Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle

Transcription

1 Nicomachean Ethics BY Aristotle

2 Book 1 Aristotle, BC 1

3 Introduction from Course Instructor The philosophical study of ethics also called moral philosophy has provided numerous theories of correct moral conduct, ethical theories which attempt to identify the relevant characteristics that make morally right actions right and morally wrong actions wrong. This is considered moral theory. More fundamentally, however, ethics asks the question: How should I live and how do I live well? In this short section of the course, we ll develop this fundamental ethical question by focusing on two more specific questions: 1) How do we generate truly, worthwhile desires so that we can live good, human lives? And 2) How do we live good, human lives in the midst of an unjust world? Indeed, the world is very messy and very complex. Misunderstanding and ignorance are perpetuated everywhere: from friends, parents, teachers, pastors, politicians, and media. Thus, there is mass confusion regarding whether or not (and to what extent) exploitation, domination, destruction, and isolation are actually built into the very systems and structures that shape our shared, social reality. Most of us don t yet have the intellectual tools necessary to understand fully the threats and complexities of the world we live in, a world characterized by ongoing social upheaval along racial and class lines; a world undergoing human-caused climate change and characterized by ecological catastrophe we are currently witnessing a major species die-off in the biosphere and are now living through Earth s 6 th mass extinction event; our state is characterized by massive surges in 2

4 incarceration, where the U.S. has imprisoned people (largely defined by race and class) at a rate that is unprecedented in world history; the last few decades in the U.S. have been characterized by widening economic inequality, reaching historic levels not seen since the gilded age; the global economy, led by the U.S., is capable of producing an extraordinary surplus of meaningless commodities while at the same time 1 in 9 children go to be hungry every night; and despite the fact that we are connected with one another virtually at all times through social media, human life is becoming more and more characterized by intense isolation, depression, anxiety, and generalized misery, such that the suicide rate in the U.S. has increased 24% since the early 1990s. What does it mean to develop truly worthwhile desires in such a world? What does it mean to live an ethical life a good life in such a world? What are the ideas that are used to justify the way the existing world has been organized for us? We are often expected to work simply for our own individual happiness. Further, we are often taught to associate happiness and meaning with having a marriage and a career. And so desires that fall outside of this framework are often severed at an early age. Ethical philosophy asks us to consider whether or not our capacity to develop worthwhile dreams and desires has deteriorated. What if that is in fact the case? What if we aren t even aware of that deterioration? 3

5 The following text is abstract and difficult to comprehend especially if you re just being introduced to philosophy! On top of that, this excerpt from Aristotle s Nicomachean Ethics is over 2000 years old. Yet, it is precisely the nature of happiness and the nature of desire that Aristotle is contemplating. Aristotle was born in a small town in Northern Greece called Stagira. At the age of 17, Aristotle was sent to Athens to complete his education. At the time, Athens was the intellectual and cultural center of Ancient Greece. Aristotle spent upwards of 20 years studying at Plato s Academy in Athens. Along with Socrates and Plato, Aristotle is one of the greatest philosophers of the Ancient world and one of the most influential philosophers of all time. It s difficult to overestimate the influence that Aristotle has had on the development and trajectory of Western philosophy and Western thought. His work has shaped our most basic concepts and categories of thinking (in politics, ethics, religion, psychology). But Aristotle s most long lasting contribution has been his moral philosophy, that is, his ethics: And what is ethics again? Fundamentally, ethics is the investigation into the questions: How do we live well? What constitutes a worthwhile life? 4

