Advanced English for Scholarly Writing

Transcription

1 Advanced English for Scholarly Writing The Nature of the Class: Introduction to the Class and Subject This course is designed to improve the skills of students in writing academic works using the English language. All aspects of the writing and publishing of scholarly works are covered. In addition, a great deal of time is spent in discussing important, common pitfalls in scholarly writing and thinking, including shortcomings in logic, banalities, plagiarism, style, statistical reasoning, fallacies, and rhetoric. The course is divided evenly between such things as (i) good English usage, the appropriate outlining of papers, footnoting, graphs, resources, use of the internet, statistical presentations, as well as other elements of style, and (ii) proper reasoning, the limits of research, poor scholarship, scientific methodology, and examples of outstanding research, etc. Beyond the requirement of a written midterm exam and numerous class discussions, students must produce a final paper that incorporates many of the things learned in the class on a topic of interest to themselves and the instructor. The topic, which must be scholarly in nature, must receive approval by the instructor and must be the student's own work. The final paper is to be written in English (roughly 15 pages in length) including an abstract, and reference page. The Nature of the Subject: To best understand the subject one must first ask why scholarly research exists at all. What is the purpose of producing scholarly works? What makes an article in the American Economic Review different from an editorial in the New York Times? These questions make us probe the theory of knowledge and ask whether it makes sense to talk about ultimate truth and the role of

2 consensus in academia. It forces us to confront the question of what is an appropriate methodology for academic studies. How can we convince our peers that what we are saying is true? Even an objective subject such as physics was found in the 1920s to have a foundation (i.e. quantum electrodynamics) which was beyond our ability to explain in simple terms using common sense. Einstein showed at the beginning of the 20 th century that our basic notions of space and time which Newton and Kant both felt were absolutely rock solid and intuitive were in fact an illusion. Are we likely to fare any better in the wildly changing world of social science? Is history and political science any simpler than physics and chemistry? Is our goal to describe reality truthfully and faithfully? Is that even possible? Or, are we to develop models of the world that help us to predict phenomena well, but which have assumptions that are patently false? Do statistics help us to understand reality, or is reality changing so quickly that past statistics are useless in helping us to understand the world today? How can we analyze society, if it is constantly changing like the clouds in the sky? Richard Feynman had some pretty harsh things to say about social science. Here is one video of him talking about how that social science is really only a pseudo-science. Feynman was someone who looked at the world saw its complexity and was amazed and excited by it. It is the spirit of all scholars in all disciplines. It is the spirit we need to nurture in ourselves. Here he is again talking about the peculiar nature of light.

3 Despite Feynman's clear understanding of scientific methodology, was he mistaken about the nature of social science. To answer this we can look at what John Maynard Keynes wrote during the 1920s and 1930s about economics. What he says is particularly relevant to all social science, including political science, history, etc. Keynes on the Subject of Economics (Introduction to Cambridge Handbook on Supply and Demand) Introduction THE Theory of Economics does not furnish a body of settled conclusions immediately applicable to policy. It is a method rather than a doctrine, an apparatus of the mind, a technique of thinking, which helps its possessor to draw correct conclusions. It is not difficult in the sense in which mathematical and scientific techniques are difficult; but the fact that its modes of expression are much less precise than these, renders decidedly difficult the task of conveying it correctly to the minds of learners. Before Adam Smith this apparatus of thought scarcely existed. Between his time and this it has been steadily enlarged and improved. Nor is there any branch of knowledge in the formation of which Englishmen can claim a more predominant part. It is not complete yet, but important improvements in its elements are becoming rare. The main task of the professional economist now consists, either in obtaining a wide knowledge of relevant facts and exercising skill in the application of economic principles to them, or in expounding the elements of his method in a lucid, accurate and illuminating way, so that, through his

4 instruction, the number of those who can think for themselves may be increased. In addition, here is part of a letter written to his friend Roy Harrod in July 1938 My dear Roy, It seems to me that economics is a branch of logic, a way of thinking; and that you do not repel sufficiently firmly attempts à la Schultz to turn it into a pseudo-natural-science. One can make some quite worthwhile progress merely by using your axioms and maxims. But one cannot get very far except by devising new and improved models. This requires, as you say, "a vigilant observation of the actual working of our system". Progress in economics consists almost entirely in a progressive improvement in the choice of models. The grave fault of the later classical school, exemplified by Pigou, has been to overwork a too simple or out of date model, and in not seeing that progress lay in improving the model; whilst Marshall often confused his models, for the devising of which he had great genius, by wanting to be realistic and by being unnecessarily ashamed of lean and abstract outlines. But it is of the essence of a model that one does not fill in real values for the variable functions. To do so would make it useless as a model. For as soon as this is done, the model loses its generality and its value as a mode of thought. That is why Clapham with his empty boxes was barking up the wrong tree and why Schultz's results, if he ever gets any, are not very interesting (for we know beforehand that they will not be applicable to future cases). The object of statistical study is not so much

5 to fill in missing variables with a view to prediction, as to test the relevance and validity of the model. Economics is a science of thinking in terms of models joined to the art of choosing models which are relevant to the contemporary world. It is compelled to be this, because, unlike the typical natural science, the material to which it is applied is, in too many respects, not homogeneous through time. The object of a model is to segregate the semi-permanent or relatively constant factors from those which are transitory or fluctuating so as to develop a logical way of thinking about the latter, and of understanding the time sequences to which they give rise in particular cases. Good economists are scarce because the gift for using "vigilant observation" to choose good models, although it does not require a highly specialised intellectual technique, appears to be a very rare one. In the second place, as against Robbins, economics is essentially a moral science and not a natural science. That is to say, it employs introspection and judgments of value. Yours ever, J M Keynes Exercise: After reading these two pieces by Keynes, explain what he was trying to say and apply it to your own field of study.