THE GENEALOGY OF METHODOLOGY & THE METHODOLOGY OF GENEALOGY: PUTTING ACCOUNTING INTO CRISIS. ABSTRACT

Transcription

1 THE GENEALOGY OF METHODOLOGY & THE METHODOLOGY OF GENEALOGY: PUTTING ACCOUNTING INTO CRISIS. By Ken McPhail University of Glasgow Draft 2.2 (Adelaide Revisions) ABSTRACT Michel Foucault s histories and his method of genealogy have generated a considerable amount of debate in many academic disciplines and arguments about the accuracy, probity and veracity of Foucault s histories have also entered into the accounting history arena (Funnell 1996; 1998; Fleischman et al 1996; Miller, Hopper & Laughlin 1991; Parker 1999; Fleischman, Mills & Tyson 1996; Hammon & Sikka 1996; Carnegie & Napier 1996; Tyson 1993) and accounting research in general (see Neimark 1990; Armstrong 1994; Hoskin 1994; Grey 1994). This essay attempts to contribute to this debate. It presents a new interpretation of Foucault s method: a genealogical interpretation of Foucault s genealogical method. The paper suggests that genealogy differs quite fundamentally from traditional historiographical method. It is contended that the aim of genealogy is to put into crisis and therefore that applications of genealogy within accounting research should endeavour to put accounting into crisis. Acknowledgements I would like to thank Rob Gray for his help in developing the ides in this paper.

2 INTRODUCTION The work of Michel Foucault has generated a considerable amount of debate within the accounting history arena (Funnell 1996; 1998; Fleischman et al 1996; Miller, Hopper & Laughlin 1991; Parker 1999; Fleischman, Mills & Tyson 1996; Hammon & Sikka 1996; Carnegie & Napier 1996; Tyson 1993) and accounting research in general (see Neimark 1990; Armstrong 1994; Hoskin 1994; Grey 1994). This essay attempts to contribute to this debate by providing a genealogical interpretation of Foucault s genealogical method. It is quite difficult to place Foucault's method within any specific tradition. Indeed, Foucault himself resisted classification, for example, he says, 'I think I have been situated in most squares on the political checkerboard, one after another and sometimes simultaneously: as anarchist, leftist, ostentatious or disguised Marxist, nihilist, explicit or secret anti-marxist, technocrat in the service of Gaullism, new liberal, etc...it s true I prefer not to identify myself and that I'm amused by the diversity of ways I have been judged and classified, (Foucault, in Rabinow 1984; see Grey 1994) Foucault s aversion to classification is however not a personal idiosyncrasy but an integral part of his philosophy. He does not wish to promote a general method. Foucault's argument is basically that the formalisation of Method can become substituted for the uncritical and unreflective application of a series of procedures 1. Hoskin (1994) explains Foucault's argument as follows, Method comes easily to persuade researchers of their sovereign rationality and consequently to overlooking the reflexive problems of how the method itself and their own use of method is generated, (Hoskin 1994). Thus, what we have in Foucault is not so much a method as an attitude or predisposition and it is this attitude that will be discussed in this paper. A number of accounting academics have drawn on the work of Michel Foucault in order to present new and critical histories of accounting (see for example Preston 1992; Loft 1986; Miller & O Leary 1987; Hopwood 1987 and Hoskin & Macve 1988). Indeed Miller, Hooper and Laughlin (1991) suggest that such is the extent of these new approaches that one may legitimately talk of a new accounting history paradigm 2. However despite the burgeoning number of projects which have, drawn on (Preston 1992) or been inspired by (Miller & O Leary 1987; Loft 1986) Foucault s notions of genealogy and archaeology, the literature as 1 Foucault is quite close to Derrida on this point (Norris 1988). 2 Miller, Hopper & Laughlin 1991 also include new Marxist perspectives in their category of new accounting histories. 2

3 yet lacks a systematic delineation of Foucault s method of historical analysis (although see perhaps Miller & O Leary 1987, and Hopwood 1987). This paper suggests that Foucault s histories differ quite fundamentally both from traditional accounting histories and from many of the new Foucauldian studies of accounting. The paper attempts to contribute to the debate over the way in which Foucault s method has been employed within accounting research to date and in particular addresses the claim that some of these studies are conservative and lack critical impact (see Neimark 1990; Armstrong 1994; Hoskin 1994; Grey 1994). This essay links Foucault with the work of the early critical theorists and the Frankfurt School and suggests that the very essence of genealogy is to put into crisis. This link with Critical Theory is quite important. From an analysis of the accountancy literature it seems that Foucault is often deleteriously labelled a postmodernist or conservative theorist and viewed in sharp contradistinction to critical theorists and Marxist historiography (see Neimark 1990; Armstrong 1994; Hoskin 1994; Grey 1994). Habermas (1994, in Hoy 1994) for example criticises Foucault for what he perceives as his complete rejection of modernity. He condemns Foucault as a postmodernist, 'Young Conservative, enemy of the project of modernity,' (Habermas 1984, in Simons 1995). However, I believe that neither Foucault s philosophy, nor postmodernism per se simply rejects modernity. Foucault was not completely opposed to every characteristic of the enlightenment (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1994) and indeed, he personally refuted claims that he was a postmodernist 3 (Hoy 1988). This essay attempts to challenge the postmodern interpretation of Foucault s work. It will be argued that Foucault follows in the tradition of the early critical theorists, although his work also represents a fundamental break from this tradition. The paper is split into two sections. Following a short preamble, section one provides the historical context within which Foucault s method of genealogy developed and should therefore be understood. Section two considers the main characteristics of Foucault s method of genealogy. PREAMBLE Debate over the validity of a specific piece of research often appears to concentrate on the accuracy of a particular research technique and the ability of its concomitant methodology to 3 An interesting anecdote is that in an interview in Telos, Gerard Raulet asked Foucault about postmodernism. Foucault replied, 'What is postmodernism? I'm not up-to-date.' (Thanks to Scott Moor of the Foucault list for this point). 3

