most minimal version requires only a material biconditional. Now, consider a phenomenal state such as a visual sensation of the kind produced by the presence of a ripe tomato in front of the subject in normal lighting conditions. The functional correlate of this state is a member, xi, of the n-tuple of would also have to say that the congenitally colour-inverted Inverted Earthlings just described would misperceive colours throughout their lives. This seems even less plausible. 6 S(xi, xj ) should be read as S is in internal states xi, xj and S( xi ) should be read as S is in a set of internal states that includes xi. T is the conjunction of all statements of the form if S(x α, x β ) and input I γ occurs, there is a probability P that motor output O λ will be produced and that S s internal states will change so that S(x µ, x ν ). 10

11 internal states <x1 xn>. Crudely speaking, the Ramsey-Lewis formalisation above allows us to think of the functional role of this state as involving three components: an in component, an out component and a sideways component. The in component consists of the sensory inputs that typically cause the mental state and out component concerns the motor outputs typically caused by it. The sideways component consists of the typical causal interactions between xi and the other members of <x1 xn>. This is an oversimplification because the three components are not independent of one another; in particular the motor outputs to which an internal state contributes are typically the result of interaction between several different internal states. It is not an oversimplification, however, to say that in humans, at least, there are some internal states that can be thought of as standing at the end of an afferent (upward) pathway from a perceptual organ. In such cases the typical cause of the state can be specified without making reference to the way in which the state interacts with every other internal state in the system. It is not plausible that our brains are so radically Quinean as to make the causation of each internal state by external influences depend on interactions with every other part of the system. 7 The behavioural effects of xi must normally coordinate with sensory inputs in such a way as to allow S s actions to be guided by S s perceptions, but the manner in which this is achieved does not have to be specified in order to describe the afferent pathway leading to a perceptual state xi. 7 Consider for example the pathway from the eyes to the occipital cortex. Relevant pathways might extend beyond this (see below on indeterminacy regarding where the pathway ends). For the use of Quinean above, and for arguments in support of the claims made above see Fodor One does not have to accept very much of Fodor s modularity hypothesis to accept the very weak point relied upon here, which is just that there could be internal states with the same typical external causes but different internal functional roles. I take it that this would have some plausibility even without the Fodorian arguments. 11

12 We can now consider the representational content of xi. In what follows I shall assume that representation has close connections with the notion of information associated with Claude Shannon s (1948) work and brought to the attention of philosophers by Fred Dretske (1981). Crudely speaking, events of type A carry information about events of type B if and only if the occurrence of events of type A covaries with the occurrence of events of type B (this typically involves events of type B causing events of type A, though it does not have to). So, for example, the sound of a smoke alarm carries information about the presence of smoke because the alarm sounds when, and only when, there is smoke in the vicinity. The sound of the alarm thus carries the representational content that smoke is present. Attempts to define representation purely in terms of covariance are problematic, but I take it to be common ground among most theories of representation that covariance is at least an important factor in determining what a state represents. This is all I really need to assume. Even theories that deny this, however, such as causal chain theories, will probably turn out to be compatible with most of what I shall claim, though I shall not pursue this here. 8 I assume, then, that each member of <x1 xn> represents whatever it covaries with. Now, insofar as xi covaries with states of affairs external to the subject it will only be the in and out components of the causal role of xi (and only part of the 8 Notoriously a full account of representation in terms of information involves more than simple correlation because, for example, the smoke alarm might be reliably triggered by any number of conditions other than the presence of smoke, but which rarely obtain in the smoke alarm s actual environment. Some theories appeal to teleology to solve this problem (Millikan 1989, Dretske 1994). I hope, however, that I shall be permitted to side step these controversies in what follows. Propositional attitudes probably involve more than mere representation, but I do not offer an account of them here. Insofar as conscious perceptual content is conceptual there may also be further requirements; I make some general remarks below about how the general framework to be developed can incorporate more specific theories on such matters. For the most part, however, my interest here is in accounting for conscious states at a level of generality that captures only what is common to both conceptual and non-conceptual organisms. 12

13 latter) that determine this. If xi is typically caused by input Ij then xi represents the state of affairs associated with Ij, at least provided that S s behavioural outputs match up adequately with perceptions. So, for example, if xi is typically caused by the presence of a ripe tomato in front of the subject in normal lighting conditions then this is the state of affairs that xi represents, at least provided that S s resulting actions are directed, where appropriate, toward the tomato. But this fixes only part of the functional role of xi. The sideways component of the functional role, and part of the out component, could vary independently of the in component. That is to say, the fact that xi represents the tomato leaves open a great deal with regard to the interactions of xi with other internal states and the nature of the resulting actions. Two individuals could thus have internal states that differed in functional role yet represented the same states of affairs. Presumably it is the functional role of xi as a whole, and not just the in component, that correlates with phenomenal character; consequently phenomenal character can vary independently of Russellian representational content. Hence standard representationalism is false, given minimal functionalist assumptions. 4. Perspectival representationalism Sydney Shoemaker (2000) has defended a version of representationalism that avoids standard objections such as Inverted Earth. While Shoemaker s theory faces certain difficulties I shall suggest that a modified version of it, which I call perspectival representationalism, would be a step in the right direction. Although this theory is vulnerable to a further objection due to Block it is worth briefly examining it because diagonal representationalism can be thought of as a generalisation of it. 13

14 Shoemaker holds that experiences represent phenomenal properties of objects. A phenomenal property is a disposition to produce an experience of a certain kind in a certain kind of subject. Thus the representational content of a visual experience of a ripe tomato includes the property that the tomato has of being disposed to produce a certain sensation, phenomenal redness, in a certain kind of subject. But the experience of a subject whose visual spectrum is inverted represents a different phenomenal property such as the disposition that the tomato has to produce a different sensation, phenomenal greenness, in a subject of that particular kind. 9 An objection that has been raised to this type of account is that it suggests that colour experiences (for example) attribute properties other than colours to coloured objects (see Chalmers 2004b). An account in the same spirit as Shoemaker s can, however, avoid the problem. Consider Michael Tye s (2002) fairly widely accepted rebuttal of an objection to representationalism raised by Christopher Peacocke. Peacocke (1983) had noted that two qualitatively identical trees seen at different distances are represented as having identical properties yet the experiences of the two trees differ in phenomenal character. Tye points out that while the intrinsic properties of the trees are represented as being the same the trees are nonetheless represented as standing in different spatial relations to the subject. This explains the difference in the phenomenal characters of the two experiences. Tye s claim does not require the subject to be explicitly represented in the experience. The trees may be presented as possessing properties such as near and far which can be ascribed using one-place predicates even though they express two-place relations (the trees are near or far from the subject or the subject s location). 9 Andy Egan (forthcoming) puts forward a view that modifies Shoemaker s proposal by including an indexical element. His account also has a certain amount in common with Chalmers (2004) account (on which see below), though it does not involve modes of presentation. Egan s theory can be thought of as a version of perspectival representationalism, and seems to me to be subject to the problem described below. 14

