The Evolutionary Thought in Economics and Social Theory *

Transcription

1 The Evolutionary Thought in Economics and Social Theory * Cemal Güzel ** - Hüseyin Özel *** Abstract: The paper focuses on the shortcomings of the attempts of applying the idea of evolution to economics and social theory in an uncritical way. First shortcoming is the fact that the notion of evolution is used in the social theory in an undiscriminating fashion, without explaining the content of evolution. For the most part, evolutionary notions are meant to be used as metaphors or analogies in the social science, but sometimes they are also expected to act like causal mechanisms to explain social change. However, since they are only metaphors, they cannot carry such burden. Secondly, especially in economics, the notion of evolution is used in an adaptationist, even a Panglossian way that emphasizes optimization principle, as in the rational choice theory used in economics. Such uses, coupled with functionalism, leads to an instrumental outlook that emphasizes the fitness of every social relation, institution, etc. to some needs. Last, but not the least, uncritical application of evolutionary notions to the social world overlooks the importance of human intentionality in social change, and thus making individuals mere puppets of some autonomous evolutionary forces. Key Words: Evolution, adaptationist programme, human intentionality, functionalism, teleology. INTRODUCTION The term evolution is probably one of the most ambiguous and frequently used terms in social theory and economics. Even though such frequent use of a term will inevitably bring about some ambiguities, confusions in meaning resulting from the adoption of different evolutionary metaphors usually leads * An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Symposium on Evolutionary Economics held by the Department of Economics/Hacettepe University on November 2009 in Ankara. The writes would like to thank the anonymous jury for their constructive criticisms about the article. ** Hacettepe University, Department of Philosophy; e-posta: cmlguzel@gmail.com. *** Hacettepe University, Department of Economics; e-posta: ozel@hacettepe.edu.tr. TODAĐE s Review of Public Administration, Volume 5 No 3 September, 2011, p.1-33.

2 2 TODAĐE s Review of Public Administration to hardly recoverable drawbacks with respect to social theory. The very aim of this article is to discuss to what extent such types of biological evolutionary notions are applicable to human societies, either uncritically or mechanically. Nevertheless, in the article, rather than different biological evolutionary approaches, the difficulties that might arise from the attempts to apply the evolutionary thought to economics and social theory in general will be explored, and whether these difficulties can be avoided will be discussed. The article argues that such efforts will be analytically helpful to a limited extent unless it is explicitly mentioned what is implied with the concept of evolution. Especially when the discontinuity or break relationship between the human world and the biological world is disregarded, it is possible to say that the evolutionary metaphors will do more harm than good to social science. Secondly, especially in economics, the notion of evolution is used in an adaptationist, even a Panglossian way that emphasizes optimization principle. Such uses, coupled with functionalism, leads to an instrumental outlook that emphasizes the fitness of every social relation, institution, etc. to some needs. Thirdly, uncritical application of evolutionary notions to the social world overlooks the human intentionality, thus making individuals appear like puppets of the societies they live in, or their social relations and changes. This article argues that the main reason for the above-mentioned drawbacks is that in general, the social theory approaches based on the notion of evolution usually confuse the three levels, i.e. metaphorical level, ontological level and level of causal mechanism. In other words, it seems possible to say that the term of evolution, which is mostly used as a metaphor in economics, is rather treated as a causal mechanism. This inevitably creates problems in understanding how this mechanism can work both in a causal and social world. Therefore, the article primarily focuses on different evolutionary notions used in social theory, and the conceptual problems they bring about via different examples, and then attempts to develop some principles relating to how the term evolution can be used especially in economics without facing such problems.

3 The Evolutionary Thought in Economics and Social Theory 3 EVOLUTIONARY METAPHORS AND CAUSALITY Though Frederick Engels, in his speech at Marx's funeral, said, Just as Darwin discovered the law of development of organic nature, so Marx discovered the law of development of human history (Engels, 1883), famous paleontologist, and evolution theoretician Stephen Jay Gould says the copy of 'Das Kapital' Marx personally sent to Darwin was in Darwin s library; its pages uncut (Gould, 1998: 9). It seems that Darwin was not much interested in Marx s own revolution. In fact, this irony becomes even heavier in view of the fact that Ernst Haeckel, who is among the leading defenders of evolution and also one of the sources of inspiration for Engels understanding of evolution in his famous work, The Part Played by Labor in the Transition from Ape to Man (Engels, 1876), propounded a hierarchy of races in the evolution of human with black people at the bottom (Gould, 1998: 228; Hodgson, 1998: 301; Hodgson, 2004: 81n). This small anecdote actually demonstrates how the concept of evolution is open to misunderstandings (or misuses). When economics in particular and even social science in general are in question, the emergence of such misunderstandings or presentations seems to be inevitable due to the two reasons that manifest themselves in the example given above. The first reason is that all different biological evolutionary approaches ranging from Haeckel to Lamarck, or from Darwin to Spencer manage to get a place in social science; thus, making a choice among them totally depends on the viewpoint of social scientist. Secondly, perhaps the basic reason that lies in the background of the former is that it is almost impossible to avoid ideological connotations of evolution regarding human societies. Among the important examples that first comes to mind in this respect are sociobiology, the so-called Social Darwinism though it actually follows the footsteps of Herbert Spencer (Wilson, 1975), and The Bell Curve Wars (Fraser, 1995), as a newer example, generated by the infamous The Bell Curve bearing explicit racist connotations, which tries to show that the reason for African- American people s lower level of education

