CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY CRAIG BROWNE

Transcription

1 CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY CRAIG BROWNE

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3 INTRODUCTION Introduction The contemporary historical conjuncture appears to simultaneously justify the project of Critical Theory and contradict its basic preconditions. On the one hand, the material effects of the latest capitalist crisis would seem to be an extremely concrete expression of the connection between social injustice and the irrationality of the capitalist system. On the other hand, advanced liberal democratic societies are undergoing a protracted crisis of values (Castoriadis, 1991). Even though this crisis of values has generated a diversity of normative positions and it is possible to identify progressive tendencies, the values that appear the most practically effective, especially individualist definitions of selfinterest, are those antithetical to Critical Theory. From a historical standpoint, Critical Theory has previously confronted equivalent dilemmas. The difficulty, even the tragedy, of such dialectical disjunctions was constitutive of the Frankfurt School s programme. Critical Theory was, in large measure, originally developed in exile, and the term itself reflected an awareness of the distortions of Marxism s emancipatory intentions, whether as a result of historical developments that Marx had not foreseen, the authoritarian and bureaucratic character of Marxist political parties, or the misinterpretation of the complexion of theory (Jay, 1973; 1984; Held, 1980; Dubiel, 1985; Wiggershaus, 1994). The possibility of radical change is nevertheless an irrevocable presupposition of Critical Theory. However, it is not prospective change in general that is presupposed, rather Critical Theory presumes that the potentials for the abolition or radical transformation of the conditions of oppression, suffering and injustice are immanent in the development of society. It may appear paradoxical that the contemporary tendencies that seem to undermine Critical Theory s programme, such as the power of global markets, the comparative regression in social policies in many advanced nation states which undercut the rights of citizens and workers and the diminishing power of some progressive movements to mobilize, give rise to consequences that make Critical Theory necessary and justified. These consequences include growing material inequalities in advanced capitalist societies, the experience of vulnerability ensuing from the dismantling of welfare state protections, the erosion of social solidarity, ideological confusions that means that the contesting of subordination and alienation is open to irrational expression, and the decline in the horizon of expectations, to use Koselleck s term, that ensues from the disillusionment with the outcomes of former progressive initiatives (Koselleck, 1988). This situation only appears paradoxical because the contradictory character of capitalist society has been occluded or is forgotten.

4 2 CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY There are many reasons for the occlusion of conflict and its sources in social relations of domination and the experiences of injustice. One reason is particularly consequential, because its appeal consists in disputing the negative assessment of the contemporary developments that were just enumerated. This is the view that the conflicts of earlier phases of capitalism have been superseded (see Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005). Now, while it is no doubt true that some of the parameters of addressing social injustice have changed, it is equally the case that preceding capitalist conflicts have been subject to displacement rather than overcome. What this means is that the major conflicts of capitalist society persist but that they are often manifested in new forms or in different domains, as well as undergoing periodic renewal at their source. The two most influential critical sociological interpretations of displacement give a certain insight into how the notion of the superseding of the earlier conflicts of capitalist society could appear justified. Habermas argues that the dynamics of the capitalist economic system and the attendant conflicts of social class relations have been displaced through their mediation by other institutional mechanisms, especially by the state s intervention in the economy and the welfare state s consolidation of the social rights of citizenship (Habermas, 1976; 1987a). Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) argue that the displacement of conflict ensues from the establishment of a new legitimating regime of justification and the related processes of the re-categorizing of problems and the altering of interpretations of the instituted reality of capitalism more generally. In fact, Boltanski and Chiapello consider that the displacement that shaped the contemporary form of network capitalism was conditioned by the social contestation over the regulated and organized capitalism that preceded it. Significantly, the model of organized capitalism had been the institutional basis of Habermas interpretation of the displacement of the dynamics of liberal market capitalism and the modified expression of capitalist conflicts in crises of individual and social identity (Habermas, 1976; 1987a). Despite the evident semantic differences, in either case the modifications that underpin the displacement of conflict reflect progressive demands for reform and significant social struggles, whether for social protection, policy coordination, flexibility or participation. The notions of displacement draw attention to how the persisting dynamics of capitalism, particularly the imperative of capital accumulation, limit and condition its modifications. Notions of displacement highlight the complications involved in comprehending these dynamics and the salience of ideological justification. In short, displacement serves to resituate and conceal antagonisms. It paradoxically introduces elements of uncertainty into critique while implying that capitalism incorporates supplementary justifications, such as that it is amenable to demands for fairness and autonomy. Claude Lefort s contention that ideology serves to fill the gap that stems from the social order not being identical with itself discloses this purpose of supplementary justifications (Lefort, 1986). Lefort further argues that ideology seeks to contain the divisions that the social order constitutes through defining change in ways that reflexively articulates the principles of the existing social institution. In this