6 Ch. 1 The Good as the aim of every action For every art and every inquiry, for every science and investigation, and similarly for every action and pursuit and choice, there seems to be some good which is aimed at; and for this reason The Good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. But it is clear that there is a certain difference to be found among the various ends [telos], or goals, or purposes, at which we aim; some ends, or purposes, are activities. Others are products apart from the activities that produce them. Where there are ends apart from the actions, it is the nature of the products to be better than the activities. Now, as there are many actions, arts, and sciences, there are also many ends; the end or purpose [telos] of the medical art is health, that of shipbuilding: a vessel. The telos of military strategy is victory, while the end [telos] of economics is wealth. But where such arts fall under a single capacity as bridle-making and the other arts concerned with horse equipment fall under the art of riding and as different military tactics fall under the more general art of military strategy and in the same way that other arts fall under more general arts the ends of the master arts (that is, the more general arts) are to be preferred over the ends of all of its subordinate arts. For it is for the sake of the former that the latter are pursued. It makes no difference whether the activities themselves are the ends of the actions, or something else apart from the activities, as in the case of the sciences just mentioned. 5

7 Ch. 2 Politics as the master science of The Good So, if there is some end [telos], or goal, in the realm of action, which we desire for its own sake (and which determines everything else we desire), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (which means the process of desiring would go on to infinity, rendering our desires empty and vain) if this is the case, then clearly this goal [telos] must be The Good and the chief good. Will not the knowledge of it, then, be of great importance for our lives, for how we live our lives? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what is right? If so, we must try, in a general outline at least, to determine what this most precious end is, what this most precious purpose [telos] is. And we must determine which of the sciences or branches of knowledge are concerned with this final end, or final purpose (for which everything else is desired). It would seem to belong to the most authoritative art, the most comprehensive art, and that which is most truly the master art. And politics appears to be of this nature; for it is politics that ordains which of the sciences (and arts) should be studied in a state, and it is politics which determines what each class of citizens should learn and do and also what they should not learn and not do. And we see even the most highly esteemed capacities the most honorable pursuits fall under the political: e.g. military strategy, economics, rhetoric [legal speech and political discourse] Now, since politics uses the rest of the sciences, and since, again, it legislates what we are to do and what we are to abstain from doing, the telos of this art must include the ends of the others, so that this end must be the good for man. For even if the telos is the same for a single man as it is for a 6

8 state, the telos of the state seems in all cases to be something greater and more complete. And while it is indeed worthwhile to attain the telos merely for one man, it is much finer and even more godlike to attain it for the whole citystate [polis]. These, then, are the ends at which our inquiry aims, since it is a political science, in one sense of that term. Ch. 4 Eudaimonia is The Good but many views are held about it So let us resume the discussion: Since all knowledge and every choice aims at some good, let us discuss then what, in our view, the aim of politics appears to be (which we earlier identified as the highest good attainable by action. ) Here we find that there is general agreement; for both the common lot of men and people of superior refinement say that it is happiness [eudaimonia]. And they both identify being happy with living well and doing well. But when it comes to a precise definition of happiness, the many (the masses) do not give the same account as the wise. For the many think happiness is some plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, or honor. The many differ, however, among one another when it comes to their view on happiness and often even the same man identifies happiness with different things, calling happiness health when he is ill, and calling happiness wealth when he is poor. But, being conscious of their ignorance, the common lot admire the wise-man who talks over their heads about some great idea that is beyond their comprehension. But to examine all the opinions that have been held would be somewhat fruitless; it is enough to examine those that are most prevalent or that seem to be plausible... 7

9 Ch. 5 Various views on the highest good Let us, however, resume our discussion from the point at which we digressed. To judge from the sort of lives that men in this world actually lead most men, and men of the most common and vulgar type, seem (not without some basis) to identify The Good, or happiness, with pleasure. This is the reason why they love the life of enjoyment. For there are, we may say, three prominent types of life, three prominent ways-of-being : 1) the vulgar life of pleasure, which we just mentioned 2) the political life 3) the contemplative life. Now the masses of mankind are evidently quite slavish and vulgar in their tastes, preferring a life suitable to beasts. But they get some justification for their view of life from the fact that many of those in very high places share these sorts of tastes the tastes of Sardanapallus [sex-crazed King of Assyria]. A consideration of these three prominent types of life shows that people of superior cultivation and an active disposition identify happiness with honor; for this is, roughly speaking, the end of the political life. But an honorable life seems too superficial an answer, since it is dependent on those who bestow honor rather than on he who receives it. Yet, the good that we are after it must be something that belongs properly to a man and not easily taken from him. Further, men seem to pursue honor in order that they may be assured of their goodness. At any rate, they seek to be honored by sensible men, by men of practical wisdom. And 8

