Perspectives on Practice: A Pragmatic Comparison of the Praxial Philosophies of David Elliott and Thomas Regelski

Transcription

1 Perspectives on Practice: A Pragmatic Comparison of the Praxial Philosophies of David Elliott and Thomas Regelski J. Scott Goble Philosophy of Music Education Review, Volume 11, Number 1, Spring 2003, pp (Article) Published by Indiana University Press For additional information about this article No institutional affiliation (26 Aug :34 GMT)

2 J. SCOTT GOBLE 23 PERSPECTIVES ON PR ACTICE A PRAGMATIC COMPARISON OF THE PRAXIAL PHILOSOPHIES OF DAVID ELLIOTT AND THOMAS REGELSKI J. SCOTT GOBLE University of British Columbia In a highly influential paper, What Should One Expect from a Philosophy of Music Education? (1991), philosopher Philip Alperson outlined three possible basic strategies for understanding and explaining music and music education. He began by describing the formalist aesthetic view that originated with such Enlightenment philosophers as Immanuel Kant, according to which disinterested contemplation (that is, attention solely to the formal, qualitative aspects of something such as a musical work without reference to concepts or to its practical significance) gives rise to aesthetic experience, a particular, highly pleasurable state of mind. According to this view, music is a fine art, and music education should involve training people to perceive and respond appropriately to musical works (that is, by cultivating their taste for masterpieces ) in order to evoke aesthetic experience in them and perhaps also to prepare them to produce works that might evoke such responses in others. Aesthetic formalists hold that such education will enhance an individual s understanding and enjoyment of music. Next, Alperson gave an account of what he termed an enhanced version of Philosophy of Music Education Review, 11, no. 1 (Spring 2003)

3 24 PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC EDUCATION REVIEW aesthetic formalism, focusing especially on what he termed the expressivist version of the aesthetic cognitivist view. This strategy extends the formalist aesthetic view by taking into account such additional features as the expressive, representational, and symbolic properties of a musical work to account for the meaningfulness of its content. Alperson went on to explain that the primary purpose of music education according to this view is to make insights into these properties accessible to people and thereby to refine their understanding of human feeling: Music education, then, is a means to the education of feeling. 1 This is, he noted, the strategy adopted and developed theoretically by Susanne Langer that was, in turn, appropriated and developed for educators by Bennett Reimer as aesthetic education. After challenging these two strategies on various bases, Alperson concluded by proffering a so-called praxial view of music and music education, according to which [t]he attempt is made... to understand [music] in terms of the variety of meaning and values evidenced in actual practice in particular cultures. 2 In using the term praxial, Alperson was drawing upon the ancient Greek distinction (discussed by Aristotle) between three areas of knowledge: theoria, techne, and praxis. Roughly equivalent to the contemporary English words theory, technique, and practice, theoria denoted for the Greeks speculative knowledge of pure, eternal truth; techne designated the kind of knowledge required for making, producing, or creating something; and praxis signified knowledge that takes into account the sorts of reasoning and critical thinking necessary for getting right results for the benefit of people in a given domain or situation. According to the praxial view of music and music education articulated by Alperson, different forms of musical endeavor are regarded as different practices, and the aesthetic approaches to music described above are best placed alongside the functions that different musical practices serve and have served in different cultural contexts. (That is, each aesthetic approach is considered one of many approaches to understanding music, and it is understood that it is not shared by all cultural groups.) Most notably, Alperson s praxial view of music education enlarges the range of music regarded as appropriate for music education to include music outside the Western art tradition (thus including works composed without aesthetic goals in mind), and it focuses attention on the motives and intentions of those who undertake them, as well as the social, historical, and cultural conditions and forces in which practices of music production arise and have meaning. 3 Subsequent to Alperson s public delivery of this paper, music education scholars David Elliott and Thomas Regelski took on the task of further elucidating implications of the notions of music as praxis and music education as praxis independently, though each has occasionally acknowledged and adopted aspects of the other s thinking. Their writings have been in the forefront of dialogue con-