5 INTRODUCTION 3 case, displacement references capitalism s persistence and restitution, rather than the innovative character of changes that may point beyond it. Given that these accounts of the respective phases of displacement are defined in terms of capitalism s historicity, it is important to underline that displacement is itself conditioned by struggles and gives expression to struggles. This means that institutional modifications are partly expressions of ongoing dialectics of control, including the empowerment of capitalism in recent decades with accelerated globalization. The concept of dialectics of control refers to conflictual relations of interdependency, such as Marx attributed to class relations and to how the dynamic of the reproduction of capitalism is contingent on the exploitation of wage labour (Marx, 1971; Giddens, 1979). Dialectics of control, however, apply to a broader range of social contexts and practices than those of class relations and wage labour. The fact that the preceding conflicts of capitalist society have been reconfigured is only one of the reasons why Critical Theory is in need of revision. Critical Theory develops through reflection on the limitations of its extant formulations, particularly relative to its aspirations and the changes in the social-historical context. The recognition of the social and historical conditioning of knowledge originally distinguished Critical Theory from traditional theory (Horkheimer, 1972). Critical Theory includes a series of demands that distinguish it from other approaches in social theory and philosophy (Calhoun, 1995). It aims to provide an explanation and analysis of present society that is able to apprehend the developmental possibilities it contains and to identify the potentials for emancipation immanent in the needs or moral experience of subjects. These needs are radical, Agnes Heller argues, because they could be satisfied only through an emancipatory social transformation (Heller, 1984a). Critical Theory does not juxtapose an ideal state against existing conditions of oppression and inequality; rather critique focuses on those existing trends and developments that prefigure an emancipated society. The normative standpoint of critique presupposes, Honneth argues, a sociological determination of a pre-theoretical interest in emancipation; such as he claims to find are present in demands for respect and the practices of mutual recognition (Honneth, 1994: 225). In its original formulation, Critical Theory was distinguished by the ties it has to those socialized subjects that seek to bring about such a transformation and by its reflection upon the social-historical context of its emergence. Critical Theory subscribes neither to traditional philosophy s model of contemplative reflection, nor the disinterested standpoint of modern science (Habermas, 1974). The validity of critique depended on its initiating processes of enlightenment that facilitate the autonomy of subjects and the future emancipatory practices that transform oppressive social relations. Critical theory thus sees itself as a necessary catalytic moment within the social complex of life which it analyses (Habermas, 1974: 2). The relationship of theory and political practice may have been permanently under strain, but it remains one of the defining considerations of Critical Theory.

6 4 CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY In part, this is because Critical Theory contends that theory always has practical implications and that these practical consequences are concealed by traditional theories in various ways. For instance, traditional theories may function as ideologies that veil, disguise and misrepresent injustice and oppression, traditional theories may not only reflect the hierarchical structure of the social division of labour but they may also perform an important role in social coordination and integration, and traditional theories confirm the distinction between theory and practice (Marcuse, 1968; Horkheimer, 1972; Habermas, 1974). For these reasons, Critical Theory is the critique of alternative theories, as well as an approach that draws upon them where appropriate in order to constitute new theoretical syntheses. It is not, however, simply the critique of ideology and false representations, Critical Theory is the critique of the social reality that gives rise to false representations and ideological misunderstandings, such as in Marx s view of religious consolation in response to suffering that appeared unamenable to change or the never achievable notion of freedom as consumer sovereignty in a society founded on commodity production and exchange (Marx, 1971; 1977c). The leading contemporary representatives of Critical Theory have, however, more cautiously formulated its practical implications. This prudence is no doubt a consequence of a heightened reflexivity regarding the complications of theory s relationship to practice and a product of an acceptance of the fallible character of theory. Jürgen Habermas and Axel Honneth have been drawn to North American pragmatist philosophy because of its practical cast and appreciation of fallibility. Pragmatism s practical character is evident in the interconnections it establishes between intersubjective communication and democracy (Habermas, 1987a; Honneth, 1995a; Browne, 2009a; 2009b). Phases, Generations, Paradigms It has become commonplace to speak of phases and generations of the Frankfurt School tradition of Critical Theory. The initial interdisciplinary materialism of the 1930s, that was consistent with Horkheimer s original vision as director of the Institute of Social Research, is regularly seen as giving way in the early 1940s to the period dominated by the critique of instrumental reason (Habermas, 1984; Dubiel, 1985; Kellner, 1989; Wiggershaus, 1994). Similarly, the notion of a second generation of Critical Theory has been used to differentiate the work of Habermas and that of several philosophers and social scientists closely related to his programme, like Albrecht Wellmer, Klaus Eder and Claus Offe (Held, 1980; Kellner, 1989; Wiggerhaus, 1994). In my opinion, Habermas developed a significantly revised Critical Theory; one explicitly intended to be an alternative framework to that of the critique of instrumental reason. In terms of the present, while the notion of a third generation of Critical Theory is not necessarily incorrect and possesses some utility, it is potentially misleading with respect to the continuities that Honneth s theory has with that of Habermas. Honneth s core notion of recognition may ultimately be considered an alternate elaboration