15 This allows the subject to be an unarticulated constituent of the content of the experience. 10 The problem with Shoemaker s account is clear in spatial cases. One would have to say, about Peacocke s example, that the relevant phenomenal properties of the two trees were dispositions to produce certain experiences in certain subjects (those at certain relative locations). Thus one would not perceive the size of a tree but merely a phenomenal property that was systematically related to the size of the tree. This seems rather unintuitive. Shoemaker might perhaps argue that the subject would perceive the size of the tree by virtue of perceiving the relevant phenomenal property. But Tye s account of spatial perception, while closely related to Shoemaker s, seems better; the subject perceives the size of the tree but also perceives the spatial relation between the tree and the subject. Both components of the representational content combine to produce an experience with a certain phenomenal character; if either component were to change then the phenomenal character of the experience would change in a corresponding way. The principle behind Tye s view of spatial experience is that the world is viewed from a spatial perspective and this perspective itself contributes a component to the representational content of an experience. This principle could be generalised beyond the spatial case. Each subject has a set of causal powers including the subject s muscular powers and the causal powers of the set of internal (brain) states <x1 xn>. Think of this as locating the subject in a causal space whose axes measure various causal parameters (the precise details of this do not matter; I only intend it as an rough intuitive aid). Each perceptible property also has a location in causal space by virtue of the causal powers it bestows on an 10 For more details of the notion of the subject as an unarticulated constituent in spatial or temporal content see Prosser 2005 and forthcoming. Shoemaker (1994) endorses a similar idea with respect to predicates like heavy, as does John Campbell (1993, 1994). For general 15

16 object. To distinguish one property from another is to distinguish its location in causal space from those of other properties. An object with several causal properties is thus located along several dimensions of causal space. For simplicity let us consider just one property of an object. A subject whose visual experience represents an object as being red in effect represents the object as located in a certain position in causal space. But the subject also has a location in causal space and hence stands in a certain relation to the object within causal space. We can therefore generalise Tye s spatial account to say that the subject s experience of an object represents both the absolute position of the object within causal space and the relation in which it stands to the subject within causal space. The resulting view, perspectival representationalism, avoids many standard objections to representationalism including Inverted Earth. Consider an Earthling and an Inverted Earthling both observing a red object. I shall suppose from here on that Inverted Earthlings are congenitally colour-inverted relative to Earthlings due to being born with appropriate cross-wiring in their optic nerves. The Earthling and the Inverted Earthling stand in different positions in causal space because of the cross-wiring in the Inverted Earthling. Consequently, although the visual experiences of both subjects correctly represent the location of the red object in causal space the representational contents of their experiences also include their own relations to the object in causal space. These relations differ, and it is because of this difference in representational content that the phenomenal characters of the two experiences of the same red object differ. The situation is analogous to that of two people looking at the same tree from different positions in space. Similarly in the converse situation in which an Earthling looks at the sky on Earth and the Inverted Earthling looks at the sky on Inverted Earth, both beings have experiences apparatus for dealing with unarticulated constituents in thought as well as language see Perry (1986). 16

17 with the same phenomenal character despite different colours of sky being represented. This is because each of them stands in the same relation to their respective skies even though the absolute positions of the two skies and the two subjects in causal space are different. A further case helps illustrate the advantages of perspectival representationalism over standard representationalism. Consider a person called Maxi looking at a tree twice their height and at a distance equal to three times their height. Consider also a miniaturised doppelganger of Maxi in a miniaturised environment. Call this person Minnie. Minnie is looking at a tree twice Minnie s height and at a distance equal to three times Minnie s height. Now, how do Maxi and Minnie s visual experiences of their respective trees compare? And how would Maxi and Minnie perceive the same object? Would it seem bigger to Minnie than it would seem to Maxi, or would it seem the same size? Tye s view implies that if Maxi and Minnie s perceptions were veridical then if Maxi and Minnie perceived the same object at the same distance it would look the same because sameness of representational content yields sameness of phenomenal character. It would follow that Minnie s miniaturised tree looks smaller to Minnie than Maxi s normal-sized tree looks to Maxi. Yet this seems very counterintuitive. One would think that being miniaturised would make small things seem big and close things seem far away. 11 I think this presents a serious problem for Tye s response to Peacocke, as it stands, and consequently for Tye s view as a whole. One must, however, be a little careful here. Simply scaling everything down would not make Minnie s environment seem the same to Minnie in every respect 11 Hollywood seems to agree. See for example the 1957 film The Incredible Shrinking Man or the 1966 film Fantastic Voyage in which a submarine, complete with crew, is miniaturised and injected into the blood stream of a human being. These illustrate the common intuitions, whether or not those intuitions are true. 17

18 as Maxi s environment seems to Maxi. At a smaller scale things behave differently; some insects can carry droplets of water, or stand on the surface of a pond without getting wet. This is because of a difference in the causal powers of the environment relative to those of the creatures in question. When we think of Minnie being miniaturised we tend to think of Minnie s causal powers being miniaturised in a corresponding way. Something that is light for Maxi to lift is thus heavy for Minnie to lift. Similarly, something that is within easy reach for Maxi is a long walk away for Minnie. This has to do with causal powers rather than size per se. Consequently how far away something looks, or how big it looks, depends not only on the objective spatial distances involved but also on the subject s causal powers (by objective distance I mean distance as measured in terms of physical constants such as the speed of light). So when Maxi and Minnie look at the same tree from the same distance it looks different to them because it is small and close for Maxi (i.e. relative to Maxi s causal powers) while being big and far away for Minnie. As noted above, though, Maxi and Minnie need not be explicitly represented in their own perceptions in order to be constituents of the representational contents of their perceptions. What all this shows is that perspectival representationalism, which includes the subject s causal powers in the contents of experience, is better able to deal with the phenomenal character of an experience with a spatial component than all versions of standard representationalism including Tye s. The subject s behavioural dispositions are related to the represented causal perspective. The bitter taste of a natural poison includes a representation of the subject s causal relation to the poison; it is appropriate for the subject to avoid ingesting bitter tasting substances precisely because of the causal relation in which these substances stand to the subject. When one enjoys the taste of an artificial substance that is detrimental to one s health one has, in effect, misperceived its 18

19 causal relation to one s body; one s senses are fooled because they evolved in an environment in which such substances did not occur. A similar story may be true of the perception of colours and combinations of colours, whose natural role in indicating danger, nutrition and other important causal relations is well known. Despite the advantages of perspectival representationalism, however, it is vulnerable to an objection due to Ned Block (1995, p. 25). Block claims that there can be phenomenal character yet no representational content whatsoever. This, if correct, is fatal for both standard and perspectival representationalism even in their weaker forms. Block s scenario combines Davidson s (1987) swampman with the brain in a vat whose entire existence has been spent in the vat. Davidson held that the swampman, created instantaneously by chance from stray molecules, lacked representational content at the instant of creation because of its lack of causal relations to its environment. But this would only be correct given a causal chain theory of content; many other theories would allow that the swampman has representational content because the swampman s internal states could track states of its environment counterfactually. 12 Brains in vats also have representational contents. Most theories of content allow that the internal states of a brain in a vat represent features of the computer environment to which it is connected. But Block invites us to consider a brain created by chance, à la swampman, in a bathtub and not connected to a computer or anything else. Assuming that phenomenal states at least supervene on brain states the brain should have some kind of experience for a few fleeting moments. Yet since it is not and has never been connected to any perceptual apparatus its 12 By analogy, consider radiation alarms in a nuclear power stations. As a guard against malfunction these are designed to emit a regular tone and to fall silent only when there is radiation present. The tone carries the information that there is no radiation present even if the alarm has never been subjected to radiation. 19