4 4 TODAĐE s Review of Public Administration and welfare than white people originates from their biological characteristics (Hernrnstein and Murray, 1994). It can be said that all of these examples are in fact ideological efforts that tries to ground their arguments on some evolutionary scientific facts. A general outlook of the history of social thought shows that such efforts are old as much as the evolutionary theories themselves. For example, famous economist Joseph A. Schumpeter, in his work, History of Economic Analysis (1954), states that the term evolutionism does not only refer to biological evolutionism; on the contrary, it is a viewpoint with different dimensions to the extent to become one of the basic ways of thinking of the nineteenth century. In this sense, according to Schumpeter, there are five different types of evolutionist thought (Schumpeter, 1954: ). The first type of evolutionist thought, Philosophers Evolutionism, is mainly based on the Hegelian philosophy; it considers the teleological change in a holistic metaphysical entity (like the Spirit ). For Schumpeter, the second type of evolutionism is Marxist Evolutionism that was developed independent of Hegel and Darwin; it considers social evolution. The third type of evolutionism is Historian s Evolutionism that has a more general approach; it considers social stages. The fourth evolutionism, which is similar to the former, but needs to be kept separate, is the Intellectualist Evolutionism, which is identified with philosophers like Condorcet and Comte. It is an evolutionist thought associated with the Enlightenment and reason. The final evolutionist approach is the Biological Evolutionism, identified with Darwin and Lamarck, where evolution is comprehended as a process of change based on a causal mechanism. According to Schumpeter, although all these evolutionary notions are correlated, they in fact have been developed independent from one another. Thus, it can be said that almost all of them represent the 19 th century s way of thinking characterized by reasoning via the concepts of change, progress, development, evolution and perfection that correspond to the thought of the Enlightenment.

5 The Evolutionary Thought in Economics and Social Theory 5 This view of Schumpeter s might in fact be helpful also in classifying different evolutionary conceptions; evolution may initially be perceived as a metaphor as was the case in the 19 th century understanding. In this respect, it can be said that all concepts like change, development, moving towards a particular end or target, or progress, which are essentially different from one another, are stuffed into the bundle of evolution. The evolutionary thought may, from another aspect, seem to be an ontological assumption. The famous debate over being and becoming that can especially be derived from the difference between Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy (that actually dates back to more ancient times, i.e. to the Parmenides- Heraclitus controversy) considers the assertions relating to whether reality changes; if so, how and in what direction it changes. This is a level that is based on more specific and serious metaphysical assertions compared to the metaphorical level, which only considers analogies. A third level is the one that is more specific than the former two. It propounds causal arguments on the mode of evolution and defines causal mechanisms. For example, the Darwinian natural selection or the Lamarckian mechanisms of evolution are the examples to this level that focus on such kind of arguments. 1 In this respect, going back to Schumpeter s classification above, for instance, it is easy to see philosopher s evolutionism is based on ontological arguments. It can be said, on the other hand, that not only Marx s theory of evolution, but also the historian s and the intellectual s evolutionism always remain at the metaphorical (or analogical) level. 2 It is obvious that in this classification, the 1 It is obvious that this does not mean that the terms like natural selection are not a metaphor themselves; nevertheless, these arguments are propounded vie causal mechanisms, though sometimes are voiced via metaphors. The most important corresponding mechanism in economics is the famous invisible hand metaphor (Özel, 2009). 2 This thought can be objected by saying that especially Marx s view of historical materialism at the same time propounds a causal mechanism (like the one-way relationship between substructure and superstructure ); nevertheless, it is still controversial even in the Marxist literature whether or not historical materialism offers a casual mechanism (even if in the final analysis ). For a good argument, see: Althusser (1979: 32), who says, From the first moment to the last the lonely hour of the last instance never comes.

6 6 TODAĐE s Review of Public Administration only approach capable of proposing causal mechanisms is the biological evolutionary perspective. The relationship between these three levels can be visualized in the form of concentric circles as in Figure 1 below. The metaphorical level is considered acceptable in every situation as it the most general level ( Similes must never go wrong ); though the ontological level is different from the metaphorical level due to its propounding more specific existence arguments, it is still of general nature. The last level, the causal mechanism level, is the one that interests the scientist most, because this is the level, which is capable of producing testable, verifiable or falsifiable hypotheses. Yet, this level has also to be based on some kind of metaphysical or ontological foundation. Before discussing this subject further, it will be helpful to remind Schumpeter s (1954: 41-42) famous concept of prescientific vision. 3 Figure 1. Evolutionary Conceptions Distinguishing these three levels makes it possible to propound the following three arguments of this article on social theory and economics: 3 For the concept of pre-scientific vision and its place in the history of economic thought, see: (Özel, 2001).