4 J. SCOTT GOBLE 25 cerning the philosophy of the music education profession in North America for the past decade. Both scholars views stand in opposition to aesthetic perspectives of all kinds, and each has presented his own critique of the aesthetic philosophy of music and music education. 4 While each of them, like Alperson, has on occasion made reference to the praxial philosophy in his writings (as if, perhaps, there was only one way of applying the Greek concept of praxis to music and music education), 5 their views do in fact differ in important respects. My purpose in this paper is to review briefly what I take to be the most prominent aspects of Elliott s and Regelski s praxialisms on their own terms, to make note of their most important similarities and differences, and then to consider from a pragmatic perspective the suitability of their ideas for the present and future practice of music education in the public schools of pluralistic, democratically governed nations. Before beginning to discuss the praxial conceptions of these two scholars, I want to point out that each has described his philosophical views in great detail and at considerable length, and the brief sketches I present here do not provide a full accounting of each scholar s vision. Since their writings present more highly nuanced and well-developed explanations of their ideas, and because they have already done and are continuing to do much to stimulate thinking and influence practice within the music education profession, I strongly encourage readers to explore their original expositions. THE PRAXIAL STRATEGY OF DAVID ELLIOTT As a doctoral student of Bennett Reimer at Case Western University, Elliott had a good opportunity to become intimately acquainted with the basic tenets and the workings out of aesthetic approaches to philosophy of music education. A review of his writings reveals, however, that by the mid-1980s he had already developed an interest in framing the practices of the profession in a different way. 6 In 1995, Elliott published the first book-length philosophy of music education based on his understanding of the notion of praxis, Music Matters: A New Philosophy of Music Education. In the first section of this book, Elliott asserted that the nature of music education depends on the nature of music itself and that the significance of music education must depend on the significance of music in human life. He reviewed and assessed the aesthetic concept of music manifested in the writings of such thinkers as James Mursell, Susanne Langer, and Bennett Reimer, concluding that these writers philosophies are ill-founded, illogical, and not credible, owing largely to their focus on the object of music as a form of art, their adherence to the notion of aesthetic experience as a highly questionable special realm of human experience, and their attendant reductive view of music education as aes-

5 26 PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC EDUCATION REVIEW thetic education (that is, the education of feeling). 7 In seeking to provide a more plausible alternative, Elliott drew conceptions from the writings of philosopher Francis Sparshott, cognitive theorist Daniel Dennett, and psychologist Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi (among others) to form a foundation for his own philosophy. Borrowing first from Sparshott, Elliott observed that [w]hat music is, at root, is a human activity that involves (1) a doer; (2) some kind of doing; (3), something done; and (4) the complete context in which doers do what they do. 8 Noting that the noun praxis derives from the Greek verb prasso, meaning (among other things) to do or to act purposefully, Elliott explained that he adopted the adjective praxial to describe his philosophy for the purpose of emphasizing that music ought to be understood in relation to the meanings and values evidenced in actual music-making and music listening in specific contexts rather than on aesthetic principles. 9 For Elliott, musicers (that is, persons who actually make music) are practitioners of a diverse human practice called MUSIC that is manifested in many different ways throughout the world. He set forth his premises for considering the value and significance of MUSIC in human life as follows. First, the fact that most (if not all) human societies have shown an interest in some form of musicing [i.e., music-making] and music listening does not establish the presence of a specific human need for which musical practices are a necessary satisfaction.... Second, in considering what tendencies might underpin MUSIC, both common sense and logic suggest that we are under no obligation to identify one overriding tendency. Third, in attempting to explain its significance, we must not lose sight of what is most obvious and curious about MUSIC: that the actions of music making and music listening often give rise to experiences of positive or satisfying affect. Indeed, even a quick glance around the world is enough to show that while some people make music chiefly for money, status, and other tangible rewards, most do not. Most musicers and listeners find the actions of musicing and listening rewarding in themselves. 10 On these bases, Elliott concluded that the keys to understanding the human valuing of MUSIC (including the valuing of musical works) are likely to be found in the nature of human consciousness and the human tendencies that stem from it. Turning next to the writings of the contemporary cognitive scientists who informed his thinking, Elliott cited Dennett s argument that consciousness is a characteristic of the human nervous system that has resulted from the evolution over several millennia of certain biological processes through both natural selection and cultural development. 11 As each individual person is born, grows, and matures, the individual s consciousness develops to form an integrated whole that he