20 internal states do not track states of its environment and consequently represent nothing. 5. Stalnaker s two-dimensional framework I must now digress a little in order to explain some relevant features of twodimensional modal semantics of the kind developed by Robert Stalnaker (1978, 2001, 2004). In this section I shall outline some important features of Stalnaker s theory as it applies to linguistic utterances and to beliefs. Then in the next section I shall show how the same apparatus can be applied to conscious experience. The resulting theory is what I call diagonal representationalism. Let W1 be the actual world, in which Le Corbusier was an architect. Let W2 be a world in which words mean what they do in the actual world but Le Corbusier became a comedian in a double act with Stan Laurel. Let W3 be just like the actual world except that in W3 Le Corbusier names Stan Laurel and architect means comedian. For simplicity, let those be all the worlds. The horizontal proposition expressed by an utterance is the set of worlds in which the utterance would be true given the meaning it has in the world in which it is uttered. This can be thought of as what is said by the utterance. So, for example, when Le Corbusier was an architect is uttered in W1 it is true. When uttered in W1 but evaluated relative to W2 it is false. When uttered in W1 but evaluated relative to W3 it is true because in W3 the very same person, Le Corbusier (or a modal counterpart if you prefer), was an architect despite not being named Le Corbusier. The horizontal proposition expressed by the utterance in W1 is therefore {W1, W3}, as represented by the two T (true) symbols in the first horizontal line of table 1. When the utterance occurs in W2 the same horizontal proposition is expressed but the utterance is false 20

21 relative to its own world. When the utterance occurs in W3, however, it expresses the same horizontal proposition that would be expressed by an utterance of Stan Laurel was a comedian in W1. In our example this is the necessary proposition {W1, W2, W3}, though the necessity comes about because we have considered only three worlds. World of evaluation W1 W2 W3 World of W1 T F T utterance W2 T F T W3 T T T Table 1 One of Stalnaker s key insights was to recognise the importance of the diagonal proposition. This is the set of worlds that we get if we look down the diagonal of the matrix of truth values from top-left to bottom-right and include all the worlds against which there is a T. The diagonal proposition for our example is therefore {W1, W3}. This is the set of ways that the world could be, given the assumption that the utterance is true as evaluated relative to the world in which it occurs. Given a larger set of worlds this would normally differ from any of the horizontal propositions associated with the utterance. Suppose that you hear an utterance of Le Corbusier was an architect but do not know who Le Corbusier was or what an architect is. There are many ways the world might be, for all you know. But if you 21

22 know that the utterance is true then you narrow down the possibilities. You might, for example, be in a world in which Le Corbusier refers to Stan Laurel, architect refers to a designer of buildings and Stan Laurel designed buildings but you cannot be in a world in which Le Corbusier refers to Le Corbusier, architect means comedian but Le Corbusier was not a comedian. In many cases, because we are not omniscient, the diagonal proposition captures a psychologically important component of the content of our utterances or beliefs. I shall suggest below that it also determines the phenomenal character of conscious experiences. Now consider utterances of Le Corbusier was an architect and Charles- Edouard Jeanneret was an architect. As a matter of fact Charles-Edouard Jeanneret was Le Corbusier s real name. What is said by both utterances is the same; they both express the same horizontal proposition. But because there are worlds in which the two names do not refer to the same person the diagonal propositions associated with the two utterances differ. The set of ways the world might be from the point of view of someone who knows only the truth of Le Corbusier was an architect is different from the set of ways the world might be from the point of view of someone who knows only the truth of Charles-Edouard Jeanneret was an architect. This explains why the two utterances differ in cognitive significance for someone who does not know that Le Corbusier was Charles-Edouard Jeanneret. Although we are sometimes aware of entertaining explicitly metalinguistic thoughts the explanation of differences of cognitive significance just given does not require this. Consider token beliefs, to which the same account applies. If one believes Le Corbusier was an architect the relevant diagonal proposition is that one s belief is true. But one need not have higher-order beliefs of which one is aware. One s belief concerns Le Corbusier, not the name Le Corbusier ; but this is consistent with the claim that the psychological role of one s belief depends on a 22

23 diagonal proposition that one only tacitly accepts (or rejects, if one disbelieves the horizontal proposition). The difference between ascribing architect-hood to someone qua Le Corbusier and ascribing it to them qua Charles-Edouard Jeanneret makes no difference to the horizontal proposition that one believes. It does, however, constitute a difference in the way in which one narrows down one s overall epistemic possibilities because there are worlds in which one belief token would be true while the other would be false due to a difference in the references of the names. The mere difference in the names themselves is all that is needed for this. 13 Another key feature of Stalnaker s framework is that in individuating an utterance across worlds no restriction need be placed on the way in which the truth value of the utterance, or the references of the terms that comprise it, are determined within a given world. Suppose that the extension of a term is determined by a descriptive condition (we need make no commitment to descriptive conditions; the assumption is just to illustrate a point). Suppose, for example, that in some worlds the extension architect is determined such that architects are designers of buildings whereas in other worlds its extension is determined such that architects are humorous entertainers. Stalnaker s account allows that utterances of architect in all these worlds can count as utterances of the same term. Only the word itself is held constant. This metasemantic account, as Stalnaker describes it, differs from the semantic accounts of other twodimensionalists including Chalmers. 14 Chalmers, as we shall see, individuates one 13 A more complex account may be needed when there are different tokens of the same generic name referring to different individuals. One way to deal with this would be to treat the tokens as tokens of different names that happen to be orthographically or phonetically identical. For elaboration of this idea see Kaplan See Stalnaker 2001, 2004 for the semantic/metasemantic distinction. A similar point is made in Stalnaker 1999, pp

24 dimension of content in terms of primary intensions, which can include descriptive contents. Although Stalnaker says relatively little about empty names or other empty terms his theory provides some useful apparatus for dealing with such cases. 15 This will be important when we come to consider hallucinatory conscious experiences. Let us use the symbol to mean no truth value. Consider another set of three worlds W1, W2, and W3, in which the same utterance occurs. Suppose that in world W1 a component of the utterance lacks a reference. When the utterance occurs in W1 it is neither true nor false when evaluated relative to W1 or any other world. The horizontal proposition expressed is the empty set. The set of worlds in which the utterance s negation is true is also the empty set; this distinguishes the utterance from one that expresses a necessary falsehood. The matrix of truth values is shown in table 2. World of evaluation W1 W2 W3 World of W1 utterance W2 T T F W3 F T F Table 2 15 Stalnaker (1999, pp. 92-5) does briefly discuss empty names in a discussion of negative existentials. Negative existential statements may, however, be a special case. It might be held, for example, that negative existential statements containing empty names are true (Stalnaker appears to hold this view). But it is not clear that other statements containing empty names would thereby have truth values. 24