4 generate knowledge. This seems particularly so within the debate surrounding the new accounting histories (see for example Tyson 1993 and Funnell 1996). However, the nature of this debate perhaps belies a more fundamental set of assumptions about the function of historiography and research in general (see Parker 1999, Gaffikin 1992), i.e. that the primary objective of research is to help us understand (the past) better. The genealogical method delineated in this paper starts from the assumption that the function of research is not only to generate knowledge but to generate knowledge in a conscious attempt to change both the subject studied and our knowledge of ourselves, that is, it assumes that research should take the form of a radical praxis. Research undoubtedly plays an active role in constructing the world investigated. This may seem a rather obvious point, few people who have considered the effects of Copernicus's astronomy, Newton's physics or Darwin's biology could deny the impact of research on society (see, for example, Checkland 1990; Arrington & Francis 1989). Research into a particular issue can have quite significant social and political effects. However, apart from the more tangible consequences, research also effects society in a more subtle kind of way through the legitimation of particular ways of generating knowledge, and perhaps also the institutionalisation of specific ways of thinking. The social and political nature of research is highlighted by Galtung (1977, in Morrow & Brown 1995) when he says, Far from being universal, a methodology even contributes to the definition and maintenance of a certain social structure by being compatible with it, or to its downfall and replacement by another by being incompatible with it. Checkland (1990) suggests that scientific research in particular has had a profound effect on society and on the way we think, he says, 'More than being merely a product... science is an invention of our civilisation - a cultural invention - and it is probably the most powerful invention ever made in the whole history of mankind. Our world in the 20th century is essentially the world created by the activity of science, and not only created physically in our cities, our transportation, and our communication systems, but also created institutionally in our political and administrative procedures, in the way we organise our society. Rationalism and empiricism, twin outcomes of the Scientific Revolution of the 17th century, have influenced all our civilisation, not only its mere technology.' (Checkland 1990 pp23) The discipline of accounting history, perhaps until fairly recently, has been almost exclusively based on and legitimated by the objective, positivist methodology of science (Parker 1999; Hammond & Sikka 1996). However new accounting histories represent a challenge, not only to this approach to historiographical analysis but also to both the social and cognitive structures it helps to maintain. 4

5 Starting from the assumption that research is a social and political activity highlights the consequences of research, at least to the extent that they can be known or anticipated. This may push the debate back from epistemological issues of method, truth and knowledge to a more fundamental, ethical debate about the kind of society we want to live in, rather than producing research which consciously or otherwise acts to shore up the inequalities and inequities in the prevailing system. Arrington and Francis (1989) make this point clear when they say, The practice of accounting and theorising about the practice are always and already informed by ethics which help to create the material conditions of human life. To deny the value-ladeness of one s theorising is to deny responsibility for the consequences of your theories.' From this, similarly value laden perspective, the choice of method and methodology are essentially political and ethical decisions. It would appear that traditional accounting historians have been preoccupied with the defensibility of their analysis and the rigour of their method and perhaps little consideration has been given to the ethical justification for the study or the consequences of the interpretation provided (see Parker 1999). SECTION ONE: THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT. This section attempts to provide the context for understanding Foucault s method of genealogy. It provides some historical background to the two methodological strands that Foucault knotted together. The paper contends that Foucault s method is located at the junction of philosophical hermeneutics and Critical Theory. Without an appreciation of this context it is impossible to understand the characteristics of the genealogical method discussed in section two. Hermeneutic Philosophy The first theoretical strand that is important for understanding Foucault s method of genealogy is hermeneutics. Hermeneutics is the theory of interpretation of meaning (Audi 1995; Llewellyn 1993). Traditionally this notion was related to the interpretation of ancient texts and as such had a relatively narrow application. However hermeneutics evolved into a whole philosophical position that emerged in Germany in the twentieth century (see Audi 1995). Hermeneutics draws an analogy between the interpretation of a text and any attempts to understand social action (Llewellyn 1993). While there are a number of significantly different hermeneutical 5