7 INTRODUCTION 5 of the intersubjective and communicative paradigm that Habermas initiated, rather than a movement beyond it (Deranty, 2009b). Be that as it may, the periodizing categories draw attention to how Critical Theory has undergone modifications in response to the changing social-historical circumstances and the advances in salient fields of knowledge, like the twentieth century linguistic turn that emerged in otherwise quite different strands of philosophy and the social sciences (Rorty, 1967). There is nothing unusual then about revising Critical Theory, but reorientations imply different trajectories of future development; and no doubt the continuity of current approaches with Critical Theory s original programme can be disputed. The original intention of Critical Theory was to give contemporary relevance, in some form, to the Marxian project of the radical transformation of society. It is therefore worthwhile briefly sketching some of those developments that put this project into question and the resulting innovations that were undertaken within Critical Theory. There are three factors in the present which bear acutely on Critical Theory s methodological preconditions: the longest standing stems from the demise of the proletariat as the historical agent of change, but the various actors Marxists have invoked as potential substitutes, like new social movements and struggles in developing nation states, have proven less than convincing alternatives. Likewise, the oppressive and bureaucratic character of state socialist societies has long cast a shadow over the project of a radical transformation of capitalist society. The dissolution of state socialist societies made the idea of a historical transition beyond capitalism appear utopian and at variance with the normal pattern of social modernization. Last, production undoubtedly remains a central structure of modern society, despite whatever questions are posed by alterations in the distribution and organization of work, however anchoring a project of emancipatory change in production has itself become the subject of sustained critiques, especially by ecologists rejecting the productivist value system of industrial society and contemporary analyses of the manifold sites of power. These critiques reflect a shift in definitions of emancipation and, somewhat paradoxically in light of the disrepute of notions of historical transition, an assessment of the intrinsic limitations to the implications of changes in the system of production. Above all, what makes these three factors outstanding amongst an array of problems is the fact that they represent second order difficulties consequent upon several original problems of Marxist critique. In a sense, when measured against its aspirations, Marxism has been in perennial crisis, however, its contemporary predicament appears unprecedented (Arnason, 1980; 1984; Márkus, 1993). Of course, countervailing factors can always be cited in Marxism s defence and the richness of Marx s original statement means that it will continue to have adherents who consider it superior to later amendments. My analysis retrieves several important components of Marx s theory for Critical Theory; for example, the centrality of the notion of dialectics of control to my analysis restores social conflict to a prominent position in the explanation of injustice and the dynamics of social reproduction. In a

8 6 CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY similar vein, José Maurício Domingues has sought to renew Critical Theory through reactivating some the resources of Marxist theory (Domingues, 2012). Likewise, the recent economic recession and the entrenching of greater inequality have meant that discussions of neo-marxist political economy have garnered interest outside their field. Nevertheless, the arguments for substantially revising Critical Theory appear incontrovertible in light of Marxism s problems. Honneth summarizes different strands of this predicament in commenting that: All in all, the suggestive potential of Marxist theory has clearly exhausted itself. Given that its scientific content has been refuted, its political claims historically relativized and its philosophical foundations subjected to critique, Marxism has become an object for the recollections of historians of theory. (Honneth, 1995b: 4) Even if every aspect of this assessment is not taken to be definitive, Honneth s summation highlights why Habermas rethinking and reformulation of the foundations of Critical Theory is significant. Habermas proposed that the paradigm of intersubjective communication and understanding is an alternative to the paradigm of production that derives from Marx. The paradigm change reflects a considerably different orientation to those previously taken within Critical Theory to the problems of Marxist social theory. The prior orientations can be loosely categorized as those of restoration and rectification. The first involved some attempt at restoring dimensions of Marx s propositions that had been subsequently obscured and distorted. The ensuing revisions were directed towards correcting the self-understanding, and misunderstandings, of the Marxist tradition, primarily through the presentation of a more sophisticated appreciation of Marx s thought and its philosophical sources. Indeed, the fact that some major texts of Marx only became available during the twentieth century, like the Paris Manuscripts of 1844 and the Grundrisse, lent considerable justification to restorative approaches (Marx, 1977a; 1973). There can be little doubt that the restorative approach produced a greater understanding of the full range of Marx s theory. Whilst a restorative procedure could appear conservative, and no doubt this is the case in some instances, it more importantly often played a significant role in the renewal of Marxist perspectives opposed to the dominant strand of this tradition. In any case, revisions of a restorative approach need not exclude the orientation of rectification, and they have clarified its basic prerequisites. Rectifying orientations seek to make good what appear to be omissions in Marx s theory; and, as such, the revisions which ensue result mainly from an extension of a Marxist perspective to new topics. Further revisions then emerge in response to problems that arise from so doing; within the tradition of Western Marxism the normal response to compound difficulties was utilizing and integrating theoretical advances in related disciplines (see Habermas, 1979; Jay, 1984; Howard, 1988). The Frankfurt School belongs to the heterodox tradition of Western Marxism and its response to the confounding of aspects

