RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM (UN)FULFILLED: Reason. New York: Harper Collins. By Nadlne Changfoot RESEMBLANCE AND DISSONANCE IN ROUSSEAU

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1 92 Sexual Dscrmnaton 2nd Edton. Scarborough: Nelson Canada. Stone, Deborah A Pdcy Paradox and Poltcal Reason. New York: Harper Collns. Weaver, Sally "Frst Natons Women and Government Polcy, : Dscrmnaton and Conflct." Changng Patterns; Women n Canada, 2nd Edton. Eds. Sandra Burt, L. Code and L. Dorney. Toronto: McLelland and Stewart nc.: ,"The Status of ndan Women." Two Natons, Many Cultures, 2nd Edton Ed. Jean L. Ellott. Scarborough; Prentlce-Hall, 19 83: ( RATONALTY AND FREEDOM (UN)FULFLLED: RESEMBLANCE AND DSSONANCE N ROUSSEAU AND HEGEL By Nadlne Changfoot J-J Rousseau and G. W. F. Hegel offer nsght nto problems assocated wth the concept of the ndvdual. Each thnker's respectve understandng of the ndvdual reveals a paradox of smultaneous human desre for freedom and ratonalty, on the one hand, and creaton of 'unfreedom' and rratonalty, on the other. An examnaton of Rousseau and Hegel reveals that the ratonal subject gves rse to rratonalty. Rousseau s hghly crtcal of the general Enlghtenment assumpton that reason s hstorcally self-mprovng and expandng n knowledge for the betterment of socety.' t s the hstorcal transformaton of human reason, for Rousseau, that confounds the actualzaton of freedom. Through hs concept of the general wll, Rousseau attempts a correctve to the problem of ratonalty but nadvertently reveals the mpossblty of the goal of realzng freedom gven the very 'perfectb1te'-- subjectve ratonalty -- of humans themselves. Poltcal socety, for Rousseau, remans a le of ts own promse of freedom. The uglness of poltcal socety that dscomfts Rousseau permdtes even Hegel's putatve progressve and developmental vew of human ratonalty. The Hegelan dea effects the same symptom of rratonalty as dentfed by Rousseau. t appears n Hegel's thought wthn the system of need n cvl socety. Need s manfest as poverty for some. Whle Hegel does not condone the condton of deprvaton, he does not consder t rratonal ether. Ths does not represent a problem, for Hegel, snce ratonalty requres acceptance of mperfectons n socety roncally as aspects of ts own ratonal self-development. The Hegelan concepton of ratonalty s more forgvng of njustces snce t renders these as necessarly symptomatc, not threatenng, of ts own formaton. Hegel crtczes Rousseau's understandng of rato-

2 94 Resemblance and Dssonance nallty. For Hegel, Rousseau's dea of reason falls short of what Hegel sees to be reason's own hstorcal development and as a result, Rousseau lmts the understandng of freedom humans can acheve. But Rousseau's pessmstc vew of ratonalty's development provdes the nsght that ratonalty gves rse to rratonalty and unfreedom. For Rousseau, ratonalty s unable to lve up to ts own promse of freedom because there s an nternal contradcton at work n reason tself that prevents such fulflment. The contradcton s a source of dstress for Rousseau as he s unforgvng of what he sees as an overwhelmng expanson of self-nterest. Rousseau cannot reconcle hs observatons of socety wth hs concept of the general wll because the two are n opposton to one another. Ths contradcton can only be resolved n Hegel's thought through an acceptance of the contradcton tself as ratonal. The mplcatons of ther respectve vews of ratonalty and freedom for ndvduals dverge sgnfcantly. Because Rousseau sees reason as nherently flawed n ts hstorcal development, there s no possblty of a genune freedom or equalty for ctzens beyond formal poltcal statement of such n the state. Contrary to Rousseau's noton of the general wll, the state s ncapable of sustanng freedom and equalty. A state founded upon reason nevtably has to temper self-nterest, whch mples that reason works aganst tself,.e., that reason s self-destructve. The ndvdual who would come nto conflct wth the state out of hs own self-nterest must be punshed. Rousseau, however, doubts the moral clam of the state over the ndvdual because the state too s not exempt from reason's fallblty. Rousseau's thought suggests that subjectve reason becomes pervasve to the extent that t gves rse to an rratonal human condton that s mstakenly understood as ratonal. n contrast, Hegel sees the culmnaton of reason's self-development n the state where freedom s realzed. Freedom n the state, for Hegel, means that ndvduals must accept judgement as ther own from an authorty whch they themselves have created. Whle Hegel crtczes Rousseau for relyng on selfnterest as the bass of ndvdual freedom n the state, Hegel n fact underestmates the powerful ndctment of ratonalty expressed n Rousseau's thought. As such Hegel's nterpretaton of Rousseau's state as an aggregaton of ndvdual desre among ctzens sells Rousseau short of hs own nsght nto the problem of the hstorcal development of reason. Because Rousseau sees the state as subject to the contradctons of reason, the resultng freedom cannot help but be contradctory gven the ndvdual's self-destructve mpulses and self-preservng desres. t s Rousseau's unsettlng apprecaton of the defcency of the ndvdual's capacty to control complex, evolvng subjectve desres that resonates wth feelngs of awe he held of poltcal socety. Rousseau states at the end of The Dscourse on the Orgns of nequalty that "t s only the sprt of socety together wth the nequalty that socety engenders whch changes and corrupts n ths way all our natural nclnaton" (p. 271).2 Even though we may desre freedom and equalty, Rousseau dscovers that we are our own worst enemy, so to speak, n that the oppo- ' ste s brought about. Yet, Hegel's clam that the ndvdual s ratonal and free leaves one askng the same questons or makng the same observatons as Rousseau: there s somethng rotten n the state n whch we fnd ourselves amdst poverty and deprvaton despte pronouncements of the progress of western cvlzaton. To expect mprovement through further progress and devel-, opment because ratonalty and freedom are our desred end evades the fundamental paradox of the ratonalty and rratonalty of the wll, from Rousseau's perspectve. * For Rousseau, alenaton from genune equalty and freedom s at the heart of beng an ndvdual. There can only be sgnfcant dsenchantment wth what exsts n poltcal socety knowng that t s fundamentally defcent : n comparson to what could possbly be acheved accord-! ng to the dea of the general wll. Poltcal acton, n : Rousseau's vew, s one that s both flawed at the outset : but also necessary f one takes the general wll serously

