HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY AND CONCEPTUAL CARTOGRAPHY

Transcription

1 Analytic Philosophy Vol. 58 No. 2 June 2017 pp HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY AND CONCEPTUAL CARTOGRAPHY NATHANIEL GOLDBERG Washington and Lee University There are many reasons for philosophers who are not historians of philosophy to study the history of philosophy. Those reasons include avoiding reinventing the wheel, recognizing the historical contingency of their own views, and appreciating their historical roots. There are also many reasons for them not to study the history of philosophy. These reasons include avoiding existing wheels that may also transport scientific inaccuracies or moral repugnancies, recognizing that the historical contingency of every view does not mean that the historical roots of every view must be made explicit, and appreciating intradisciplinary division of labor. My aim in this paper is not to answer whether philosophers who are not historians of philosophy should study the history of philosophy. That answer is complicated and deserves more space than available here. My aim is instead to articulate and argue for a modest use to which philosophers who are not historians of philosophy might put the history of philosophy. Thus even those who are not historians of philosophy have reason not to dismiss that history. Moreover, though the use is modest, apparently no one else has articulated or argued for it explicitly. The use for the history of philosophy that I have in mind is in conceptual cartography. Some topics demand detailed analyses, others analyses that are more programmatic. The present topic demands both. Hence, while I do offer specific formulations of specific claims, I also cast a wide net at the issues in play. In 1 I explain what I mean by conceptual cartography. In 2 I explain what I mean by using the history of philosophy in conceptual cartography. In 3 I discuss how and why one might use the history of philosophy as such. In 4 I consider objections. In 5 I conclude. 1. Conceptual Cartography Roughly, geography sans qualification may be defined as the study of the physical environment and human interactions with it. Cartography may itself then be defined as the practice of depicting that environment or, as one cartography textbook puts it, the making and study of maps (Robinson, Morrison, Muehrche, Kimerling, and Guptill 1995, 9). While some (Crampton 2010, 42) argue that map 119 Analytic Philosophy Vol. 58 No. 2

2 itself has no definition, let us follow that textbook in defining a map as a graphic representation of the geographic setting (Robinson, et al., 9). 1 A graphic representation moreover presupposes graphicacy. While literacy is a way of communicating with written language, and articulacy is a way of communicating with spoken language, graphicacy is a way of communicating with drawings, paintings, plans, and diagrams (9). Maps employ graphicacy by choosing objects in the environment, selecting relevant features of those objects, and then systematically transforming those features into signs that stand for them. The relevant features might include distances between objects, as well as their individual size, composition, temperature, economic output, languages spoken, or others. The transformations involve scaling down these objects proportionally to one another (10 11). Recently cartographers have begun taking a philosophical stance toward their discipline. Denis Wood (1992) emphasizes the interestspecificity of maps (passim) and conjectures that the way in which children draw hills matches the way in which hill signs developed historically (ch. 6). John Brian Harley (2001) applies Michel Foucault s analysis of power to map construction and Jacque Derridas notion of deconstruction to the map genre (passim), and asks whether there can be an ethics of maps (ch. 7). Jeremy W. Crampton (2010) relies on Foucault s notion of discourse and Immanuel Kant s notion of critique to explain cartography and graphic information science; the latter studies systems that capture, display, manipulate, and store geographic information. Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther (2016), himself a philosopher, expands philosophical reflections on cartography to graphic information science more broadly, discussing elements of digital map generalization. While geography sans qualification may be the study of the physical environment and human interactions with it, we might understand conceptual geography as the study of the conceptual environment and such interactions. Conceptual cartography and conceptual maps might themselves be understood correlatively. Let me specify further what I mean by conceptual cartography per se by building on what Gilbert Ryle means by logical geography (1949/2000, intro) and later cartography (1962/2009). In introducing his approach to the philosophy of mind, Ryle mentions mental concepts (or predicates): careful, stupid, logical, unobservant, ingenious, vain, methodical, credulous, witty, self-controlled and a thousand others (1949/2000, lix lx). He then explains: 1 See John Brian Harley (2001, 35) for an alternative definition inspired by Michel Foucault, which questions the notion of representation. Though Denis Wood (1992) accepts the above definition (1), he nevertheless maintains that all maps, inevitably, unavoidably, necessarily embody the authors prejudices (24). I broadly agree with Wood but regard such prejudices more as interests. 120