9 INTRODUCTION 7 of Marx s prognosis was precisely to extend the Marxist critique of capitalist society to new domains. This is apparent in Habermas claim that six themes dominated the work of the Frankfurt School Institute of Social Research until the early 1940s: (a) the forms of integration in postliberal societies, (b) family socialization and ego development, (c) mass media and mass culture, (d) the social psychology behind the cessation of protest, (e) the theory of art, and (f) the critique of positivism and science. (Habermas, 1987a: 378 9) It is worth noting that many of the Frankfurt School s extensions of the Marxist critique of capitalism were enabled by György Lukács preceding conceptualization of reification. Lukács argued that the reification deriving from the prevalence in capitalist society of the commodity form conditioned the entire attitude of subjects to the world. Reification s expression of the dominance of objectivity over subjectivity therefore inflected bourgeois culture as a whole (Lukács, 1971). Under the influence of Lukács synthesis of Marx s political economy and Weber s sociology of modernity, the Frankfurt School theorists would contend that the rationalization of production, as well as the rationalization of other institutions of capitalist society, intensified reification. In other words, rather than rationalization developing the forces of production that could underpin an emancipatory reorganization of society, it was consolidating social relations of domination and diminishing the potential of individuals to be autonomous (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1972). The rectifying orientation towards Marx s theory of capitalist society produced, to be sure, significant innovations. The revisions deriving from it have certainly gone beyond those that would result from simply taking into account subsequent changes. However, over time rectifying procedures appeared less capable of convincingly addressing the full range of problems and dilemmas comprising the predicament of Critical Theory. In its turn, this circumstance brought the original deficiencies of this orientation to the fore; these deficiencies have been explored in reappraisals of Horkheimer s interdisciplinary conception of Critical Theory and the research conducted under his auspices during the 1930s. Even sympathetic critics argue that, in spite of the syntheses countenanced by the Frankfurt School s receptivity to other theories, the revisions actually proposed were limited by a reliance on the guiding framework of Marxist political economy (Habermas, 1974; Benhabib, 1986; Honneth, 1991; 1995b; Hohendahl, 1991). This latent orthodoxy is apparent, for example, in a functional for capital interpretation of the socializing role of the family and an underestimation of the freedoms guaranteed by the institutions of bourgeois democracy in the critique of ideology. But, above all, it reflected a conception of emancipation that was almost entirely conditioned by the Marxist philosophy of history and the Frankfurt School s adherence to the founding category of social labour. Habermas considered that the Frankfurt School Critical Theory

10 8 CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY reached a kind of theoretical and political impasse: its critique of instrumental reason and state regulated capitalism s totally administered society did not contain much prospect for emancipation (Habermas, 1984; 1987a). Habermas writings originally pursued the restoring and rectifying orientations, but, in the course of developing the revisions he saw necessary for Marxian theory, his critique underwent a process of increasing radicalization. Although it is certainly the case that these qualitative changes occurred in stages, they did culminate in a different orientation. Those problems Habermas identified in Marx s thought stimulated his construction of an alternative Critical Theory; especially determining this reorientation was Habermas perception of the deleterious consequences that these problems had for Marxist theory and practice (Habermas, 1974). This lack of separation between Marx s thought and the failings of later Marxism contradicts a major tenet of restorative approaches. Despite his extended critique and presentation of an alternative communicative paradigm, Habermas claimed to have still retained in a revised form whatever remains of value in Marx s standpoint (Habermas, 1979; 1987b). Of course, the justification presented for this claim has changed substantially; it is based on conclusions drawn from orientations that are principally those of reconstruction and replacement. Habermas reconstruction of historical materialism proved relatively unstable, because the core dimensions that would make up his alternative perspective, like communication, morality and rationality, informed his original critical analyses of Marx. Marx, he argued, had elided the difference between labour and social interaction; the latter is founded on the structure of communicative action and is oriented towards the achievement of mutual understanding, whereas labour is guided by an interest in the technical control of the material environment, and it is principally a type of instrumental action (Habermas, 1974; 1978a; 1978b). In retrospect, Habermas reconstruction of historical materialism appears to have only been a transitional work. Further refinements precipitated a much more far-reaching assertion: that is, that his theory of communicative action is an alternative and substitute for the original Marxist Critical Theory, instead of a component of the reconstruction of it. In other words, Habermas considers that his project displaces the Marxist original and should be considered, at least in some respect, a replacement for it (Habermas, 1979; 1984; 1987a; 1987b). One of the major strengths of Habermas alternate paradigm of understanding is its provision of normative grounds for critique. Habermas claims that the philosophy of consciousness, or the subject-centred reason, has exhausted its potential and that its irresolvable antinomies have been exposed, such as that it is perennially caught in the bind of converting subjectivity into an objectivity that the subject can reflect upon (1987b). Habermas theory of communicative action sketched a different trajectory of rationalization in modernity, one originally initiated by the cultural transformation that derived from the rationalization of communication (Habermas, 1984). In short, Habermas argues that communicative rationalization initially shaped various spheres of society in the constitution of