6 positions within the social science literature all are characterized by an attempt to get beyond the subject-object dichotomy. The hermeneutical turn which has taken place in the broader social sciences has been manifest in the accounting literature. It has been introduced into organisational theory (Boland 1989) and management accounting theory (Llewellyn 1993) and also has been used in the analysis of accounting education (Power 1991a). Recently within the accounting history literature Fleischman et al (1996) have drawn on Gadamer s hermeneutics in their call for greater dialogue amongst the various parties in the new historiographic debate. However this methodological position has not yet been used to develop an understanding of Foucault s method of genealogy. There are two related issues here which are important to understanding the impact that hermeneutics has had on accounting research. The first issue relates to attempts which have been made to apply hermeneutics as a method for investigating accountancy (see Llewellyn 1993). The second issue relates to the, 'linguistic turn,' within hermeneutic philosophy. This linguistic aspect has been used to develop new perspectives for understanding the role that accounting plays in society. In relation to this second issue some researchers have viewed accounting as a kind of language system (see Laughlin 1981,1987; Cooper 1983; Roberts and Scapens 1985, Lavoie 1987). Boland (1989) for example stresses the importance of hermeneutics in appreciating the interpretative nature of accounting. He says, 'accountants are engaged in the interpretative act as both readers and writers of organisational texts,' however he contends that accountants have become conditioned into interpreting situations in specific ways. Laovie (1987) literally studies accountancy as the language of business. Schweiker (1993) provides a hermeneutic examination of the process of giving an account, in an attempt to stress the moral dimension of accounting. Francis (1994) studies auditing from a hermeneutic perspective and suggests that it is a hermeneutic activity (see also Manicas 1993) and Power (1991a) has introduced hermeneutics to the study of accounting education. He analyses the process of professional accounting training from a Habermasian perspective and suggests that they can be conceptualized in terms of a distorted speech situation. There are two basic divisions in hermeneutics. The first is based on the work of the German philosopher and historian Wilhelm Dilthey ( ). This approach attempts to develop hermeneutics as a method for social science research and seems to be related to the first sense in which hermeneutics is being applied within accounting research. The second strain of 6

7 hermeneutics is generally called, Hermeneutic Philosophy, and is based on the work of Martin Heidegger ( ). Foucault s method of genealogy draws on this second strain of hermeneutic philosophy. The work of the German philosopher Friedrich Schleiermacher ( ) on understanding represents the beginning of hermeneutics as it has developed from Dilthey (Audi 1995). Schleiermacher developed a method of analysis known as the hermeneutic circle. This notion is based on the observation that in social science both the researcher and the individuals being researched are connected by particular traditions and customs, essentially because they are part of the same society or community. The concept of the hermeneutic circle refers to the idea that the interpretation of a specific situation or event depends upon an interpretation of the whole social context within which the event takes place and conversely the interpretation of the whole context depends upon the interpretation of its constituent parts. The method proceeds firstly with an initial overview of the subject matter, this overview informs an examination of the parts which in turn elucidates the concept of the whole. This is repeated in an iterative process which, it is assumed, will gradually lead to a better understanding of the situation (see Llewellyn 1993; Boland 1989; Audi 1995). From this analysis it is hopefully clearer how the subject-object dichotomy is transcended within hermeneutics. Both the researcher (the subject) and the individuals being researched (the object of the study, which may be subjects) are seen to be linked together to the extent that both belong to a generally similar cultural and historical tradition. The differences in the understanding of both the researcher and the object of his/her research are mutually exposed and reconciled in the course of the research. As such, this approach is significantly different to the empirico-scientific approach described above. From a hermeneutic perspective, the study of society is seen as an endless process of reassessment rather than a transition from ignorance to truth, as is characteristically the case within positivist research (Bauman 1978). Bauman (1978) describes the hermeneutic circle as a process where understanding is seen to go in circles rather than in a linear process towards progressive enlightenment. In hermeneutics, there is no correct place from which to begin or end. The strain of hermeneutics that emanates from Dilthey s work is generally called, 'Hermeneutic Theory' (as opposed to, Hermeneutic Philosophy, which will be described later, see Audi 1995). Hermeneutic Theory is concerned with the problem of how an individual can objectively understand meaning (Bleicher 1980) and, as such, still represents what seems to 7

8 be a fairly innocuous attempt to increase understanding. Within this type of hermeneutic analysis, it is assumed that any situation has a meaning independent from the act of interpreting the situation (Winograd & Flores 1987). Thus, while it is important to note the fundamental differences between hermeneutics and scientific methodology, it is also important to note that this particular form of hermeneutics seems to remain a neutral tool for generating a better understanding of things. As such, both science and Hermeneutic Theory may be seen to have generally similar aspirations, although, as we have seen above, the way in which they attempt to achieve them is fundamentally different. The second strain of hermeneutics is generally termed philosophical hermeneutics and is associated with the work of Martin Heidegger. Heidegger elaborates his philosophical hermeneutics at two levels. Firstly, he contends that the nature of being lies not in the essence of the thing itself but rather lies in the structures within which things are situated and which create the space for them to be. However in the second part of his thesis Heidegger suggests that the, 'deep truth,' behind our partial and taken-for-granted interpretations is just more interpretation, an 'unsettling groundlessness,' (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982). Thus, from this perspective Freud s contention that consciousness is somehow underpinned by the libido and Marx argument that consciousness is underpinned by economic structures are exposed as just more interpretation (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982). Thus in Heidegger the notion of the hermeneutic circle is radicalized such that it is taken to apply to everyday life and interpretations of the deep meanings behind everyday life. Hermeneutic philosophy has been developed by Hans-Georg Gadamer (see Vattimo 1988; Bleicher 1980; see also Boland s 1989 analysis of the work of Gadamer and its implications for organisational theory). In Gadamer s work hermeneutics is conceptualised not as a method of investigation (as in Dilthey s Hermeneutic Theory) but as a characteristic of all knowledge and as such a feature of everyday life (see Audi 1995). Gadamer develops the second major contribution Heidegger has made to hermeneutics (see Bleicher 1980). Heidegger provides a link between being and language (Vattimo 1988). This aspect of Hermeneutic philosophy is particularly important for understanding Foucault s notion of the construction of the self through discourse. Heidegger s famous dictum, 'the being that can be understood is language,' is developed by Gadamer. Gadamer explains that when Heidegger said that, language is the house of being, he meant that, 'it is not so much a matter of showing that every experience of the world is made possible for the individual by the possession of language; language is not that which the individual speaks but rather that which speaks the individual,' (Vattimo 1988). 8