7 The Evolutionary Thought in Economics and Social Theory 7 1-In social theory and economics, the concept of evolution is used in an ambiguous way mostly without being explicit. As the evolutionary concepts or hypotheses, which are adopted as analogical in general, or as ontological approaches at the best, are usually attempted to be employed as causal mechanisms, they fail to carry the burden attributed to them. The main reason is the reality that similes go wrong. 2- Especially in economics (but also in other fields of social theory), evolutionism is generally used compliant with the Panglossian, i.e. the optimization principle. Such uses that corresponds rather to the functionalist approach diminishes the benefits of social science, because this leads to an instrumentalist point of view, which argues that every social formation, relationship or institution are exactly as they should be since they definitely perform a function. 3- Uncritical application of the evolutionary concepts and theories to social theory overlooks the transforming power of the human agent, thus making individuals puppets of the societies they live in, or their social relations and changes. In the following section, these three theses will be discussed respectively. The Ambiguity Thesis: In Social Theory, What should be Understood by the Term Evolution is not Clear. Though mostly used as metaphor, there are numerous examples, where the evolutionary terms and notions are considered as causal mechanisms. Before entering in this discussion, it may suffice to quote Giddens 1999: ) citations from eminent social scientists, which he, as an opponent to the use of the evolutionary approach, presents with an aim to better reveal the ambiguity on this matter: Whether the adjective biological be used or not, the principle of evolution is firmly established as applying to the world of living things... Such basic concepts of organic evolution or variation, selection, adaptation, differentiation, and integration belong at the centre of our concern, when appropriately adjusted to a social and cultural subject-matter. (Parsons)

8 8 TODAĐE s Review of Public Administration Evolution can be considered as an interest in determining recurrent forms, processes and functions... Cultural evolution may be regarded as either a special type of historical reconstruction or a particular methodology or approach. (Steward) Evolution (both natural and social) is a self-maintaining, selftransforming and self-transcending process, directional in time and therefore irreversible, which in its course generates every fresh novelty, greater variety, more complex organization, higher levels of awareness, and increasingly conscious mental activity. (Huxley) Evolution may be defined as a temporal sequence of forms: one form grows out of another; culture advances from one stage to another. In this process, time is as integral a factor as change of form. The evolutionist process is irreversible and non-repetitive...the evolutionist process is, like the historical, or diffusionist, process in that both are temporal and therefore irreversible and non-repetitive. (White) In both its biological and cultural spheres evolution moves simultaneously in two directions. On the one side, it creates diversity through adaptive modification: new forms differentiate from old. On the other side, evolution generates progress: higher forms arise from, and surpass, lower. The first of these directions is Specific Evolution, and the second, General Evolution a different taxonomy is required in examining these two aspects of evolution. Concerned with lines of descent, the study of specific evolution employs phylogenetic classification. In the general evolutionary outlook emphasis shifts to the character of progress itself, and forms are classed in stages or levels of development without reference to phylogeny. (Sahlins) Another example is given by philosopher of science Roy Bhaskar. Direct equivalents of biological evolutionary mechanisms in social theory according to Bhaskar (1981) are provided in Figure 2:

9 The Evolutionary Thought in Economics and Social Theory 9 Figure 2. Evolutionary Social Theory (Bhaskar, 1981) Lineage = history Replicator = social structure Interactor 1 = practical/institution Interactor 2 = agent Environment = community of interactors located in biosphere. Another example that can be given with respect to economics is the evolutionary economics tradition inherited from Schumpeter. Even though Schumpeter himself meticulously avoided using the term evolution, evolutionary economists establish their thoughts mostly on Schumpeter s concept of development. 4 Schumpeter grounds the concept of evolution in innovation (evolutionary economists use it in a meaning close to the term mutation ), and defines development as transition from one norm of the economic system to another norm in such a way that this transition cannot be decomposed into infinitesimal steps (Schumpeter, 2005: 11). According to John Foster (2000: 323), one of the leading evolutionary economists, development is an emergent process with an unknown outcome. Putting aside the question of whether this definition should be understood as evolution or not, it is also surprising to observe that various evolutionary economists, as the units of economic evolution (the whole itself subject to evolution), have different perceptions of evolution. For example, for Marx, what is being evolved is history and society, while for Veblen and his followers it is the institutions. And for Schumpeter and evolutionary economists, capitalism, firms, technology and knowledge, or even all these are subject to evolution. In this respect, looking at different evolutionary approaches adopted in the history of economic thought (Araz-Takay and 5 For a comprehensive presentation and approach on evolutionary economics, see: Araz-Takay (2009).

