European Journal of Sport Science, vol. 3, issue by Human Kinetics Publishers and the European College of Sport Science.

Transcription

1 European Journal of Sport Science, vol. 3, issue by Human Kinetics Publishers and the European College of Sport Science Sport Is Art / 1 Sport Is Art Dimitris Platchias I here attempt to show that sport can legitimately be regarded as art. Both art and sport appear to be open concepts in that they are unamenable to an absolute definition. This is not though to mean that we are not allowed at all to speak about certain characteristics that both concepts possess, in that otherwise, everything could be art or everything could be sport. My discussion then, in an attempt to reveal their relation, or how close is the intimacy between them and therefore to explore the possibility of whether sport can be legitimately regarded as art, is in terms of similarities and common characteristics. One may find innumerable similarities or common features between them, such as institutionalization, or the fact that both art and sport can be performed on stages, or arenas, presented for a public and so forth. However, my inquiry here focuses on an attempt to discern the most important or central (as opposed to peripheral) characteristics that both concepts possess, in a task where finding these characteristics would enable one plausibly to assert that sport can be regarded as a form of art. I have concentrated on demonstrating main common characteristics between these two concepts with respect to the nature of sport, to the aesthetic and to the artistic, which I believe enable me to make such a contention. Moreover, my discussion focuses on David Best s misconceived distinction between purposive and aesthetic sports in relation to Immanuel Kant s considerations of beauty in the arts. Key Words: philosophy, art, sport, aesthetics Key Points: 1. The aesthetic is central to both aesthetic and purposive sports. The intention to create beautiful objects or to give aesthetic pleasure is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for something to be art. 2. Best s distinction between purposive and aesthetic sports is misconceived. The purposive sports are artistically superior and indeed more similar to great works of art. 3. Best s distinction and Immanuel Kant s considerations of beauty in the arts is the starting point of my attempt to show that sport, besides sharing main common characteristics with art as regards its nature and the aesthetic, can be considered a form of art. 4. Finally (and what the aim of the present enquiry is), sport, as achieving a substantial part of resemblance, can be fully accepted and established within the arts. The author is currently pursuing his doctoral degree in Philosophy at the University of Glasgow, Oakfield Avenue, Glasgow G12 8QQ, UK. 1

2 2 / Platchias Introduction The aim of the present inquiry is to show that sport can legitimately be regarded as art. What I wish to accomplish here is to illustrate how the main objections to the claim that sport is an art form fail, and moreover to demonstrate the main common characteristics between these two concepts with respect to the nature of sport, to the aesthetic and to the artistic which will enable me plausibly enough to make such a contention. It appears though necessary that if one is to get involved in an endeavor to compare two concepts one must have an understanding of these concepts. It is therefore important to give an outline of these concepts in an attempt to provide a clearer picture. Both art and sport appear to be open concepts in that they are unamenable to an absolute definition. A task of providing a set of necessary or sufficient conditions for both so that we could absolutely give a certain account of defining properties appears impossible. I ll briefly state my views. In the case of art, most writers in the field follow mainly three lines as regards the endeavor of grasping its concept. The essentialist attempts, such as formalism, the mimetic theory, expressionism, and so forth, are proved not to be plausible enough to define art, in that there will always be some or other neglected property, or there will always be shown that they are inadequate to face all counterexamples (not to say that their definition is sometimes even more obscure than that which is being defined). By contrast, relativistic theories claim that there is no such thing as a defining property that will enable one to discern art from non-art that is, there is no property common to all works of art. The Wittgensteinian approach of family resemblances, appealing to games, claims that some games resemble others in some respects, but there is no such thing as a common property to all 1. There is however a claim that a work of art must have some or other evaluative use 2. Before I proceed with the notion of an open concept, I shall refer to the revisionary approach. First of all, the revisionary approach, which defines art in terms of the social or historical context that an object finds itself, must provide a rationale to explain how certain works of art have managed to be considered great (e.g., Homer s or Shakespeare s works) throughout different cultures and historical contexts. In general, employing the notion of an institution in such a way as to make implicit or to claim that institutionalizing is a necessary component of the nature of both sport 3 and art is highly contentious, and I believe incorrect. The institutional theory of art holds that artifacts can legitimately be called artworks, because they occupy a certain position in a certain institution, an established practice, namely the artworld 4. Considering Dickie s institutional theory of art, an object can be regarded as art if and only if a member of the artworld confers upon it arthood. Thus, a member of the artworld can arbitrarily christen any object (an artifact) as a work of art, and this christening is what establishes that the object in question is art. However, every work of art must have some or other evaluative use, and this is something that the institutional theory of art does not take into account. In fact, an object may be christened as art even when it has no evaluative use whatsoever. What we have in this case is a conferring of arthood upon a certain object, but what we don t have however is the reason for this conferring and also no grasp of the concept of art or any understanding of this concept. There is no specification of the notion of appreciation of art, no suggested guidelines for this appreciation, and therefore no understanding of its concept. What is more, institutionalism does not even provide a basis of what is to distinguish one institution from another. That is to