9 Gadamer contends that the problem of language is the most crucial issue in hermeneutics. He presents language not as an objectification or a system of symbols that we use 4 but, using terminology similar to Heidegger s, he says language is, 'that which speaks to us,' (Bleicher 1980). Like Heidegger, Gadamer views the hermeneutic circle as characteristic of all knowledge and activity (Boland 1989; Bleicher 1980; see also Winograd & Flores 1987; Fleischman et al 1996). Gadamer (1975, 1976) contends that we are confronted everyday by an essentially meaningless world that we immanently make meaningful. He says, 'the world must be interpreted by us if we are to engage in purposive action in it.' However he also contends that the way in which we make the world meaningful is an historic act and therefore that our cognition is unavoidably prejudiced and biased. Gadamer places considerable emphasis on the role that language plays both as the location within which we ascribe meaning to things and also as the harbinger of bias. For Gadamer language is the place where the, collective ethos of a historically determined society, is manifested 4. He suggests that language encapsulates the cultural history of a particular society and embodies the shared world (or collective consciousness) of the members of that society (Thompson 1981). Gadamer thus construes language as more than just the faculty of speaking. Gadamer's ideas on language may be taken as referring to, a kind of collective consciousness, which, although it serves as a basis for our judgments, is not always fully apparent to us, (Vattimo 1988). This short analysis of Gadamer s contribution to the hermeneutic tradition hopefully clarifies the notion and objectives of the hermeneutic circle. Both the researcher and the researched are seen to be participants in a historically generated language. In his philosophy, the hermeneutic process involves a situation whereby the two horizons, that of the researcher and the researched are, fused together (Outhwaite 1994). Gadamer construes understanding as a continuing historical process in which, 'prejudices are challenged and horizons broadened,' (Audi 1995). At this boundary, or horizon, to use Gadamer s terminology, where world views meet, it is assumed that prejudices will be revealed and subsequently, that we will become aware of the constraints they place on our thinking (Winograd & Flores 1987). 4 Language has always been an important aspect of hermeneutic thinking. Dilthey, for example, highlighted the importance of the role that language plays in understanding. He contended that language is not a system of logical relationships, as some linguistic theory assumes, and therefore that the interpretation of meaning can not be reduced to the search for and study of simple linguistic rules. 9

10 Gadamer argues that to present the world in this way means that understanding is not the terminus we reach when all influence and bias is eliminated, as is assumed in positive science 5, rather it is, 'a moving dialectic that always takes place anew at the horizon of our prejudice,' (Boland 1989). Indeed hermeneutics suggests that progress or understanding is made when individuals discuss their interpretations and attempt to understand the differences between them 6. Foucault s work was undoubtedly influenced by his reading of Heidegger. Eribon (1989) for example recounts how Foucault had once commented: I still have here the notes I took when I was reading Heidegger. I ve got tons of them! And they are much more important than the ones I took on Hegel or Marx. My entire philosophical development was determined by my reading of Heidegger. Foucault s work draws on philosophical hermeneutics in two important respects. Firstly his work is both influenced and characterised by the unsettling groundlessness of Heidegger s philosophical hermeneutics. Foucault s work seems to rest on the premise that the, 'deep truth,' behind our partial and taken-for-granted interpretations is just more interpretation. His work paradoxically represents a shift from a search for deep truth to the study of interpretations or the study of truths or knowledge. Foucault is interested in how certain interpretations have come to dominate in an almost haphazard way and how they are sustained through networks of power relations. He also attempts to show the groundlessness of these prevailing interpretations 7 (see Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982). Foucault s method of genealogy represents a conscious attempt to replace the prevailing social structure with something else, if only temporarily. Foucault s work also draws heavily on Heiddeger s dictum that, the being that can be understood is language. Echos of Heidegger can be heard in Foucault s contention that subjectivity is constructed through discourse. The links between Foucault and philosophical hermeneutics are deveoped in more detail in the second section under the heading, genealogy is interpretation. 5 Gadamer's examination of prejudice and tradition is situated within his critique of positive science. Even those scientific techniques which appear most neutral are set within a nexus of traditions and prejudices (see Bleicher 1980). 6 Habermas suggests that hermeneutic understanding is incomplete because it fails to recognise that language is not just a means of communication but is also used as a medium for control and domination (Outhwaite 1995). 7 There are of course contradictions in Foucault s position. However, he recognises this and in an attempt to remain consistent attempt to deligitimise his own interpretation. 10