10 10 TODAĐE s Review of Public Administration Özel, 2008), for example, the Institutional Economics approach pioneered by Veblen perceives the notion of evolution as a causal mechanism that gradually and continually works in the development of institutions and societies. The Austrian school of economics takes a similar point of view only to use it in explaining the development process of the market system. Unlike Veblen, it adopts a more adaptationist or functionalist standpoint. In addition, the evolution process is perceived by newer and Schumpeterian viewpoints sometimes as a metaphor and sometimes as a causal mechanism, and the quantities subject to evolution also display differences like knowledge, technology, economy and capitalism. These new evolutionary notions see evolution as a discontinuous and punctuated process rather than a gradual one. It seems natural to conclude in view of all these ambiguities and different conceptions of evolution that social scientists must avoid as possible they can using the term evolution for the sake of better comprehensibility. Nevertheless, the major problem created by this ambiguity is that different answers to be given to the following three questions imply the emergence of different types of social theory: 1. What kind of changes should be considered evolution? 2. Does the process of change have an ultimate purpose or final state? 3. Is change gradual or continuous; or discontinuous and punctuated? The answers given to these questions largely depend on the basic vision adopted or ideology of evolution in general. Therefore, it will be helpful to look at the relationship of the evolutionary ideology with some concepts (Levins and Lewontin, 1985). Numerous practices of evolutionary ideology seem to have different points of view based on whether they accept the ideas of change, order, direction, progress and perfectibility. Besides, it is also observed that the concepts focused differ according to the fields of science. For example, the theories

11 The Evolutionary Thought in Economics and Social Theory 11 of evolution of the inorganic world, like cosmology and thermodynamics, generally include only change and order, whereas biological and sociological theories add the ideas of progress and even perfectibility as elaborations of their theoretical structure (Levins and Lewontin, 1985: 10). On the other hand, for example, the Darwinian evolutionary theory asserts that evolution has no purpose, no direction; thus, any harmony and order displayed in the world is incidental (Gould, 1998: 11). The primary element of evolution is undoubtedly change; evolution itself is also a change. Yet, how change should be perceived differs as can be seen in the citations above. Nevertheless, it should be considered that first of all, the evolutionary change is not an instant change imposed to a static, unchanging world as in Noah s Flood, but rather a continuous process characterized by mutations, replacements and natural selection. Order is another concept that accompanies change. In this sense, for example, nearly all evolutionary notions used in social theory attempt to describe the outcome of the evolutionary process in terms of the emergence of new orders. Yet it is clear that it should be careful here too, because the development of an evolutionary transformation of a system and of the appropriate dimensions of description is a dialectical process that cannot be carried out by a priori assumptions about either law or description (Levins and Lewontin, 1985: 13). Therefore, as will be touched on while speaking of the invisible hand paradigm below, it should always be kept in mind that the ideas of the concept of order are profoundly ideological. In this sense, evolution seems to be neither a fact nor a theory, but a mode of organizing knowledge about the world (Levins and Lewontin, 1985: 14). Another controversial concept is the direction of change. However, this also seems to be a concept closely linked with the concept of order and thus, cannot be free from ideological connotations. In this respect, one of the ways of perceiving evolution is that it is the change from the least to the most complex (Levins and Lewontin, 1985: 16). However, as the

12 12 TODAĐE s Review of Public Administration question, in what sense is a mammal more complex than a bacterium? (Levins and Lewontin, 1985: 17) points out, the validity of this type of an idea is doubtful. Moreover, if such an acceptance is considered a way of approaching to social world, as in Parson s approach cited above, it will be almost inevitable to assume that today s Western societies represent the most developed and complex form of humanity. The basic problem of the concept of progress, probably one of the concepts with the heaviest ideological burden, is that it bears the risk to create a kind of teleology or Whig biology (or history) 5 due its incorporating both the direction of the change and an ethical value judgment: all of evolution lead to the entrepreneurial man (Levins and Lewontin, 1985: 24). Another problem that might arise with respect to the understanding of evolution is whether or not evolution is gradual and continuous. Even though the continuity relationship seems to be more prevalent in evolutionary explanations, a recent important approach, punctuated equilibrium, proposes that most species exhibit a punctuated evolutionary change. Accordingly, sudden changes may occur or new species may arise during the long and stable evolutionary process. This will disturb and punctuate previous homeostatic equilibria to the extent that numerous species may arise during such punctuations (Eldredge and Gould, 1972). Based on this discussion, it can be concluded that one should be careful in choosing which evolutionary notion to be used in social theory and economics. Even though the process of evolution takes change into account, it should be kept in mind that the evolutionary notions founded on these ideological assumptions that overlooks the facts that not every kind of change should be taken as a form of evolution, and that the process of evolution is not necessarily a rigid and entirely deterministic movement running towards a 6 As it is known, Whig is the nickname for Liberal Party in the United Kingdom. The Whig historians also asserted that the history has inevitably evolved to the society based on today s liberal institutions. The term Whig history refers to the attempt of reading history from the viewpoint of the present so that the categories of the past are treated by those of the present.