10 they seek to be honored based on their own worth and virtue. Clearly, then, virtue is better than honor (even according to the men who seek honor). Perhaps one might even suppose excellence (or virtue) to be the end of the political life, instead of honor. But even this appears somewhat incomplete. For possession of virtue seems actually compatible with being asleep, or with lifelong inactivity, and, further, with the greatest sufferings and misfortunes. But certainly a man who is virtuous, yet also miserable no one could call this man happy, unless doing it just for the sake of argument. But enough of this. There was the vulgar pleasure seeking life, the life of honor, and third comes the contemplative life, but we shall only consider this later. Now, the life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion. And wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking. For it is merely useful and for the sake of something else. And so one might rather regard the before mentioned objects pleasure, honor, contemplation to be the end, the purpose, the telos of the good life. For they have intrinsic worth. They are loved and desired for themselves. But it is evident that not even these are really final ends; yet many arguments have been thrown away in support of them. Let us leave this subject, then. Ch. 7 The Good is the final and self-sufficient; happiness [eudaimonia] is defined Let us again return to the good that we have been seeking and ask what it can be. It seems to be different in different 9

11 actions and arts; it is one thing in medicine, another in military strategy, and so on with the other arts. What then is the good of each of those arts? Surely, it must be that for whose sake everything else is done. In medicine this is health, in military strategy it is victory, in building it would be the production of a house and in any other sphere, or art, it would be something else. But it is always, and in every art, ultimately for the sake of the end, the telos, that all the activities associated with the art are performed. Therefore, if there is some one end, or some one goal, for all that we do well then this end or goal will be The Good achievable by action. And if there are more than one, then these many ends will together make up the goods achievable by action. So, the argument has proceeded such that we have reached the same point where we began in Ch. 2: namely, that there at least appears to be some end, in the realm of action, that is desired for its own sake and which determines all other desires: a final telos. But we must try to clarify this even further. Since there are, obviously, several ends, and since we choose some of these ends (for example, wealth, and all other means and instruments) for the sake of something else, clearly not all ends are final ends; but the chief good is evidently something final. Therefore, if there is only one final end one final goal this will be what we are seeking, and if there are more than one, the most final of these will be what we are seeking. Now, we call that which is in itself worthy of pursuit more final than that which is worthy of pursuit for the sake of something else. And we call that which is never desirable for the sake of something else more final than the things that are desirable both in themselves and for the sake of something 10

12 else. Therefore, what is always chosen as an end in itself (which is never chosen as means to something else) we call final, in an unqualified sense. It is that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else. Now, it appears that we are describing that which we call happiness [eudaimonia]. Happiness, above all else, is held to be this final end that is desired for itself and nothing else. On the other hand, consider honor, pleasure, beauty, intelligence, and every virtue that we choose for themselves. We choose these virtues for themselves, because if nothing else resulted from them, we would still choose them. But we choose them also for the sake of eudaimonia, judging that by means of them we shall be happy. Happiness, eudaimonia, on the other hand is never chosen for the sake of these previous virtues. No, in general, happiness is never chosen for anything other than itself. If we consider eudaimonia while having in mind the notion of self-sufficiency the same result seems to follow. That is to say, the final good [the life of eudaimonia] is thought to be self-sufficient. Now, by self-sufficient we do not mean the man who lives in isolation, as though he had no desire for or need of others. No, we have in mind the men who live with, and for, their parents, their children, their wives, their friends, and, in general, men who live with and for their fellow citizens. This is because man is born for citizenship man is a political being. But, of course, some limit must be set to this. For if we extend our requirement to ancestors and descendants and friends of friends, then we are in for an infinite series. However, let us examine this particular on another occasion. 11