3 Sport Is Art / 3 say, it does not provide a rationale of what it is that makes the institution of art, namely the artworld, a distinctive cultural practice from say, the sportworld or other established practices. Institutionalization cannot be a necessary component of the nature of art. Similarly, in the case of sport, if members of the sportworld (an established practice with respect to sport) confer sporthood upon a certain activity, this would not give us any reason to consider that this institutionalization of the activity is a necessary component of its nature. Hence, a task of providing a set of necessary or sufficient conditions for art (this also holds for sport) so that we can absolutely give a certain account of defining properties appears impossible. As in the case of art, sport appears to be an open concept that is unamenable to an absolute definition. However, this is not to mean that we are not allowed at all to speak about certain characteristics that both concepts possess in that otherwise everything could be art or everything could be sport 5. Thus, our discussion with respect to sport and art has to be in terms of certain similarities or characteristics that these two concepts possess and in finding parallels between them in such a way that the exploration of these concepts enables us plausibly to assert that the nature (with as much clarity and precision as we are allowed to talk of it) of forms of art and sport is that similar, or their degree of intimacy is that strong (in terms of these characteristics) that it can allow us to legitimately regard sport as art. My purpose here is to argue that sport can be fully accepted and established within the arts, having achieved a substantial resemblance, and not to discuss the nature of these concepts in an attempt to identify a sufficient number of defining properties that may define this nature. Now to the discussion. The claim that sport is an art form has been misapprehended. Many commentators have thought that by establishing a claim that sports do have an aesthetic aspect (and in some cases, even in a trivial sense) can be regarded as an art form. That is, these commentators equate the aesthetic with the artistic in thinking that an intimacy between sport and the aesthetic would suffice for sport to be regarded as art. It is evident though that there is a distinction between the aesthetic and the artistic in that the aesthetic applies, for instance, to sunsets, people, and so forth. Thus, even if one manages to show that the aesthetic in sport is central, one must also provide an account as regards the artistic. Generally, the source of criticism against the claim that the aesthetic can be central to sport is more or less the same. Commentators employ the same or almost the same structure in their line of argumentation. David Best s (2) position, though, is an exemplary case in that it expresses more accurately the above thesis, the main elements of which are: Whereas the aesthetic is a non-purposive concept, sports by contrast with art, does have a purpose or aim. The purpose or aim of sports is extrinsic and can be identified independently of the manner in which it is achieved, whereas in the case of art or, more generally, where the aesthetic is concerned, the distinction between means and ends is inapplicable. Whereas in art, there can only be one way to accomplish an end because there is no independent specifiable end (a purpose independent from the activity itself), and thus it cannot be the case that there could be equally effective alternative means for the same end in the case of sport (in the case of a functional object), there can be many different ways or equally effective

4 4 / Platchias alternative means to accomplish an end. Let me add another point to Best s: The participants lack intention to be elegant or graceful and thus are unable to use more appropriate means to give aesthetic pleasure. However, these points do not hold (at least not all of them), as Best claims, against all sports. At this point, Best makes his well-known/-accepted distinction between non-purposive or aesthetic and purposive sports. Thus, Best calls sports such as gymnastics, figure skating, and diving aesthetic or non-purposive sports, since they are similar to the arts in that their purpose cannot be considered apart from the manner of achieving it and calls sports such as football, climbing, and track and field events purposive since, in these sports, the purpose can be specified independently of the manner of achieving it, as long as it conforms to the limits set by the rules or norms (2: p. 380). Consequently, the aesthetic sports are similar to the arts in that there is no distinction between means and ends that is, there cannot be an end identifiable apart from the means (the means are the ends) whereas in the purposive sports, there is a distinction between means and ends. According to Best, in the case of the aesthetic sports, similar to the arts, the purpose of an activity is inseparably bound up with the manner in which the activity is performed, which means that the purpose is intrinsic to the activity 6 (it cannot be identified apart from the way it is accomplished), whereas in the case of the purposive sports, there is an extrinsic purpose (it can be identified apart from the way it is accomplished). The Nature of Sport Best holds that there is still a gap between the aesthetic sports and the arts. To proceed here, it is important to appeal to another distinction that bears an obvious resemblance to Best s distinction between aesthetic and purposive sports. The distinction I refer to is Bernard Suits distinction between judged performances and refereed games. His pithy definition of a game is the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles (17: p. 55). Constitutive rules or the rules that proscribe more efficient means in favour of less efficient ones (17: p. 55) are, for Suits, the crux of games, and it is that which differentiates refereed games from judged performances, where the crux of the matter is the approximation of the postulated ideals. Thus, games have constitutive rules, whereas performances have rules of skills or tactical rules. Suits example for a constitutive rule is the offside rule in football that is, there are referees, who ensure the compliance of the participants with such rules (as the offside rule) by imposing penalties when they are not followed. It is far from clear, though, that the fact that the gymnast must not falter or stumble after dismounting from the parallel bars (in using Suits example) is just a rule of skill or a tactical rule. That is to say, if the athlete fails to perform the task at hand, the judges impose penalties; in any case the athlete fails to follow such rules, the judges detract points from his or her score, and there is a specific detraction of points with respect to the failure of completing a specific move. Now, all other apparatus events, such as the flying rings, the uneven bars, and so forth seem also to demonstrate this limiting characteristic namely, a deliberative choice of inefficient means to accomplish the task at hand 7. In short, similar considerations with