11 INTRODUCTION 9 modernity, especially law and morality. Yet, the instrumental-functionalist rationalization of capitalism and the bureaucratic state would delimit and somewhat undermine the communicative infrastructure to which the identity of subjects remained attached. Nevertheless, Habermas argues that communicative action remains a source of potential emancipation and that legitimacy has increasingly come to depend on the satisfaction of the procedures of democratic discourses (Habermas, 1996a). Habermas theory s various revisions imply that the legal and constitutional institution of rights and democracy in bourgeois society could form the basis of future progressive transformations. In his opinion this is especially important, because the sphere of production no longer represents a domain of substantial emancipation and a source of general autonomy in other spheres of society. Habermas thesis is more complex than this synopsis conveys. Still, its general implications are reflected in the fact that, following The Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas concentrated on developing his discourse theory of morality, justice and democracy, rather than extending and refining the social theoretical component of Critical Theory (Habermas, 1984; 1987a; 1990; 1996a). In short, discourse theory focused to a much greater extent on the concerns of normative political philosophy. Normative Political Philosophy and Social Theory After Habermas, it is hard to imagine that Critical Theory would revert to the paradigm of consciousness or the philosophy of the subject. Indeed, Honneth s theory of recognition has consolidated the intersubjective perspective in Critical Theory (Honneth, 1995a; 1995b). Nevertheless, Critical Theory does confront different lines of potential future development and, as will be explained in detail later, the normative and explanatory dimensions of Critical Theory have recently tended to diverge. The recent Critical Theory discussions have tended to be dominated by debates in normative political philosophy. Given the substantial revival of normative political philosophy, especially under the influence of John Rawls theory of justice, and the shift in Habermas focus towards law and rights, there are good reasons why normative political philosophy has become so prominent (Rawls, 1971; Habermas, 1996a; 1998). This development is clearly related to Habermas position on the emancipatory significance of the bourgeois constitutional heritage and the emphasis on democracy. For all the important and constructive discussions that have ensued, such as those on civil society and deliberative democracy, this predominance of normative political philosophy has some limitations from the perspective of a Critical Theory of Society. In particular, the dominance of the format of normative political philosophy has meant that the social theory component of Critical Theory has not received an equivalent elaboration. My book is, in large part, an attempt to rectify this deficit and to renew the social theory of contemporary society. It would be misleading to claim that this assessment is exclusively my own. The very latest contributions of Axel Honneth, and Nancy Fraser, as well as

12 10 CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY those of other theorists, like Lois McNay, constitute a reaction to the predominantly political framing of contemporary discussions in Critical Theory (Honneth, 2014; Fraser 2009; McNay, 2014). Honneth identifies several problems that ensue from the independent development of the themes of normative political philosophy. In particular, normative political philosophy s method of formulating abstract principles and models contains the potentially irremediable problem that its conceptions of justice and freedom may have no actual connection to reality. In Honneth s opinion, there is no guarantee that the gap between claim and reality of these theoretically purified conceptions can be bridged at all (Honneth, 2014: 63). Although this criticism does not entirely apply to the Critical Theory discussions, it illuminates some of the dilemmas that ensue from framing Critical Theory in the terms of normative political philosophy. Namely, it can lead to theoretical positions that are based on highly simplifying assumptions and to rather narrow conceptions of society. Honneth argues that there has recently been a tendency to conceive of all social relations as if they were legally constituted in order to make them consistent with the model of justice that is proposed. To some extent, a rather similar problem is present in extrapolating from Habermas notion of democratic legitimacy depending on the fulfilment of formal procedures. It has to treat the substantive conditions of enacting justice and autonomy as either external additions or prerequisites that are presupposed in order to satisfy the procedure s basic criteria, like the participation of all concerned (Honneth, 2014). There is much to be gained from engaging in normative political philosophy, although it is not difficult to perceive how its construction of principles and models often depends on a liberal and individualist conception of the subject (see Wagner, 2008). The more significant problem is the supplanting of the sociological standpoint that has defined Critical Theory. The original methodological intentions of Critical Theory ran counter to the notion of the independence of normative political philosophy. One of Critical Theory s defining features has been its interest in the sociological translation and practical realization of philosophical categories, like justice, reason and autonomy. In my opinion, it is important that this intention is retained, since it informs Critical Theory s heightened reflexivity and its method of immanent critique. Further, Critical Theory has always been defined as a programme of interdisciplinary research (Horkheimer, 1993). It presumes that knowledge drawn from different disciplines is necessary for comprehending the capitalist constellation. The recent relative lack of elaboration of the social theory component throws the whole interdisciplinary programme into doubt, because social theory provided the framework of this programme s integration and it established the historical perspective of Critical Theory s interpretation of emancipatory change. The importance of synthesis to Critical Theory is evident in Fraser and Honneth s description of their respective ambitions to connect the usually discrete levels of moral philosophy, social theory, and political analysis in a critical theory of capitalist society. This they claim is contrary to much of the work of those currently identifying with Critical Theory, who they claim

