WHEN AND HOW DO WE DEAL

Transcription

1 WHEN AND HOW DO WE DEAL WITH STRAW MEN? Marcin Lewiński Lisboa Steve Oswald Universidade Nova de Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam OUTLINE The straw man: definition and example A pragmatic phenomenon Examples Contextuality of the straw man Effectiveness of the straw man Conclusion 2 1

2 THE STRAW MAN Definition of a straw man So: A fallacy of argumentative criticism in which an opponent misrepresents a proponent s standpoint or arguments in such a way that they become easier to refute, and then attacks the misrepresented position as if it were the one actually defended by the proponent. form: various types of misrepresentation function: attack on an arguer with his own words 3 TEXTBOOK EXAMPLE A: Many marriages go through some kind of a crisis, sometimes leading to a divorce. B: How bizarre to believe that all couples are bound to divorce! My wife and I married 20 years ago and we have lived happily ever since. The straw man typically exploits the difficulty of securing an unambiguous interpretation 4 2

3 ACCOUNTING FOR THE STRAW MAN «a common, familiar and thoroughly theorized fallacy» (Talisse & Aikin 2006: 349) yet, both theoretical and empirical examination is ongoing and far from complete (see Aikin & Casey forth.; Bizer, Kozak & Holterman 2009; van Laar 2008; Lewiński 2010: Ch. 9; Talisse & Aikin 2006 and Walton & Macagno 2010) 2 interrelated key questions (see van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2003, Jackson 1995) 1. When can we justifiably say that the straw man occurred? reasonableness 2. How can we explain its remaining covert and thus its persuasive or even manipulative potential? treacherousness 5 AN INTEGRATED PRAGMATIC TAKE ON THE STRAW MAN Pragma-dialectics Normative pragmatic approach: develops theoretically justified, external criteria for normative interpretation (reconstruction) and evaluation of argumentative discourse answer to question 1: identification of definitional criteria Fallacies as derailments of strategic manoeuvring dialectically unreasonable attempts to persuade Relevance Theory Cognitive pragmatic approach: develops an explanatory account of natural mechanisms of naïve interpretation of communicative stimuli (including argumentation) Fallacies as manipulative discourse twofold constraint on interpretation (cf.maillat & Oswald 2009, forth.) answer to question 2: why the straw man can be effective 6 3

4 PRAGMATIC ASPECTS OF THE STRAW MAN (1): AN ISSUE OF COMMITMENT The straw man operates on the (mis)attribution of commitment unreliably portraying what someone intended to communicate A question of meaning: understanding triggers commitment attribution (cf. Saussure & Oswald 2008, 2009) Commitment to explicit vs. implicit content commitment attribution to explicit content is straightforward (based on explicit linguistic material) commitment attribution to implicit content is trickier indeterminacy of meaning Cf. notion of disagreement space (see van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson & Jacobs 1993) 7 STRAW MAN? 1) a. Laszlo: The garbage can is full again b. Lucinda: I m busy; I cannot take it out now c. Laszlo: I was actually pointing out that we should simply change this goddamn can for a bigger one, it s just too small 2) a. We should change the garbage can as it is too small. b. Could you take the garbage out? c. You should be more careful with everything you throw away. 8 (taken and adapted from Morency, Oswald & Saussure 2008: 211) 4

5 PRAGMATIC ASPECTS OF THE STRAW MAN (2): AN ISSUE OF CONTEXT The difficulty involved in example (1) can be dodged by considering contextual criteria linked to activity types 2 parameters: precision of interpretation / commitment attribution charity of interpretation Precise interpretation (narrow plausibility) Loose interpretation (broad plausibility) Highly critical (uncharitable) criminal trial blind academic review much of political discourse, especially informal (public sphere) 9 Constructive (charitable) doctor-patient consultation conference presentation classroom discussion chat in a pub dinner table EXAMPLE: KACZYŃSKI VS. KOMOROWSKI (2010) 3) Komorowski: The presidential elections will come or the president [L. Kaczyński] will fly somewhere and all this will change. 4) J. Kaczyński, relaying Komorowski s words: The president will fly somewhere and perhaps everything will be over

6 KACZYŃSKI VS. KOMOROWSKI (1) Two reasons why it is fallacious: 1. Decontextualised, as clear with referential shift (3): all this = the stalemate regarding ambassadors nominations (4): everything = the presidential rule and possibly even the life of my brother 2. Limited to just one conditional, rather than a disjunction of conditions: (3): elections or flight two possible and fully justified procedural alternatives for a change of situation (4): flight simple mono-conditional determination pointing to an assassination plot involving a plane crash Kaczyński is (expectedly) uncharitable, but the problem lies in the implausibility of the 11 commitment he attributes to Komorowski EXAMPLE 2: BOLKESTEIN VS. CHOMSKY (1988) Western governments, including Bolkestein: We are focusing on the events in Cambodia rather than East Timor because of the incomparable scale of genocide in Cambodia. Chomsky: You are focusing on the events in Cambodia rather than East Timor because you politically and militarily support Indonesia an invader of Timor and benefit from the invasion. Bolkestein: Professor Chomsky uses the oldest debating trick on earth he erects a man of straw and proceeds to hack away at it

7 COGNITIVE ASPECTS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FALLACIES The success of fallacies rests on a twofold process secure unproblematic and relevant interpretation ensure absence of critical information Constraint on the selection of information Contextual Selection Constraint (cf. Maillat & Oswald 2009, forth.) exploitation of cognitive fallibility (comprehension heuristic) variations in salience may influence relevance strengthening strategies weakening strategies 13 KACZYŃSKI VS. KOMOROWSKI (2) Why (4) might be effective: 1. Both (3) and (4) contain a conjunction implicatures triggered: temporal ordering and causal relationship P & Q = P and then Q, but also P and Q = Q because P 2. But there is a difference between (3) and (4): In (4) the disjunction is eliminated strengthens he will fly somewhere, weakens the elections will come 3. Suppressing the disjunction affects the causal reading (3): (A v B) & C, (4): B & C 2 to 1 relationship 1 to 1 relationship: causal link strengthened in favour of the conspiracy reading as B is presented as the only relevant state of affairs allowing C to be the case 4. Replacement of indexical by vague pronoun all this (concrete situation) becomes everything (?) 5. Relevance of fly in the context of a plane crash is high but difference in lexical extension of the concept between (3) and (4) increases the relevance of the conspiracy reading 14 7

8 CONCLUSION Complementarity of these pragmaticallygrounded theories: descriptive and explanatory requirements are met elaboration of a more comprehensive account of the straw man (and presumably other fallacies) 15 8