13 The Evolutionary Thought in Economics and Social Theory 13 specific end or a target, will do more harm than good to social science. A major difficulty here is that such an ambiguity is, in fact, inevitable even if different evolutionary notions are used at analogical or metaphorical level. The main reason for this is explained in David Hume s criticism, in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Hume, 2004), of analogical arguments in the context of intelligent design. The following is an example to an inductive argument based on analogy (Sober, 2009: 87): In human beings, blood circulates. Human beings and dogs are similar. Then, In dogs, blood circulates. This can be applied to social evolution as follows: Organisms evolve. Societies and organisms are similar. Then, Societies evolve. Even though such an argument finds a place for itself in most social theoretical approaches, an argument that has exactly the same structure like the following does not much seem acceptable in terms of ontology despite its being a right deduction logically: Mammals evolve Societies and societies are similar. Then, Societies evolve. The above deduction based on the similarity between dogs and human beings compares two things that are similar in existential terms. That is to say, the prerequisite of making comparison, i.e. the principle of comparing two similar things, works. Human beings and dogs are real, i.e. sentient beings. That is to say, their way of existing is the same. Moreover, both are living beings, organisms. Blood circulation is one of the

14 14 TODAĐE s Review of Public Administration fundamental characteristics of an organism. Thus, a generalization based on a single example is possible. And, as what makes an organism an organism is a natural necessity, this characteristic of human being applies to dog too, which is also an organism. The other two deductions liken two things with dissimilar form of existence, organism and society. As stated above, an organism is a real being. Its existence does not depend on human beings. On the other hand, society is an unreal being. Its existence depends on human beings. It is a being established by human beings for different purposes, whose structure changes by time or within the same slice of time based on the underlying principles of its establishment. In other words, the natural necessity that applies to one of these forms of existence (organism) will never arise for the other (society). The reason is that such structural, natural essentiality is impossible for the latter. If it was so, the things that are said about what the society is once in the right manner would remain unchanged. Furthermore, while each of the antecedents of the first deduction is a correct piece of information, the antecedents of the latter, organisms evolve, are acceptance rather than information. That they are right or wrong is debatable. According to the community of scholars, who believe in evolution, evolution voices a truth, whereas its manner of explanation is far from being scientific. The existence of two opposing considerations on the same subject not only points to the difference in the existential form of these two things, but also means: evolution is an explanation about a one-time being. It is an explanation about how living beings come into existence, and how come they display such diversity. Evolution explains a state that has started in one stage of time and that still continues at present. Just like answering the question how did universe originate? Such one-time formations cannot be observed or tested by recurrent sense experiences. Therefore, it is impossible to say that it is right or wrong based on these experiences. Even though some individual experiences or observations seem to

15 The Evolutionary Thought in Economics and Social Theory 15 support the things the theory asserts, it is quite difficult to deduct definitive conclusions related to the theory as a whole. Besides, the validity of a deduction depends on its premises. In other words, when some things are said, a conclusion is deduced from those things. That is to say, the deduction is valid only when the conclusion is inevitably inferred from its premises. However, the proven validity of the deduction does not tell anything whether or not the premises used in the deduction, thus, the conclusion are right. It is possible too to make a valid deduction based on the premise, each of which is wrong piece of information. The logical validity of deduction does not ensure the truth content of the hypotheses used in the deduction. Another example that can be given is Dawkins (1976: Part 11) famous memetic approach. Memes, which Dawkins coined as the behavioral equivalent of genes in social world, are mechanisms that provide social and cultural transmission. Even though memes are clearly used as analogies, Dawkins s statements reveal that these are typically perceived as metaphysical (based on ontology) quantities, or even as causal mechanisms too. However, the attribution of genes role in the biological world to memes in the human world seems to come from social science s desire to benefit from the prestige of the theory of evolution among natural sciences. As a matter of fact, such an ultra-darwinism (Rose, 2009a, b), namely, the use of genes as the ultimate explanatory categories is a problematic approach in itself, because evolution is a process characterized by interaction of genes, organisms and environment and thus by its relations of overdetermination (Lewontin, 2007; Rose, 2009a, b). This means that the evolution of an organism depends neither on an individual gene, nor on merely the genes from an organism; there always exists an interaction between genetic change and family and environmental factors (Rose, 2009a: ). Therefore, the following theses on evolution are important (Rose, 2009b: ): 1- The individual gene is not the only level at which selection occurs;