25 Although an utterance in W1 expresses no horizontal content there is, however, a diagonal proposition provided that the utterance could have been true. If the term that fails to refer in W1 could have referred then the utterance would have been true or false in at least one world, had it occurred in that world. This is again illustrated in table 2; the utterance expresses a truth about W2 when it occurs in W2 and a falsehood about W3 when it occurs in W3. If these were all the worlds then the diagonal proposition would be {W2}. When, in W1, one acts on the belief state expressible by the utterance one manifests a tacit acceptance that the utterance is true. Hence it is a tacit acceptance of the diagonal proposition that accounts for one s actions. One acts, mistakenly, in a way that would be appropriate in any of the worlds in the diagonal proposition but without needing any further commitment to which of these worlds one inhabits. There are, however, some subtleties to be noted, especially when the twodimensional framework is applied to thoughts or, as I intend, conscious experiences. For all I have said it may appear that the diagonal proposition constitutes a kind of narrow content that is available regardless of the layout of the world external to the subject, in contrast to the externalistically individuated horizontal proposition. Notice, however, that the diagonal proposition is a set of worlds, just like the horizontal proposition. So the diagonal proposition really does capture a content in the same sense as the horizontal proposition; they are not different kinds of proposition but merely different propositions. I shall say a little more about narrow content and externalism below. Certain philosophers who hold radically externalist will reject the assumption that content that is available regardless of the existence or non-existence of objects external to the subject can be adequate for the purposes of psychological explanation. They may, for example, hold that psychological explanation makes reference to object-dependent de re senses that comprise object-dependent Fregean 25

Types of perceptual content

Types of perceptual content Types of perceptual content Jeff Speaks January 29, 2006 1 Objects vs. contents of perception......................... 1 2 Three views of content in the philosophy of language............... 2 3 Perceptual

More information

Naïve realism without disjunctivism about experience

Naïve realism without disjunctivism about experience Naïve realism without disjunctivism about experience Introduction Naïve realism regards the sensory experiences that subjects enjoy when perceiving (hereafter perceptual experiences) as being, in some

More information

Spectrum inversion as a challenge to intentionalism

Spectrum inversion as a challenge to intentionalism Spectrum inversion as a challenge to intentionalism phil 93515 Jeff Speaks April 18, 2007 1 Traditional cases of spectrum inversion Remember that minimal intentionalism is the claim that any two experiences

More information

6 Bodily Sensations as an Obstacle for Representationism

6 Bodily Sensations as an Obstacle for Representationism THIS PDF FILE FOR PROMOTIONAL USE ONLY 6 Bodily Sensations as an Obstacle for Representationism Representationism, 1 as I use the term, says that the phenomenal character of an experience just is its representational

More information

Perceptions and Hallucinations

Perceptions and Hallucinations Perceptions and Hallucinations The Matching View as a Plausible Theory of Perception Romi Rellum, 3673979 BA Thesis Philosophy Utrecht University April 19, 2013 Supervisor: Dr. Menno Lievers Table of contents

More information

Affect, perceptual experience, and disclosure

Affect, perceptual experience, and disclosure Philos Stud (2018) 175:2125 2144 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0951-0 Affect, perceptual experience, and disclosure Daniel Vanello 1 Published online: 21 July 2017 Ó The Author(s) 2017. This article

More information

The central and defining characteristic of thoughts is that they have objects. The object

The central and defining characteristic of thoughts is that they have objects. The object Tim Crane 2007. Penultimate version; final version forthcoming in Ansgar Beckermann and Brian McLaughlin (eds.) Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford University Press) Intentionalism Tim Crane,

More information

IS THE SENSE-DATA THEORY A REPRESENTATIONALIST THEORY? Fiona Macpherson

IS THE SENSE-DATA THEORY A REPRESENTATIONALIST THEORY? Fiona Macpherson . This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

More information

Reply to Stalnaker. Timothy Williamson. In Models and Reality, Robert Stalnaker responds to the tensions discerned in Modal Logic

Reply to Stalnaker. Timothy Williamson. In Models and Reality, Robert Stalnaker responds to the tensions discerned in Modal Logic 1 Reply to Stalnaker Timothy Williamson In Models and Reality, Robert Stalnaker responds to the tensions discerned in Modal Logic as Metaphysics between contingentism in modal metaphysics and the use of

More information

Conceptualism and Phenomenal Character

Conceptualism and Phenomenal Character Paper for TPA 2006 Conceptualism and Phenomenal Character Caleb Liang Department of Philosophy National Taiwan University October 5, 2006 What is the nature of perceptual experience? It is a common view

More information

In The Mind and the World Order, C.I. Lewis made a famous distinction between the

In The Mind and the World Order, C.I. Lewis made a famous distinction between the In Mind, Reason and Being in the World edited by Joseph Schear (Routledge 2013) The Given Tim Crane 1. The given, and the Myth of the Given In The Mind and the World Order, C.I. Lewis made a famous distinction

More information

Against Metaphysical Disjunctivism

Against Metaphysical Disjunctivism 32 Against Metaphysical Disjunctivism PASCAL LUDWIG AND EMILE THALABARD We first met the core ideas of disjunctivism through the teaching and writing of Pascal Engel 1. At the time, the view seemed to

More information

Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science

Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science ecs@macmillan.co.uk Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science Mental content, teleological theories of Reference code: 128 Ruth Garrett Millikan Professor of Philosophy University of Connecticut Philosophy Department

More information

24.500/Phil253 topics in philosophy of mind/perceptual experience

24.500/Phil253 topics in philosophy of mind/perceptual experience 24.500/Phil253 topics in philosophy of mind/perceptual experience session 8 24.500/Phil253 S07 1 plan leftovers: thought insertion Eden 24.500/Phil253 S07 2 classic thought insertion: a thought of x is

More information

Two-Dimensional Semantics the Basics

Two-Dimensional Semantics the Basics Christian Nimtz 2007 Universität Bielefeld unpublished (yet it has been widely circulated on the web Two-Dimensional Semantics the Basics Christian Nimtz cnimtz@uni-bielefeld.de Two-dimensional semantics

More information

This essay provides an overview of the debate concerning the admissible. contents of experience, together with an introduction to the papers in this

This essay provides an overview of the debate concerning the admissible. contents of experience, together with an introduction to the papers in this The Admissible Contents of Experience Fiona Macpherson This essay provides an overview of the debate concerning the admissible contents of experience, together with an introduction to the papers in this

More information

We know of the efforts of such philosophers as Frege and Husserl to undo the

We know of the efforts of such philosophers as Frege and Husserl to undo the In Defence of Psychologism (2012) Tim Crane We know of the efforts of such philosophers as Frege and Husserl to undo the psychologizing of logic (like Kant s undoing Hume s psychologizing of knowledge):

More information

A Higher-order, Dispositional Theory of Qualia. John O Dea. Abstract

A Higher-order, Dispositional Theory of Qualia. John O Dea. Abstract A Higher-order, Dispositional Theory of Qualia John O Dea Abstract Higher-order theories of consciousness, such as those of Armstrong, Rosenthal and Lycan, typically distinguish sharply between consciousness

More information

Perception and Mind-Dependence Lecture 3

Perception and Mind-Dependence Lecture 3 Perception and Mind-Dependence Lecture 3 1 This Week Goals: (a) To consider, and reject, the Sense-Datum Theorist s attempt to save Common-Sense Realism by making themselves Indirect Realists. (b) To undermine

More information

On Recanati s Mental Files

On Recanati s Mental Files November 18, 2013. Penultimate version. Final version forthcoming in Inquiry. On Recanati s Mental Files Dilip Ninan dilip.ninan@tufts.edu 1 Frege (1892) introduced us to the notion of a sense or a mode

More information

Review of Epistemic Modality

Review of Epistemic Modality Review of Epistemic Modality Malte Willer This is a long-anticipated collection of ten essays on epistemic modality by leading thinkers of the field, edited and introduced by Andy Egan and Brian Weatherson.