5 Sport Is Art / 5 respect to other performances, such as diving and ice-skating, lead one to the same conjecture. Whereas it is not hard to see that judged performances, besides the concern of approximating postulated ideals, do have constitutive rules, it is of interest to explore the possibility of finding a parallel in art. It might be objected that this central characteristic of games cannot be found in art. That is, there are no rules in art, or even if there are rules, such as a way of instantiating the perfection of a concept or the perfection of an ideal, they are only contingently so that is, there are no constitutive rules or a complex series of imposed rules specifically limiting the means acceptable to attain the required goals, at least not by definition. If the athlete in the floor event in gymnastics steps beyond the boundary line, this necessarily (that is, by definition) elicits score reductions, whereas in art (even in the performing arts, such as dance, where there are such lines), this is only contingently so. Elements in art, such as improvisation and creativity, even in the case of a dancer stepping beyond the boundary line, may indeed make the dancer s performance more worthy of praise. Although admittedly, this is a difficult case, it is not a decisive one. Employing the type-token 8 distinction, one can plausibly claim that if a specific type is art (e.g., a certain notation in music), then every proper instance of this type that is to say, every proper token is also art. It can be plausibly asserted that the token which is instantiated by the performance of a certain notation by an artist in a violin competition is the same, with the performance of the same notation by the same artist, who in this case is a member of, say, the Vienna Symphony Orchestra and performing a concert. The fact that the token is performed in a different context does not differentiate its essence. Even if improvisation and creativity are missing from both instances that is, from both tokens as such it is not necessary or sufficient to possess these elements as the type-token distinction shows. A work of art may just be the instantiation of a specific type, as the most instances in the performing arts show, where the specifiable end of each performance is reached only by means of the perfection of a concept (or ideal) or the achievement of a function where elements such as improvisation and creativity (which would surely make them more worthy of praise) are totally absent. It might be objected, though, that regarding the two tokens (which occur in a violin competition and in a concert, respectively), there is a difference with respect to their specifiable ends that is, winning the first prize in the violin competition. However, this does not differentiate these tokens in any essential respect: The intention of the artist (to give aesthetic pleasure or to create/make art or just to win) is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for establishing an object as art. These purposes are extrinsic to art as such. (I discuss this point later.) As David Best claims, in art the end cannot be identified apart from the manner of achieving it.... The end is inseparable from the means of achieving it (2: p. 379). In each case, the manner of reaching the specifiable end 9 is the same and, moreover (respecting the specifiable ends), one should expect that the artist in question would exercise the same amount of effort in each case; the fact that he wants to win the first prize in the competition does not mean that his performance in the Vienna Symphony Orchestra will be less admirable.