6 J. SCOTT GOBLE 27 or she comes to regard as the self. Elliott also cited Csikszentmihalyi s observation congruent with Dennett s view that the self is an epiphenomenon (that is, an occurrence or fact that is over or above that which can be perceived directly by the senses). In Csikszentmihalyi s view, the self is the result of consciousness becoming aware of itself. 12 According to Elliott, Dennett and Csikszentmihalyi assert that consciousness evolved to meet certain needs of the human organism, and they have argued from this point that the attendant central goal of each self is to bring order or strength to itself. Elliott observed that while some life experiences (such as the loss of a loved one or other traumatic event) may tend to weaken or bring disorder to the self, an individual s undertaking of activities that are congruent with her or his self-goals tends to bring order and strength to the self. Csikszentmihalyi has termed the positive affective experience associated with such challenging activities optimal experience, autotelic experience, or flow (italics added). 13 The enjoyment the individual experiences while engaging in such behaviors, Elliott affirmed, is the affective concomitant of self-growth. 14 Elliott reported that Csikszentmihalyi and his fellow researchers have observed that the various flow entailing, self-growth producing activities undertaken by human beings have several characteristics in common. First, flow experiences generally occur in certain specific kinds of action contexts that involve challenge and challenge-related knowledge (for example, sports, games, and the arts); notably, the acquisition of knowledge is the key to enjoyment and control in these mini-worlds of effort. Second, these experiences typically entail the individual s complete focus of concentration on her or his actions. Third, this absorbing concentration tends to be facilitated by pursuits or activities that involve clear goals and feedback within the context of a distinct tradition. Fourth, such experiences typically entail a loss of self-consciousness while one is engaged in the activity. Finally, these consciousness-ordering pursuits are usually undertaken for the enjoyment and order they bring to the self, rather than for external reward. Elliott observed that a consequence of the self-growth that occurs as one meets the challenges that arise in any such action context is raised self-esteem, the awareness that one has achieved or come to possess desirable qualities. Seeking to draw connections to MUSIC from this set of assertions, Elliott argued that the development of skills and the taking on of challenges in both music-making and music listening (in all world traditions) represent unique and important ways of effecting flow and bringing order to consciousness, and that they lead to self-growth, self-knowledge, and raised self-esteem. Asserting that the musical works that make up the body of most music cultures spiral upward in complexity, 15 Elliott concluded that the task of music education must, therefore, be to develop the musicianship of learners and thus to effect their self-growth