More information

Twentieth Excursus: Reference Magnets and the Grounds of Intentionality

Twentieth Excursus: Reference Magnets and the Grounds of Intentionality Twentieth Excursus: Reference Magnets and the Grounds of Intentionality David J. Chalmers A recently popular idea is that especially natural properties and entites serve as reference magnets. Expressions

More information

DON T PANIC: Tye s intentionalist theory of consciousness * Alex Byrne, MIT

DON T PANIC: Tye s intentionalist theory of consciousness * Alex Byrne, MIT Forthcoming in A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind symposium, http://www.uniroma3.it/kant/field/tyesymp.htm. DON T PANIC: Tye s intentionalist theory of consciousness * Alex Byrne, MIT Consciousness,

More information

The Problem of Perception

The Problem of Perception The Problem of Perception First published Tue Mar 8, 2005; substantive revision Fri Feb 4, 2011 Crane, Tim, "The Problem of Perception", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), Edward

More information

Ridgeview Publishing Company

Ridgeview Publishing Company Ridgeview Publishing Company Externalism, Naturalism and Method Author(s): Kirk A. Ludwig Source: Philosophical Issues, Vol. 4, Naturalism and Normativity (1993), pp. 250-264 Published by: Ridgeview Publishing

More information

Necessity in Kant; Subjective and Objective

Necessity in Kant; Subjective and Objective Necessity in Kant; Subjective and Objective DAVID T. LARSON University of Kansas Kant suggests that his contribution to philosophy is analogous to the contribution of Copernicus to astronomy each involves

More information

M. Chirimuuta s Adverbialism About Color. Anil Gupta University of Pittsburgh. I. Color Adverbialism

M. Chirimuuta s Adverbialism About Color. Anil Gupta University of Pittsburgh. I. Color Adverbialism M. Chirimuuta s Adverbialism About Color Anil Gupta University of Pittsburgh M. Chirimuuta s Outside Color is a rich and lovely book. I enjoyed reading it and benefitted from reflecting on its provocative

More information

Bas C. van Fraassen, Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective, Oxford University Press, 2008.

Bas C. van Fraassen, Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective, Oxford University Press, 2008. Bas C. van Fraassen, Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective, Oxford University Press, 2008. Reviewed by Christopher Pincock, Purdue University (pincock@purdue.edu) June 11, 2010 2556 words

More information

Faculty of Philosophy, University of Cambridge Part IB: Metaphysics & Epistemology

Faculty of Philosophy, University of Cambridge Part IB: Metaphysics & Epistemology Faculty of Philosophy, University of Cambridge Part IB: Metaphysics & Epistemology Perception and mind-dependence Reading List * = essential reading: ** = advanced or difficult 1. The problem of perception

More information

Naïve Realism, Hallucination, and Causation: A New Response to the Screening Off Problem

Naïve Realism, Hallucination, and Causation: A New Response to the Screening Off Problem Naïve Realism, Hallucination, and Causation: A New Response to the Screening Off Problem Alex Moran University of Cambridge, Queens College Penultimate Draft: Please Cite the published version ABSTRACT:

More information

Comments on Bence Nanay, Perceptual Content and the Content of Mental Imagery

Comments on Bence Nanay, Perceptual Content and the Content of Mental Imagery Comments on Bence Nanay, Perceptual Content and the Content of Mental Imagery Nick Wiltsher Fifth Online Consciousness Conference, Feb 15-Mar 1 2013 In Perceptual Content and the Content of Mental Imagery,

More information

Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. GONZALO RODRIGUEZ-PEREYRA. Oxford: Clarendon Press, Pp. xii, 238.

Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. GONZALO RODRIGUEZ-PEREYRA. Oxford: Clarendon Press, Pp. xii, 238. The final chapter of the book is devoted to the question of the epistemological status of holistic pragmatism itself. White thinks of it as a thesis, a statement that may have been originally a very generalized

More information

What Can Experimental Philosophy Do? David Chalmers

What Can Experimental Philosophy Do? David Chalmers What Can Experimental Philosophy Do? David Chalmers Cast of Characters X-Phi: Experimental Philosophy E-Phi: Empirical Philosophy A-Phi: Armchair Philosophy Challenges to Experimental Philosophy Empirical

More information

The Human Intellect: Aristotle s Conception of Νοῦς in his De Anima. Caleb Cohoe

The Human Intellect: Aristotle s Conception of Νοῦς in his De Anima. Caleb Cohoe The Human Intellect: Aristotle s Conception of Νοῦς in his De Anima Caleb Cohoe Caleb Cohoe 2 I. Introduction What is it to truly understand something? What do the activities of understanding that we engage

More information

What is Character? David Braun. University of Rochester. In "Demonstratives", David Kaplan argues that indexicals and other expressions have a

What is Character? David Braun. University of Rochester. In Demonstratives, David Kaplan argues that indexicals and other expressions have a Appeared in Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (1995), pp. 227-240. What is Character? David Braun University of Rochester In "Demonstratives", David Kaplan argues that indexicals and other expressions

More information

Naturalizing Phenomenology? Dretske on Qualia*

Naturalizing Phenomenology? Dretske on Qualia* Ronald McIntyre, Naturalizing Phenomenology? Dretske on Qualia, in Jean Petitot, et al., eds, Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science (Stanford: Stanford

More information

Scents and Sensibilia Clare Batty University of Kentucky

Scents and Sensibilia Clare Batty University of Kentucky American Philosophical Quarterly 47: 103-118. Scents and Sensibilia Clare Batty University of Kentucky Beauty is an ecstasy; it is as simple as hunger. There is really nothing to be said about it. It is

More information

Thomas Szanto: Bewusstsein, Intentionalität und mentale Repräsentation. Husserl und die analytische Philosophie des Geistes

Thomas Szanto: Bewusstsein, Intentionalität und mentale Repräsentation. Husserl und die analytische Philosophie des Geistes Husserl Stud (2014) 30:269 276 DOI 10.1007/s10743-014-9146-0 Thomas Szanto: Bewusstsein, Intentionalität und mentale Repräsentation. Husserl und die analytische Philosophie des Geistes De Gruyter, Berlin,

More information

Perceptual Demonstrative Thought: A Property-Dependent Theory

Perceptual Demonstrative Thought: A Property-Dependent Theory Topoi https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-017-9537-x Perceptual Demonstrative Thought: A Property-Dependent Theory Sean Crawford 1 The Author(s) 2018. This article is an open access publication Abstract The