16 16 TODAĐE s Review of Public Administration 2- Natural selection is not the only driving force behind evolutionary change; 3- Organisms are not indefinitely flexible to change; an overdetermination process may always emerge; 4- Organisms are not mere passive responders to selective forces; they are active players that play a role in their own destiny. Fortunately, as Dawkins, with a more reductionist approach, tends to approach to genes as the ultimate explanatory variables, he uses memes of metaphysical nature that by no means be tested as the ultimate explanatory variable in social world as well. It is possible to multiply these examples; opportunely, here the power of argument will depend on the answers to the questions of to what extent analogy is appropriate; in what aspect societies are similar particularly with mammals, or to what extent memes and genes are alike, or even, whether or not memes have existential status. In this case, construction of appropriate analogies will determine the power of evolutionary arguments as well. That is to say, the individual analogy lacks the power to determine the acceptance or non-acceptance of a concept; otherwise simile goes wrong. Then, the claim that what determines the appropriateness of the analogy to be chosen is ideological assumptions or vision adopted with respect to evolution does not seem an extreme one. Nevertheless, what is important here is that unless the content of evolutionary metaphor used is clearly laid down, this metaphor will remain at a very general level, and thus will lose its explanatory power. Therefore, the term and theories of evolution should be used cautiously. The Optimization Thesis: Evolution is not an Adaptationist Process Characterized by Functionalism. Use of the optimization principle in the evolution process is a common practice both in biology and especially in economics. The approach of Samuel Butler, who says A hen is only an egg's way of making another egg, or viewpoint of Richard

17 The Evolutionary Thought in Economics and Social Theory 17 Dawkins (1976), who asserts that each living organism's body is just a survival machine for its genes are examples to such type of adaptationist approaches. This adaptationist approach, which assumes that in general, the evolution process or natural selection process as a causal mechanism acts like an agent that seeks optimization sees evolution in a Panglossian way (Gould and Lewontin, 1979: ; Lewontin, 1991: ; Lewontin, 2007; Dawkins, 1976; Sober, 2009: Part 5). This adaptationist program seems to adopt the following fundamental assumptions (Gould and Lewontin, 1979: 151): 1) An organism is atomized into 'traits' and these traits are explained as structures optimally designed by natural selection for their functions. A story of adaptation to environmental conditions is told for each of these traits. 2) After the failure of part-by-part optimization, interaction is acknowledged via the dictum that an organism cannot optimize each part without imposing expenses on others. The notion of 'trade-off' is introduced, and organisms are interpreted as best compromises among competing demands. Therefore, evolution is truly a Panglossian process: Our world may not be good in an abstract sense, but it is the very best we could have. Each trait plays its part and must be as it is (Gould and Lewontin, 1979: 151). The following can be an (stylized) example to such evolutionary explanation : (i) Functional Thesis: The tail of cow is functional I swatting flies. (ii) Conclusion Thesis : Therefore, cows develop tail; (iii) Theoretical treatment of connection given within the thesis (Darwinian natural selection); (iv) Natural history of the case under discussion (tailless/short-tailed cows are eliminated). This perspective is based on the view that the concept of adaptation is that the external world sets certain "problems" for organisms and that evolution consists in "solving" these

18 18 TODAĐE s Review of Public Administration problems, just as an engineer designs a machine to solve a problem (Levins and Lewontin, 1985: 25). The Panglossian nature of this viewpoint can be traced through common styles of argument adopted by the adaptationist programme (Gould and Lewontin, 1979: ): 1) If one adaptive argument fails, try another; 2) If one adaptive argument fails, assume that another must exist (a weaker version of the first argument); 3) In the absence of a good adaptive argument in the first place, attribute failure to the imperfect understanding of where an organism lives and what it does; 4) Emphasize immediate utility and exclude other attributes of form. As can be seen, these strategies are used, in Popperian terms, as immunizing stratagems (Güzel, 1998) that ensure non-falsification of adaptationist explanations by any means. In this aspect, the adaptationist view is a hypothesis that by no means can be falsified just like rational election theory in neoclassical economics; its invalidation is even not desired. As Frank Hahn (1984: 1-2), one of the prominent general equilibrium theoreticians, says when he explains in which sense he accepts the label of a neo-classical economist, neo-classical economics is based on the following three methodological principles: 1) I am a reductionist in that I attempt to locate explanations in the actions of individual agents. 2) In theorizing about the agent, I look for some axioms of rationality. 3) I hold that some notion of equilibrium is required, and that the study of equilibrium is useful. These three features, i.e. reductionism (methodological individualism), the principle of optimizing behavior and equilibrium approach are basic assumptions of neoclassical economics, and its similarity to the adaptationist theory of evolution is striking. The point that is important for this subject is that the rationality postulate in the sense of conformity between ends