13 INTRODUCTION 11 assume a disciplinary division and are reluctant to theorize capitalist society as a totality (Fraser and Honneth, 2003: 4). The original interdisciplinary synthesis of Critical Theory was broader than the three levels just described. Psychoanalysis, in particular, was a crucial dimension of the Frankfurt School s theory of capitalist society, since it revealed some of the sources of the integration of individuals into this social order and their attachment to it, as well as elements of the individual that were resistant to the social order and that may constitute demands for liberation (Marcuse, 1966; Fromm, 1971). In the case of Habermas, the interdisciplinary synthesis expanded to include a wider variety of theoretical perspectives, like linguistic theories, genetic psychology, and elements of sociological systems theory. Yet, this did pose the question of whether some of the perspectives that Habermas drew upon were compatible with the intentions of a critical theory of society. In my opinion, Habermas for the most part adapted frameworks in a way that overcame the potential inconsistencies with Critical Theory, but his drawing on strands of functionalism undercut his major critical diagnostic intention, that is, of presenting a critique of functionalist reason (Habermas, 1984; 1987a). One could argue that this antinomy is one of the major reasons for the subsequent subordinating of the social theory component of Critical Theory. The dialectical approach of Critical Theory partly shaped its interdisciplinary syntheses. The dialectical approach has different connotations, but a commitment to it constitutes a distinctive methodological background to Critical Theory. In one sense, the very idea of critique bears witness to a commitment to the power of negation. For Critical Theory aims to disclose how existing reality is in contradiction with its rational potential and how this contradiction manifests itself in forms of suffering, oppression and pathologies. For instance, Habermas argued that the mechanisms of the material reproduction of capitalist society, exchange value and administrative power, have developed to a point where they undermine the rationality of communication. This erosion of communication has given rise, in turn, to contemporary social movements and protests over the conditions of living, such as resistance to urban developments, opposition to the unequal legal treatment of minorities and the welfare state policies that are based on prescriptive definitions of identity, such as in relation to gender and sexuality (Habermas, 1987a). Habermas paradigm of communication draws on the early sense of dialectics as dialogue. However, his theory came to downplay the more ontological connotations of dialectics, which Marx had foregrounded. That is, the dialectical sense of the historicity of social development and the process character of society (Adorno, 1989). In other words, Marx s dialectical approach concerns the unfolding dynamics rather than the static representation of society. Similarly, Honneth s development of Hegel s original idea of struggles for recognition implies that the expansion of moral understandings derives from opposition and conflict (Honneth, 1995a). Critical Theory has consistently deployed the dialectical method in order to account for the conversion between the subjectivity of social actors and the