More information

The red apple I am eating is sweet and juicy. LOCKE S EMPIRICAL THEORY OF COGNITION: THE THEORY OF IDEAS. Locke s way of ideas

The red apple I am eating is sweet and juicy. LOCKE S EMPIRICAL THEORY OF COGNITION: THE THEORY OF IDEAS. Locke s way of ideas LOCKE S EMPIRICAL THEORY OF COGNITION: THE THEORY OF IDEAS Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas; how comes it to be furnished? Whence comes

More information

1/6. The Anticipations of Perception

1/6. The Anticipations of Perception 1/6 The Anticipations of Perception The Anticipations of Perception treats the schematization of the category of quality and is the second of Kant s mathematical principles. As with the Axioms of Intuition,

More information

COLOUR FOR REPRESENTATIONALISTS

COLOUR FOR REPRESENTATIONALISTS Erkenntnis (2007) 66:169 185 Ó Springer 2007 DOI 10.1007/s10670-006-9031-0 COLOUR FOR REPRESENTATIONALISTS ABSTRACT. Redness is the property that makes things look red in normal circumstances. That seems

More information

CONTINGENCY AND TIME. Gal YEHEZKEL

CONTINGENCY AND TIME. Gal YEHEZKEL CONTINGENCY AND TIME Gal YEHEZKEL ABSTRACT: In this article I offer an explanation of the need for contingent propositions in language. I argue that contingent propositions are required if and only if

More information

NATURALIZING QUALIA. ALESSANDRA BUCCELLA University of Pittsburgh abstract

NATURALIZING QUALIA. ALESSANDRA BUCCELLA University of Pittsburgh abstract ALESSANDRA BUCCELLA University of Pittsburgh alb319@pitt.edu NATURALIZING QUALIA abstract Hill (2014) argues that perceptual qualia, i.e. the ways in which things look from a viewpoint, are physical properties

More information

Five Theses on De Re States and Attitudes* Tyler Burge

Five Theses on De Re States and Attitudes* Tyler Burge From The Philosophy of David Kaplan, Joseph Almog and Paolo Leonardi (eds), Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2009 Five Theses on De Re States and Attitudes* Tyler Burge I shall propose five theses on de

More information

By Tetsushi Hirano. PHENOMENOLOGY at the University College of Dublin on June 21 st 2013)

By Tetsushi Hirano. PHENOMENOLOGY at the University College of Dublin on June 21 st 2013) The Phenomenological Notion of Sense as Acquaintance with Background (Read at the Conference PHILOSOPHICAL REVOLUTIONS: PRAGMATISM, ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGY 1895-1935 at the University College

More information

dialectica The Place of Subjects in the Metaphysics of Material Objects

dialectica The Place of Subjects in the Metaphysics of Material Objects bs_bs_banner dialectica dialectica Vol. 69, N 4 (2015), pp. 473 490 DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12121 The Place of Subjects in the Metaphysics of Material Objects Thomas HOFWEBER Abstract An under-explored

More information

The identity theory of truth and the realm of reference: where Dodd goes wrong

The identity theory of truth and the realm of reference: where Dodd goes wrong identity theory of truth and the realm of reference 297 The identity theory of truth and the realm of reference: where Dodd goes wrong WILLIAM FISH AND CYNTHIA MACDONALD In On McDowell s identity conception

More information

There Are No Easy Problems of Consciousness 1

There Are No Easy Problems of Consciousness 1 There Are No Easy Problems of Consciousness 1 E. J. Lowe Department of Philosophy, University of Durham, Durham, UK This paper challenges David Chalmers proposed division of the problems of consciousness

More information

Semantic Externalism and Psychological Externalism. Åsa Wikforss Department of Philosophy Stockholm University

Semantic Externalism and Psychological Externalism. Åsa Wikforss Department of Philosophy Stockholm University Semantic Externalism and Psychological Externalism Åsa Wikforss Department of Philosophy Stockholm University asa.wikforss@philosophy.su.se Abstract Externalism is widely endorsed within contemporary philosophy

More information

Chudnoff on the Awareness of Abstract Objects 1

Chudnoff on the Awareness of Abstract Objects 1 Florida Philosophical Society Volume XVI, Issue 1, Winter 2016 105 Chudnoff on the Awareness of Abstract Objects 1 D. Gene Witmer, University of Florida Elijah Chudnoff s Intuition is a rich and systematic

More information

Book Reviews Department of Philosophy and Religion Appalachian State University 401 Academy Street Boone, NC USA

Book Reviews Department of Philosophy and Religion Appalachian State University 401 Academy Street Boone, NC USA Book Reviews 1187 My sympathy aside, some doubts remain. The example I have offered is rather simple, and one might hold that musical understanding should not discount the kind of structural hearing evinced

More information

THE METAPHYSICS OF INEFFABILITY

THE METAPHYSICS OF INEFFABILITY THE METAPHYSICS OF INEFFABILITY Silvia L. Y. N. Jonas BPhil Thesis in Philosophy delivered to the University of Oxford in Trinity Term 2010 Supervision: Professor A.W. Moore 1 Abstract The existence of

More information

Diachronic and synchronic unity

Diachronic and synchronic unity Philos Stud DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9865-z Diachronic and synchronic unity Oliver Rashbrook Ó Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012 Abstract There are two different varieties of question concerning

More information

WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF CHANGE? Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra Hertford College, Oxford

WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF CHANGE? Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra Hertford College, Oxford Published in in Real Metaphysics, ed. by H. Lillehammer and G. Rodriguez-Pereyra, Routledge, 2003, pp. 184-195. WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF CHANGE? Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra Hertford College,

More information

Conclusion. One way of characterizing the project Kant undertakes in the Critique of Pure Reason is by

Conclusion. One way of characterizing the project Kant undertakes in the Critique of Pure Reason is by Conclusion One way of characterizing the project Kant undertakes in the Critique of Pure Reason is by saying that he seeks to articulate a plausible conception of what it is to be a finite rational subject

More information

Approaches to Intentionality By William Lyons Clarendon Press, Pp ISBN

Approaches to Intentionality By William Lyons Clarendon Press, Pp ISBN 471 BOOK REVIEWS Approaches to Intentionality By William Lyons Clarendon Press, 1995. Pp. 261. ISBN 0-19-823526-7. 30.00 In this clearly written, informative book Lyons provides a critical survey of some

More information

Pictures, Perspective and Possibility 1

Pictures, Perspective and Possibility 1 1 Pictures, Perspective and Possibility 1 I Depictions, like thoughts and sentences, distinguish between different ways things might be; the Mona Lisa, for example, represents Lisa by distinguishing amongst

More information

THE PROPOSITIONAL CHALLENGE TO AESTHETICS

THE PROPOSITIONAL CHALLENGE TO AESTHETICS THE PROPOSITIONAL CHALLENGE TO AESTHETICS John Dilworth [British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (April 2008)]] It is generally accepted that Picasso might have used a different canvas as the vehicle for his