3 Resemblance and Dssonance as a normatve dea. Moreover, we learn from Rousseau that we can and should condemn our stuaton and ourselves for brngng t about. The solutons for change are uncertan, wll always be nadequate, but can nevertheless be guded by the dea of the general wll. For Hegel, Rousseau's angushed doubt of attanng a genune freedom and equalty s msplaced snce Hegel argues that Rousseau reles on a destructve self-nterested understandng of ratonalty at the outset. Reason's self-development, so Hegel clams, actually reconcles both subjectve and unversal nterest. ndvduals are free but ther freedom s consttuted n ther own self-development from whch the famly, cvl socety, and the state emerge. Accordngly, the ndvdual accepts state authorty as one's own. We learn from Hegel that crcumstances of poverty, dsablty, unequal dstrbuton of wealth emerge from ratonalty's own self-development and what we can do s affrm ourselves whle recognzng and allevatng the varety and degree of need observed n cvl socety of one's own tme. Whle Hegel s crtcal of Rousseau's noton of ratonalty, Hegel does not address Rousseau's dscomfture over socety's tendency toward nequalty and unfreedom -- ratonal outcomes of ratonal objectves--and cannot enact Rousseau's dea of the general wll n whch Rousseau envsaged equalty and freedom. We are not led to queston fundamentally ether our noton of ratonalty, ourselves, or the state n Hegel's thought. The problems we observe wthn cvl socety are worth addressng but as problems to be solved wthn the system tself. We cannot provde a radcal crtque of socety drawng upon Hegel n the same way as Rousseau because ratonalty's purported outcome of freedom, for Hegel, s taken to be suffcently normatve. The foundaton of freedom, for Rousseau, s the ndvdual. The ndvdual forms hmself through the ablty to thnk.3 The capacty for reason, or the 'faculty of self-mprovement,' s put to use for the purpose of enablng the ndvdual to decde what s best for hmself. t s ths faculty whch makes man ratonal and sets man apart from the anmal. n the Dscourse, Rousseau states, "the one [anmal] chooses and refuses by nstnct, the other [man] from an act of free wll" (p. 207). The ndvdual s srnultaneousy nfluenced by what s external to hm/her,.e., other smlar ndvduals n socety.' Rousseau's understandng of the ndvdual reveals the followng paradox: n order to understand hmself as beng free, an ndvdual must be able to act on hs needs and desres wthout obstructon or nterference from other ndvduals, on the one hand, yet he must also recognze hs freedom, hs capacty to thnk of, and act on hs desres, as stuated n relaton to other smlar ndvduals, on the other. An ndvdual's ablty to fulfl hs needs and desres s dependent upon other ndvlduals, and vce versa. The ndvdual, however, puts hmself frst to secure hs own exstence or self-preservaton, even though he s also cognzant of hs dependence on others.' Rousseau states: hs frst law s to provde for hs own preservaton: hs frst cares are those whch he owes hmself; and as soon as he reaches years of dscretlon, he s the sole judge of the proper means of preservng hmself, and consequently becomes hs own master (SC 1,). Self-presewaton, accordng to Rousseau, hstor- ; cally evolves to be nextrcably lnked wth amour propre.6 Rousseau suggests that self-nterest rsks the destructon of both oneself and the other. Amour-propre, or self-love, becomes so all-consumng that t precptates 1 the demse of the self and that of socety altogether. Selflove, n effect, becomes the obstacle to human exstence that s ratonal and truly free. ndvdual freedom s threatened by the followng nternal opposton at work n reason. Whle t s ratonal thought that s the lfe-affrmng aspect of the ndvdual, t s amour propre that s lfethreatenng. n that the nterdependence between nd vduals has come to be dctated by self-love, socety rsks fallng nto the Hobbesan war of all aganst all. The fact

4 98 Resemblance and Dssonance that reason can act on amour propre and follow a selfdestructve course s rratonal, for Rousseau, and therefore must be changed. He states: suppose men to have reached the pont at whch the obstacles n the way of ther preservaton n the state of nature show ther power of resstance to be greater than the resources at the dsposal of each ndvdual for hs mantenance n that state. That prmtve condton can then subsst no longer; and the human race would persh unless t changed ts manner of exstence (SC 1,V). The paradoxcal aspects of the ndvdual -- selfpreservng thought and self-destructve mpulses -- need to be reconcled for Rousseau n order to assure freedom and lfe tself. The 'manner of exstence' n socety s transformed from one where ndvduals pursue ther selfnterest to destructve ends nto one where ndvduals are peaceably at one wth themselves and wth others. How each person can attan a socal exstence so that each can act freely on ther own desres s a trcky problem under such an assocaton. Such a communty would seem to mpose lmts on self-nterest. Rousseau states: The problem s to fnd a form of assocaton whch wll defend and protect wth the whole common force the person and goods of each assocate, and n