7 28 PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC EDUCATION REVIEW through progressive musical problem-solving in balanced relation to appropriate musical challenges. 16 Earlier in his book, Elliott put forth the notion, noted above, that musicers (or music-makers) are practitioners of a diverse human practice called MUSIC that is manifested in different ways worldwide. In his view, this practice has various subpractices, subspecialties, or arts of music that go by such names as jazz, choral music, rock music and opera. 17 Different musical practices pivot on the understandings and efforts shared by musicers who are practitioners of that practice. Furthermore, each such practice produces listenables that manifest the shared principles and standards of those who make them. This is how we know Baroque choral singing, bebop jazz improvisation, Balinese kebyar, and Korean kayagžm sanjo when we hear them: by the stylistic features manifested in the musical sound patterns themselves. Specific musical practices eventuate in distinct musical styles. A musical style is a body of musical products that share certain auditory features in common. These commonalties are explained by the fact that the musicers and listeners of a musical practice share a certain set of musical beliefs, understandings, and preferences in common. 18 Since MUSIC consists in many different musical practices, Elliott asserted, music educators have a fundamental responsibility to induct children into a variety of such practices during the time they spend in music education programs. 19 In three later chapters on Musicing in Context, Music Listening in Context, and Musical Creativity in Context, Elliott argued that the development of musicianship is intimately related to the authenticity of the musical situations in which it is taught, learned and used; that is, musical action and musical context work together to coproduce musical understanding. In his discussion of musicing, he examined issues concerning composition, performance, improvisation, and arranging in different cultural circumstances, affirming that one must have a knowledge of the practices within a particular tradition in order to music (that is, to engage in music-making) successfully in that tradition. Next, in his discussion of listening, he acknowledged that compositional designs and musical performances are influenced by and reflective of their cultural ideological contexts, and he suggested that listeners should learn how to apprehend cultural information in, and attribute cultural meanings to, musical patterns and musical works by convention. Then, in his chapter on creativity, Elliott observed that creative achievement results from know-how, from ideas generated and selected by deliberate choice, by plans continuously altered, by commitments to goals, and by judgments of creative promise. 20 He noted that various studies have suggested that creative achievement in general is motivated by desire to search

8 J. SCOTT GOBLE 29 out gaps in what is already known, to advance a practice, or to extend the practice beyond what is already accepted. Finally, in the last major section of his book, Elliott returned to his conception of engagement in a musical practice as self-growth eliciting behavior, and he made recommendations on this basis for the implementation of music education curricula in the schools. He asserted that students should be inducted into different music cultures during the course of their education, with music education programs serving as reflective musical practicums in which children learn to work with one another in solving musical problems. In concluding his penultimate chapter, Elliott observed that students participating in such practicums may learn to make music well through deeper understandings of the beliefs (artistic, social, and cultural) that influence music-making and listening in different practices, thus realizing the goals of a humanistic education. 21 He stated the matter succinctly at the end of the chapter in which he first set forth the essential aspects of his philosophy. To conclude, if we conceive music education as the systematic development of musicianship in balanced relation to progressive musical challenges, then music education programs will provide the optimum conditions for realizing the values and aims of music education. What this means, in turn, is that students will come to view the development of musicianship as a specific kind of process that they are capable of pursuing, learning, and enjoying. In this process, students will also learn firsthand why and how MUSIC is a valued global practice. 22 THE PRAXIAL STRATEGY OF THOMAS REGELSKI Thomas Regelski s interest in attending to what music is good for independent of the claims of writers who espouse aesthetic philosophies and then predicating the practice of music education on such a foundation seems to have begun emerging in the early 1980s. His first book, Principles and Problems of Music Education (1975), served as a college-level introduction to the psychology of music teaching and learning, and it addressed matters of feeling and aesthetic responses to music as covert affective behaviors in ways congruent with Susanne Langer s thinking. 23 In his second book, the short opus Arts Education and Brain Research (1978), Regelski presented then-recent research into brain function, explaining what was understood at the time about the functional asymmetry of the cerebral hemispheres (that is, left brain/right brain theory), to make the argument that schools have long educated only half the child, 24 to support notions of aesthetic learning and to suggest future directions for research. His second college textbook, Teaching General Music (1981), while still influenced by aesthetic perspec-

