admitted that Hume woke him from his dogmatic slumbers his philosophy was primarily directed toward saving the Enlightenment from Hume s skepticism

Transcription

1 Kant ( ) a pivotal figure in e Enlightenment and for all subsequent philosophy respected as a major figure by bo analytic and continental philosophers ough different aspects of his work are highlighted and different interpretations of ose different aspects favored admitted at Hume woke him from his dogmatic slumbers his philosophy was primarily directed toward saving e Enlightenment from Hume s skepticism for Kant e Enlightenment was a transition from immaturity, a dependence upon auority, to maturity or autonomy, e ability to use one s understanding wiout guidance from anoer In e Critique of Pure Reason (1781) Kant seeks to establish e limits and underlying structure of human knowledge draws togeer most of e central issues of e Enlightenment imaginative synesis of empiricism and rationalism bo empiricism and rationalism are following in e Cartesian project of establishing certainty and resisting e spurious claims of religious knowledge does not rule out religious belief but sought to purify it of unjustifiable pretensions and superstitious remnants empiricists hold all knowledge based on experience on our impressions or sensations all knowledge is us a posteriori someing we achieve only after having appropriate experience no innate ideas, mind is a tabula rasa rationalists hold at important, perhaps e most important, instances of human knowledge are a priori available to us prior to or independent of experience rationalists closer to Platonic tradition taking maematics and logic raer an natural science as favored models of human knowledge Kant seeks to combine insights of bo rationalists and empiricists agrees wi rationalists at ere are some trus we can know a priori but he seeks a more adequate explanation for such a possibility agrees wi empiricists at much of our knowledge depends on experience but argues at ey neglect e formal contribution e mind makes to e content it receives from experience all experience is us structured by e mind before we can make sense of it at all rationalists undervalue e contribution of experience empiricists fail to see e importance of e formal structure by which experience is organized Kant s insight allows a distinctive solution to e problem of accounting for human knowledge Kant considered is a Copernican revolution in philosophy: it is possible to have a priori knowledge of e form or structure of experience because it is our Freeman's Notes 1

2 minds at contributes at form to experience Kant call is special kind of knowledge transcendental not because it is knowledge of a transcendental realm like Plato s Forms but, much more modestly, it is knowledge of e structure of e human mind Kant s Copernican Revolution involved a radically new conception of e human mind and us of human knowledge prior to Kant, bo Rationalists and Empiricists assumed at e mind was someing like a passive mirror of nature we can trace is idea of knowledge at comes rough passive reflection back to Plato Kant argued at e mind is not passive at all but actively imposes order upon our experience our concepts and our language do not us just correspond to reality but in some sense set up e world just as Copernicus had revolutionized our conception of e universe (solar system) by positing at e ear was not at e center, but revolved like oer planets around e sun Kant argued at e ground for objective, universal scientific knowledge of e world was not to be found outside e mind, but raer wiin e structure of e human mind itself e mind sets up or constitutes e world in a sense e understanding does not derive its laws from, but prescribes em to, nature (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, 1783) e previous conception of e mind as a passive mirror of nature assumed at if only we have e right meod and if we can somehow find e source of human error at knowledge wiin e human mind is an accurate reflection of e world as it is in-itself Hume s skepticism had shown how is was impossible Kant responds to is skepticism by simply giving up e idea of gaining knowledge of e world as it is in-itself Kant us makes an important distinction between e Phenomenal World and e Noumenal World e world as it appears to us e world as it is in-itself Kant accepts e conclusion of Hume s consistent empiricism: we don t know e world as it is in-itself only e world as it appears to us e use of human reason, even scientific knowledge, only gives us knowledge of e phenomenal world but e world appears to us in ways at are structured by e human mind and at structure, for Kant, is e same in all of us e world appears to us rough a necessary, and us, universal structure of experience Kant describes his novel approach as a transcendental idealism Freeman's Notes 2

3 a description often misunderstood idealism is usually associated wi e belief at ere is no external, material world ere are only ideas Empiricism provides a skeptical route to is belief skeptical idealists maintain simply at we can t have certain knowledge of an external world dogmatic idealists like Berkeley ( ) go one step furer and claim at ey know reality is mental Kant s transcendental idealism is often misunderstood as idealism in is sense (especially by analytic philosophers) but Kant s transcendental idealism is designed to refute all forms of empirical idealism Kant claims at e world of appearances, e phenomenal world is inevitably experienced as a material world of causally interacting objects in space and time we cannot know e world as it is in itself we only have knowledge of e world of appearances we cannot assume at e world is exactly as it appears but is does not mean at we only have knowledge of e contents of our minds Kant maintains distinction between mere semblance (Apparenz) or illusion (Schein) and reality Kant inks we can achieve objective knowledge of reality Kant seeks to undercut what he sees as source of much metaphysical confusion seeks to undercut transcendental realism e view at regards appearances as ings in emselves How is it at Kant inks we can get objective knowledge of reality if all we can know is e world as it appears to us? Here we have to return to Hume s Fork e distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact becomes, in Kant s language, a distinction between Analytic Statements and Synetic Statements ese are true simply by analysis of our language ese tell us someing about e world and tell us noing about e world and us add (synesize) to our knowledge Analytic statements are true by definition: A bachelor is an unmarried male in Kant s language, e concept of e predicate ( is an unmarried male ) is included in e concept of e subject ( Bachelor ) ey are plausible examples of a priori knowledge for we don t find out ey are true by observation we don t need to do a study and find out if bachelors are all unmarried males Freeman's Notes 3