whch each, whle untng hmself wth all, may stll obey hmself alone, and reman as free as before (SC,V). Ths assocaton s acheved through the socal compact whch requres the complete alenaton on the part of each ndvdual of hmself, and all hs clams made aganst the whole communty. Alenaton, for Rousseau, means "to gve or to sell" (SC 1,V). What s gven up s that rratonal part of the ndvdual wll that s manfest through amour propre and whch s the obstacle to selfpreservaton and freedom. Snce there s total allenaton 1 of ths aspect of the self across the board, accordng to Rousseau, the condtons of socety are equal for all ndvduals. Formal equalty s realzed as a result of ths covenant or socal compact. Rousseau clams that, because there s formal equalty for all members of socety, no one benefts by tryng to take advantage of another person. Complete and uncondtonal alenaton sets the ground rule or understandlng that no ndvdual member has to clam addtonal or dsproportonate rghts aganst one another; formal equalty precludes nequalty. He states that the covenant represents the total alenaton of each assocate, together wth all hs rghts, to the whole communty; for, n the frst place, as each gves hmself absolutely, the condtons are the same for all; and, ths beng so, no one has any nterest n makng them burdensome to others (SC 1,V). The most mportant aspect of ths abstract assocaton of ndvduals s that each person retans hs own freedom. Because the unty of ndvduals s based on the uncondtonal alenaton by all, there s uncondtonal equalty n the sense that rghts ganed and lost n the. assocaton are not advantageous to any sngle ndvdual. ' n fact, there s only a gan for all of socety's members 1 gven that all ndvduals augment ther freedom by beng 1 able to preserve what each already possesses or owns. As! Rousseau states: each man, n gvng hmself to all, gves hmself to nobody: and as there s no assocate over whch he does not acqure the same rght as he yelds others over hmself, he gans an equvalent for everythng he loses, and an ncrease of force for the preservaton of what he has (SC 1,V). The general wll, accordng to Rousseau, "creates a moral and collectve body" (SC,V). t s moral snce t embodes the ndvdual as the negaton of the self-destructve aspect of amour propre, and gves rse to corn-

5 100 Resemblance and Dssonance plete ratonalty, formal equalty, and freedom, as a result. ndvduals mantan ther autonomy snce they can pursue ther self-nterest wthout worry of fulfllng an unclamed rght aganst another, and conversely, they can be oblgated to others wthout feelng that each s beng dsadvantaged. The general wll, for Rousseau, s a theoretcal devce whch enables the ndvdual to act on self-nterest n a communty, where one can realze freedom, one's very exstence, wthout self-destructve tendences. The ndvdual s transformed nto a unty of two dmensons whch neutralzes, n thought only, the self-destructveness of subjectve ratonalty. n ths sense, the general wll embodes the ndvdual n an abstract and deal exstence that transcends the ndvdual. Rousseau, however, cannot mantan the reconclaton of the paradoxcal aspects of the ndvdual accordng to hs concept of the general wll. Although the ndvdual can clam to mould oneself accordng to the abstract concept of a general wll that negates the self-destructve nterest, the clam wll not be realzed. The ndvdual that s the prncple of the state, for Rousseau, s partal as Hege alleges, but not for the reason Hegel gves. Rousseau attempts to consder the ndvdual as completely free and ratonal, as opposed to "only n ts determnate form" ( 258), but dscovers that ratonalty tself s ts own greatest obstacle to ratonalty and freedom. Accordng to Hegel, Rousseau's state arses out of a contract through the unon of arbtrary self-nterest. Hegel's nterpretaton gnores Rousseau's consderaton of the ndvdual wth ratonal potental. Whle Rousseau's general wll may fnally succumb to arbtrary self-nterest, t s not untl the general wll s consdered n lght of ts dyadc elements that subjectve reason s seen to persst as an obstacle to freedom, accordng to Rousseau. Rousseau's delberatons about the general wll reveals that ts falure may be better exhbted n Rousseau's thought than Hegel concedes. The general wll conssts of two meanngs. Frst, there s the general wll n whch reconclaton s com- plete n thought. n ths case there s perfect reconclaton between the ndvdual's smultaneous self-destructve and self-preservng tendences, whch, n turn, enables the ndvdual to coexst harmonously wthout destructve self-nterest. The general wll n ts second meanng represents ncomplete reconclaton, but nevertheless takes the name of the 'general wll.' n ths case the reconclaton s flawed gven the persstence of rratonal destructve self-nterest. The state, for Rousseau, s abstractly founded upon the frst meanng of the general wll, but t operates accordng to the second meanng and s left to contend wth the ndvdual's self-destructve tendency of subjectve reason. Governng n Rousseau's state, accordng to Hegel, conssts of expressng ndvdual consent "gven at ts own dscreton" (PRs258). Arbtrary wll s nvested wth power, but the wll acted upon s assumed to be ratonal, when n fact, t s not, and consequently freedom s not realzed. Hegel states that "when these abstractons were 1 nvested wth power the ntenton behnd ths was to gve t what was supposed to be a purely ratonal bass" (PRS258). When the two meanngs of the general wll posed above are taken nto consderaton, Hegel s gnor- / ng the possblty that Rousseau s aware of the problem 1 of abstracton, and n fact s cognzant that t s not the frst meanng of the general wll that s empowered, but rather the second. n contrast to Hegel's nterpretaton of Rousseau, Rousseau understands that there s no ratonal j bass for the second meanng of the general wll that s 1 empowered. The ndvdual can lve only through selfnterest that has self-destructve tendences. Freedom and equalty as defned through the frst meanng of the general wll remans elusve. What perssts are rratonal mpulses and desres: amourpropre. For Rousseau, the actual s not ratonal. The general wll remans unactualzed and exsts only as a concept. n Rousseau's dea of the general wll the contradct ton contaned n reason tself can be observed. The ndvdual comprses an nternal opposton that pts evolvng amour propre that s subjectve partcularty n