11 However, while Foucault's work draws heavily on Heideggers philosophical hermeneutics it also represents a radical departure from the hermeneutic tradition. Foucault s position was essentially takes us beyond hermeneutics (see Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982). His work differs from philosophical hermeneutics on a number of accounts. Firstly, while hermeneutics replaces the Cartesian line with a spiral both tend upwards, having pretensions of progress and development. Foucault brought into question the enlightenment tenet of progress (see Hoy 1994). Secondly Foucault s method of genealogy is more critical than hermeneutics, it searches for strategies of power and the interests served by specific dominant interpretations. Finally, Foucault s position is different because he changed the focus of attention from language to discourse. Marxism & Critical Theory The second major methodological strand that is important for understanding Foucault s method of genealogy is Critical Theory. This section commences by highlighting four aspects of Marxist theory that are critical for understanding the development of Critical Theory and Foucault s genealogical position 8. These aspects are praxis; historical materialism; dialectics and immanent critique. Praxis The notion of praxis has a long history which dates back to the work of Aristotle (Audi 1994). Within Marxist theory it has two related meanings. The first aspect is summed up in Marx moral exhortation to, 'not only interpret the world but also to change it.' (Roderick 1986). As such Marx contends that there should be a close correlation between theory and practice. Contemporary analysis of the notion of praxis goes even further in challenging the distinction between theory and practice. It is suggested that praxis pre-dates and pre-empts theory and is not simply the application of it. The second aspect of praxis relates to Marx belief that human beings act upon the world, that is they work. In particular, Marx links praxis with the economic system of production and exchange which is set up within society to meet human needs (Abercrombie et al 1994; Audi 1995). Within contemporary philosophy, the notion of praxis is seen to be related more to communication and discourse than a specific system of 8 Having said this however, there are so many different interpretations of Marx s work that any attempt to identify even the most basic elements of his thinking, particularly by someone not trained in philosophy, is bound to be simplistic and partial. 11

12 production, as the discussion of hermeneutics above has indicated. Foucault s method of genealogy is more specifically related to the first sense of praxis. Historical Materialism & Dialectics The second important issue is Marx notion s of historical materialism. Marx quite fundamentally rejected any possibility of a world of ideas beyond the material world. He also rejected materialism because of its deterministic view of individuals. Instead Marx combines materialism with his belief in the historically changing nature of human agency. Marx 9 believed that our understanding of the world, our actions and our perceptions of our needs all result from social-historical processes (Roderick 1986; Poster 1984) and in particular he suggested that there was a direct correlation between individual class consciousness and the role individuals play in the economic system. The importance of the notion of historical materialism will hopefully be more apparent when we remember the arguments made within Gadamer s form of hermeneutic philosophy. Gadamer argued that the language of our collective consciousness is the outcome of historical processes. From a Marxian perspective, this historical process is characterised by struggle, particularly the struggle between classes 10. Marx believed this conflict was attributable to the actual material structure of society, a structure that was both determined by and reflected in the mode of production. Marx's dialectic relates to the contradictions found in the struggle between classes. He believed that the process of history does not follow strict logical laws but was the outcome of class conflict. There are three aspects of dialectics which are pertinent to the ensuing discussion (see Poster 1984): Firstly, dialectics contains the notion of progress. Through the dialectical process, progress is made towards the resolution of conflict and contradiction. Secondly, in order for this to happen, Marx depends on individuals who will recognise the contradictions within society and act to resolve them; and finally, if the 8 In some forms of Marxism, what Roderick (1986) calls, Scientific Marxism, there is a rigid and deterministic correlation between the mode of production (the base) and ideology, or false consciousness (the superstructure), such that the relationship is assumed to be governed by laws. From this perspective, human agency becomes subsumed within the structures of society (Roderick 1986). 10 It is important to note in passing the relationship between historical materialism and Foucault s methods of analysis. The fact that Foucault called what he was doing archeology and genealogy (two notions with obvious historical connotations) is not without significance. 12

13 contradictions are not acted upon, then this means that the members of the dominated class are characterised by a false consciousness. Immanent Critique The final issue of importance is the notion of immanent critique (or internal critique). Because Marx claimed that reason itself was shaped by the struggle between classes through history and the mode of production, this apparently removes the ability of reason to act as a basis for critique (Poster 1984). The method of immanent critique represents an attempt to try and get round this problem. Immanent critique is a method of criticism that proceeds only by appealing to those values actually found in a given social and historical context. As such, it does not require an external basis (Poster 1984). Critical Theory Marxist theory was developed by the Early Critical Theorists and the Frankfurt School. Towards the end of the 19th century Germany experienced a rapid development in capitalism. It was within this milieu that a social research institution, now commonly known as the Frankfurt School, was established. The institution was deliberately set up outside the academic community and was not initially associated with any university. This was because the members of the Frankfurt School believed that the universities had become too conservative. Indeed, the aims and work of the institute represented a concerted attempt to, 're-engage learning.' The early theorists who worked at the institute believed that the rapid expansion of capitalism was having a deleterious effect on society. They argued that one way to combat this malaise was through education but suggested that in order to realize its potential, education first had to, 're-engage' with learning. The important point to highlight here is that the Frankfurt School was set up during a period when capitalism was flourishing. The early theorists contended that a proper understanding of society required a broader kind of analysis than Marxism offered. They suggested that a form of analysis 11 was required that incorporated ideas from different branches of the social sciences and they subsequently 11 The school engaged in research which combined theoretical and empirical inquiry based on a materialist perspective. 13