3 It is, however, one thing to know how to apply such concepts, quite another to know how to correlate them with one another and with concepts of other sorts. Many people can talk sense with concepts but cannot talk sense about them; they know by practice how to operate with concepts, anyhow inside familiar fields, but they cannot state the logical regulations governing their use. (lx) Whether or not many people actually can talk sense with but not about concepts, Ryle is right that the skills differ. Being able to say that a ripe tomato is red differs from being able to say that nothing totally red can simultaneously be totally blue. The former presupposes knowing, as an empirical matter, that red applies to tomatoes. The latter presupposes knowing, as a conceptual matter, that red and blue cannot simultaneously be applied in totality to objects. According to Ryle, talking about concepts (or expressing propositions making conceptual claims) engages in logical geography: To determine the logical geography of concepts is to reveal the logic of the propositions in which they are wielded, that is to say, to show with what other propositions they are consistent and inconsistent, what propositions follow from them and from what propositions they follow. (lx) That an object is totally red is inconsistent with its simultaneously being totally blue. It follows from these (or these entails), as a conceptual matter, that an object can be either totally red or totally blue but not both simultaneously. That in turn follows (or is entailed by) both red s and blue s being a color, which is a visual property of objects surfaces. Later Ryle (1962/2009) redescribes the distinction between talking sense with and talking about concepts in terms of concepts being operated with and being operated on (437, original emphases in all quotations passim), respectively. We operate with red when we apply it to tomatoes. We operate on red when we determine that nothing totally red can simultaneously be totally blue. 2 Ryle describes an inhabitant of a village who knows well every house, field, stream, road and pathway in the neighbourhood and is, for the first time, asked to draw or consult a map of his village (440 41). Such an inhabitant is to operate not only with but also on his knowledge of the village. He has, so to speak, to translate and therefore to re-think his local topographical knowledge into universal cartographical terms (441). Local topographical knowledge of concepts concerns talking sense, or operating, with them. For Ryle, a conceptual villager would be any competent speaker of a language. Universal cartographical knowledge of 2 Ryle redescribes the distinction in terms of concrete and abstract assertions, respectively, and analyzing adverbs and nouns, respectively, as well (1962/2009, 438). 121

4 concepts concerns talking about, or operating on, them. A conceptual cartographer would be a philosopher. My notion of conceptual cartography extends Ryle s notion of logical geography, and later cartography, in three ways. First, while Ryle intends logical geography or cartography to apply to ordinarylanguage concepts, I intend conceptual cartography to apply to ordinary-language as well as philosophical ones. While Ryle would have philosophers analyze concepts expressed by predicates such as careful, stupid, and logical, I would have them analyze concepts expressed by predicates such as empiricist, rationalist, and transcendentalist ; contractarian and libertarian ; and if not a thousand then at least many others. These concepts are entire philosophical views. As a logical behaviorist, Ryle might have trouble analyzing empiricist, but such trouble would not differ in kind from analyzing careful. Though I am neutral on different accounts of concepts, any such account must allow sensory predicates, such as red, behavioral predicates, such as careful, and philosophical predicates, such as empiricist, all to express concepts since they all do. Behavioral and philosophical predicates may or may not reduce without remainder to primitive predicates, nor may sensory predicates be primitive. Regardless let us regard concepts as whatever is expressed by predicates of any kind. Whatever is so expressed might be behavioral dispositions (as Ryle wanted), Fregean senses, causal-theoretical referents, functions from possible worlds, speaker s intentions as or as not recognized by audiences, moves in a language game, or something else. However construed, concepts are the epistemological correlate of meanings. Just as red, careful, and empiricist each possesses meaning, however construed, each likewise expresses a concept, however primitive or complex. Second, while Ryle s logical geography or cartography limits the relevant relations between concepts to the logical ones of consistency and entailment, conceptual cartography includes these logical relations and other conceptual ones also. Roughly, empiricist describes the view, or someone holding the view, that all significant knowledge derives from experience; rationalist, that all such knowledge derives from reason; and transcendentalist (of the Kantian or neo-kantian sort), that, though all knowledge starts with experience, it does not thereby derive from experience. Transcendentalism, the view, is therefore inconsistent with both rationalism and empiricism, the views, and neither entails nor is entailed by the others. Yet transcendentalism also relates to rationalism and empiricist differently by incorporating different elements of each. It does so by promulgating a more complicated model of knowledge than either of the others, (at least) bifurcating starting conditions from derivation. While consistency and entailment relations exist among transcendentalism, rationalism, and empiricism, philosophically fruitful comparisons among all three require conceptual tools more robust than the merely logical. 122

5 And third, while Ryle s logical geography or cartography is meant to clarify confusion in and resolve tension between concepts, conceptual cartography as a form of cartography involves making maps. Conceptual cartographers choose objects, or concepts, in the conceptual environment, selecting relevant logical and extralogical features of those concepts, and then systematically transforming those features into signs or objects in conceptual space that stand for them. The relevant features might include similarities and differences the distances between the concepts themselves as well as individual properties of particular conceptual interest. The transformations involve scaling down those objects proportionally to one another. Ryle compares those who do not know how to talk about concepts to people who know their way about their own parish, but cannot construct or read a map of it (1949/2000, lx). Conceptual cartography analyzes logical and extralogical relations among concepts and in turn constructs maps that those or other people can read. Rationalism might be drawn as a large territory, maybe a continent of views, at one end of the map. Empiricism might be drawn as an equally large territory at the other. Transcendentalism might be drawn higher or lower on the map than both of these though nevertheless touching each at a point. Other views could then be drawn relative to each. Maybe positivism would be relatively close to empiricism, in the vicinity of transcendentalism, and far from rationalism. Maybe absolute idealism would be in positivism s opposite spot. Regardless of the accuracy or utility of this particular map, conceptual cartography is the practice of mapping how concepts generally (including philosophical views) relate conceptually (including logically and extralogically). Next I offer a more detailed example of conceptual cartography to explain how the history of philosophy might be used in it. 2. Situating Landmarks Using the history of philosophy in conceptual cartography involves two steps. One is using the history of philosophy to situate landmarks on a conceptual map. The other is situating views, historical or contemporary, relative to those landmarks. In this section I discuss the first step. In the next I explain how and why one might perform the second. Elsewhere (Goldberg 2015, chs. 1, 7) I have shown how the history of philosophy can be used to situate landmarks concerning the content of concepts and meaning of terms. Here I discuss how it can be used to situate landmarks concerning the metaphysics of empirical properties. Empirical properties are properties that cannot be known without experience. On my simplified story, I use two axes to construct a map on which I situate different historical views. 123