6 102 Resemblance and Dssonance Hegel's terms wth what Rousseau vewed to be man's object of freedom whereby all obey all and also themselves ndvdually. Ths nternal opposton s smultaneously reconcled, cancelled, and mantaned n the concept of the general wll. Reconclaton, however, falls apart outsde the dea of the general wll because of the predomnance of destructve self-nterest and what remans s the war of all aganst all that s cvl socety. Hegel would purport to overcome the nternal opposton observed n Rousseau's noton of reason through hs dalectc. The Rousseauan rreconclablty between the preservng and destructve tendences of ratonalty s putatvely resolved by Hegel through reason's process of self-dentty. Ratonalty understands ts own determnatons,.e., feelngs, needs, desres, objects, as ntegrally part of the unversal brought down nto ts own partcularty. Ths s acheved through the Aufhebung; the ndvdual overcomes the other through struggle, and va transcendence, s able to preserve the other n oneself. n ths sense, the ndvdual s beng wth oneself n an other. What the ndvdual mght confront n another s, accordng to Hegel, one's own self that can be overcome n a hgher level of self-understandng. Rousseau's general wll exhbts a smlarty to Hegel's transcendent moment of ratonalty. For Rousseau, ndvduals would nterpenetrate unproblernatlcally n ther abstract dentty accordng to the concept of the general wll. Unlke Hegel, however, Rousseau s unable to translate the ndvdual's exstence conceved n the dea of the general wll to actual socety. The nternal opposton of ratonalty cannot be contaned by the general wll; ratonalty regresses toward amour propre that s lnked to the prmacy of self-nterest versus preservaton, reconclaton of amour propre, and desre for freedom. Gven ths antagonsm, the ndvdual of the general wll remans transcendent, separate from the ndvdual n socety. turn next to a dscusson of the state as key to understandng how Rousseau's noton of reason condemns us to lve n a poltcal communty wthout freedom and how Hegel's understandng of reason clams to permt us to lve n a state of freedom. For Rousseau, the state s mportant n that t s the object of the dea of the general wll whch s ultmately found untenable. Yet, t s wthn poltcal communty that the ndvdual should attan freedom. Smlar to Rousseau, the state s where freedom should be realzed, but unlke Rousseau, s thought to be realzed, accordng to Hegel. Whereas ratonalty and freedom n the state s mpossble for Rousseau, they are possble for Hegel. The form of assocaton borne by the general wll s not exempt from the contradctons of ratonalty that are dentfed by Rousseau n the Dscourse. The opposng tendences of ratonalty are observed n Rousseau's state to the extent that the state cannot ensure freedom through control of destructve self-nterest accordng to the dea of the general wll. n contrast, Hegel's noton of reason s mantaned n hs understandng of the state. : For Hegel, the state embodes ratonalty n ts contradctory and reconcled moments at a hgher level of selfdevelopment. The general wll that gves the "body poltc lfe and exstence" (SC 1,Vl) s undone by the prmacy of destructve self-nterest, accordng to Rousseau. He states ( that "the body poltc, as well as the human body, begns j to de as soon as t s born, and carres n tself the causes! of ts destructon" (SC 1,X). We cannot lve the deal human exstence through the general wll n ts frst meanng, and consequently, the exstence we do lead s at best an ncomplete and dubous one n terms of the second meanng of the general wll. Rousseau's metaphor 1 of the body s devastatng n that t mples that our 1 human exstence and freedom cannot be realzed as long j as the paradox of reason remans. Rousseau, however, also states that "the best-consttuted State wll have an end; 1 but t wll end later than any other" (SC 111,X). Our exstence s partal n so far as the ratonalty, freedom and formal equalty of the abstract general wll are not fully e realzed aspects of our lved lfe n a socety that takes

7 104 Resemblance and Dssonance destructve self-nterest as a moral mperatve. Tragcally, t s the partal ndvdual of ths moral mperatve that s the source of our less than ratonal and free exstence. The two meanngs of the general wll can be seen n Rousseau's understandng of the state, partcularly n hs dscusson of the crmnal. He states that "n a well governed State, there are few punshments, not because there are many pardons but because crmnals are rare" (SC 1,V). Ths s the state founded on the frst meanng of the general wll, where ratonalty s harmonously reconcled n a communty of others, and the destructve aspects of amour propre are snuffed out. The general wll corrects the ndvdual who comes nto conflct wth the communty by force, when necessary. Government acts to restran and respond to the potental self-destructon of our exstence. Accordng to Rousseau, the crmnal s one who volates the laws of the state. n so dong, the crmnal ceases to be a member of the state and "n such a case the preservaton of the State s nconsstent wth hs own, and one or the other must persh; n puttng the gulty to death, we slay not so much the ctzen as an enemy" (SC 1,V). The crmnal has commtted an act that runs counter to the preservaton of the state, and also hmself as ctzen. By puttng the state and hmself n jeopardy, the ndvdual has acted rratonally, "as merely a