14 attempted to reinterpret Marx. They argued this was essential because the nature of society had changed such that it did not fit into the old Marxist categories. They were particularly concerned with the non-revolutionary nature of the proletariat and, in an attempt to try and understand this characteristic of capitalist societies, changed their focus of attention away from the working class towards culture and power in general (Rose 1978; Poster 1984). They attempted to reconceptualise the Marxist perspective of the individual particularly in his/her relationship to the economic system of production (Poster 1984) and in doing so they incorporated developments within the field of psychology into their critical analysis of society. Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse and Theodor Adorno were amongst the most prominent early critical theorists. Their work, which was primarily an analysis of western reason, represents what has been called the, 'rational turn,' in Critical Theory. This was the first of two theoretical turns within Critical Theory. The second turn can be found in the work of Jurgen Habermas and relates to the incorporation of the study of language into social critique (see Wolin 1992). The early critical theorists studied reason for two reasons. Firstly, they studied reason because it seemed as though the notion of class struggle had been eclipsed and they wanted to investigate the way in which the working classes had apparently been psychologically and culturally integrated into the capitalist system. They also studied reason because they believed that, 'western rationalism,' was responsible for the political malaise. The early critical theorists incorporated Max Weber s work on rationality into Marxist analysis. As I suggested above this was essentially related to the problem of revolution or more specifically the lack of it. The problem was that according to orthodox Marxist theory the economic conditions existed that should have resulted in a revolution. However, this was not the case, the revolution had not happened. Horkheimer and Adorno, and later Marcuse, argued that orthodox Marxism did not fully explain the, 'subjective conditions, (consciousness) that were also required for revolution (Roderick 1986). These issues were originally developed by a number of intellectuals who are generally considered to be the predecessors to the Frankfurt School. This group includes, for example, Lukacs and Gramsci, amongst others, and they have become known as the, Western Marxists. These theorists suggested that the capitalist system had somehow managed to subjugate the revolutionary consciousness of the working class. 14

15 In The Dialectic of the Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer argued that western reason was partly to blame for this impasse 12. Their argument was based on Max Weber s notion of, the paradox of reason. Weber believed that, 'our increasing degree of instrumental mastery over the natural and social world,' had been achieved at the cost of freedom. Adorno and Horkheimer represented the enlightenment tenet of progress as increasing domination. Wolin (1992) says, 'Benjamin's notion of history as the incessant process of ruination and decline appears to be a determinant influence on the thinking of Adorno and Horkheimer. Adorno and Horkheimer argued that liberation could only be realised through a complete break from western instrumental reason (Roderick 1986). However, their argument obviously has significant repercussions for the possibility of immanent critique. Marx had suggested that critique could be based on values within society, like freedom and justice. However, Horkheimer and Adorno argued that even those kinds of notions (freedom & justice) were being reinterpreted within a capitalist framework. They contended that this form of critique may no longer be possible if, as they believed, capitalism had been able to legitimate itself not only through recourse to social values like justice and equity but through the rise in the material standard of living. In other words they argued that capitalism self legitimates. This view of rationalism ultimately creates problems for the critical theorists for by equating reason with domination they undercut both their own analysis and their objective of disillusionment and empowerment. Wolin (1992) sums up this problem nicely when he says, 'when enlightenment becomes equated with, myth, and domination, the project of human emancipation (and the goal of liberal education) renounces its most essential means: rational reflection and critical thinking. Without them the whole project of human emancipation descends into esoterics.' (Wolin 1992). However the problem remains how can critique proceed if reason has been completely coopted? Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse had three different responses to this problem. Horkheimer turned to religion, viewing it as, one of the last repositories of hope beyond a society dominated by instrumental reason, (Wolin 1992). Adorno's approach to the problem was to turn from reason to aesthetics as an alternative way of knowing (Wolin 1992; Poster 1984). Adorno believed that art may be considered an alternative vehicle for conveying knowledge and truth. He argued that art conveys knowledge, not through clarity of analysis and argument, as in instrumental reasoning, but rather through images, sounds and colour. It is important for 12 Adorno and Horkheimer fused Nietzsche and Weber together (See Rose 1978) and this is particularly important for understanding Foucault. 15