14 12 CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY objectivity of social institutions. The attempt to understand the interplay and mediations of this relationship necessitated the development of complex interdisciplinary frameworks. Marx s labour theory of value naturally represented an interpretation of the conversion between the subjectivity of the worker and the objectivity of the capitalist institution (Marx, 1971). However, the tradition of Critical Theory sustains the dialectical intentions of value theory, but it treats it less as an economic proposition in the narrow sense. Rather, it considers that the theory of value is concerned with a more general social theory problem. Namely, the problem of the contradictions of social reproduction; the theory of value is concerned with the dialectical relationship between the potentials for autonomy and the actual institutionalized constraints upon it. It is in this latter dialectical sense that value theory represents something of a guiding thread for my analysis of the conflicts and structural contradictions of the contemporary capitalist constellation. My analysis takes into account how Habermas conceptualization of the interrelationship of the lifeworld and the social systems of the market economy and the state-administration was intended to revise Marx s theory of value (Habermas, 1987a). It accepts that the processes of conversion and interchange have become more complex and mediated, particularly owing to the intervention of the state in the economy and the current combination of the dynamics of subjective incorporation and social exclusion. Critical Theory and Radical Thinkers Given that my book explores how Critical Theory can be developed through the critique and synthesis of insights drawn from other social theories of the present development of society, it is necessary to briefly contrast the Critical Theory perspective that traces its lineage to the Frankfurt School with the more elastic use of the term critical theory in contemporary discourses in the humanities and the social sciences. The latter usage typically covers a broad range of theories that are critical of contemporary capitalism (see Keucheyan, 2013). It often includes post-marxist or radical theorists like Alain Baidou, Slavoj Žižek, Jacques Rancière, Antonio Negri, Judith Butler, as well as some post-structuralist and post-colonial perspectives, feminist theorists, and others. Now, many of these theorists have affinities with the Frankfurt School version of Critical Theory and it is not entirely unreasonable to claim that a case could be made for the salience of their writings to revising conventional Critical Theory in a way that is relevant to contemporary circumstances. These writers have offered neo-marxist critiques of capitalism, they are certainly concerned with the critique of domination, many of them are influenced by psychoanalysis (more so than some recent work in the main tradition of Critical Theory), and several of them continue the interest in aesthetics that was a distinctive feature of the Frankfurt School Critical Theory as well. Yet, for these theorists to be taken as continuous with the Frankfurt School tradition would require disavowing the internal development of Critical Theory, the previously outlined

15 INTRODUCTION 13 substantial considerations that led to its development and programmatic revisions. In particular, it would involve, to my mind, neglecting some of the core problematiques that have given Critical Theory its unique complexion. It is certainly unfair to collapse a considerable diversity of radical thinkers and critical approaches, but there are common divergences from the Frankfurt School tradition. In some respects, the key contrasts are the same as those that Habermas emphasized in his critique of postmodernism and post-structuralist approaches (Habermas, 1987b). Many of these radical theorists do not share Critical Theory s methodological orientation, with its commitment to the concept of rationality and its normative universalism. Similarly, Critical Theory s understanding of the dialogue between, and synthesis of, philosophy and the social sciences is not accepted by some of these radical theorists. The precise form and meaning of this relationship is contested within Critical Theory; however, it remains significant to the self-understanding of this tradition and it sets out some of the parameters for the justification of its critique. Further, the political perspective of these radical theorists regularly owes more to other strands of Marxism and it sometimes shades into the politics of orthodox or party Marxism. In the sense, that the approach that some radical theorists have to politics is more instrumental and the other concerns or commitments of theory, like methodology, normative justification, or even rationality, are taken to be matters that are ultimately resolved politically or in combination with power. These are positions that tend to reflect the influence of Antonio Gramsci and Michel Foucault in fields like those of cultural studies and postcolonial studies. In fact, it is not the perception of the imbrication of theory and power that separates these approaches from Critical Theory, but the conclusions that are drawn from it. For instance, the fact that some radical thinkers, like Chantal Mouffe, have contributed to the renewal of interest in the politics of Carl Schmitt may be indicative of the divergence from Critical Theory, even though it is true that this interest has antecedents in Walter Benjamin s engagement with Schmitt in his critique of violence (Benjamin 1978b[1955]; Mouffe, 1999). Schmitt s critique of liberalism and his conception of politics as based on a division between friend and foe are certainly contrary to the democratic and deliberative perspective of Habermas Critical Theory (Schmitt, 2007[1932]; Habermas, 1998). These heterogeneous strands of radical thought regularly dissent from Critical Theory s underlying adherence to the intentions of the project of modernity, or the modernist articulation of its vision of the autonomous constitution of society. In some respects, it is the aspect of dissent rather than affirmation which has led to many of them being labelled critical theories. In fact, there has actually been a proliferation of the category of critique or critiques, often with the intention of emphasizing the acceptance of disputation and the diversity, or fragmentation, of progressive social and political movements, such as feminist, environmental, and identity (see Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005). At the same time, the Frankfurt School tradition of Critical Theory may have come to be perceived as relatively less critical. This is probably because of its more