man" (SC,V), and must be punshed possbly extrcated from the communty through executon. But even the state works aganst the dea of the general wll. ndvduals pursue self-nterest that runs counter to the dea of the general wll and the state s put n a poston of workng aganst the very self-nterest that gves rse to the general wll at the outset. He states: as the partcular wll acts constantly n opposton to the general wll, the government contnually exerts tself aganst the Soveregnty. The greater ths exerton becomes, the more the consttuton changes; and, as there s n ths case no other corporate wlt to create an equlbrum by resstng the wll of the prnce, sooner or later the prnce must nevtably suppress the Soveregn and break the socal treaty (SC 1,X). The ndvdual remans alenated from the state, for Rousseau. ndvdual freedom cannot be guaranteed by the state snce the state nevtably has to work forcbly aganst ts own ctzens' nterests. Freedom becomes mtgated by state acton upon the ndvdual. n workng aganst corrupt ndvduals of whch t s composed, the state, accordng to Rousseau, also takes on ts own selfnterest whch, n turn, takes state acton further away from the dea of the general wll. Rousseau further says that "t s when a State s n ; decay that the multtude of crmes s a guarantee of mpunty" (SC l,v). Ths suggests that crme becomes the behavoural norm and as such crmnal acts go unjudged. They cannot be judged because the state that does not realze tself as the dea of the general wll can no longer make moral judgements. The state comes to accept crme as acts of freedom and n so dong has shown tself to have succumbed to the rratonalty of destructve selfnterest. rratonalty becomes the norm and masks tself as ratonal. Self-doubt emerges as to what can be judged whch mples that all ndvduals may take on aspects of the rratonal crmnal to be punshed: Rousseau says ' feel my heart protestng and restranng my pen; let us leave these questons to the just man who has never offended, and would hmself stand n no need of pardon" (SC 1.V). n contrast to Rousseau's state that becomes torn rupt by destructve self-nterest, the state, for Hegel, s "the actualty of concrete freedom" (PRO260)7. Concrete 1 freedom, for Hegel, means the full realzaton of the self- [ determned ratonal ndvdual as developed wthn the / famly and cvl s~cety,~ as parts of the state. The ndvdual recognzes oneself as the unversal nterest from 1 whch freedom and socal nsttutons are manfest. t s j the desre for freedom that creates socal nsttutons, j accordng to Hegel. One must "knowngly and wllngly acknowledge ths unversal nterest even as ts own sub-

8 106 Resemblance and Dssonance stantal sprt, and actvely pursue t as ts ultmate end" (PR5260). The ndvdual s self-conscous of one's freedom gven the dalectcal consttuton through the unversal and partcular whose end s the state.g For Hegel, the contradcton between the unversal and partcular s resolved when the self recognzes the state both as the unversal and as ts own ratonal end. Accordng to Hegel, the state s an organsm that contnually produces and preserves tself (PRS266) because of ts ratonal bass. Unlke the state body of Rousseau, however, Hegel's s not a dyng one, but an hstorcally self-mprovng one. Smlar to Rousseau, Hegel uses the metaphor of the body, specfcally the nervous system as a metaphor for the state (PRs263). The nervous system s that part of the body whch s not vsble to the external world but has ts own nternal organzatonwthout whch the body tself would not exst--that provdes perpetual unseen order to the body. Hegel beleves that the state has longevty because t allows ndvduals to fulfl ther own arbtrary desres or self-nterest even to an extreme, wthout the self-destmctveness that such pursuts mply. Destructon s preempted gven that self-nterest s pursued n relaton to the unversal whch the ndvdual recognzes to be hs own. The unty between self-nterest and the unversal, whch s dvne and everlastng, s preserved n the partcular tself. Hegel states that: the pf ncple of modern states has enormous strength and depth because t allows the prncple of subjectvty to attan fulflment n the selfsuffcent extreme of personal partcularty whle at the same tme brngng t back to substantal unty and so preservng ths unty n the prncple of subjectvty tself (PRs260). As a member of the state, the ndvdual realzes hs own freedom snce the content of the state,.e., laws, rghts, and dutes n cvl socety, s recognzed to be a part of the ndvdual hmself, as of hs own makng. n obeyng laws, satsfyng rghts, and fulfllng dutes, the ndvdual s ratonal and also free n recognzng self-made constrants. For Hegel, the crmnal, as a member of the state, s a ratonal beng and must be so "honoured" (PR 100). n recognzng the state as part of hmself, the crmnal must come to understand that, n commttng a crme, he s smultaneously subjectng hmself to a law that "he has recognzed for hmself n hs acton" (PRs100). The crmnal understands that he w1 and must be punshed snce he s subject to the laws of the state that are hs own. f punshment s dened, or f the crmnal does not recognze the need for hs own punshment, he s beng dened hs ratonalty and, consequently, s treated no dfferently from an anmal. Rousseau's anxety over the ndvdual's tendency toward self-destructon, actng on hs desres rratonally, s never fully resolved n hs poltcal thought because he s not content to resolve ths problem n thought only. Ths s not to say that he does not try. n order to ensure our partal exstence and slow down the process of nherent degeneraton of the ndvdual and hs communty, accordng to Rousseau, the general wll must be mposed va the state, whch, however, s tself flawed n ts ncepton. Gven the decay of the state, forces both nternal and external to the state are requred to mpnge on the ndvdual so that he recognzes hs own capacty for freedom, even f t s freedom deally construed. The nternal forces can be the state tself through law and punshment; the external forces can be what Rousseau refers to as the Legslator and Cvl Relgon. The paradox of the ratonalty, however, remans n these attempted s01utons.~~ Each opposes destructve self-nterest as an attempt to enact the general wll yet each fals because n so dong ndvduals would have to be deprved of ther own wll. Try as Rousseau mght, the rratonal outcomes of ratonaly cannot be overcome. As Horowtz and Hor~wtz~~ suggest, Hegel does not allow the contradctons that trouble Rousseau to get n the way of hs systematc and totalzng thought. By