6 6 / Platchias Thus, being the same token in each case, both instances can be regarded as works of art. (It would be unlikely for one to deny that a performance of Bach s partite No. 1 in a violin competition is a work of art.) Now the violin competition can be regarded as a judged performance in that it has all the characteristics that a judged performance requires to be called that. Thus, participants are involved with a required high level of physical skills, aiming to win, performing a certain task-routine in trying to approximate postulated ideals, and judges give marks to them on the basis of the degree of approximation of the postulated ideal. It is therefore plain that, as in the case of other judged performances (sport activities such as gymnastics, diving, and ice-skating), in the case of the violin competition, there are constitutive rules. Each time the participant fails to complete an accurate instantiation of parts of the certain notation, however nice and creative this deviation sounds or however more expressive it sounds in regard to what the content of the particular instantiation expresses, because of the incorporated restrictions, this would not give him more credits or make his performance more worthy of praise; necessarily, by definition, it will lead to a certain detraction of points. In regard now to the two tokens stated above, a possible difference could only be this deviation; whereas in the case of the concert the deviation could raise the standard of the performance, in the case of the competition it will necessarily detract from the standard of the performance. Each time the participant fails to perform a particular notation with the exact manner (with maximum accuracy), points are detracted from his score, and there is a specific detraction with respect to each failure. The Aesthetic in Sport As mentioned, Best holds that there is still a gap between the aesthetic sports and the arts. There is no complete identification because, as he claims, there is still an externally specifiable aim even though, for instance, it is impossible entirely to specify what the gymnast is trying to achieve apart from the way in which he tries to achieve it (2: pp ). To support this claim, the only argument he submits is that if, say, the gymnast deviates from the requirements of a vault, however gracefully, it will inevitably detract from the standard of the performance, whereas a poet may take liberties with a sonnet form without necessarily detracting from the quality of the sonnet. As argued, though, in a violin competition, if the performer deviates from the postulated requirements that is, from performing accurately a certain notation this would inevitably detract from the standard of his performance. The same inevitable detractions would occur with respect to possible deviations in other competitions in the arts, such as ballet and piano competitions. Thus, if in the concept of art, there is a means/ends complete identification, which can also occur in arts competitions, why is there still a gap in regard to means/ends identification with respect to the aesthetic sports? It appears that there is no such a gap. What is more, I believe there isn t such a gap between purposive sports and the arts either. What led Best to the supposed means/end gap in the first place will appear later on. First, I want to comment briefly on Best s implausible endeavor to limit the supposed gap between purposive sports and the arts with respect to the aesthetic. He claims: However successful a sportsman may be in achieving the principal aim of his particular activity, our aesthetic acclaim is reserved for him who achieves it with maximum economy and efficiency of effort.... To consider the

7 Sport Is Art / 7 purposive sports from the aesthetic point of view is to reduce the gap between means and ends thus, as far as the aesthetic is concerned, there is a narrower range of possibilities, available for the achievement of an end in an aesthetically pleasing way, since the end is no longer simply to win, but to win with the greatest economy and efficiency of effort (2: p. 381). It appears, however, that maximum economy and efficiency of effort are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for making sports aesthetically pleasing or for giving grace to them. An illustrative example is weightlifting in that it is a sport in which the primary concern is to perform each movement with the maximum direction of effort. I cannot think of any other sport in which the actions are directed at the required end with more economy and efficiency of effort. One would not consider graceful the movements of a weightlifter, at least not as graceful as the maximum economy and efficiency of effort (with which these movements are performed) would imply. Best s reply is that the explanation lies simply in a general tendency to prefer, from the aesthetic point of view, sports which allow for smooth, flowing movements in the achievement of the primary purpose (2: p. 382). There are, though, other examples. Boxing is another illustrative case. Best refers to Muhammad Ali as a person who naturally moves gracefully whatever he may be doing. However, this is not the case. The aesthetic excellence of athletes such as Muhammad Ali and Sugar Ray Leonard is based on their style. What these great athletes did not have, in contrast to, say, Mike Tyson, was maximum economy and efficiency of effort (in their movements) towards the required end. However, whereas lack of maximum direction of effort cannot preclude them of being considered two of the most graceful athletes ever, this gracefulness is lacking in Mike Tyson s case, despite the fact that he is a model of economy and efficiency of effort. What led Best to the supposed means/end gap in the first place, and thus to the assertion that the aesthetic in sport is not central but rather trivial or incidental, is the misapprehended distinction that he implicitly draws between extrinsic and intrinsic purposes 10 and the fact that in discussing art and sport, he employs a partial analysis. One would not regard, say, scoring goals in football as an extrinsic purpose but rather as an intrinsic one namely, a purpose within the activity. It is evident that what it means to score depends upon the activity or upon the particular game being played. Scoring goals in football can be accomplished in only one way only by playing football. As Joseph Kupfer claims, practical purposes in the everyday, however, are independent of their means and are rightly said to be the purposes of their activities since they are attainable by some other means (11: p. 394). In sports, though purposes such as scoring through netted hoops in basketball may well be viewed as purposes, they are only purposes within the activity. Therefore, scoring in a sport cannot be done in a way other than by playing that sport 11. What is more, Best employs a partial analysis when he speaks of art and sport. The way he describes art differs from the way he describes sport that is, when he refers to art he considers the characteristics of a certain (particular) work of art, whereas when he refers to sport he discusses sport in an unspecific manner. A singular description is the way, with respect to art, one refers to the painting or play and what it might express and, with respect to sport, to the goal scored. By contrast, an unspecific or general description is the way one refers to what is expressed in a work of art, independently of this work, and as regards sport, to the scoring of goals in general. What is implicit at a general level, then, is that there can be many different