6 The first axis concerns subjective sources constitutive of those properties. I understand subjective sources to include such things as minds or the specific perceptual or conceptual capacities inherent in them. I can extend the cartographic image as follows. On a two-dimensional map of the Earth, the Prime Meridian is at zero longitude. It can therefore be understood as the vertical, and on my model subjective, axis. The greater the distance from the Prime Meridian that a philosophical view is, and so the greater the number of degrees longitude that it has, the greater the role that subjective sources are to its account of empirical properties. The analogy with this map is imperfect, since distances, and degrees, from the Prime Meridian can be east or west. For simplicity s sake I consider only those east. I also leave the notion of distance intuitive and comparative albeit in a way that should become clearer as I proceed. The second axis concerns objective sources constitutive of empirical properties. I understand objective sources to include such things as transcendent objects that exist independent of minds and their capacities; worldly objects that exist similarly; or the world or reality itself, in itself, or considered in itself, if construed in a subject-independent way. We might then imagine the objective axis as the Equator at zero latitude. The greater the distance from the Equator that a view is, and so the greater number of degrees latitude that it has, the greater the role objective sources are to its account of empirical properties. Distances, and degrees, from the Equator can themselves be north or south. For simplicity s sake I consider only those north. I again leave the notion of distance intuitive and comparative. 3 All maps are interest-specific, and I have chosen these two axes because doing so satisfies my interest of relating historical views according to their subjective and objective sources. Further, I understand these sources, rather than falling on a continuum, or single axis, as being distinct, and so as so falling on two axes. That is because (as we hear below) degrees of subjectivity and objectivity vary independently of one another. One view can be twice as objective as another without having any subjective source, while another can be more objective than subjective without its subjectivity being of a less degree. Different philosophical views can have sources that are distinctly subjective and objective, rather than merely some degreed combination thereof. As for individual degrees of subjectivity or objectivity and so distance from my axes as I have said, I leave these intuitive and comparative. Here are examples. A view according to which empirical concepts have two objective sources I understand as twice as far from the Equator as a view according to which they have only one. Likewise a view according to which all empirical concepts 3 The view that the subjective/objective distinction collapses is mappable also. As I explain below, it occurs where the Prime Meridian and Equator intersect: zero longitude, zero latitude. 124

7 have subjective and objective sources I understand as twice as far from the Prime Meridian as a view according to which only some empirical concepts have subjective and objective sources while others have only objective ones. 4 Choosing a conceptual coordinate system, though interest-specific and in that sense conventional, is not without constraint. If it is to be valuable, then like anything philosophical that is valuable one must be able to defend it. Here that involves defending the system s overall accuracy, consistency, explanatory value, and simplicity in representing philosophically relevant features. Choosing such a system therefore shares similarities with Rudolf Carnap s (1950/1988) position on choosing linguistic frameworks, since those are to be chosen based on similar pragmatic virtues. Nonetheless, while a Carnapian linguistic framework establishes the language within which statements internal to the framework can be meaningfully articulated, 5 philosophical views that one situates on a conceptual coordinate system have already been meaningfully articulated in a language. A conceptual coordinate system permits one to map ways in which these views relate to one another. I illustrate this first step in using the history of philosophy in conceptual cartography using that history to situate landmarks by selectively drawing on the history of philosophy directly. Whether or not the history of Western philosophy in particular consists of a series of footnotes to Plato, I understand him as maintaining that empirical properties are the properties that they are purely in virtue of objective sources. For Plato, different kinds, or species, of objects have the empirical properties that they do because these species [have]... natural joints (Phaedrus 265e). Nature, or the empirical world, comes carved. It has real classes (Statesman 262b). Suppose, for example, that we undertake to cut something. If we make the cut in whatever we choose and with whatever tool we choose, we will not succeed in cutting... If we try to cut contrary to nature,... we ll be in error (Cratylus 387a). 6 These species, or real classes, do not depend on how we choose to cut. They are really, or objectively, there. They are in the objects themselves on my view, that qualifies Plato as a realist and with luck, diligence, and intellect we might discover them. Moreover, Plato explains these natural joints, which determine these species and real classes, by appealing to supernatural forms. 4 By taking distances from axes as intuitive and comparative I am inspired by David Lewis s (1973/2001) taking distances between possible worlds (understood in terms of similarity between worlds) to be the same. 5 See Goldberg (2015, , ) for more on Carnap (1950/1988). 6 The Phaedrus translation is Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff s; Statesman, C.J. Rowe s; Cratylus, C. D. C. Reeve s both in John M. Cooper (1997). 125