4 Synetic statements are not necessarily true but only contingently true: No woman has ever been President of e USA here e concept of e predicate is clearly not included in e subject (being male is not part of e definition of President of e USA) synetic statements are a posteriori, requiring sense evidence Against Hume, Kant held at all knowledge is not eier a relation of ideas or a matter of fact Kant argued at ere must be a category of synetic a priori trus he inks, in oer words, at we can have non-trivial knowledge of e structure of experience independently of all experience Kant inks at we can still get objective knowledge, and us save e Enlightenment, because e world at appears to us, appears to us rough categories of e mind which are e same in all of us Kant s assumption is at e human mind in all of us is running e same software (Kant obviously didn t put it in terms of software but is seems perhaps an appropriate analogy) e synetic a priori trus are is software what Kant meant by transcendental knowledge is knowledge of is software us knowledge of e structure of our experience knowledge of trus at are synetic (ey add to our knowledge not simply tautologies) and a priori (and us necessary) Kant s attempts to prove his claims about e necessary structure of our experience have been quite controversial his transcendental deduction of e categories has been subjected to much scrutiny difficulty of Kant s arguments is notorious for mainstream analytic philosophy ese arguments are not considered successful ey are eier unconvincing or can be reduced to analytical claims of no great significance for analytic philosophers Kant s crucial class of synetic a priori trus turn out to be empty analytic philosophy us starts out from a austere interpretation of Kant taking his strictures against traditional metaphysics to close off all furer speculative discussion of metaphysics in effect, e analytic tradition reverts to Hume s view at all knowledge is eier relations of ideas (analytic a priori) or matters of fact (synetic a posteriori) and at we should consign to e flames any views at not one or e oer philosophy should us ignore ose questions at it is not able to answer us analytic philosophy has paid less attention to questions at, according to Kant, human reason, and indeed, e living and acting human individual is not able to ignore Freeman's Notes 4

5 it was Kant s Critique of Judgment (1790) which opened e door to Romanticism In e Critique of Judgment : 1. Kant maintained e autonomy of aesetic judgment (as distinguished from e eoretical and e practical). Though Kant did not explicitly demarcate an independent realm of e aesetic, he was read by later Romanticist inkers to have indeed distinguished e aesetic as an autonomous realm separated from e realms of nature and freedom. Later Romanticist philosophers would develop e notion of e aesetic as an independent, autonomous realm. 2. Though Kant explicitly denied at art has tru value some statements in e Critique of Judgment seemed to contradict is view. For Kant art is a matter of pleasure, not knowledge. He does hint, however, at art can put us into contact wi someing at cannot be grasped rough concepts. Later Romanticist philosophers would develop e notion at it is rough art at man can reach tru. 3. Kant s notion of genius as e talent at generates aesetic ideas at provide e soul at distinguishes fine art had a great influence on e development of Romanticism. This conception of aesetic genius as distinguished from e scientific mind greatly influenced romanticism. An aesetic idea is an idea for which no adequate concept can be found, and us cannot be made intelligible by language. The notion of an aesetic idea us pointed toward e view of art as expressing e inexpressible. This also suggested at art is someing more an mere pleasure. 4. In general e whole Kantian Copernican Revolution which suggested e mind is not just a passive mirror of nature, but at e mind imposes form and order upon experience and us tru is in some sense bo discovered and created. Romanticism noing is more difficult to pin down an Romanticism e term is usually applied to certain aspects of European intellectual life in late 18 and early 19 centuries, roughly between Romanticism took different forms in different countries: Germany, England, France August Wilhelm Schlegel ( ) coined e term Romanticism in his Vienna lectures of he used it to distinguish modern poetry and art from e Classical Precursors of Romanticism ere was an ongoing critique of Enlightenment during e 18 century its sober and often moralistic free inkers were frequently condemned as aeists Freeman's Notes 5

6 and corrupters of society ere were of course conservative defenders of traditional morality and orodox religion but from e perspective of Enlightenment inkers ese conservatives reactions were futile attempts to stem tide of progress but oer critics were not so easy to dismiss ey also appreciated e Enlightenment attack on superstition, dogma, and arbitrary auority but ey also recognized dangers in e quickening tide of modernization Rousseau ( ) made fertile contribution to critique of Enlightenment also influenced Kant, especially his moral philosophy and conception of autonomy strongly critical of direction of civilization or modernity contrasts savage wi degraded existence of civilized man Rousseau s condemnation of evils of civilized existence is unambiguous but he does not advocate a return to some primitive uncivilized state of nature misleading to associate Rousseau wi noble savage rejects any assumption of an original human nature for Rousseau it is only in society at e individual becomes a responsible moral agent as opposed to a creature of impulse us only in society at e individual is truly free is notion of moral liberty and autonomy influenced Kant significantly Rousseau s distinctive social account of human individuality is also at heart of his notion of e general will like Hobbes and Locke he is not satisfied wi unenlightened justification of e state by e divine right of kings Rousseau derives sovereignty of state from e people government should act in accordance wi general will not simply equivalent to will of all democratic institutions may not be best means of finding out what general will is for Rousseau it can only be reached rough process of negotiation and deliberation designed to discover e common interest of society as a whole reaching general will might involve transformation of individual particular wills critics see is as large step toward totalitarianism contemporaries saw is view leading to Jacobin terror of e Revolution Freeman's Notes 6