16 14 CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY affirmative relation to liberalism and rights, as well as the priority that Habermas discourse theory accords to agreement in determining social justice and normative justification. But it may simply be due to the view that the founding problems of Critical Theory belong to an earlier period and that its institutionalization simply makes its theses seem predictable (see Honneth, 2009: 19). There have always been, to be sure, radical critiques of capitalism that diverge from Critical Theory, and which are opposed to its basic standard of critique. Critical Theory bases its critique on the existing but unfulfilled rationality of society. Habermas claims that Critical Theory is critical of the reality of developed societies inasmuch as they do not make full use of the learning potential culturally available to them, but deliver themselves over to an uncontrolled growth of complexity (Habermas, 1987a: 375). This dimension of critique equally applies to alternative theories, irrespective of whether they are traditional or radical. The recent generalization of critique reflects an appreciation of the multiplicity of injustices and the delegitimizing of formerly uncritical positions. It is fair to claim that Critical Theory can learn from struggles for justice, yet its methodology and perspective differentiate it from many forms of these struggles. Ultimately, it serves as a critical standard for assessing perspectives. In this respect, it is worth recalling Critical Theory s standpoint in relation to the workers movement and how the Frankfurt School sought to explain the proletariat s diversion from its emancipatory potential. From this starting point, Critical Theory was forced to commence a process of rethinking the prospects and meaning of a general interest in emancipation. Similarly, Habermas theory of the colonization of the lifeworld sought to understand and explain the then new protest movements, like the ecological, peace and anti-consumerist movements, potentials and how new conflicts were connected to the strains on the welfare state from demands for services and legitimacy (Habermas, 1987a). In his opinion, the explanatory intention of his theory was that of enabling a better understanding of those sources of discontent that are not entirely clear to the movements, and, by this, to counteract indiscriminate rejections of modern rationality. The latter took the form of elaborating the more expansive and democratic conception of communicative rationality (Habermas, 1984; 1986). One of the problems of this approach was that it appeared rather distant from the substantive concerns of these movements and it did not fully satisfy its own explanatory intentions. Even so, Habermas basic assumption remains correct. Critical Theory should provide a revised account of the conflicts that underlie contemporary movements and protests. It should constitute, then, not just a normative clarification of social struggles demands for justice, but also a sociological explanation of the prevailing forms of domination and suffering. This explanation may coincide with or enhance those understandings of progressive movements opposing injustices, but it may constitute a critique of movements explanations and serve to initiate dialogical reflection. Of course, Critical Theory must be open to learning from movements and their capacity to reveal injustices.

17 INTRODUCTION 15 There are other ways in which the commitment to rationality differentiates the Frankfurt School tradition of Critical Theory from many of the other post- Marxist and radical perspectives that are often labelled critical theory today. One of them is the extent to which Critical Theory has been shaped by its reception of Max Weber s theory of rationality and Weber s ambivalent vision of modernity (Weber, 1930; 1958). For Weber, rationalization harbours constraining and destructive consequences; particularly those of bureaucratic domination and the dissolution of those meanings and values that could either limit purposive rationalization or give it a purpose beyond itself. Despite these dangers and the negative dimensions of rationalization, Weber believed that rationalization in the form of efficiency, predictability, the application of means, technological expansion, the growth in expertise and the disenchantment of magic and spiritualist interpretations of reality is so effective in modernity that there is no realistic possibility of renouncing it. In fact, Weber claimed that even the major alternative to capitalist rationalization would not result in a rupture with the destructive aspects of rationality. Socialism, Weber argued, would consolidate bureaucratic control and domination (Weber, 1994). As noted already, the Frankfurt School s reception of Weber s theory of rationalization was anticipated and mediated by Lukács theory of reification. Lukács argued that, although Weber s depiction of many of the tendencies of rationalization was correct, Weber s vision was affected by the reifying logic of capitalism and its tendency to make social processes appear to operate according to irresistible objective dynamics (Lukács, 1971). Without going into detail here, Lukács conception of the transcendence of reification through proletarian revolution was implausible by the time of the formation of the Frankfurt School. It is probably sufficient to demonstrate the degree to which Critical Theory has been shaped by Weber s theory of rationalization to note that it has pursued two almost contradictory positions in relationship to it. On the one hand, the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School extended and generalized Weber s theory of rationalization. It detailed the penetration of rationalization into additional spheres of life, such as into leisure activities through the mass media, and sought to ascertain the deeper sources of instrumental rationalization, such as in the formation of human subjectivity and the mythical prehistory of Western civilization (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1972; Marcuse, 1966). On the other hand, Critical Theory has sought to contest the implications of Weber s theory of rationalization. In short, it has contested Weber s conception on the basis of visions of a more encompassing and fulfilling meaning of rationality, for instance, challenging the repressive character of the corresponding model of subjectivity or explicating aesthetic experiences that expose the internal limits of instrumental rationality (Marcuse, 1966; Adorno, 1985). Habermas argument that communicative rationalization could enable a more balanced institutionalization of rationality similarly contests the conclusions that Weber drew about rationalization. Habermas envisages the possibility of a higher order democratic regulation of the currently dominant processes of the rationalisation of the capitalist market and bureaucratic state administration (Habermas, 1987a).