9 108 Resemblance and Dssonance problcmatque 109 takng reason as self-developmental, for Hegel, the contradctory aspects of freedom cohere n hs noton of reason. These contradctory aspects are manfest n the pursut of subjectve desre, on the one hand, versus meetng the exgences of the wll n an unversal form, on the other. They are resolved, accordng to Hegel, n the ndvdual's very formaton of oneself and one's ratonal end, lfe wthn the state. n other words, freedom, for Hegel, s attaned n the very development of ratonalty as t s emboded n nsttutons of the famly, cvl socety, and the state. The ndvdual accepts constrants to one's absolute freedom as themselves ratonal and as part of freedom tself. Hegel's crtcsm that Rousseau's noton of the ndvdual s partal converges wth Rousseau's nsghts nto the ndvdual. That s, Hegel's crtcsm of Rousseau turns out to be a pont about whch Rousseau may be all too aware. Rousseau does understand the ndvdual as partal, but only after he dscovers that human bengs, "taken as they are," are, n fact, partal. For Rousseau, t s the very ncompleteness of the ndvdual that mpedes hs own freedom and ratonalty. n fact, t s our very humanness that makes us ncomplete. Self-destructve mpulses of desre and need are part of the ndvdual, for Rousseau, and on the bass of ths understandng he mples that there s an hstorcal rratonal part of the ndvdual that cannot be overcome, except n an abstract exstence that transcends the ndvdual. Whle Rousseau s very much n search of a medaton between the lfeaffrmng and lfe-denyng aspects of the ndvdual n the dea of the general wll, he cannot master the nevtable self-destructveness of amour propre. Perfect reconclaton n the deal general wll remans oblque to destructve self-nterest n socety. Faled reconclaton, n turn, unravels the abstract harmonous communty of ndvduals, freedom, and equalty. Contrary to Hegel's nterpretaton, Rousseau dd not 'destroy' the unversal aspect of reason, but rather t s reason tself that lmts the actualzaton of the concept of the general wll,.e., ts own unversalty. Whle Hegel's concepton of the ndvdual reles on an mmanent selfdevelopment, Rousseau detects that the ndvdual becomes subject to hs own destructve self-nterest n ways that are not clearly understood. Ths, for Rousseau, s an effect of the nternal opposton he dscovers. t s the subjectve aspect of reason, for Rousseau, that s the obstacle to attanng freedom. The ndvdual remans separate from hs deal exstence posted tn the dea of the general wll precsely because of the persstence of destructve self-nterest. Ths separaton, for Rousseau, ndcates that nether the ndvdual, nor humanty, realzes freedom. Ratonalty tself : s ncapable of guaranteeng freedom or equalty for a poltcal communty, from Rousseau's perspectve. n ; other words, arbtrary wll can be elmnated n thought ; only. n spte of the abstract possblty of freedom n accordance wth the dea of the general wlll, the nd- vdual s enslaved to rratonal mpulses of amour propre. The general wll that s enacted thus takes on a dfferent meanng than ts ntended one. t Hegel, unlke Rousseau, understands freedom as attanable. n that freedom s realzed as an abstracton or j dea, for Hege, t remans n a process of self-actualza- 1 ton. Freedom, then, may fall short of ts own concept, but! ths does not mean that the ndvdual s not self-actualz- 1 ng freedom. Nor does ths mean that Hegel solves the problem of, what are for Rousseau, rratonal manfesta- / tons n socety to Rousseau's satsfacton. Hegel s only able to account for why they persst, not how they can be elmnated because he accepts them as ratonal. Whle Rousseau s able to account for the uglness of rratonalty n socety, unlke Hegel, he wants very much to elmnate t. He cannot as hs thought reveals falure already n hs soluton of the general wll. Rousseau endeavours to put forward a vson of socety that embodes a ratonal subject, but t s the very antagonstc ratonal and rratonal elements of the ndvdual that preempt the ernergence of a ratonal state. Although Hegel's crtque of

10 110 Resemblance and Dssonance Rousseau s sustanable wthn hs system of thought, Hegel s unable to respond adequately to Rousseau's despar and resgnaton over a persstent malase of ratonalty that s manfest through contradctons n socety. roncally, Hegel also understands that hs state as the actualzed dea -- whch s freedom, the ndvdual, and the state n concrete form -- s tself not the guarantor of an deal exstence that Rousseau envsages as a possblty through the general wll that transcends the ndvdual. Human exstence n cvl socety, for Hegel, s tanted wth poverty, unequal dstrbuton of wealth, the rabble, the crmnal, aspects of socety about whch Rousseau felt embttered, and feared were manfestatons of the hstorcally rratonal ndvdual.'