7 a near contemporary of Rousseau was Herder ( ) a German inker whose critique of e Enlightenment was in some ways more radical Herder held at language is not just an instrument for expressing oughts and ideas but was at which makes ought possible different languages are us not just alternative instruments for expressing e same ideas but raer are emselves different ways of inking language did not en simply correspond to reality is idea of language undermined e Enlightenment assumption of a universal human essence emphasizes national and cultural differences leads toward a relativism in which e values of different peoples are simply incommensurable is was liberating in a German-speaking world resentful of e dominance of French culture ough not a Romanticist, Herder s ought had an impact on e bir of Romanticism in Germany at e beginning of e 19 century Friedrich Schiller ( ) ough not a Romanticist, Schiller is e bridge between Kant and Romanticism he develops and extends Kant s discussion of e aesetic and is e first to take up Kant s suggestion of a higher role for art in his Letter of an Aesetic Education of Man ( ) Schiller puts for a history of e whole of Western Culture in which e nobility and exaltation of Greek culture is contrasted wi e fragmentation and alienation of modern man Schiller is one of e first to take up e idea of modern alienation is sense of alienation is e result of e gap between nature and freedom and us e contradiction between e Enlightenment project for a science of society (science is based on nature a realm of necessity) and its continuing belief in morality (based on freedom) for Schiller e cure for is alienation lies in art e aim of Schiller s aesetic education is to establish an aesetic state, an ideal to which society can progress towards, in which individual members are harmoniously related in an organic social totality us e alienation at results from e gap between nature and freedom is overcome for Schiller e artist-philosopher is e aesetic educator who leads humanity to e ideal state Schiller us defines e notion of e avant-garde at informs 20 century art in ese Aesetic Letters, as ey are sometimes referred to, Schiller transforms Kant s account of aesetic experience into Freeman's Notes 7

8 an anropological insight into human nature conceiving beauty as our second creatress st which offers us e possibility of becoming human beings (21 letter) it is rough art and aesetic experience at e human being is fully developed takes up Kant s suggestion of e aesetic as reuniting e realms of nature and freedom in e 20 letter we see is notion of e aesetic as mediating between sensation and ought, necessity and freedom in e aesetic state one does indeed act freely, is in e highest degree free from all compulsion, but is in no wise free from laws (44). Schiller s most important notion is e Spieltrieb (play drive) Schiller brings togeer Kant s idea of e free play of e powers of representation and Fichte s idea of e drives (Triebe) and develops is notion of e Spieltrieb (play drive) human experience is suspended between a sensuous drive (Sinntrieb) which chains individuals to nature and a formal impluse (Formtrieb) which aims to bring harmony into experience if fragmentation is to be overcome and integration achieved neier e rational nor e sensuous side of experience can be repressed e Spieltrieb sublates (aufgehobt) e sensuous drive and e form drive we see in e 20 letter is distinction between e sensuous drive and e form-impulse (43) one passes from sensation to ought rough a middle disposition (44) is middle disposition will later be developed as e Spieltrieb according to Schiller it is in art at is play drive emerges only in e play of art are e sensuous drive and e formal drive brought togeer only in contemplating e beautiful is man harmonized only here does man find a happy medium between e moral law (freedom) and physical exigency (necessity) beauty offers an instance of moral freedom being compatible wi sense it leads e sensuous man back to form and ought and e spiritual man back to e world of sense is idea at human beings reach eir fullest potential when playing wi beauty is Schiller s unique contribution it develops e Kantian notion of an aesetic attitude as detachment from practical or intellectual concerns Freeman's Notes 8

9 Schiller argues at aesetic sensibility is essential for a liberal society here ere is an important distinction between aesetic semblance and mere illusion he follows Kant in treating art as a matter of Schein (semblance or illusion) and not tru us adhering to Kant s distinction between e aesetic and non-aesetic Kant s insistence on e autonomy of aesetic judgment led him to deny at art has tru value for Schiller, we are drawn to e free play of art, not by any supposed revelation of tru is is what separates bo Schiller and Kant from e later Romantics ough Schiller did not see art as a source of tru his Aesetic Letters were read by younger inkers to suggest at art could be a source of tru and us opens e doors to Romanticism Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling ( ) Schelling transposes Schiller s utopian idealism into an absolute idealism in which beauty actually constitutes e original essence of reality in a manner similar to Kant s Third Critique Schelling constructs a transcendental idealism to bridge e gap between nature and reason The Philosophy of Art (1802-3) attempts a systematic philosophical articulation of e arts forms a crucial chapter in post-kantian idealism plays a significant role in e emergence of e aesetic at informs modernism in System of Transcendental Idealism (1800) Schelling saw art as e organ of philosophy for it can see what philosophical concepts cannot: e absolute wi is Schelling us turns philosophy in an aesetic direction is notion of art as e organ of philosophy art as e means to get to tru art has tru status becomes one of e foundational elements of Romanticism in art and philosophy Schelling contends at nature and e work of art are e product of one and e same activity an activity at is in its essence aesetic e only difference between e world and e work of art is at in e former e creative activity is unconscious, whereas in e latter it is conscious As Schelling put it: e objective world is only e original, still unconscious poetry of e spirit given his conviction at reality is poetic it is not surprising at he sees philosophy culminating in art only art can make objective what e philosopher represents in ought us philosophy, after completing its task of representation must return to e universal ocean of poetry from which it started out Freeman's Notes 9