9 30 PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC EDUCATION REVIEW tives, represented something of a departure from them, as it advocated an action learning approach to music education that seeks the closest possible connection or relevance to a student s life. 25 However, it is in his writings since 1994 that Regelski has focused most directly on developing the notions of music as praxis and music education as praxis. His elucidations of these notions differ from those of Elliott in several noteworthy respects, but, since he has not yet produced a book-length account of his philosophical perspective, it is necessary for one to read several of his articles (published in various places) to get a full sense of the implications of his unique vision for music education. It becomes apparent when one considers his writings collectively that his intention is to challenge aesthetic notions systematically and to seat or establish music education firmly on a praxial foundation. In Taking the Art of Music for Granted: A Critical Sociology of the Aesthetic Philosophy of Music (1994), Regelski presented an historical account of the origins of the idea of music as art, demonstrating that the aesthetic paradigm of the fine Arts is predicated largely on a social ideology that is essentially at odds with both the expectations for and the reality of schooling as a social institution. 26 He argued that aesthetic concepts of taste, notions of beauty, and ideas of the sublime are not disinterested and thus universal (as had been argued historically by Kant and supported by others), but are instead socially rooted and thus in the province of ideologies held by people in positions of power. In particular, he pointed out, the concepts that have undergirded music education throughout its history have actually been legitimated by an institution of cultural elitism. Even when music of different cultural traditions has been embraced by music education organizations in the United States, such as the Music Educators National Conference, their inclusion has been undertaken in conceptual and analytic terms according to the aesthetic education paradigm. 27 He concluded this paper by advocating a praxial philosophy of music and a rationale for music education that would equitably accord all forms of music their pragmatic value in the total scope of human agency. 28 In 1996, Regelski published Prolegomenon To a Praxial Philosophy of Music and Music Education, a paper which, despite evidently having been intended as an introduction, arguably represents the most complete single exposition of his praxial view to date. He began by observing that though the aesthetic basis of music is largely taken for granted by some audiences, a growing volume of critical thinking against the aesthetic ideology has appeared in recent years, out of which a new praxial view of music is emerging. After defining again the ancient Greek words theoria, techne, and praxis (described above) as vocabulary necessary for his argument, he introduced the additional Greek term phronesis which denotes a capacity for realizing the proper values of rational human conduct in a given

10 J. SCOTT GOBLE 31 situation to highlight the reflection in action that guides any genuine musical praxis toward the good results it is intended to realize. For Regelski, praxis implies that one is enjoined to get right results with one s music-making in particular situations where contextually unique results are called for. Drawing support from arguments made previously by scholar Ellen Dissanayake, writer of such books as What is Art For? (1988) and Homo Aestheticus: Where Art Comes From and Why (1992), 29 Regelski expressed three additional tenets of his praxial view: that music is a universal human trait, a way by which moments in life are made special, and a key means by which life is well-lived. 30 Quickly drawing a line between these three key ideas and any notions that could be misconstrued as having metaphysical or transcendental overtones, he emphasized the importance of understanding music in terms of its pragmatic consequences. In his view, the goods of music... are rooted... in the situated and highly specific conditions of the here and now to current life, the experienced quality of good time between the recently remembered past and the avidly anticipated future. 31 With notions involving the contemplation of music such as those usually associated with aesthetic philosophies thus carefully set aside, Regelski stated an additional tenet of his view, that a praxial philosophy of music in and through education is concerned to get people into action musically. 32 In Regelski s view, all music should be regarded as functional in some way, whether it is a central focus of a given praxis (as it is, for example, at a concert) or is not the central focus (as in, say, advertising). For him, the all-important question is: What is music good for in each situation in which it is present? Regelski observed that the greatest percentage of music made in the world is not made for concert listening, and he stressed that the traditional aesthetic distinction between pure music, attended to strictly for its own sake, and functional music, which serves some other purpose (or praxis), is simply not valid. He noted further that while important goods can of course be served without the presence of music, the Being and Becoming involved with musical practice it s making special of human time and events is unique and available in no other manner. 33 According to Regelski, there is a unique set of process values present in every musical praxis that is associated with the qualia given to sounds by human beings (such as pitch, rhythm/meter, intonation, and so on) by which we come to recognize music as music. The fact that we give attention to these values does not mean, however, that an amateur performance, being less well in-tune or having less-refined tone than that of the professional, will be any less meaningful for the amateur performer; the good associated with the praxis for that individual may be served whether or not these process values are fully achieved. Moreover, it is important to note that the training required for an individual to become competent in one musical praxis (say, the in-tune performance of Western art mu-