8 Plato s forms are archetypes of empirical properties, which transcend the natural world. As self-subsisting, they are ultimately transcendent objects. [W]e say that there is something that is equal. I do not mean a stick equal to a stick or a stone to a stone, or anything of that kind anything in the natural world but something else beyond all these, the Equal itself (Phaedo 74a). 7 To grasp the forms is in Plato s image to emerge from a cave to a realm of pure thought (Republic 514a 520a). As the medievals explain, for Plato, the forms exist ante res, or ontologically prior to the objects in the world whose speciation they make possible. The forms are in fact constitutive of empirical objects and their properties. We start down the path of knowing these forms by experiencing the empirical properties of which they are archetypes, abstracting to the forms themselves. Yet those empirical properties themselves, as empirical rather than formal (or purely intellectual), cannot be known without experience. I understand Aristotle as agreeing that all empirical properties are the properties that they are purely in virtue of objective sources. He likewise agrees that species have natural joints and nature real classes. Empirical properties are again in the objects themselves Aristotle, like Plato, is a realist and both allow that with luck, diligence, and intellect we might discover them. Unlike Plato, however, Aristotle does not explain natural joints by appealing to supernatural forms. For Aristotle, though there are forms, they, like everything else, exist within the natural order. They are not transcendent objects. For Aristotle, the forms exist only in rebus, or in the objects in the world whose speciation they make possible. Indeed, one part of the thing, or object, is matter and the other form. Nevertheless, when we ask, Is there a sphere apart from the individual spheres or a house apart from bricks? we must answer no (Meta 1033 b 18-20). 8 Regardless the forms remain constitutive of empirical objects, insofar as they make those objects the species that they are, and of empirical properties, insofar as they just are those properties when fully actualized in empirical objects. While Plato countenances two objective realms, the natural and the supernatural, Aristotle countenances only one, the natural. Even so, for both, we can know these empirical properties, and ultimately their forms, only with experience. On my conceptual map, therefore, I situate both Plato s and Aristotle s views on the Prime Meridian, some degrees north of the Equator. According to each, empirical properties are constituted entirely by objective sources the natural and supernatural world, for Plato; the natural (and only) world, for Aristotle. According to both, therefore, the subjective contribution to empirical properties is nil. Nonetheless I situate Plato s view twice as far north, and so having 7 The Phaedo translation is G. M. A. Grube s, in Cooper (1997). 8 The Metaphysics translation is J. L. Ackrill s (1988). 126

9 twice as many degrees latitude, as Aristotle s. Plato countenances two objective sources; Aristotle, one. Because for Aristotle empirical properties have no less a subjective contribution than they do for Plato each has zero I situate each at the same number of degrees longitude, viz., zero. The Hellenistic, Roman, and European Middle Ages witnessed elaborations, incorporations, and rejections of Plato s and Aristotle s views. They were worked out by themselves, against local competitors, and then in Jewish, Islamic, and ultimately Christian contexts. None of this is conceptually trivial. Nonetheless not every point on a map need be a landmark. The so-called fathers of modern philosophy Rene Descartes and John Locke each retained elements of their medieval predecessors. Yet each also sufficiently broke from them that it is not uncommon for histories of philosophy to move from ancient to modern. When Descartes explains: Several years have now passed since I first realized how numerous were the false opinions that in my youth I had taken to be true (AT 17; 1641/1999, 13), the opinions that Descartes has in mind include Aristotle s views that in his youth he studied at the Jesuit College of La Fleche. Locke in turn reacts against Descartes by denying the existence of innate ideas (1689/ 1979, I II), whose existence was central to Descartes own rejection of Aristotle. Let me likewise turn to the moderns. In situating landmarks on my conceptual map, I focus not on Descartes or Locke s views on innate ideas but on Locke s view on empirical properties. Unlike Plato or Aristotle, Locke countenances two different kinds of empirical properties. Primary qualities Locke names bulk, extension, figure, mobility, motion, solidity, and texture (1689/1979, II.viii.9 10) are empirical properties utterly inseparable from the body (II.viii.9). They are real because they are essentially a part of, and so in, the body or object. An object is solid because of its inherent composition. That composition is constitutive of the empirical property. Moreover primary qualities produce ideas directly in us through experience. Secondary qualities colors, sounds, tastes, &c., according to Locke are nothing in the objects themselves but power to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities (II.viii.10) when we experience them. Secondary qualities are dispositional, real, and relational. They are dispositional because they are powers, or potentialities, in the objects to produce effects, what Locke classifies as sensory ideas, in us via experience. They are real because they are in the objects. And they are relational because they are the properties that they are in virtue of being disposed to produce effects in us (again via experience). An object is red because its inherent composition is disposed to cause normal human beings under normal conditions of observation to perceive it as red. Something about the object, its dispositional base, and something about the subject, her 127