10 art occupies e highest place for e philosopher, since it opens up to him e holy of holies, so to speak, where in primal union, as in a single flame, ere burns what is sundered in nature and history and what must eternally flee from itself in life and action as in ought (System of Transcendental Idealism) German Romanticism e flowering of German Romanticism comes wi e Schlegel broers August Wilhelm ( ) and Friedrich ( ) Primary emes of Romanticism 1) in general, art has a preeminent role to play in human life and culture There is a divination of art art has a religious significance and role in human society. Art has a healing role it leads to a feeling of unity of e human being wi nature. The discord between man and nature at is e result of e gap between nature and freedom is replaced by a notion of organic or aesetic unity. Thus, an important motif of Romanticism is at of a "circuitous journey," a move from alienation, rough spiritual crisis, to a redemptive reintegration wi e cosmos. 2) Art is a source of knowledge, it has a cognitive status art is seen as a manifestation, even a source, of tru one at rivaled and even surpassed at of e analytical reason of e Enlightenment is led to a higher value placed on art and artistic creation a glorification of art There is a revaluation of e relationship between philosophy and art, or art and tru. Philosophy becomes aesetic art becomes e organ of philosophy. a romanticist epistemology a kind of emotional intuitionism superseding e previous domination of rationalism and empiricism has its origins in 18 century, e inner sense of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson e sentiment of Hume A. Schlegel finds in e poet ose deep intuitions in which e dark riddle of our existence seems to solve itself 3) e notion of e aesetic as an autonomous realm, independent of e realms of nature and freedom 4) artistic production conceived as self-expression some basic change in aesetic values eyes opened to new aesetic vistas new impulse to e enjoyment of feeling and emotion e scope of great art is widened a loosening of form offset by more individualized, poignant, presentation of personal emotions Freeman's Notes 10

11 artistic production becomes conceived as essentially an act of self-expression e critic becomes more concerned wi e artist his sincerity, details of biography, inner spiritual life Victor Hugo: What indeed is a poet? A man who feels strongly and expresses his feelings in a more expressive language is notion we find already in Voltaire: Poetry is almost noing but feeling us e imitation eory of art is set aside, or relegated to a subordinate position a form of expression eory develops focus is not on e object, but on e artist s state of mind e spontaneity and intensity of e artists emotions Wordswor: all good poetry is e spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings e parallel of poetry and painting at dominated aesetic ought since e Renaissance gives way to a new parallel between poetry and music for music is e pure expression of feeling in an essay on Beeoven, E.T.A. Hoffman said of music: It is e most romantic of all e arts one might say e only genuinely romantic art for its own sole subject is e infinite 5) exaltation of e imagination is claim to knowledge gave rise to a new eory of e imagination now it was not only a faculty of inventing and reassembling materials but a faculty of seizing directly upon important trus influence of e Kantian revolution which gave a sense of creation to e mind e mind no longer viewed as passive discoverer of tru but somehow active, creative tru is bo discovered and created on e Continent, Joubert and en Baudelaire: Imagination is, as it were, a divine faculty, which perceives directly, wiout e use of philosophical meods, e secret and intimate relationships of ings... 6) e notion of organic, or aesetic unity also important is e concept of organism, e notion of organic unity or aesetic unity one of Coleridge s greatest contributions to romanticist aesetics Plato and Aristotle compared a literary work to a living animal e notion of e world of nature as a living ing (Gaia hypoesis) goes back to Plato Goee: a deep sense of e organic unity of all nature and of man as a part of nature works of art grow out of, and express man s unity wi nature Freeman's Notes 11