8 8 / Platchias ways for what is expressed in a painting to be expressed, or for goals to be scored, whereas at a singular level, there is only one way for the painting to express what this particular painting expresses, and only one way for the goal to be scored. This way will be their constitutive way. Thus, employing an unspecific mode of description (that Best employs when he refers to sports), as in the case of scoring goals in sport, internal purposes that can be identified independently of the way they are accomplished, can be also found in art. It is a common practice in drama for the director and the other contributors to a play (actors, scriptwriters, etc.) to try to find or choose the most appropriate (for the needs of the play, or with respect to an instance of a play) manner to reveal a certain concept (e.g., to provide the viewers with the ability to understand better a certain meaning or expressed idea). The fact that there can be a chosen particular instantiation of the meaning of the play, or of the meaning of one of its instances, shows that there can be internal ends or purposes in drama, which can be specified or identified independently of their particular instantiation. This reveals that there can be internal ends in art, which can be identified apart from the way they are accomplished. Moreover, the same idea may be expressed by many works of art; however, appreciation of each and the identification of means and ends is done only if we employ a singular mode. Similar considerations hold for sport. In fact, there are many different ways in art for, say, sadness to be accomplished, as an achieved internal end of a painting as many as the ways that a goal can be scored in football (viewed of course under the same unspecific mode of description). Moreover, the goal scored, or a particular scored goal in football, cannot be identified from the very fact of a ball entering the goalposts line and getting into the net. It is the way or the manner that the goal is scored that can only identify it. Therefore, to conclude, employing a singular mode of description of a goal scored, or the meaning of a painting (what a particular painting expresses), can only be accomplished by one way, their constitutive way, and can only be identified from the manner in which they are accomplished. There is, therefore, no means/end distinction, and it cannot be the case that there could be equally effective alternative means for the same end that is, there is only one way of achieving the end, the constitutive way. By contrast, if we employ an unspecific level of description, there can be many different means or ways (with respect to both art and sport) to accomplish the desirable end (there is a means/end distinction). As regards my fourth point stated above, I ve mentioned that the aesthetic applies also to sunsets (Best), people, and so forth. A beautiful sunset, despite the fact that it lacks any intention whatsoever to give aesthetic pleasure, can be superb aesthetically, and the lack of intention cannot diminish its aesthetic excellence. Thus, for the objection to be stated clearly and correctly, it has to be in such terms that would restrict the aesthetic from applying to many different things and to apply therefore only to art. In this case, the claim that there has to be something intentionally created or performed for aesthetic value takes the form of a necessary if not a sufficient condition with respect to the artistic that is, for an object to be art. Evidently, though, this is not the case. As Best claims, the shape of the radiators and spectacles and colored toilet paper are cases of artifacts intentionally created to give aesthetic pleasure, but none of these can be considered art 12.

9 Sport Is Art / 9 Many things can be aesthetically pleasing without intending to be, and also there are many cases where, even if the intention to give aesthetic pleasure is present, what is being performed or created is far from being regarded as art. Moreover, there are many instances in art, many works of art, created with no intention whatsoever to give aesthetic pleasure. What is performed, or created, is in terms of autotelicity, or in terms of an activity satisfying in itself, where what matters is not what would, if presented (or performed), be aesthetically pleasing, but what the artist s aesthetic considerations dictate him to create in terms of genuine expression. However, this is not to mean that all instances of art have to be in terms of genuine expression, and neither that this is to be considered as a necessary condition of art, for it is clear that there can be art without such a requirement in that, for example, it is obvious that such a requirement is absent from many instantiations of types that is, from many occurrences of tokens where types are instantiated with maximum accuracy (where there is no creativity and it may also be an intention of giving aesthetic pleasure). What I believe is that there can be art in terms of genuine expression (artistic expression) without any intention of giving aesthetic pleasure, (I say more on this later on.) The fact that people may appreciate later these works of art for the aesthetic pleasure that they might give to them would be beyond the artist s intentions. Concluding this section, it is worth noting that it is not the case that most of those involved with sports care only for the fact that goals are scored, or just for the result of the game and not at all for the manner of the goal scored. There are many instances where the spectators (e.g., after watching a football match) feel disappointed because despite the fact that their favorite team won, it didn t play well, and there are many instances where the spectators make assertions of the kind: X won the game but Y played better. Moreover, I do not think that most of those involved with sports would want their team to win because of a goal scored by a spoilsport, namely, from one who scores non-permissibly with respect to the rules and the conventions of a game. Sport As a Form of Art Now, even if (as shown) the aesthetic is central to both art and sport (purposive and aesthetic sports), something more is needed to establish or to make plausible to assert that sport can be accepted and established within the arts. It has also been argued that an attempt of the kind that the artistic is that which is intentionally created or performed for aesthetic value fails that is, the intention to give aesthetic pleasure is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for something to be art. However, this view is held by many commentators, such as Louis Arnaud Reid (14), and reflects their hope to show that at least the aesthetic sports can be art that is, because these commentators (including Best) failed to realize that the aesthetic can be central to the purposive sports as well. Therefore, having in mind that only in the aesthetic sports, the aesthetic is central, they thought that this is the only plausible candidate to be considered as art. Thus, Best claims: It does seem to me unquestionable that the purposive sports, that is the great majority are not even plausible candidates for art forms (4: p. 30). According to Best, there remains an interesting question: The aesthetic sports have been shown to be similar to the arts with respect to the impossibility of distinguishing means and ends. Does this means that such sports can legitimately be