10 mind or specific perceptual or conceptual capacities, are jointly constitutive of its being red. 9 Hence, for Locke, objective sources are constitutive of primary qualities. Because they are relational, objective and subjective sources are constitutive of secondary qualities. On my conceptual map, therefore, I situate Locke s view both east of the Prime Meridian and north of Equator. Since, however, the objective source is twice as relevant it is constitutive of both primary and secondary qualities, while the subjective is constitutive of only the secondary I situate his view farther north than east, at a greater number of degrees longitude than latitude. George Berkeley and Immanuel Kant both use Locke s view as their starting point but travel in different conceptual directions. Berkeley travels to a location marked by idealism. Misidentifying Locke s secondary qualities with their effects, specifically sensory ideas in our mind, Berkeley urges that all empirical properties are those ideas. Though we still experience ideas, they are nevertheless constituted by the mind ours or ultimately God s (1713/1979, 64). And, since they are ideas, they exist only within the mind. [T]heir esse is percipi, nor is it possible that they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them (1710/1982, 3). Indeed, for Berkeley, there is nothing besides ideas and minds having them. There is only the subjective. Moreover, because these ideas, and so empirical properties, are not in objects themselves but in subjects, they are not real but are ideal. Nor without any objective base are they dispositional, as were Locke s. Because they are purely subjective, however, they might be understood as relational relational to a subject. On my conceptual map, therefore, I situate Berkeley s view on the Equator some degrees east of the Prime Meridian. The objective contribution to empirical properties is zero, while the subjective contribution is positive. Kant travels to a location marked by globalism and transcendentalism. We can see this by comparing Kant s and Locke s view on dispositionalism, realism, and relationalism. First, while, for Locke, only some empirical properties are dispositional because they are powers, or potentialities, in objects to produce effects in us via experience, for Kant, all empirical properties are dispositional. Kant (1783/2010, 4: ) claims that all empirical properties are secondary qualities. 10 All empirical properties are the properties that they are in virtue of both subjective and objective sources. Both sorts of sources constitute them all. 9 See Goldberg (2008, 469; 2011, ; 2015, 34) for more on this reading of John Locke (1689/1979). 10 See Hilary Putnam (1981, essay 3), James Van Cleve (1995), and Rae Langton (1998/2004, ch. 7). 128

11 Second, for Kant as for Locke, all empirical properties are real, because they are in the objects. Kant, however, does not understand objects as Locke does, viz., as configurations of primary qualities. He instead understands them as things-in-themselves, or noumena, which we cannot know but about which we can think. Nonetheless, for Kant, empirical properties are empirically real because they are in the objects insofar as we experience them. Yet they are also transcendentally ideal because we can know those objects only insofar we experience them. And third, while, for Locke, only some empirical properties are relational, because they are the properties that they are in virtue of being disposed to produce effects in us, for Kant, all empirical properties are relational. As for Locke, an object is red because normal human beings under normal conditions of observation would perceive the object as red. For Kant, an object is solid for similar reasons. He explains: We can accordingly speak of space, extended beings, and so on only from the human standpoint (1787/1998, A26/B42). Space, extended beings, and so on and a fortiori all their empirical properties are the properties that they are relative to us. On my conceptual map, recall, I situated Locke s view farther north than east. Some empirical properties are the properties that they are in virtue of subjective and objective sources, while others are the properties that they are purely in virtue of objective sources. Because Kant globalizes Locke s secondary-quality view, every empirical property shares equally in both subjective and objective sources. Hence, I situate Kant s view as far north of the Equator as east of the Prime Meridian, at the same number of degrees longitude and latitude. The point at which the Prime Meridian and Equator meet is the point at which I situate the final historical view considered, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel s. I understand Hegel as explaining the metaphysics of empirical properties not, like Plato, by giving the only constitutive role to objective sources; nor, like Locke, by giving a partially shared constitutive role to subjective and objective sources; nor, like Berkeley, by giving the only constitutive role to subjective sources; nor, like Kant, by giving a fully shared constitutive role to both kinds of sources. Instead Hegel maintains that the distinction between subject and object is itself spurious. [E]verything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not only as Substance, but equally as Subject (Hegel 1807/1976, 17). If what is True can be expressed not only as substance, or an object, but equally as a subject, then all empirical properties are the properties that they are in virtue of sources that can themselves be counted equally as subjective and as objective. So the distinction between such sources is nil. The distinct constitutive contribution of subjective and objective sources is therefore also nil. Experience reveals the world as it really is because the subjective/objective distinction dissolves. On my conceptual map, therefore, I situate Hegel s view at zero longitude, zero latitude. It sits at the center 129