12 again, here e important ing is e notion of art as revealing of nature and of us having a higher tru an science Shelley: A poem is e very image of life expressed in its eternal tru 7) The celebration of artistic genius art has a religious dimension two tendencies in inking about e artist: 1) e artist as divinely inspired (in a positive way Plato couldn t imagine) Novalis: The genuine poet is always a priest Goee calls e artist God s annointed Hugo: Nature is God s immediate creation, and art is what God creates rough e mind of man 2) e artist as Promeean figure, rival of bo Nature and God, cursed wi a tragic but glorious doom Romanticism vs e Enlightenment Romanticism shared wi e Enlightenment some common attributes bo were humanist in eir high estimation of human being and eir concern wi e human perspective on e universe bo saw is world and nature as a setting for a human drama bo looked back to classical culture as high point for human civilization bo fought against oppressive auoritarianism of medieval period bo celebrated human freedom, individual genius, e bold exploration of e new but ere were profound differences between Romanticism and e Enlightenment e Romantics perceived e world as a unitary organism instead of a lifeless machine Romanticism arose partly as a result of a loss of fai in reason The Romanticists read Kant as suggesting a higher role for art at art could go where reason had failed e genius of artistic imagination could gain access to e ing-in-itself art was viewed, not like Plato ree steps removed from tru, but as a source of knowledge e Romantics radicalized e Kantian view at e human mind is not just a passive mirror but is active, artistic, creative in shaping e world Romanticism us valued imaginative and spiritual aspirations raer an e scientific e genius of Beeoven or Goee over at of Newton e powers of individual expression and creativity over at of eoretical calculation Freeman's Notes 12

13 for e Romantics nature was not an object for experimentation and technological manipulation but raer a source of mystery and revelation Hegel ( ) as a young man Hegel was an ardent Romanticist in college he was a roommate wi Schelling and Hölderlin his mature philosophy shows a Romanticist influence and yet he breaks wi Romanticism in turning to reason and philosophy raer an art as a source of knowledge attempts synesis of Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment emes influenced by Rousseau and Herder, Goee, Hölderlin, as well as Kant Hegel followed Kant in accepting at reason gives us knowledge of e Phenomenal World e world as it appears as a phenomenon in consciousness however, he rejects Kant s assumption (shared by e prior tradition) of a Noumenal World, a world as it is in-itself apart from how it appears in human consciousness in oer words, e world just is as it appears as a phenomenon of human consciousness ere simply is no point of talking about a world as it is in-itself us Hegel s is a holistic worldview in which consciousness and e world are not separate but inseparably integrated (Solomon, 291) at first glance is might seem to imply e most pernicious relativism in which e world is radically different for different human consciousnesses wi no way of evaluating one worldview as better an anoer but for Hegel all individual consciousnesses are a manifestation of e Absolute Spirit or Mind realizing itself rough human consciousness his masterwork, die Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807) translated as Phenomenology of Spirit or Phenomenology of Mind traces e development of a process of Self-realization of Geistes rough human consciousness in e Phenomenology Hegel proposes to begin from a position wiout presuppositions to examine consciousness from e inside as it appears to itself a phenomenology of Geistes is an exposition of knowledge as a phenomenon as it actually appears in consciousness (e word phenomenon is etymologically connected to e word appearance ) Freeman's Notes 13

14 Hegel us suggests at we give up e view at e self is essentially a feature of e individual: e self or Spirit is shared by all of us (Solomon, 291) we all participate in e unfolding of Spirit rough history us Hegel s philosophy is an all-encompassing system which sought to relate and unify man and nature, spirit and matter, human and divine, time and eternity (Tarnas, 379) Hegel referred to his philosophy as an Absolute Idealism in contrast to Kant s Transcendental Idealism reality, for Hegel, is simply e product of is Absolute Spirit moving rough history e development of human history en is regarded as a series of successive stages of Spirit s journey toward Self-realization us any particular worldview is not just as valid as any oer (relativism) any particular worldview is us measured by its place in history, its place in e development of Spirit s Self-realization The way we view e world is already determined by our place in history, our language, and our society (Solomon, 292) each worldview us emerges wiin a particular historical context at a particular stage in Spirit s journey rough history ere is e sense at all views or forms of consciousness are all moving toward some final end e correct view (Solomon, 292) Hegel ought he understood how e process of history worked his famous account of is process is called e dialectic of history dialectic is etymologically related to e word dialogue in Plato we have e dialectic as a process of dialogue a conversation between two people who, starting from opposing perspectives on an issue, eventually arrive at a position at preserves e insights of each (Guignon & Pereboom, 3) Hegel s dialectic develops according to a ree stage pattern from esis to antiesis to synesis first ere is a esis e next stage emerges as a negation of e esis and is us e antiesis e next stage is a negation of e negation leading to a synesis is synesis involves a special double movement of bo canceling and uniting Hegel uses e verb aufheben which has is double meaning in German it signifies conserving, preserving, and at e same time also making cease, making an end (Hegel, 181) Freeman's Notes 14

15 when someing is aufgehoben it is bo cancelled and preserved Someing is aufgehoben only insofar as it has entered into a union wi its opposite (Hegel, 181) us in e final stage of e dialectic e original esis and its antiesis are aufgehoben ey are negated or cancelled but en also preserved in a higher unity e resulting synesis can en be a new esis for furer development history us moves in an ascending spiral eventually reaching a standpoint of absolute knowing Hegel us shows how consciousness evolves rough a series of transformations towards increasingly developed forms. Each form of consciousness (like each stage of history) contain tensions or contradictions which render it incomplete and unstable, so at it is ultimately bound to give way dialectically to more adequate forms (West, 39) e scope of Hegel s task is immense to say e least he manages to compress e history of morality, art, religion and philosophy into e stages of his phenomenology of mind (West, 39) Hegel ought e process of history was a rational process wi each stage a furer step forward in a rational process until at e end e Absolute is reached at is Absolute standpoint reality is conceived as maximally rational reality becomes e maximally rational for Hegel e rational is e real and e real is e rational us, for Hegel, Reason governs e world and has consequently governed its history Hegel ought e dialectic of spirit culminates in his own philosophy in his philosophy spirit comes to e fullest and most fully rational self-consciousness a self-consciousness equivalent to e highest possible realization of freedom you know you are at e end when you ve reached a stage of consciousness wiout any furer internal contradictions where knowledge is no longer compelled to go beyond itself and in his philosophy he ought at consciousness had come to is absolute standpoint perhaps e most famous example of e dialectical process in e Phenomenology is e development of spirit rough stages of political organization esis: e family here individuals all know eir place, and act for e benefit of e whole family which is governed by e rule of e faer antiesis: e individual here individuals break from e family and seek eir own individual interests (capitalist society) Freeman's Notes 15