* Accordng to Hegel, however, the state s not a work of art; t exsts n the world, and 1 hence n the sphere of arbtrarness, contngency, and error, and bad behavour may dsfgure t n many re- spects. But the uglest man, the crmnal, the nvald, or the crpple s stll a lvng human beng; the affrmatve 1 aspect -- lfe -- survves [besteht] n spte of such defcen- j ces, and t s wth ths affrmatve aspect that we are here, concerned (PRS258). For Hegel, the state s the affrmatve aspect of human lfe, n spte of the msery experenced, snce t s through the state that the free and ratonal wll develops hstorcally. Whle our exstence may not be perfect now, the ndvdual putatvely knows that there s the possblty for mprovement snce the state s capable of accommodatng ths possblty. The state remans the realm of freedom, for Hegel, because t s the end of ratonal thought. For Rousseau, however, 'bad behavour,' 'uglness,' 'defcency,' and 'crmnalty' are the actual manlfestatons of the self-destructve self that for hm reveal the paradox of the wll and unrealzaton of freedom. For Rousseau, t s the ndvdual tself that remans the greatest obstacle to attanng freedom, and overcomng ths obstacle n thought only s nsuffcent for hm to accept problbmatlque 111 the problems he observed n relatons among ndvduals n socety. At the concluson of the Dscourse Rousseau states: n the mdst of so much phlosophy, humanty, cvlzaton, and of such sublme codes of moralty, we have nothng to show for ourselves but a frvolous and decetful appearance (271). The realm of freedom, for Rousseau, s found nether n the state, nor cvl socety, but only n the concept of the general wll that transcends and remans separate from the ndvdual, and therefore, human exstence. For Rousseau, ths separaton s the crux of hs frustraton and the contradctons that arse from ths problem of ratonalty that necessarly perssts no matter what mprovement or progress occurs n socety. When we reflect upon our own hstorcal context, we can contnue to be guded by nsghts offered by both Rousseau and Hegel. nspred by Rousseau, we can mmedately condemn or at the very least suspect our stuaton as fallng short of a normatve dea such as the general wll and ourselves for playng a role n our own mperfecton even f we may be less clear on how we brng about our own stuaton. The possblty of an deal should lead us to realze that poltcal socety requres sgnfcant transformaton and yet the dffculty n achevng such wholesale change requres us to reflect upon our very selves that gve rse to what we crtcze. Hegel echoes Rousseau n that regardless of what poltcal changes we may enact (rratonal) sde effects wll emerge that themselves are the product of our own ratonal exstence. We contnue to lve n poltcal communty even f t mght be a communty rdden wth volence, poverty, and nequalty. These are the byproducts of ratonalty. n contrast to Rousseau, rather than condemn our stuaton and ourselves as gvng rse to our stuaton, Hegel seems to suggest that we should affrm ratonalty and exercse t wth the understandng of ts self-contradctory consttuton to work n favour of what mght and can be better.

11 112 Resemblance and Dssonance problcmatque 113 We learn that poltcal change can have contradc- or the concept of ratonaly n themselves as n Rousseau's tory effects. Although nexplct, Rousseau's thought thought. As such, we can look to Rousseau more than suggests that only radcal poltcal acton can brng about -egel to provde a more potent, thorough-gong crtque transformaton n socety and yet t s always nadequate. wth the ntent of radcal transformaton to be levelled at Hegel's thought does not necessarly preclude radcal 1 ourselves and socety. poltcal acton because hs understandng of the state Notes would see such acton as ratonally emboded by the state. But regardless of the acton, therewould be contradctor^ 1, would lke to thank Martn Morrs and the anonysde effects that would be a source of msery n socety. mous revewers of Probematque for ther very helpful comments and suggestons on earler drafts of ths paper. v Rousseau wrtes wth rony that "t s a noble and beaut- Rousseau and Hegel provde two opposng vews of ful spectacle to see man rasng hmself, so to speak, from ratonalty and freedom. Rousseau sees reason as nher- nothng by hs own exertons; dsspatng, by the lght of ently contradctory and gvng rse to rratonal contradc- reason, all the thck clouds n whch he was by nature tons and unavodable lmtatons on freedom n socety. enveloped; mountng above hmself; soarng n thought Hegel's noton of reason comprses contradctons that he even to the celestal regons; lke the sun, encompassng clams are themselves ratonal and attan freedom as ts wth gant strdes the vast extent of the unverse; and own end. Rousseau attempts to develop a concept of the what s stll grander and more wonderful, gong back to general wll founded on subjectve ratonalty that could hmself, there to study man and get to know hs own acheve freedom and equalty but the self-destructve nature, hs own dutes and own end" (A Dscourse on the mpulses of subjectve ratonalty preempt the enactment Moral Effects of the Arts and Scences, translated by G. D. of Rousseau's dea of the general wll. Hegel's system takes H. Cole (London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1950), p reason as consttutve of freedom that s self-developng and clams to overcome contradctons n successve 2. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Socal Contract and Dsmoments of hgher self-actualzaton. The general wll courses, translated by G. D. H. Cole (London: J. M. cannot be enacted, for Rousseau, n the state because the Dent 1 and Sons, Ltd, 1950). References to The Socal Contract state s founded on destructve self-nterest. Freedom s and The Dscourse on the Orgns of nequalty wll be enacted, for Hegel, because he s able to accept njustces made as SC and Dscourse respectvely. as ratonal sde effects of the development of ratonalty tself. Wth Rousseau's nsght nto the problem of subjec- 3. Rousseau, n the Dscourse, traces the hstorcal develtve ratonalty, we understand that freedom s never opment of the human speces. n ths work, he emphaszes attaned, that ndvduals are not fully ratonal, nor equal that ndvduals are not atomstc and self-suffcent as as members n poltcal socety. Gven that ratonalty s suggested by Hobbes and Locke. On the contrary, the understood to unfold as freedom n Hegel's thought, hs development of the human speces has been hstorcal system does not lend tself to questonng the state as a whereby our capacty for perfectblte has been a prwhole." The problems of the state are worth addressng, mary factor n ths evoluton. but as ~roblems wthn the system. Whle such problems would have been consdered-njustces for both-thnkers, Hegel does not lead to a profound questonng of the state 4. The "other" for Rousseau s also nextrcably lnked to property and labour. n the Dscourse, Rousseau argues that man lost hs ndependence as exchange developed n