12 on my map, with Plato s, Aristotle s, Locke s, Berkeley s, and Kant s views at different distances surrounding it. Admittedly Hegel calls his view absolute idealism. The idealism suggests that everything is in the mind or subjective. The absolute, however, signals that what is subjective is all encompassing and in that sense also objective or real. Hegel elsewhere explains: What is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational (1821/1991, 20). The rational is traditionally construed as the purview of the mind. Hegel himself construes the actual as having external existence and so concerning objects. Because, for Hegel, empirical properties are therefore in the objects, his idealism is a kind of realism. Hegel collapses the distinction, which is why I situate his view at the coordinates zero, zero. 3. Situating Views Relative to Those Landmarks As I explained, using the history of philosophy in conceptual cartography involves two steps: using the history of philosophy to situate landmarks on a conceptual map, and situating historical or contemporary views relative to those landmarks. In the previous section I gave an example of the first step. Here I explain how and why one might perform the second. How is simple. Once the history of philosophy is used to situate such landmarks, philosophers can situate other views relative to those landmarks by appealing to what they select as the views relevant features. Consider my map. Someone like Saul Kripke might situate his essentialism (1980/2005) about the metaphysics of empirical properties near the landmark that is Aristotle s. Someone like Hilary Putnam might situate his early realism (1975a/1979, 1975b/1979) about their metaphysics in the vicinity of the same landmark, his middle internal realism (1978/2010, 1981) nearer to Kant s, and his later pragmatism (2002) nearer to Hegel s. As I suggest elsewhere (2015, ch. 2), someone like Mark Johnston (1989, 1993) or Crispin Wright (1988, 1989, 1992/1999, 1993) might situate his local response-dependence near Locke s landmark, while someone like Philip Pettit (2002, pt. 1) might situate his global response-dependence near Kant s. 11 Admittedly, neither Kripke, Putnam, Johnston, Wright, nor Pettit himself needs to situate his view relative to any such landmarks. Nor does anyone else. Regardless each could. Philosophers could also retain my coordinate system and landmarks but use them more restrictively, situating views on the metaphysics of particular kinds of empirical properties, like color or natural- or 11 Putnam (1981, 63) and Philip Pettit (2002, 18 20, 50, 90, ) do both remark that their views are similar to Immanuel Kant s. Yet neither articulates nor argues for using the history of philosophy in conceptual cartography directly. 130

13 social-kind properties, rather than generally. They could retain the system but replace the landmarks, situating views on the metaphysics of ethical or esthetic rather than empirical properties. Plato s objectivist and Hume s subjectivist views about either might serve as landmarks. 12 Or they could change systems and landmarks altogether. Normative ethical views might be situated on a map with three axes: one, the degree to which a view is aretaic; two, the degree to which it is consequentialist; and three, the degree to which it is deontological. Its landmarks might include Aristotle s, Kant s, and John Stuart Mill s ethical theories. 13 Semantic views on the content of proper names might themselves be situated on internalist and externalist axes. Locke s view that words, and therefore proper names, express ideas (1689/1979, III.ii) might be one landmark, while Mill s view that [p]roper names are attached to the objects themselves (1843/ 2001, I.ii.5) might be another. Why philosophers might situate their views relative to historical landmarks are many. For starters, doing so helps others (and perhaps themselves) appreciate how those views relate to these historical landmarks. It thereby makes the contours of their views clearer. Philosophers can then navigate through the conceptual landscape generally by appealing to something potentially familiar. Moreover historical landmarks are both epistemologically privileged and ontologically positioned. They are epistemologically privileged because, though not everyone knows every historical view, many do know the major ones. From their own training as, and of, students, even philosophers who are not historians of philosophy are almost never completely historically ignorant. And those who are often have colleagues who are not. Historical landmarks, in conceptual as much as physical space, can be useful for locals and tourists. Nor need historical views directly favor anyone in any current debate. History provides personal neutrality. Different contemporary philosophers can appeal to different historical views existing independently of their own in the conceptual landscape. Though selected by present philosophers, they are views of past philosophers personally neutral thinkers by which present philosophers might navigate. These historical landmarks are ontologically positioned because philosophers have historically developed their views partly in response to their predecessors. It is no coincidence that the map that I constructed has landmarks occupying positions usefully relative to one another. Aristotle designed his views partly in response to Plato s; Locke, partly in response to medieval scholasticism, itself 12 Though he discusses the metaphysics of ethical and esthetic properties in several locations, Plato (Republic 514a 520a) is his most famous statement of his objectivist view. David Hume ( /2000, III; 1751/1998) intersperses his subjectivist view on the metaphysics of ethical and esthetic properties. 13 Aristotle (Irwin 1999), Kant (1785/1999, 1788/1999), and John Stuart Mill (1861/ 2002) express their most famous ethical views. 131