More information

FUNCTIONALISM AND THE QUALIA WARS. Ekai Txapartegi

FUNCTIONALISM AND THE QUALIA WARS. Ekai Txapartegi Abstracta 2 : 2 pp. 180 196, 2006 FUNCTIONALISM AND THE QUALIA WARS Ekai Txapartegi Abstract The debate concerning the reality of qualia has stagnated. The dominant functionalist approach to qualia concentrates

More information

Reviewed by Max Kölbel, ICREA at Universitat de Barcelona

Reviewed by Max Kölbel, ICREA at Universitat de Barcelona Review of John MacFarlane, Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and Its Applications, Oxford University Press, 2014, xv + 344 pp., 30.00, ISBN 978-0- 19-968275- 1. Reviewed by Max Kölbel, ICREA at Universitat

More information

Sensuous Experience, Phenomenal Presence, and Perceptual Availability. Click for updates

Sensuous Experience, Phenomenal Presence, and Perceptual Availability. Click for updates This article was downloaded by: [Christopher Frey] On: 13 February 2015, At: 22:00 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer

More information

Thesis-Defense Paper Project Phi 335 Epistemology Jared Bates, Winter 2014

Thesis-Defense Paper Project Phi 335 Epistemology Jared Bates, Winter 2014 Thesis-Defense Paper Project Phi 335 Epistemology Jared Bates, Winter 2014 In the thesis-defense paper, you are to take a position on some issue in the area of epistemic value that will require some additional

More information

CHAPTER 15. Five Theses on De Re States and Attitudes. Tyler Burge

CHAPTER 15. Five Theses on De Re States and Attitudes. Tyler Burge CHAPTER 15 Five Theses on De Re States and Attitudes Tyler Burge I shall propose five theses on de re states and attitudes.* To be a de re state or attitude is to bear a peculiarly direct epistemic and

More information

Image and Imagination

Image and Imagination * Budapest University of Technology and Economics Moholy-Nagy University of Art and Design, Budapest Abstract. Some argue that photographic and cinematic images are transparent ; we see objects through

More information

An Aristotelian Puzzle about Definition: Metaphysics VII.12 Alan Code

An Aristotelian Puzzle about Definition: Metaphysics VII.12 Alan Code An Aristotelian Puzzle about Definition: Metaphysics VII.12 Alan Code The aim of this paper is to explore and elaborate a puzzle about definition that Aristotle raises in a variety of forms in APo. II.6,

More information

Semantic Externalism and Psychological Externalism

Semantic Externalism and Psychological Externalism Philosophy Compass 3/1 (2008): 158 181, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00107.x Oxford, PHCO Philo 17 Blackw October 0158 18 Lo 107 10.1111/j.17 Semantic 2007 47 1??? g -9991 so & phy ell The UK 2007 Philo Externalism

More information

On Crane s Psychologistic Account of Intentionality

On Crane s Psychologistic Account of Intentionality Acta Anal https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-018-0342-y On Crane s Psychologistic Account of Intentionality Mohammad Saleh Zarepour 1 Received: 21 March 2017 / Accepted: 30 January 2018 # The Author(s) 2018.

More information

Varieties of Nominalism Predicate Nominalism The Nature of Classes Class Membership Determines Type Testing For Adequacy

Varieties of Nominalism Predicate Nominalism The Nature of Classes Class Membership Determines Type Testing For Adequacy METAPHYSICS UNIVERSALS - NOMINALISM LECTURE PROFESSOR JULIE YOO Varieties of Nominalism Predicate Nominalism The Nature of Classes Class Membership Determines Type Testing For Adequacy Primitivism Primitivist

More information

Exploring touch: A review of Matthew Fulkerson s The First Sense

Exploring touch: A review of Matthew Fulkerson s The First Sense Philosophical Psychology, 2015 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2015.1010197 REVIEW ESSAY Exploring touch: A review of Matthew Fulkerson s The First Sense Clare Batty The First Sense: A Philosophical

More information

Philosophy of sound, Ch. 1 (English translation)

Philosophy of sound, Ch. 1 (English translation) Philosophy of sound, Ch. 1 (English translation) Roberto Casati, Jérôme Dokic To cite this version: Roberto Casati, Jérôme Dokic. Philosophy of sound, Ch. 1 (English translation). R.Casati, J.Dokic. La

More information

Berkeley s idealism. Jeff Speaks phil October 30, 2018

Berkeley s idealism. Jeff Speaks phil October 30, 2018 Berkeley s idealism Jeff Speaks phil 30304 October 30, 2018 1 Idealism: the basic idea............................. 1 2 Berkeley s argument from perceptual relativity................ 1 2.1 The structure

More information

Truest Blue. Alex Byrne and David R. Hilbert. 1. The puzzle

Truest Blue. Alex Byrne and David R. Hilbert. 1. The puzzle draft 7/20/06 Truest Blue Alex Byrne and David R. Hilbert 1. The puzzle Physical objects are coloured: roses are red, violets are blue, and so forth. In particular, physical objects have fine-grained shades

More information

Sources of Immunity to Error through Misidentification

Sources of Immunity to Error through Misidentification In S. Prosser and F. Recanati (eds.) Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sources of Immunity to Error through Misidentification Simon Prosser

More information

A New Approach to the Paradox of Fiction Pete Faulconbridge

A New Approach to the Paradox of Fiction Pete Faulconbridge Stance Volume 4 2011 A New Approach to the Paradox of Fiction Pete Faulconbridge ABSTRACT: It seems that an intuitive characterization of our emotional engagement with fiction contains a paradox, which

More information

Philosophy of Science: The Pragmatic Alternative April 2017 Center for Philosophy of Science University of Pittsburgh ABSTRACTS

Philosophy of Science: The Pragmatic Alternative April 2017 Center for Philosophy of Science University of Pittsburgh ABSTRACTS Philosophy of Science: The Pragmatic Alternative 21-22 April 2017 Center for Philosophy of Science University of Pittsburgh Matthew Brown University of Texas at Dallas Title: A Pragmatist Logic of Scientific

More information

Ithaque : Revue de philosophie de l'université de Montréal

Ithaque : Revue de philosophie de l'université de Montréal Cet article a été téléchargé sur le site de la revue Ithaque : www.revueithaque.org Ithaque : Revue de philosophie de l'université de Montréal Pour plus de détails sur les dates de parution et comment

More information

Hill on mind. Alex Byrne 1. Abstract. Hill s views on visual experience are critically examined. Keywords

Hill on mind. Alex Byrne 1. Abstract. Hill s views on visual experience are critically examined. Keywords Philos Stud DOI 10.1007/s11098-015-0613-z Hill on mind Alex Byrne 1 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015 Abstract Keywords Hill s views on visual experience are critically examined. Chris Hill

More information

McDowell, Demonstrative Concepts, and Nonconceptual Representational Content Wayne Wright

McDowell, Demonstrative Concepts, and Nonconceptual Representational Content Wayne Wright Forthcoming in Disputatio McDowell, Demonstrative Concepts, and Nonconceptual Representational Content Wayne Wright In giving an account of the content of perceptual experience, several authors, including

More information

of perception, elaborated in his De Anima as an isomorphic motion of the soul. It will begin by

of perception, elaborated in his De Anima as an isomorphic motion of the soul. It will begin by This paper will aim to establish that the proper interpretation of Aristotle's epistemology is one of direct realism, rather than representationalism, by way of exploring Aristotle's doctrine of perception,

More information

observation and conceptual interpretation

observation and conceptual interpretation 1 observation and conceptual interpretation Most people will agree that observation and conceptual interpretation constitute two major ways through which human beings engage the world. Questions about

More information

PHI 3240: Philosophy of Art

PHI 3240: Philosophy of Art PHI 3240: Philosophy of Art Session 5 September 16 th, 2015 Malevich, Kasimir. (1916) Suprematist Composition. Gaut on Identifying Art Last class, we considered Noël Carroll s narrative approach to identifying

More information

Existential Cause & Individual Experience

Existential Cause & Individual Experience Existential Cause & Individual Experience 226 Article Steven E. Kaufman * ABSTRACT The idea that what we experience as physical-material reality is what's actually there is the flat Earth idea of our time.