16 synesis: e state here individuals realize e futility of radical individualism and return to a kind of family again, is time e state which considers e interest of e collective over at of e individual The influence of Hegel upon Marx was of course significant Marx just rew out e Hegelian idea at e process of history was a development of spirit Marx s philosophy was us a dialectical materialism e communist state was e final stage in e political development of history Hegel (and Marx) arrogantly claimed to stand at e end of is process of history in a sense, us claiming to know which way history was to develop much of e reaction against Hegelianism in e later half of e 19 century was a reaction against Hegel s fai in reason and e arrogance of Hegel s absolutism The lasting influence of Hegel is his historical approach to philosophy here tru itself becomes historical, a process raer an a static correspondence to someing unchanging Hegel s philosophy triumphed in Germany in e first half of e 19 century e next generation of philosophers, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard and Marx, all developed in reaction against Hegel s philosophy apparently Nietzsche never read Kierkegaard or Marx ough he was certainly aware of bo philosophers Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are bo considered pre-cursors to Existentialism Freeman's Notes 16

17 Schopenhauer ( ) Schopenhauer s philosophy develops out of Romanticism celebrating art, especially music, as e means to e highest knowledge in The World as Will and Representation (1844) Schopenhauer takes Kant s distinction between: e Phenomenal World and e Noumenal World e world as it appears to us e world as it is in-itself and recasts it as e distinction between: e World as Representation and e World as Will Schopenhauer furer connects e will at is e world, as it is in-itself, wi Plato s eternal Ideas: First of all, however, e following very essential remark. I hope at in e preceding book I have succeeded in producing e conviction at what in e Kantian philosophy is called e ing-in-itself, and appears erein as so significant but obscure and paradoxical doctrine, is, if reached by e entirely different pa we have taken, noing but e will in e sphere of is concept, widened and defined in e way I have stated. [...] Furer, I hope at, after what has been said, ere will be no hesitation in recognizing again in e definite grades of e objectification of at will, which forms e in-itself of e world, what Plato called e eternal Ideas or unchangeable forms. [...] Now if for us e will is e ing-in-itself, an e Idea is e immediate objectivity of at will at a definite grade, en we find Kant s ing-in-itself and Plato s Idea, for him e only truly being ose two great and obscure paradoxes of e two greatest philosophers of e West to be, not exactly identical, but yet very closely related.... (The World as Will and Representation 31) Against Hegel, Schopenhauer argues at reason is subordinate to e will: Thus, originally and by its nature, knowledge is completely e servant of e will, and, like e immediate objects which, by e application of e law of causality, becomes e starting-point of knowledge, is only objectified will. [...] Therefore, knowledge at serves e will really knows noing more about objects only in so far as ey exist at such a time, in such a place, in such and such circumstances, from such and such causes, and in such and such effects in a word, as particular ings. If all ese relations were eliminated, e objects also would have disappeared for knowledge, just because it did not recognize in em anying else. We must also not conceal e fact at what e sciences consider in ings is also essentially noing more an all is, namely eir relations, e connections of time and space, e causes of natural changes, e comparison of forms, e motives of events, and us merely relations. [...] Now as a rule, knowledge remains subordinate to e service of e will, as indeed it came into being for Freeman's Notes 17