19 The Evolutionary Thought in Economics and Social Theory 19 and means entirely turns into an immunizing stratagem. For example, according to Austrian School economist Boland (1981: 1034), the neoclassical premise is: For all decision makers there is something they maximize. Such a statement is a metaphysical statement that is neither verifiable nor refutable. Its metaphysical status is a result of how it is used in a research program. Metaphysical statements can be false but we may never know because they are the assumptions of a research program, which are deliberately put beyond question. In such case, a consumer is not maximizing utility or a producer is not maximizing profit, this would not constitute a refutation of the neoclassical hypothesis (Boland, 1981: 1034). That is to say, rational, optimizing behavior is in fact a normative command rather than an explanatory proposition: to say that people are rational does not explain what they do, but only at best how they do it (Bhaskar, 1989: 30). But, rationality by itself does not explain a thing; it is a priori assumption of the research, and is actually a kind of proposition that determines, Schumpeter s (1954: 41-42) pre-scientific vision. Another important drawback of the adaptationist/optimizationist approach to evolution particularly in terms of social theory is its emergence coupled with the functionalist point of view. Functionalism argues that every being, organism, system, institution or social practice exists primarily to perform its assigned function. In other words, the explanation of the operation of a system is made in the context of its fulfilment of its predefined purposes or functions. In social sciences, functionalism asserts that social systems have needs ; therefore, how societies or social systems meet these needs should be determined. How an element of the society establishes the conditions that will be useful for a broader system is among the basic questions to which functionalism seeks an answer. 6 Nevertheless, it can be said that this conception of biological evolution encompasses two major problems (Levins and 7 For the functionalist thought and its criticisms, see: Hollis (1994: ); Giddens (1984: ); Little (1991: 91-93), Mahner and Bunge (2001). For a Marxist view of functionalism, see: Cohen (1978).

20 20 TODAĐE s Review of Public Administration Lewontin, 1985: 25). Firstly, it is very difficult, albeit not impossible, to clearly define the problems the external world sets for organisms; secondly, it is impossible to determine whether the solution found is actually the best solution for the problem at hand. This approach seems to believe the place we currently are in the evolution process is the best solution, which points to the implicit adoption of a teleological point of view. Along with those mentioned above, adaptationism creates other problems for social theory as well. For example, the fact that a social element, practice or system is assigned to perform certain functions does not explain the reason for its origin. 7 Functionalism may be helpful in explaining the functioning of synthetic systems designed to achieve specific purposes via certain features or processes; however, there is almost no one, who maintains that social processes, structures or relations are such types of systems. It might be helpful to discuss different forms of functionalism in order to closer look at the problems of functionalism in social theory. Functions can be classified in five groups (Mahler and Bunge, 2001): Internal (biotic) activity (Function1): the internal activity of some organismic system or subsystem, such as a tissue or an organ, is simply the set of all processes occurring in it (e.g. the uncounted biochemical reactions occurring in the liver). This notion has no evolutionary, adaptive, or teleological connotations whatsoever. The external (biotic) activity (Function2): The relations of some organismic subsystem to (or rather its interactions with) other such subsystems, or to the organism as a whole, or to the organism-in-its-environment. That is to say, the role of an organismic subsystem is what it does in the supersystem of which it is a part (e.g. the interaction of liver with other or- 8 Yet, same institution may perform more than one functions as well; this may even become a general rule: no institution ever survives its function-when it appears to do so, it is because it serves in some other function, or functions, which need not include the original one (Polanyi, 1944: 183).

21 The Evolutionary Thought in Economics and Social Theory 21 gans). This very broad concept can be restricted to that of the specific external activity. Total activity (Function3): Since the internal and external activities of some organ are often interdependent, their state of interaction (e.g. the function(ing) of the legs; both the physiological activities of the muscles and the locomotion they bring about. The functions of some organismic subsystem are valuable to the organism (like the function of the heart), while those of some are almost nil (like the appendix); Aptation (Function4): the subsystem valuable to the organism. If a function should turn out to be neutral, it is called a nullaptation or dysfunction. Adaptation (Function5): The aptedness of most activities is often not merely accidental: in most cases it will be the result of selection all adaptations are aptations, but not conversely. The aptations that cannot be retained or improved on by selection an adaptation are called malaptations. Logical relations among the concepts of function in natural sciences can be demonstrated as follows (Figure 3). Figure 3. Logical Relations Among Concepts of Function (Natural Sciences) Source: Mahner and Bunge, 2001: 79 The same relations in social sciences can be demonstrated as follows.

22 22 TODAĐE s Review of Public Administration Figure 5. Logical Relations Among Concepts of Function (Natural Sciences) Source: Mahner and Bunge, 2001: 80. Teleofunction: refers to a (relational) property of some systems performing any one function. That is, a purpose or goal may be attributed to each of the five functions distinguished above. It may be realized as individual level [ manifest function], or at system level [ latent function]. In general, forms of functionalism in social theory are as follows: (Mahner and Bunge, 2001): Formalist : Two things perform the same function; their material or compositional differences do not matter. (teleofunction1) Black Box : Two compositionally different things can perform the same external activities or roles. It disregards the inner workings of the things in question. (teleofunction 2) Adaptationist) : Every item of certain kinds serves some function ( purpose ). (teleofunction 4-5). Teleological: All socio- and technofunctions, whether or not they are aptations or adaptations, are in any case teleofunctions, in being useful to somebody or at least in being intended to be useful to individuals or groups. (teleofunction 5).