10 10 / Platchias regarded as art forms? (2: p. 384) Best insists that they cannot. He gives two reasons. The first is that in these sports there is still an externally identifiable aim, and the second is that the aesthetic is distinct from the artistic. Besides the above stated distinction between the aesthetic and the artistic, namely that the aesthetic can also be found in sunsets, people, and so forth, he offers one more. He considers that every form of art has an essential characteristic 13, which can provide an adequate distinction between the aesthetic and the artistic. Best claims that sports lack this characteristic, and moreover that this characteristic is what makes art a distinctive concept, as he claims, without it an activity could not count as a legitimate art form (3: p. 78) that is, It is a central characteristic of an art form that it allows for the expression of the conception of life issues, such as conceptions of war, or social injustice of various kinds (4: p. 31). Other commentators have made similar assertions. Thus, P.N. Humble in a discussion on whether chess can be a form of art, claims: But however beautiful or profound the masterpieces of Alekhine, Bronstein and Kasparov may be, I doubt whether we wish to describe them as great works of art. (There is an interesting asymmetry herechess masterpieces: minor art works). Perhaps this is because chess by its very nature cannot comment upon the deep human themes, characteristic of great art. (8: p 65) Now, I have discussed already Best s first reason, namely that there is still an externally identifiable aim in the aesthetic sports in regard to music competitions and competitive features, and it has been shown that there is no such externally identifiable aim in these sports that differentiate them from art or preclude them from being art. Moreover, it has been shown that the aesthetic is central (as in the case of the aesthetic sports) in the purposive sports in that there is no means/end distinction in these sports, either. However, even if Best were to accept that there is no means/end distinction in the case of the purposive sports, and thus this would make them plausible candidates for being considered as art, he would still deny that these sports could be art. Best s reason is that, as in the case of the aesthetic sports, purposive sports cannot allow for the expression of the conception of life issues. I think that Best s case here is quite convincing in that it is plain that sports cannot allow for the expression of a conception of life issues such as a conception of war, social injustice of various kinds, or comment on life situations. Is this to mean that sport cannot be art? Before I proceed with this, I shall refer to an important factor of Best s distinction between purposive and aesthetic sports which, in that respect, has been misconceived. In short I ll try to show that, in art, purposive and aesthetic sports viewed in a non-trivial sense (in a singular level of description), the aesthetic is central, purposive sports must be viewed differently, against what is implicit in this distinction, or what most commentators hold. That is, purposive sports possess elements that are present in great works of art, whereas such elements are absent from the aesthetic sports. However, this is not to mean that the superiority that the purposive sports have in regard to the aesthetic sports precludes the latter from being also considered as art. As argued, there is no crucial distinction between purposive and aesthetic sports with respect to the aesthetic. Thus, the alleged main reason for this distinction

11 Sport Is Art / 11 fails namely, that in the aesthetic sports, the aesthetic is central, whereas in the purposive sports is trivial or incidental. However, the distinction still holds but for another reason. It will be remembered that Suits draws a distinction between judged performances and refereed games. Whereas Suits basic claim for this distinction is misapprehended, the distinction still holds because of the main characteristic of refereed games or of the purposive sports as opposed to judged performances or to the aesthetic sports. The purposive sports comprise elements such as creativity, improvisation, and uniqueness, whereas these elements are absent from the aesthetic sports. The participants of the aesthetic sports are concerned with the performing or the perfection of a certain task-routine, where any deviation of this task, no matter how beautiful, elegant, or graceful, will necessarily lead to the detraction of the standard of the performance. By contrast, in the purposive sports, the possession of those elements might lead to what might be called ingenious gracefulness and therefore enhance the quality or the standard of the performance. Suits is right when he claims that in judged performances (aesthetic sports), there is the concern of approximating postulated ideals. What matters is the perfection of an ideal, or the degree that the ideal is approximated. At this point, as the connection becomes eminent, it is of importance to consider Kant s dependent beauty 14. In a discussion concerning beauty in the arts, he writes: In estimating beauty of art the perfection of the thing must be also be taken into account-a matter which in estimating a beauty of nature, as beautiful, is quite irrelevant (10: p. 173). And also: In the estimate of a free beauty (according to mere form) we have the pure judgment of taste. No concept is here presupposed of any end for which the manifold should serve, the given object, and which the latter therefore should represent... But the beauty... of a building (such as a church, palace, arsenal or summer-house) presupposes a concept of the end that defines what that thing has to be, and consequently a concept of its perfection; and is therefore merely appendant beauty. ( 10: pp ) This beauty is for Kant artistic beauty and involves the perfection of a concept, the achievement of a function, because there is a concept in contrast with nature (for example, a beautiful sunset), where its beauty is independent, free of concepts. Moreover, in the purposive sports, the movements do have a function, such as scoring a goal in football, or side-stepping an opponent in boxing or in a team sport and so forth. The difference, though, between the purposive and the aesthetic sports, lies in what Suits has claimed concerning judged performances (aesthetic sports): It is possible to speak of a perfect performance, at least in principle, without fear of contradiction (18: p. 6). Suits claims that this cannot be done in the case of the refereed games (purposive sports). Thus, in the aesthetic sports, or in a piano (or ballet) competition, it can be plausibly asserted that, when the approximation of the postulated ideal reaches a certain degree, the performance is perfect. However, as Kant claims: For fine art, i.e. the production of such objects [beautiful objects], one needs genius (10: p. 172). In the discussion of an attempt to define genius (the faculties of the mind that constitute genius), he claims:

12 12 / Platchias The mental powers whose union in a certain relation constitutes genius, are imagination and understanding... enabling one to find out ideas for a given concept, and besides, to hit upon the expression for them... it displays itself not so much in the working out of the projected end in the representation of a definite concept, as rather in the portrayal, or expression of aesthetic ideas containing a wealth of material for effecting that intention. (10: pp ) Thus, speaking for a perfect work of art, or to put it differently, for a work of art in which what is expressed, is expressed perfectly, sounds incoherent. There are no perfect works of art. There are great works of art. Similarly, in the purposive sports, the presence of elements such as creativity, improvisation, and uniqueness make plausible the assertion that in these sports the producer of states of affairs (in achieving a function) may be a genius and, being so, or when he displays this genius, thus raises the quality and enhances the aesthetic pleasure of his performance. That is in the nature of these sports (by contrast to the aesthetic sports). Thus, one may claim that an instance in the aesthetic sports has gracefulness, but this cannot in any case be pure artistic ingenious gracefulness. What it can be is the instantiation of a type, where each time the type is instantiated (that is, a token) or each time the postulated ideal is approximated has gracefulness, whereas in the purposive sports, there can be instances of ingenious gracefulness that is, in these instances, there is both the creation and the instantiation of a type 15. The superiority, though, that the purposive sports have in this respect towards the aesthetic sports, is not to mean that the latter cannot be art, not as long as music, dance, and other performances in competitions and other events are considered thus 16. Considering now Best s objection namely, that sports cannot be art because of the fact that they cannot allow for the expression of a conception of life situations or they cannot comment upon deep human themes it must be asserted that this is not so for every art form, either. As in the case of other essentialist accounts, Best s account appears inadequate to satisfy all counterexamples. It may be true that Picasso s Guernica or Shakespeare s King Lear express a certain conception of the horrors of war and that renunciation is not a form of self-interest, respectively, it is evidently untrue that every art form expresses a conception of life issues. Thus, it appears implausible to assert that abstract art, music, and architecture fulfill this requirement. That is, I do not think that, say, a piece of music or a building could comment upon life issues such as conceptions of war or social injustice of various kinds 17. Moreover, dance is likely to be another plausible candidate. Therefore, the expression of life situations is not an essential characteristic of art, which distinguishes its concept in that in the absence of which an activity could still count as a legitimate art form. Best, in his book Expression in Movement and the Arts (1), quotes Wordsworth: All good poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings (l: p. 3). Best claims that this idea is captured perfectly, and adds: Thus, artistic expression is thought to be a release of feelings through the artist s particular medium a sort of emotional catharsis (1: p. 3). I would think that no one would deny that characteristics such as the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings or emotional catharsis are to be found in the purposive sports. This is not to claim, though, that these characteristics are not to be found in the aesthetic sports.