12 114 Resemblance and Dssonance and the socal nsttutons n each of those facets of selforder to ensure survval. He states that "but from the moment one man began to stand n need of the help of development are, for Hegel, "only the superfcal exteror" another; from the moment t appeared advantageous to (PR Preface, footnote 22) to a process that has been smultaneously completed, and from whch hstory stll unany one man to have enough provsons for two, equalty j folds. dsappeared, property was ntroduced, work became 1 ndspensable" (p. 244). ' 10. Gven that the scope of ths paper s lmted to a dscusson of the ndvdual, have-decded not to exam- 5. Rousseau dverges from lberal thnkers such as ne ths aspect of the Legslator and Cvl Relgon n ths Hobbes and Locke who post the jndvdual who s not dependent on any other ndvdual for hs own self-! paper, Brefly, the Legslator s proposed by R~~~~~~~ to preservaton, but whose securty s threatened by other enact proper laws n accordance wth the concept of the ndvduals. general wll. The Legslator fals, however, snce ndvdu als n socety are ncapable of understandng the unversal laws of the ~e~slator as beng n ther own partcular 6. Rousseau explans ths evoluton n Part Two of the Dscourse, see especally p nterest. The purpose of the Cvl Relgon, for Rousseau, s to foster a sense of love for duty toward others n socety, 7. Hegel's concepton of the state s drawn from hs thus strengthenng the socal bond. The Cvl Relgon, : however, also fals snce ts "beng founded on les and Elements of the Phlosophy of Rght, ed. Allen W. Wood, error" (p.135) reveals the nherent contradcton of the translated by H. B. Nsbet (Cambrdge: Cambrdge Unlversty Press, 1991). Ths work s referred to as ndvdual hmself. The contradcton beng that the PR. / ndvdual of self-nterest requres a le n the form of cvl 8, Gven the scope of ths paper, wll not be tracng the development of the concept of freedom through the famly and cvl socety. What 1 wll say s that, for Hegel, both the famly and cvl socety are consttutve moments of the dea of the state. Nether s ndependent of the state, nor of each other. 9. The end of the self-actualzaton of the wll s also the end n hstory, accordng to Hegel. Hstory, for Hegel, s ted to the development of sprt through four successve "world hstorcal realms" (PRS 3 5 2) whch are as follows: the Orental Realm; the Greek Realm, the Roman Realm, and fnally the Germanc Realm n whch sprt s actualzed as beng-n-and-for tself (PR5358). The end n hstory as the development of a process has been reached. Ths does not mean, for Hegel, that the self-development of the wll as freedom emerges perfectly or as t ought to develop, or that there s no more hstory. The hstorcal self as t appears n the famly, cvl socety and the state, relgon to regan a semblance of the ratonalty of the 1 concept of the general wll Asher Horowtz and Gad Horowtz, "Everywhere They Are n Chans: " Polltcal Theory from Roussea u to Manr, (Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1988), p n the Dscourse, Rousseau vews the socal contract / as an egregous event. He states that "everythng beng reduced to appearances, there s but art and mummery n even honour, frendshp, vrtue, and often vce tself" (271). Whle n the Dscourse, Rousseau s vtrolc about the socal contract, he s more fearful of ts falngs n The Socal Contract, 13. Whle Hegel does not advocate uncondtonal duty to the state, t s the subject of debate the degree to whch an

13 116 Resemblance and Dssonance ndvdual can queston the state accordng to hs concept of the ratonal ndvdual. See Z. A. Pelczynsk, "The Hegelan Concepton of the State," n Hegel's Poltcal Phlosophy: Problems and Perspectves (Cambrdge: Cambrdge Unversty Press, 1971 ). Works Cted + Althusser, Lous Poltcs and Hstory: Montesque, ; $ Rouseau, Wegel and Mam; Translated by Ben Brewster. London: New Left Books Avnerl, Shlomo Hegel's Theory of the Modern State. Cambrdge: Cambrdge Unversty Press., F Hegel, G.W.F Elements of the Phflosphy of Rght. [ Edted by Allen W. Wood, Translated by H.D. Nsbet Cambrdge: Cambrdge Unversty Press. Horowtz, Asher Rouseau, Nature and Hstory. Toronto: Unversty of Toronto Press. f Redel, Manfred " Nature and Freedom n Hegel's Phlosphy of Rght." Hegel's Poltcal Phlosphy: Problems and Perspectves. Edted by A.A Pelczynsk. Cambrdge: Cambrdge Unversty Press. pp Rouseau, J. J A Dscourse on nequalty. Translated by Maurce Cranston. New York: Pengun Books. Rouseau, J.J The Socal Contract and Dscourses. Translated by GDH Cole. London: J.M. Dent and Sons, Ltd. Taylor, Charles Hegel. Cambrdge. Cambrdge Unversty Press. Wood, Allen W Hegel's Ethcal Thought. Cambrdge: Cambrdge Unversty Press. Horowtz, Asher, and Gad Horwtz "Everywhere they are n chans": Poltcal Theory From Rouseau to Mam. Scarborough: Nelson Canada. Levne, Andrew The Poltcs of Autonomy: A Kantan Readng of Rouseau 's Socal Con tract. Amherst: Unversty of Massachussets Press. Pelczynsk, Z.A "The Hegelan Conceptons of the state." n Hegel's Poltcal Phlosphy: Problems and Perspectves. Edted by A.A Pelczynskl. Cambrdge: Cambrdge Unversty Press. pp Plamenatz, John "Hstory as the realzaton of Freedom." n Hegel's Poltcal Phfosphy: Problems and Perspectves. Edted by A.A Pelczynsk. Cambrdge: Cambrdge Unversty Press. pp