14 incorporating much of Aristotle s; Berkeley and Kant, both partly in response to Locke s; and Hegel, partly in response to Kant s. Similar patterns are historically ubiquitous. The history of philosophy contains views ready to be situated as landmarks on a map because historical views philosophical and otherwise are responsive to one another. The history of philosophy unfolds dialogically. Though that unfolding does not aim at any particular goal, it nevertheless originates from philosophers reading each other s work and agreeing or disagreeing with it when formulating their own. It is no wonder that appropriately spaced historical landmarks are there for the situating. 4. Objections I have articulated and argued for a modest use to which philosophers who are not historians of philosophy might put the history of philosophy. There are many objections to all this. Let me consider six. As I explain, the initial three all turn out to be irrelevant and false, while the final three all turn out to be able to be handled. Objection 1. Philosophers, contemporary and historical, often do compare their views to those from the history of philosophy. Sometimes these comparisons involve mapping conceptual connections in ways that I have suggested. One might therefore object that my project is not novel. This objection is irrelevant and false. It is irrelevant because novelty is not a criterion of truth. It is false because both my articulating and my arguing for using the history of philosophy in conceptual cartography are novel. Admittedly, whenever a philosopher contrasts her view with someone else s by delineating points on which they do or do not contact, she is engaging in conceptual cartography to some extent. Likewise she may appeal to historical views when doing so. Regardless only I have articulated the view that one could situate various historical views as conceptual landmarks and situate other views relative to them. Likewise only I have argued that the history of philosophy, because of its dialogical nature, can be used to situate landmarks on a conceptual map where such historical landmarks would be both epistemologically privileged and ontologically positioned. Objection 2. Whether using the history of philosophy or not, engaging in conceptual cartography requires that a philosopher learn about others views when she could be developing her own. One might therefore object that doing so is unnecessarily taxing. This objection is also irrelevant and false. It is irrelevant because my aim is to articulate and argue for a modest use for the history of 132

15 philosophy, viz., in conceptual cartography. It is not to argue that all philosophers should so use it. It is false because one way to develop one s view and express it to others just is to compare and contrast it with and so situate it in conceptual space relative to other views. That involves engaging in conceptual cartography in some form and to some degree. So engaging in it is to that extent not unnecessarily taxing. Ryle himself writes that the philosophical examination of a concept... can never be the examination of that concept by itself, but only the examination of it vis-a-vis its neighbour-concepts, and then vis-a-vis their innumerable neighbours too (1962/2009, 444). If Ryle is right, then some degree of his logical geography or cartography, or my conceptual cartography, is unavoidable. There are also those who engage in conceptual cartography to a great degree. Though he does not appeal to the history of philosophy, Daniel Dennett (1986), himself Ryle s student, discusses what he calls the logical geography of computational approaches to cognitive science. Elsewhere he (Dennett 1989) situates contemporary views on intentionality relative to the North Pole of mentalism and South Pole of behaviorism. John Haugeland (1990/2000, ch. 7) meanwhile situates similar views around a baseball diamond. Neither finds engaging in conceptual cartography unnecessarily taxing, nor should we. 14 Objection 3. Whether or not engaging in conceptual cartography is unnecessarily taxing, one might object that using the history of philosophy in it is. There might be three reasons to think this. First, historical views are often obscure. Second, not all philosophers know enough historical views to make this use feasible. And third, contemporary views can work at least as well as historical ones in situating landmarks on conceptual maps. This objection is irrelevant for the same reason that the previous one is. My aim is not to argue that all philosophers should use the history of philosophy in conceptual cartography but to suggest that they might. It is false because each of the three reasons just mentioned is false. Regarding the first, while historical views are often obscure, they are not always so in all details. Though many of Plato s commitments regarding empirical properties might be obscure, that he believes that species have natural joints and that nature has real classes independent of how they might be perceived by us is not. Regarding the second, while not all philosophers might know enough 14 See David Wagner (2013) on metaphors of perfect maps from Jorge Luis Borges, Lewis Carroll, and Josiah Royce, compared with remarks by Ludwig Wittgenstein and Charles Sanders Peirce. Cartographic language is so common that Martin Dodge, Rob Kitchin, and Chris Perkins begin the first chapter of their book on the philosophy of cartography by employing it without comment (and perhaps even self-recognition): In this opening chapter we explore the philosophical terrain of contemporary cartography (2009, 1). 133

16 historical views to use the history of philosophy in conceptual cartography, as we heard above philosophers who are not historians of philosophy themselves likely know something about the history of philosophy or someone else who does. Resources are there for the taking. Finally, regarding the third, while philosophers can use historical views as landmarks, they can use contemporary ones also or instead. Nonetheless, as we heard, there are advantages to using historical ones, including epistemological privileging and ontological positioning. Objection 4. Situating historically disparate views as landmarks on a single conceptual map removes those views from their historical context. It therefore treats them anachronistically, which, one might object, does them injustice. This objection can be handled. Whenever anyone engages in history, of philosophy or otherwise, anachronism remains a risk. One solution is never to engage in history. Another is to engage in it carefully, which is required here. Nor need merely comparing different views be anachronistic. Often philosophical views can be understood equitable in terms. Moreover using the history of philosophy in conceptual cartography is often so focused that the risk of anachronism is minimal. I did not compare Plato s and Hegel s metaphysical views generally or even their views on the metaphysics of empirical properties generally. I instead compared their views on the metaphysics of empirical properties concerning subjective and objective sources specifically. Objection 5. Using the history of philosophy productively in conceptual cartography requires choosing complex concepts, or views, selecting relevant features, and systematically transforming those features into markers in conceptual space. In my own example this involved simplifying Plato s, Aristotle s, Locke s, Berkeley s, Kant s, and Hegel s views on the metaphysics of empirical properties concerning subjective and objective sources, ignoring the rest of their views on metaphysics (and much else), and ignoring other views altogether which, one might object, does all such views injustice. This objection too can be handled. All cartography requires choices, selections, and systematic transformations. These in turn require simplifying and ignoring phenomena. There is good reason for this. Maps are models not copies. They are meant not to duplicate what they represent but to display its relevant features. And what is relevant is relative to the interests of their users. Mercator, polar, and other maps differ drastically from the geographic setting that they represent. We should expect no less from the conceptual kind. Further, historians of philosophy themselves simplify and ignore views 134