13 Sport Is Art / 13 I take an instance from Olympic gymnastics. The gymnast starts to perform a certain routine, say, in the floor exercise event. All his anguish before the performance now becomes more intense. He might feel his hands or knees shaking, but his will is stronger. He reaches half of his performance; he does really well. The crowd that filled the stadium feels for him, the coach, everybody. The emotional stress that surrounds him as he finally gets to the point, where he has to perform his last somersault is at its peak. The crowd feels the same. The spectators do not breathe. The atmosphere is electrified. The gymnast starts executing his last exercise, the last somersault, everyone s concentrated attention is at its most intense, unaware of anything else. He finally performs it; he achieves. All the emotions, the feelings, are now released, a sort of emotional catharsis. Such instances are more to be witnessed in the purposive sports. They are to be found, mostly, when the excellence of play is combined with the limitation of time that is, when the balance in a sporting contest between the opponents reaches a certain degree of quality, where everyone s concentrated attention is at its most intense, becoming thus unaware of anything else. The participants, the crowd, everybody, is thrilled by the motion and the rhythm of the game, and as the time gets more and more limited, the emotional stress is raised towards the uncertainty of the outcome. The atmosphere, because of the tension and the dynamic character of the game, is electrified. Everyone involved expects the end of the tension. They expect the final resolution, the release of these feelings. Those on the playing field all want to achieve something difficult, to succeed, to end a tension (7: p. 6). The game comes closer and closer to the end, the dramatic tension is at its peak. And then, it is the last moment... he scores! He achieves. The desirable end arrives. The dramatic spectacle comes to an end; the dramatic tension ends. All the emotions, the feelings, are now released, a sort of emotional catharsis. Those involved now step out of the magic world and return to the real world. What causes the aesthetic experience, or gives the aesthetic pleasure (to both athletes and spectators), in an achievement of the desirable end, is the athlete s genuine artistic expression, which consists in the instantiation of the winning pattern (in a general sense, such as to employ a winning strategy, or the employment of a way of moving on the play field, the style ), or of a special pattern (in a particular sense, such as a combination in boxing) that the athlete s aesthetic considerations dictate him to employ in getting to this end. That is, when the athlete perceives the desirable end which doesn t have to be the scoring of a goal but may instead well be the achievement of a function such as a combination in boxing or the side-stepping of an opponent or even, in the longer run, the style his aesthetic considerations enable him to discern a pattern in choosing the appropriate means, where the instantiation of this pattern enables him to reach the desirable end. What enables him to discern and employ the pattern might be called aesthetic ideas in Kant s terminology. These aesthetic ideas consist in the free play of the cognitive faculties that is, imagination and understanding. Thus, the instantiation of a pattern that the free play of the powers of cognition enable him to discern, in terms of the aesthetic experience itself, is what arouses the aesthetic contemplation or what gives aesthetic pleasure (and therefore without thereby being, or needed, any intention of the athlete to give this pleasure). Thus, the instantiation

14 14 / Platchias of the discerned pattern is, as in the case of art, beauty, what Kant calls the expression of aesthetic ideas (10: p. 183) 18. What dictates that the athlete discern and instantiate a winning pattern is the free play of the powers of cognition, which enables him to envisage the perfectly harmonized arrangement of means and ends (the whole) and then to employ the special patterns, each instantiation of which is the perfect arrangement of means and ends (the particular) and is what arouses the aesthetic contemplation or what gives aesthetic pleasure 19 and, further, what enhances the aesthetic pleasure is when the particular is harmonized with the whole 20. The aesthetic excellence then consists of what dictates the athlete to discern and instantiate a pattern, and that is the perfect fitting of the discerned (appropriate) pattern, and its instantiation of it, with respect to the desirable end. It is then the athlete s aesthetic judgment that enables him or her to discern and then instantiate this pattern in terms of the perfect arrangement of means and ends with respect to the particular and, further, in terms of the harmonious fitting of the particular in the whole. Considering now cases such as Muhammad Ali, Sugar Ray Leonard, or Michael Jordan, what enabled them to employ their style, their combinations, their way of moving, their strategy in every instance, what led them to reach the level of their aesthetic excellence, was their aesthetic considerations, the free play of their faculties of cognition, which enabled them to envisage the way toward finding the desirable end on the basis of the employment of the winning pattern and also by employing each time a pattern, a harmoniously fitting pattern respecting the specific subdivided end, the instantiation of which, in a perfect arrangement of means and ends, is what gives the aesthetic pleasure, which is enhanced in the case where the particular is harmoniously fitted with the whole. These aesthetic considerations, then, that enable the athletes to discern these patterns can, I believe, be considered as pure artistic creation, and their instances can legitimately be regarded as instances of artistic expression 21. Conclusion In summary, both art and sport appear to be open concepts in that they are unamenable to an absolute definition. As mentioned, though, this is not to mean that we are not allowed at all to speak about certain characteristics that both concepts possess, in that otherwise everything could be art or everything could be sport. Our discussion, then, in an attempt to reveal their relation, or how close is the intimacy between them and therefore to explore the possibility of whether sport can be legitimately regarded as art, has to be in terms of similarities and common characteristics. One may find innumerable similarities or common features between them, such as institutionalization, or the fact that both art and sport can be performed on stages, or in arenas, presented for a public, and so forth. However, what we must do is focus on an attempt to discern the most important or central characteristics (as opposed to peripheral) that both concepts possess, in a task where finding these characteristics would enable us plausibly to assert that sport can be regarded as art. I consider that I have concentrated on demonstrating the main common characteristics between these two concepts, with respect to the nature of sport, to the aesthetic and to the artistic, such as to form a substantive part of resemblance, which enables me to make such a contention. I therefore conclude my discussion here, with the assertion that sport can be legitimately accepted and established as a form of art.