18 is service; in fact, it sprang from e will, so to speak, as e head from e trunk.(the World as Will and Representation 33) Kant ought e noumenal was unknowable even ough we can make assured postulates about it on moral grounds Schopenhauer s original and striking suggestion: e ing in itself is really an irrational and limitless urge he called it e Will to Live e phenomenal world us becomes e objectification of e primal Will e Will is sheer striving, wiout direction, goal or end As soon as knowledge, e world as representation is abolished, noing in general is left but mere will, blind impulse. That it should obtain objectivity, should become representation, immediately supposes subject as well as object; but at is objectivity should be pure, complete, adequate objectivity of e will, supposes e object as Idea, free from e forms of e principle of sufficient reason, and e subject as pure subject of knowledge, free from individuality and from servitude to e will. Now whoever has, in e manner stated, become so absorbed and lost in e perception of nature at he exists only as purely knowing subject, becomes in is way immediately aware at, as such, he is e condition and hence e supporter, of e world and of all objective existence, for is now shows itself as dependent on his existence. He erefore draws nature into himself, so at he feels it to be only an accident of his own being. In is sense Byron says: Are not e mountains, waves and skies, a part Of me and of my soul, as I of em But how could e person who feels is regard himself as absolutely perishable in contrast to imperishable nature? Raer will he be moved by e consciousness of what e Upanishad of e Veda expresses: I am all is creation collectively, and besides me ere exists no oer being. (The World as Will and Representation 34) Schopenhauer now reveals where art comes into e pictured it is rough e genius of e artist at one has access to e will itself: But now, what kind of knowledge is it at considers what continues to exist outside and independently of all relations, but which alone is really essential to e world, e true content of its phenomena, at which is subject to no change, and is erefore known wi equal tru for all time, in a word, e Ideas at are e immediate and adequate objectivity of e ing-in-itself, of e will? It is art, e work of genius. It repeats e eternal Ideas apprehended rough pure contemplation, e essential and abiding element in all e phenomena of e world. According to e material in which it repeats, it is sculpture, painting, poetry, or music. Its only source is knowledge of e Ideas; its sole aim is communication of is knowledge. Whilst science, following e restless and unstable stream of e fourfold forms of reasons or grounds and consequents, is wi every end it attains again and again directed farer, and can never find an ultimate goal or complete satisfaction, any more an by running we can reach e point where e clouds touch e horizon; art, on e contrary, is everywhere at its goal. For it plucks e object of its contemplation from e stream of e world s course, and holds it isolated before it. [...] Only rough e pure contemplation described above, which becomes absorbed entirely in e object, are e Ideas comprehended, and e nature of genius consists precisely in e preeminent ability for such contemplation. Now as is demands a complete forgetting of our own person and of its relations and connexions, e gift of genius is noing but e most complete objectivity, i.e., e objective tendency of e Freeman's Notes 18

19 mind, as opposed to e subjective directed to our own person, i.e., to e will. Accordingly, genius is e capacity to remain in perception, to remove from e service of e will e knowledge which originally existed only for is service. In oer words, genius is e ability to leave entirely out of sight our own interest, our willing, and our aims, and consequently to discard entirely our own personality for a time, in order to remain pure knowing subject, e clear eye of e world....(the World as Will and Representation 36) The genius is distinguished from e common man: For genius to appear in an individual, it is as if a measure of e power of knowledge must have fallen to his lot far exceeding at required for e service of an individualwill; and is superfluity of knowledge having become free, now becomes e subject purified of will, e clear mirror of e inner nature of e world. This explains e animation, amounting to disquietude, in men of genius, since e present can seldom satisfy em, because it does not fill eir consciousness. This gives em at restless zealous nature, at constant search for new objects wory of contemplation, and also at longing, hardly ever satisfied, for men of like nature and stature to whom ey may open eir hearts. The common mortal, on e oer hand, entirely filled and satisfied by e common present, is absorbed in it, and finding everywhere his like, has at special ease and comfort in daily life which are denied to e man of genius. Imagination has been rightly recognized as an essential element of genius; indeed, it has sometimes been regarded as identical wi genius, but is is not correct. The objects of genius as such are e eternal Ideas, e persistent, essential forms of e world and of all its phenomena. [...] Therefore e man of genius requires imagination, in order to see in ings not what nature has actually formed, but what she endeavored to form, yet did not bring about, because of e conflict of her forms wi one anoer....(the World as Will and Representation 36) Schopenhauer comments on e fine line between genius and madness: It is often remarked at genius and madness have a side where ey touch and even pass over into each oer, and even poetic inspiration has been called a kind of madness; amabilis insania, as Horace calls it; and in e introduction to Oberon Wieland speaks of amiable madness. Even Aristotle, as quoted by Seneca, is supposed to have said There has been no great mind wiout an admixture of madness. Plato expresses it in e above mentioned my of e cave by saying at ose who outside e cave have seen e true sunlight and e ings at actually are (e Ideas), cannot afterwards see wiin e cave any more, because eir eyes have grown unaccustomed to e darkness; ey no longer recognize e shadow-forms correctly. They are erefore ridiculed for eir mistakes by ose oers who have never left at cave and ose shadow-forms. Also in e Phaedrus (245 A), he distinctly says at wiout a certain madness ere can be no genuine poet, in fact (249 D) at everyone appears mad who recognizes e eternal Ideas in fleeting ings... (The World as Will and Representation 36) Here Schopenhauer points out at ere is some element of e genius is in all of us and en he will go on to emphasize what distinguishes e genius and en, exactly, what e work of art is: Now, according to our explanation, genius consists in e ability to know, independently of e principles of sufficient reason, not individual ings which have eir existence only in e relation, but e Ideas of such ings, and in e ability to be, in face of ese, e correlative of e Idea, and hence no longer individual, but pure subject of knowing. Yet is ability must be inherent in all men in a lesser and different degree, as Freeman's Notes 19