13 The self-sufficiency we have in mind, then, is: that which taken by itself makes life something desirable and deficient in nothing. And as such, we think happiness [eudaimonia] to be exactly this. Further, we think it the most desirable of all things, without being counted as simply one good thing among others. Indeed, if eudaimonia were thought of as merely one good thing among other good things, then adding more goods to it (even negligible goods) would improve eudaimonia because the addition would produce an extra amount of good. And a greater amount of good is always more desirable than a lesser amount. We seen then that eudaimonia is something final and self-sufficient. It is the ultimate end, the telos, of all our actions. Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a little trite, a mere platitude. A clearer account of what eudaimonia is, is still desired. Perhaps, a clearer account of happiness could be given, if we could first ascertain the function [ergon] of man. For just as it is for a flute-player, or a sculptor, or an artist and in general, for anyone who fulfills some function or performs some action the good and the well seem to reside in the proper function, if of course that thing has a function. Do the carpenter, then, and the tanner have certain functions or activities, and yet man in general has none? Is man born without a function? Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each of the parts of the body evidently has a function, 1 may one lay it down also that man, similarly, has a function apart from all these? What then can this function be? 1 For example, the function (ergon) of the eyes are to see. The function of the ears are to hear. The function of the heart is to pump blood, etc. etc. So all of the different parts and organs that make up a person have functions, but Aristotle is trying to determine whether a person in general? 12

14 Life seems to be common even to plants, but we are seeking what is peculiar to man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth as being the function [ergon] of a man. 2 Next there would be a life of perception, but it also seems to be common even to the horse, the ox, and every animal. So, neither nutrition nor perception qualify as the function of man. There remains, then, the active-life [energeia] of the rational element. The rational element of man has two parts: one part is rational in the sense that it is obedient to reason and the other part is rational in the sense that it possesses and conceives of rational rules (it possesses and exercises thought). Because the active-life of the rational element has two meanings, we must make it clear that we mean when we re getting after the function of man a life that is determined by the activity (as opposed to the mere possession) of the rational element [logos] of man. For the activity, it seems, has a greater claim to be the function of man. The proper function of man, then, is an activity of the soul [psyche] which follows or implies a rational principle or standard. And if we say so-and-so has a good function, we mean that he sets high standards for himself. He is a serious man [spoudaios]. For example, the proper function of a harpist is the same thing as the function of a harpist who 2 By the life of nutrition and growth Aristotle is simply referring to the physiological processes that allow a creature (plant, animal, or human) to grow and develop. For plants, this would include converting sunlight into energy, taking nutrients from the soil, blooming, etc. For animals and humans, it would include eating and drinking, distributing oxygen and blood throughout the body, etc. etc. In order to for an activity to qualify as the function for a human being, Aristotle is arguing that this activity must be unique to human beings. Because we share the nutritive activity with plants and animals, it is not the ergon of man in general. 13

15 has set high standards for himself. The same applies to any and every group of individuals. Of course, the attainment of excellence must be added to the mere function. In other words, the function of the harpist is to play the harp. The function of the harpist who sets high standards for himself is to play the harp well. On these assumptions, if we take the proper function of man to be a certain kind of life, and if this kind of life is an activity of the soul and consists of actions performed in conjunction with the rational element [logos], and moreover if a man of high standards is he who performs the actions well and properly, and if a function is well performed when it is performed in accordance with the excellence appropriate to it then based on all this, we reach this conclusion: that The Good of man is an activity of the soul in conformity with excellence or virtue, and if there are several virtues, then in conformity with the best and most complete. But we must add to this: in a complete life. For one songbird does not make a spring, nor does one sunny day. Similarly, one good day, or a short time, does not make a man blessed and happy. Translators used: Martin Ostwald and W.D. Ross 14

16 Does the carpenter, then, and the tanner have certain functions or activities, and yet man in general has none? Is man born without a function? Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each of the parts of the body evidently has a function, may one lay it down also that man, similarly, has a function apart from all these? What then can this function be? 15