17 when engaging in the history of philosophy for its own sake. Discussions of Kant s view on the Antinomies simplify his view on the Schematism, if they include it at all. They might even simplify his view on the Antinomies themselves to communicate it better. And they completely ignore Kant s views on the moral law and the beautiful and the sublime. Not every feature of every view makes it into works in the history of philosophy. We should expect no less from historical views used in conceptual cartography. Objection 6. Using the history of philosophy in conceptual cartography is a metaphilosophical activity that should remain neutral among historical views that it might map. Yet, one might argue, instead of remaining neutral, it presupposes Hegel s philosophy of history in particular. Thinking that historical views can function as landmarks presupposes that, as Hegel maintains, history presents us with a rational process (1857/2004, 9). Moreover, while I situated Hegel s view on the metaphysics of empirical properties as a landmark and his philosophy of history is implicated in that view 15 even those not situating any of Hegel s views would also rely on Hegel s notion that history is to some extent or in some way rational. That explains their commitment to the history of philosophy as a source for appropriately spaced conceptual landmarks in the first place. This objection also can be handled. There is no avoiding presupposing some philosophical view when engaging in metaphilosophy. Because Hegel is a groundbreaking philosopher of history, it is unsurprising that his comes up. Nonetheless I am not relying on anything specific to Hegel in my metaphilosophical project, nor need anyone else. Hegel holds that history must unfold in a specific way, the history of philosophy itself beginning with concerns about sense certainty and continuing through to Kant s positing the thing in itself. Hegel also holds that history is being carried by Spirit toward a determinate end, philosophically culminating in his own absolute idealism. I neither hold nor rely on any of those tenets, nor need anyone else using the history of philosophy in conceptual cartography either. The only metaphilosophical presupposition that anyone using the history of philosophy in conceptual cartography does need to hold is that philosophers develop their views partly in response to their predecessors. They read, elaborate on, and break with the views of those preceding them. Philosophy is not done in a vacuum. That is so in the present as much as it was in the past. Philosophical views build on one another diachronically. There need be no deeper explanation for that than that historical and contemporary 15 For George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not only as Substance, but equally as Subject (1807/1976, 17) because the temporal succession of views in the history of philosophy matches the logical succession of views leading to the True. 135

18 philosophers are influenced by those who came before. That explains why the views that I considered above can all be situated as landmarks relative to one another. So any metaphilosophical presupposing of Hegel is slight. Indeed the chief metaphilosophical view that I am presupposing is not Hegel s but Plato s. Plato is metaphilosophically committed to philosophy as dialogue. In conversation, as Plato illustrates, views can be laid out for dialogical participants to inspect. Unlike Plato, however, I am urging that the history of philosophy itself consists in dialogically responsive work. While Plato s philosophy takes the form of dialogues between his contemporaries, I am urging that the history of philosophy be seen as taking the form of dialogues between historical philosophers. And that Platonic, even if not quite Plato s own, metaphilosophical commitment is why in Hegel s own famous phrase [r]eason is in history (1830/1971, 549). Historical views are dialogically and therefore rationally responsive to one another. Because history is rational in that minimal sense, the history of philosophy offers views that can be situated as landmarks in conceptual scape relative to one another. Philosophers can then situate their own views relative to those landmarks when explaining them. Regardless, that metaphilosophical commitment does not presuppose much else from Hegel, Plato, or other philosophers Conclusion I do not know whether philosophers who are not historians of philosophy should study the history of philosophy. Nothing that I have said answers the question. I do, however, know that using the history of philosophy in conceptual cartography is a modest use to which philosophers who are not historians of philosophy might put it. Using the history of philosophy as such could help us know our way around not merely our philosophical parish but also parts of the larger philosophical world. References Ackrill, J.L. A New Aristotle Reader. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Berkeley, George. Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, ed. Kenneth Winkler. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc, 1710/ Ryle himself says that the procedure of the philosophical examination of a concept is necessarily an argumentative or, if you prefer, a dialectical procedure. The philosopher... has, so to speak, to tug these [implication] threads [of a concept] through their neighbouring threads, which, in their turn, he must simultaneously be tugging (1962/2009, 445). This dialectical procedure, however, does not involve neither a dialogical partner, as Plato and my own suggestion of using the history of philosophy in conceptual cartography both do, nor does it involve the history of philosophy at all. 136