20 oerwise ey would be just an incapable of enjoying works of art as of producing em. Generally, ey would have no susceptibility at all to e beautiful and to e sublime; indeed, ese words could have no meaning for em. We must erefore assume as existing in all men at power of recognizing in ings eir Ideas, of divesting emselves for a moment of eir personality, unless indeed ere are some who are not capable of any aesetic pleasure at all. The man of genius excels em only in e far higher degree and more continuous duration of is kind of knowledge. These enable him to retain at oughtful contemplation necessary for him to repeat what is us known in a voluntary and international work, such repetition being e work of art. Through is he communicates to oers e Idea he has grasped. Therefore is Idea remains unchanged and e same, and hence aesetic pleasure is essentially one and e same, wheer it be called for by a work of art, or directly by e contemplation of nature and of life. The work of art is merely a means of facilitating at knowledge in which is pleasure consists. That e Idea comes to us more easily from e work of art an directly from nature and from reality, arises solely from e fact at e artist, who knew only e Idea and not reality, clearly repeated in his work only e Idea, separated it out from reality, and omitted all disturbing contingencies. The artist lets us peer into e world rough his eyes. (The World as Will and Representation 37) Schopenhauer a pessimist: all willing springs from suffering: All willing springs from lack, from deficiency, and us from suffering. Fulfillment brings is to an end; yet for one wish at is fulfilled ere remain at least ten at are denied. [...] No attained object of willing can give a satisfaction at lasts and no longer declines, but it is always like e alms rown to a beggar, which reprieves him today so at his misery may be prolonged till tomorrow. Therefore, so long as our consciousness is filled by our will, so long as we are given up to e rong of desires wi its constant hopes and fears, so long as we are e subject of willing, we never obtain lasting happiness or peace. (The World as Will and Representation 38) since in willing, which we do all e time, we are trying to change e state we are in it follows at is state is felt to be unsatisfactory but as soon as we achieve what we are willing, we are propelled into willing someing else is willing is e essential nature of everying us e world is a scene of perpetual frustration and conflict but ere are certain circumstances where we are able to suspend, if only temporarily, e activity of willing primarily in aesetic experience accepts here Kant s notion of disinterested contemplation When, however, an external cause or inward disposition suddenly raises us out of e endless stream of willing, and snatches knowledge from e raldom of e will, e attention is now no longer directed to e motives of willing, but comprehends ings free from eir relation to e will. Thus it considers ings wiout interest, wiout subjectivity, purely objectively; it is entirely given up to em in so far as ey are merely representations, and not motives. Then all at once e peace, always sought but always escaping us on at first pa of willing, comes to us of its own accord, and all is well wi us. (The World as Will and Representation 38) The experience of e sublime is particularly important for Schopenhauer: There is a slight challenge to abide in pure knowledge, to turn away from all willing, and precisely in is way we have a transition from e feeling of e beautiful to at of e sublime. It is e faintest trace of e sublime in e beautiful, and beauty itself appears here only in a slight degree. The following is an example almost as weak. Freeman's Notes 20

21 Let us transport ourselves to a very lonely region of boundless horizons, under a perfectly cloudless sky, trees and plants in e perfectly motionless air, no animals, no human beings, no moving masses of water, e profoundest silence. Such surroundings are as it were a summons to seriousness, to contemplation wi complete emancipation from all willing and its cravings; but it is just is at gives to such a scene of mere solitude and profound peace a touch of e sublime. For, since it affords no objects, eier favorable or unfavorable, to e will at is always in need of strife and attainment, ere is left only e state of pure contemplation, and whoever is incapable of is is abandoned wi shameful ignominy to e emptiness of unoccupied will, to e torture and misery of boredom. (The World as Will and Representation 39) Therefore if, for example, I contemplate a tree aesetically, i.e., wi artistic eyes, and us recognize not it but its Idea, it is immediately of no importance wheer it is is tree of its ancestor at flourished a ousand years ago, and wheer e contemplator is is individual. Or any oer living anywhere at any time. The particular ing and e knowing individual are abolished wi e principle of sufficient reason, and noing remains but e Idea and e pure subject of knowing, which togeer constitute e adequate objectivity of e will at is grade. And e Idea is released not only from time but also from space; for e Idea is not really is spatial form which floats before me, but its expression, its pure significance, its innermost being, disclosing itself and appealing to me; and it can be wholly e same, in spite of great difference in e spatial relations of e form. (The World as Will and Representation 41) art us exists and justifies itself as a means of escape from e tyranny of will and e misery of existence art alone makes life at times tolerable leads to a Buddhist renunciation of desire and selfhood e aesetic experience leads to knowledge of e Platonic Idea puts to sleep e restless craving of e Will for a time deadens e pain of being Therefore, ose eternally praisewory masters of art expressed e highest wisdom perceptibly in eir works. Here is e summit of all art at has followed e will in its adequate objectivity, namely in e Ideas, rough all e grades, from e lowest where it is affected, and its nature is unfolded, by causes, en where it is similarly affected by stimuli, and finally by motives. And now art ends by presenting e free self-abolition of e will rough e one great quieter at dawns on it from e most perfect knowledge of its own nature. (The World as Will and Representation 48) very clearly sees is experience of art and e knowledge at comes wi it as different from science and viewing ings from e principle of sufficient reason art is essentially a cognitive enterprise wi its own special object of knowledge e Platonic Ideas in aesetic experience we become pure will-less subjects of knowledge works of art exist to present Ideas each art is specialized wi respect to content Freeman's Notes 21