16 understanding the analysis of Foucault s work that a few characteristics of Adorno's aesthetics are highlighted. Adorno distinguished between contemporary pop-art which he believed was intended to convey irrationality and non-meaning and other forms of art. His theory of aesthetics is associated with earlier forms of art which attempt to convey meaning and understanding. Indeed, he warns that contemporary art is dangerously close to turning into, a vehicle of affirmation, that is the uncritical mirror image of the happy consciousness of late capitalism (see Wolin 1992; Rookmaaker 1994). Where Horkheimer turns to religion and Adorno turns to art, Marcuse turns to the imagination. He argues that imagination plays a crucial role in social change. Wolin (1992) explains that, By virtue of its capacity to take the materials with which it is provided in the here and now and refashion them according to the demands of the spirit, the imagination serves as a harbinger of an emancipated sensibility, Another attempt to deal with the problem of foundations for critique is found in the work of Habermas. Habermas attempts to salvage reason through his concept of, the ideal speech situation, (Wolin 1992). He objects to the way in which reason was presented as totally coopted within the early critical theorists analysis and fears that this perspective disregards may of the good aspects of modernity, like (intellectual) progress, enlightenment and development 13 (Wolin 1992). Wolin, (1992) contends that of all the poststructualrist philosophers, Foucault s project seems closest to the early critical theorists 14. He says, Foucault and the early critical theorists share not only a common set of methodological concerns but share other concerns as well, particularly the mechanisms of domination and power, (Wolin 1992). Indeed, Poster (1984) claims that Foucault not Habermas is the main hope for advancing Critical Theory! (see also Wolin 1992). 13 Foucault, on the other hand, resorts to aesthetics (Simons 1995). Foucault s notion of aesthetics is, however, different from Adorno s. He emphasises the role of unreason in art and can be seen to use this artistic approach in his critiques of rationality. 14 Work by Mark Poster (1984, 1989, 1990) has attempted to appropriate postmodernist themes into Critical Theory (see Morrow & Brown 1994). This perspective is based on the belief that both modernism and postmodernism on their own are essentially incomplete, but when taken together both positions could potentially inform each other and perhaps negate their worst excesses (Aronowitz & Giroux 1991). Morrow & Brown (1994) explain that Poster draws mainly on the work of Foucault in his attempts to combine modern and postmodern themes. It is of course not inconsequential that Poster uses Foucault s work as the basis for his argument. 16

17 Foucault made the association between his own work and the work of the early critical theorists himself towards the end of his life (Morrow & Brown 1994). He situates his own agenda firmly in line with the critical theorists contending that we must embrace, critical thought that will take the form of an ontology of ourselves, an ontology of the present; it is this form of philosophy that, from Hegel, through Nietzsche and Max Weber, to the Frankfurt School, has founded a form of reflection in which I have tried to work. (Foucault,in Wolin 1992) Foucault thus suggested that there was a profound affinity between his method of genealogy and the critique of instrumental reason that Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse had been involved in. Foucault wasn t really introduced to critical theory until after May 1968 (Poster 1984). His education had exposed him to different influences. Indeed, he complained that his lecturers had not address the Frankfurt School, and suggested that this body of work would have been helpful to him. Poster (1984, see also Smart 1994) argues that after May 1968 Foucault carried out a clarification of his ideas based on the work of the Western Marxists. The reason why the 1968 revolution had such an effect on Foucault was because it was different from what Marxist theory predicted. The revolution took place at all levels of society. The demands that were being made were for a more fundamental participation and creative role within society in general and not just for an equal share in the material produce of capitalism (Poster 1984). It was after this event that Foucault began to focus more explicitly on the relationship between power and knowledge (Poster 1984). Foucault was interested in the way in which power normalized individuals, constructing them as docile bodies. The parallels between this aspect of Foucault s work and the Frankfurt schools critique of instrumental reason are hopefully quite obvious. However, there are also some important and quite fundamental differences. Foucault s ideas on power represent a fundamental advance in the study of rationality and also the possibility of resistance. Foucault changed the focus from the study of the negative effects of power (i.e. rationality as domination in Horkheimer and Adorno s emancipation/domination dialectic), away from the notion of reason as repression and developed a notion of power as a formative force that shaped and constituted individuals (Poster 1984). Foucault studied the way in which subjectivity was created through discourse. The relationship between Foucault s work and Critical theory is developed in section two below under the subheadings genealogy is the study of power; genealogy is dialectics; genealogy is critique and genealogy is praxis. Foucault s study of power is viewed as an extension of the project undertaken by the early critical theorists and the critical 17