23 The Evolutionary Thought in Economics and Social Theory 23 Here, two points should be taken into consideration. First, it is clearly observed that both adaptationist and teleological forms of functionalism adopt an approach that focuses on the outcome. Despite their rather metaphysical nature, teleological approaches give the same results with the adaptationist ones. Therefore, they can easily be confused with one another. Yet more important is that the viewpoint common especially in economics is in essence an adaptationist form of functionalism, because especially rational selection theory insists on the necessity to explain individual decisions entirely by optimization, thus the adaptation process. The second point that should be considered is common preference of black box form of functionalism in economics. The reason is that the evolutionary processes that are mostly used either as analogies or metaphors in economics are perceived rather as causal mechanisms, and thus reinforce the proposed theories, or they are used in providing a scientific foundation for hypotheses generally propounded. However, the problem here is that such uses remain as black boxes. Totally, an outcome-oriented viewpoint is adopted without clearly demonstrating causal mechanisms, or how they work. These explain why such point of view is appealing especially for economics. The neoclassical economics, which also itself is an approach based on rational choice theory, has, from the beginning, acted consistently in tending to generalize the optimization principle to all human behavior, even to the nature. Especially the evolutionary argument of the theory of Invisible Hand has appealed economists, though it was actually originated from the Austrian school of economics. The major problem of such type of approaches is the Panglossian view they have adopted, which argues that an ever-harmonious social order will emerge (Özel, 2009, 2010). The adoption of nonoptimal views like Invisible Backhand (Ylikoski, 1995) or Evolutionary Hand (Dosi et al., 1988) does not seem acceptable for most economists. It once again seems possible to say that the underlying vision or ontological approaches determine the evolutionary economic or social perspectives.

24 24 TODAĐE s Review of Public Administration Intentionality Thesis: Social Evolution is not Independent of Human Intentions. Probably the most important difference between the biological world and human world is the fact that human beings are agents with intended behavior and transforming power. As selection or intention does not apply to biological organisms and processes, it is obvious that the evolution cannot be perceived as a process founded on intentions unless it is assumed that it moves towards a specific purpose. Nevertheless, this difficulty can be avoided by adopting an evolutionary approach based especially on the Aristotelian concept of nature. According to this understanding, the nature of each thing consists of its essence that defines its potentials for natural development; what each thing is when its coming into being is complete is the nature of that thing (Aristotle, 1975: 9). Hence, the process, in which the potential of the thing is realized, can be perceived as evolution. A similar viewpoint is valid when the concept of development that lies in evolution is perceived as an unfolding or unrolling of something that is already present and in some way preformed just like the process of realizing a photographic image. The image is already immanent in the exposed film, and the process of development simply makes this latent image apparent (Lewontin, 2007: 3-4). The preformationist view of the 17 th century, which maintained that the whole of humankind having been originally stored in the ovaries of Eve or in the semen of Adam, could be given as an example to it (Lewontin, 2007: 4-5; Westfall, 1998: ). When human being is in question, the unfolding of this essence and self-realization by making use of opportunities can also be perceived as an evolutionary process with powerful ethical implications. Such point of view manifests itself in Marx s evolutionary approach, who emphasizes the difference between human nature in general and human nature as modified in each historical epoch (Marx, 1976: 759n). It can be said that the starting point of Marx s theory of alienation that underlies his analysis of capitalism is his proposition that the essence of man, which he perceives as the refer-

25 The Evolutionary Thought in Economics and Social Theory 25 ence made by the innate in every human being to the whole of potentials, which determine his appropriate or natural development, with his existence under private property. To Marx, the thing that determines the essence of human being is the blend of his trait of being both particular and general, and his existence as both an individual and social being; when the term, which Marx adopted in 1844 Manuscripts, is used, man, is a species-being, not only because in practice and in theory he adopts the species (his own as well as those of other things) as his object, but and this is only another way of expressing it also because he treats himself as the actual, living species; because he treats himself as a universal and therefore a free being (Marx, 1975: 327). There are two identical meanings of why a person is a species-being: first, because of the nature of human perceptual and conceptual faculties of human lifeactivity; second, due to the human activity s being a social activity (Hunt, 1986: 97, 98). That is to say, the whole activity of man, who exists as individual and social being at the same time, including his existence, is necessarily of social nature. Therefore, society must not be considered a being independent of individuals, superior to or against them; in other words, the individual is a social being (Marx, 1975: 350). What distinguishes man from other natural beings is that his life activity or history is based on a social interaction with nature (Marx, 1975: 391). This intentional praxis of individuals towards transforming both nature, i.e. their inorganic body (Marx, 1975: 328) and themselves, according to Marx, is in fact nothing, but man s self-objectification. Man, by means of this activity, where he uses his labor, not only realizes his potentials, i.e. reveals his humanity, but also he finds himself in the product he created. Another way of avoiding the problem that might arise from the unintended consequences of the human agent s intended behavior with respect to evolution, which economist prefer most, is the hypothesis of unintended consequences of intended action (Özel, 2010). This hypothesis suggests that though human behaviors are determined by the intention of individuals, these behaviors sometimes have unintended conse-