More information

THESIS MIND AND WORLD IN KANT S THEORY OF SENSATION. Submitted by. Jessica Murski. Department of Philosophy

THESIS MIND AND WORLD IN KANT S THEORY OF SENSATION. Submitted by. Jessica Murski. Department of Philosophy THESIS MIND AND WORLD IN KANT S THEORY OF SENSATION Submitted by Jessica Murski Department of Philosophy In partial fulfillment of the requirements For the Degree of Master of Arts Colorado State University

More information

PHL 317K 1 Fall 2017 Overview of Weeks 1 5

PHL 317K 1 Fall 2017 Overview of Weeks 1 5 PHL 317K 1 Fall 2017 Overview of Weeks 1 5 We officially started the class by discussing the fact/opinion distinction and reviewing some important philosophical tools. A critical look at the fact/opinion

More information

Mental Representations: the New Sense-Data? Chuck Stieg Department of Philosophy University of Minnesota. Abstract

Mental Representations: the New Sense-Data? Chuck Stieg Department of Philosophy University of Minnesota. Abstract Mental Representations: the New Sense-Data? Chuck Stieg Department of Philosophy University of Minnesota Abstract The notion of representation has become ubiquitous throughout cognitive psychology, cognitive

More information

1/8. The Third Paralogism and the Transcendental Unity of Apperception

1/8. The Third Paralogism and the Transcendental Unity of Apperception 1/8 The Third Paralogism and the Transcendental Unity of Apperception This week we are focusing only on the 3 rd of Kant s Paralogisms. Despite the fact that this Paralogism is probably the shortest of

More information

1. What is Phenomenology?

1. What is Phenomenology? 1. What is Phenomenology? Introduction Course Outline The Phenomenology of Perception Husserl and Phenomenology Merleau-Ponty Neurophenomenology Email: ka519@york.ac.uk Web: http://www-users.york.ac.uk/~ka519

More information

MODES OF PRESENTATION AND WAYS OF APPEARING: A CRITICAL REVISION OF EVANS S ACCOUNT*

MODES OF PRESENTATION AND WAYS OF APPEARING: A CRITICAL REVISION OF EVANS S ACCOUNT* ELISABETTA SACCHI Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Milan sacchi.elisabetta@unisr.it MODES OF PRESENTATION AND WAYS OF APPEARING: A CRITICAL REVISION OF EVANS S ACCOUNT* abstract There are many ways

More information

The Strengths and Weaknesses of Frege's Critique of Locke By Tony Walton

The Strengths and Weaknesses of Frege's Critique of Locke By Tony Walton The Strengths and Weaknesses of Frege's Critique of Locke By Tony Walton This essay will explore a number of issues raised by the approaches to the philosophy of language offered by Locke and Frege. This

More information

WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND METAPHYSICS

WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND METAPHYSICS WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND METAPHYSICS WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND METAPHYSICS AN INTRODUCTION TO HIS THOUGHT by WOLFE MAYS II MARTINUS NIJHOFF / THE HAGUE / 1977 FOR LAURENCE 1977

More information

Visual Acquaintance, Action & The Explanatory Gap

Visual Acquaintance, Action & The Explanatory Gap [[Forthcoming in Synthese this is an uncorrected draft, so please don t quote from or circulate this version!]] Visual Acquaintance, Action & The Explanatory Gap Thomas Raleigh, Ruhr University Bochum

More information

On the Analogy between Cognitive Representation and Truth

On the Analogy between Cognitive Representation and Truth On the Analogy between Cognitive Representation and Truth Mauricio SUÁREZ and Albert SOLÉ BIBLID [0495-4548 (2006) 21: 55; pp. 39-48] ABSTRACT: In this paper we claim that the notion of cognitive representation

More information

A PRACTICAL DISTINCTION IN VALUE THEORY: QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE ACCOUNTS. Galen A. Foresman. A Dissertation

A PRACTICAL DISTINCTION IN VALUE THEORY: QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE ACCOUNTS. Galen A. Foresman. A Dissertation A PRACTICAL DISTINCTION IN VALUE THEORY: QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE ACCOUNTS Galen A. Foresman A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment

More information

Indexical Concepts and Compositionality

Indexical Concepts and Compositionality Indexical Concepts and Compositionality François Recanati To cite this version: François Recanati. Indexical Concepts and Compositionality. Josep Macia. Two-Dimensionalism, Oxford University Press, 2003.

More information

Volume 59 Number 236 July 2009

Volume 59 Number 236 July 2009 Volume 59 Number 236 July 2009 CONTENTS SYMPOSIUM ON THE ADMISSIBLE CONTENTS OF PERCEPTION Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content Tim Bayne 385 Seeing Causings and Hearing Gestures S. Butterfill

More information

Truth and Tropes. by Keith Lehrer and Joseph Tolliver

Truth and Tropes. by Keith Lehrer and Joseph Tolliver Truth and Tropes by Keith Lehrer and Joseph Tolliver Trope theory has been focused on the metaphysics of a theory of tropes that eliminates the need for appeal to universals or properties. This has naturally

More information

CRITICAL STUDY O SHAUGHNESSY S CONSCIOUSNESS

CRITICAL STUDY O SHAUGHNESSY S CONSCIOUSNESS The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 51, No. 205 October 2001 ISSN 0031 8094Y CRITICAL STUDY O SHAUGHNESSY S CONSCIOUSNESS BY A.D. SMITH Consciousness and the World. BY BRIAN O SHAUGHNESSY. (Oxford: Clarendon

More information

Steven E. Kaufman * Key Words: existential mechanics, reality, experience, relation of existence, structure of reality. Overview

Steven E. Kaufman * Key Words: existential mechanics, reality, experience, relation of existence, structure of reality. Overview November 2011 Vol. 2 Issue 9 pp. 1299-1314 Article Introduction to Existential Mechanics: How the Relations of to Itself Create the Structure of Steven E. Kaufman * ABSTRACT This article presents a general

More information

In his essay "Of the Standard of Taste," Hume describes an apparent conflict between two

In his essay Of the Standard of Taste, Hume describes an apparent conflict between two Aesthetic Judgment and Perceptual Normativity HANNAH GINSBORG University of California, Berkeley, U.S.A. Abstract: I draw a connection between the question, raised by Hume and Kant, of how aesthetic judgments

More information