18 interpretations (Foucault s praxis) that he uses to generate dialectical tension are explored more fully. The two methodological strands briefly discussed in this section provide the context for understanding Foucault s method of genealogy. The characteristics of Foucault s genealogical method can only be understood if it is seen to emerge from a combination of hermeneutic philosophy and critical theory. The following section explains Foucault s histories in more detail. SECTION TWO: FOUCAULT S METHOD OF GENEALOGY. This section delineates Foucault s method of historical analysis. After a brief consideration of the different domains of analysis in Foucault s work, ten characteristics of his form of historiography are discussed in some detail. Three distinct arenas of analysis can be found in Foucault s work: an analysis of systems of knowledge; an analysis of power; and an analysis of the way in which individuals discipline themselves (Davidson 1994; Prado 1995). Foucault employed three different modes of analysis to study each of these three domains: archaeology, for analysing systems of knowledge; genealogy, for analysing power; and ethics, for analysing how individuals construct themselves as ethical subjects (Foucault in Rabinow 1994; Davidson 1994; Smart 1985; McPhail 1999). Foucault used his method of archeology to study discourses. Archeology does not attempt to reveal the hidden meaning behind discourse but rather has three different objectives (see Smart 1985). Firstly, the Foucauldian archeologist studies the structure of discourse. Secondly, they investigate the factors that contribute to the existence of a discourse and the conditions under which the discourse continues to exist in the same form. And finally, they attempt to study the effects of discourse. Rather than investigate what was known (history) or how knowledge is possible (epistemology), Foucault focused on how fields of discourse or knowledge are structured and the effect these structures have on human beings (Major-Poetzl 1983). Genealogy is Foucault s second mode of analysis. The difference between archeology and genealogy is that where as archeology appeared to be more of an objective description, genealogy explicitly considers the role that power plays in the structure of discourse (Smart 1985). Genealogy represents a more overt commitment to critique and the analysis of power. 18

19 Finally, Foucault s notion of ethics involves the relationship to oneself, or, 'ethical self understanding,' but this is not detached from the other two areas of study (Foucault in Rabinow 1994) Simons 1995). Thus after Foucault had studied the way in which the social sciences construct individuals as both objects and subject s, his attention turned to focus more specifically on how individuals discipline themselves as ethical subjects (see Hoy 1994; Hacking 1994; Davidson 1994). There is some dubiety and debate as to whether these three methods of analysis represent breaks in Foucault s thought and changes in direction or whether they represent developments in his thought and are essentially related (See Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982; Hoskin 1994; Megill 1985). For the purposes of this essay, archaeology, genealogy and ethics are considered to be complementary (see Prado 1995). The remainder of the paper considers some of the characteristics of genealogy. The object is not to disregard archeology and ethics but to take the essential elements of them and combine them with a genealogical perspective as I think Foucault does. The salient elements are presented first and these are followed by a more detailed discussion. The main characteristics are as follows (see Dreyfuss & Rabinow 1982): 1. genealogy is empirical; 2. genealogy is opposed to conventional historical method; 3. genealogy is critique; 4. genealogy is interpretive; 5. genealogies are based on an analysis of the present; 6. genealogy attempts to combine the analysis of power and knowledge and actively looks for strategies of power; 7. genealogy focuses on surface events and avoids the search for deep meanings; 8. the genealogist attempts to view from a distance, to present a broad, general picture. 9. genealogy is praxis 10. genealogy is dialectical Genealogy is Empirical The first important characteristic of Foucault's genealogical method is that it is empirical 15 (Hoy 1988). Indeed, Foucault describes genealogy as, 'gray, meticulous, and patiently 14 The issue of the role of empirical research in critical accounting has been addressed recently by Laughlin (1995). He explains how changes have taken place in accounting research since the 1970's 19

20 documentary,' (Foucault 1977, in Prado 1995). His genealogies are based on similar kinds of documentary evidence as traditional methods of archive analysis and, as such, Foucault s genealogies claimed the, status of knowledge,' (Davidson 1994). While some of the new accounting histories may tend to place greater emphasis on the interpretation over the facts (see Tyson 1995), it is hard to see how the same charge could be made against Foucault. He may have looked in different places for the facts and he may have interpreted those facts in an unusual way, but his histories were always characterised by lots of historical digging (Merquior 1985). Genealogy is Opposed to Conventional Historical Method. However, while it is true that Foucault used a conventional method of historical investigation, it is important to point out that Foucault's genealogies are not an objective form of historical analysis. Neimark (1990) seems to suggest this when she argues that Foucault, 'resurrects a form of value-free analysis that had previously been rejected in critiques of conventional social sciences.' However, Foucault s method is not objective (Poster 1984). Despite its apparent objectivity genealogy is actually a reaction against traditional forms of historical analysis (Smart 1985). Foucault challenges the way in which conventional methods attempt to, 'search for the exact essence of things.' This charactristic represents one of the major tensions between old and new accounting histories (see Miller, Hopper & Laughlin 1991; Carnegie & Napier 1996; Funnell 1996; 1998; Fleischman 1996). Fiction Scientific methodology is characterised by a belief that it is possible to gradually refine the method of analysis as earlier erroneous theory is replaced by later, more sophisticated, truer ones (Hoy 1994). Foucault rejects this position. His archaeology of the human sciences is an attempt to show that this notion of progressive enlightenment is false (but see Armstrong 1994). Similarly, Davidson (1994) contends that Foucault s later genealogical works are not an attempt to, 'erect shining epistemological foundations,' but rather attempt to show that what we take to be knowledge is actually rooted in power (but see Merquior 1985 and Said 1983 in Neimark 1990). because normative ideas were not taken up and used in practice. He argues that empirical research in accounting is now of central importance and explains that this has arisen as a consequence of a need for a better descriptive understanding of how accounting currently functions in society. He argues that this greater understanding is to be used in the development of more appropriate normative systems. Copper (1981, in Laughlin 1995) says, '...only through a well grounded understanding of how systems operate can we prescribe how accounting systems should be changed.' 20