11 32 PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC EDUCATION REVIEW sic) may be at odds with the requirements of another musical praxis (say, the microtonal constructions of the music of another world culture, the uniqueness of which may cause it to be heard by a Western listener as out-of-tune ). However, he stressed, it is not true that one must be an insider of a given praxis to find value in it; all that is required is an informal familiarity with the nature of the activity. Notably, even where one has never been (and never expects to be) involved in its performance, many aspects of a musical praxis can be accessed via listening. Listening, he noted further, is a unique praxis of its own, distinct from the praxis of performing. Continuing his discussion of musical process-values, Regelski pointed out that these values are assessed as good by those persons involved with a particular musical praxis only when they conform to the individual, social, religious, and/or cultural meanings the praxis is intended to serve. While it is possible to attend to musical process-values without regard to the praxis with which they originated, doing so can neutralize or negate the original intentions of the attendant praxis, as when one treats madrigals as concert music rather than as a means of social interaction (as they were originally intended to be). Still, musical process-values can legitimately be separated from a praxis, as when the performers engaged in one praxis are influenced by or borrow from another. Regelski argued that it is intentionality that defines a praxis as music, and it also establishes the musical process-values involved. Thus, the intention to make special certain human ends via music is a musical praxis, and the intention determines the way it is actualized musically. Challenging once again the views of those who hold aesthetic views, Regelski re-asserted that music... is rarely if ever to be about or for itself, but that it rather serves a wonderfully complex variety of social and other human goods. 34 Moreover, he noted, music is not a mere servant in such processes; instead, means and ends, process and product are inseparable and are jointly conditioned by the intentionality governing the situated context of music-making. 35 He pointed out that while some people regard strictly intra-musical processes as worth considering and undertaking for their own sake, such intentions are very rare in the world, and are held mostly by trained musicians. He noted that Paul Valery s term esthesic provides a helpful way of denoting such matters in order to keep them distinct from aesthetic notions. Regelski concluded by explaining the difference between his position and Alperson s and what he believes to be Elliott s position with regard to the aesthetic ideology. In his view, Alperson is not concerned with establishing a universal characteristic of all music, but rather focuses on what different forms of music have meant to people in their different cultural contexts, thus including and acknowledging the existence and the cultural significance of aesthetic experience to those people who find the concept meaningful. Elliott, on the other hand,

12 J. SCOTT GOBLE 33 seems to have replaced the idea of aesthetic experience with Csikszentmihalyi s notion of flow, and he regards the aesthetic response to be a social fabrication or myth. 36 Regelski explained that he personally follows the pragmatic criterion that the worth or value of a proposition or belief is seen in the actual results that obtain from its use, 37 noting that belief in aesthetic experience can produce something like the experience predicted. 38 Like belief in God (whose existence, he stated, cannot be definitely proved any more than it can be disproved), belief in aesthetic experience is associated with right results or a musical good for some people. However, he stated that he would discourage the aesthetic motive for music praxis within the context of education if only for the pragmatic reason that the privateness and intangibility claimed for aesthetic responding makes it impossible to evaluate either teaching or learning. 39 He is thus in agreement with Elliott that aesthetic philosophies should no longer be used as the basis upon for music education curriculum and pedagogy. In Action Learning: Curriculum and Instruction as and for Praxis (1997), Regelski returned to the notion of action learning he had explored in his 1984 textbook, reiterating and elaborating on the Greek concept of praxis (as distinct from theoria and techne) he had explored in subsequent writings, and advocated that the two be used as tools in guiding the formation of music education curricula. His recommendations on curriculum include two especially notable aspects. First, according to Regelski, action learning is predicated on answering the question: What of all that can be taught is most worth teaching? Not surprisingly, he answered this question by reiterating the praxial values of music he had identified previously, that music is a way by which moments in life are made special and that it is an important means by which life is well-lived. Second, in Regelski s concept of action learning, the teaching process operates as a form of action research, as the teaching practitioner-as-researcher reflects on results, evaluates the methods and materials used in instruction, and reconsiders the actual value ultimately manifested by the ideals that initially motivated the instruction. Regelski underscored his point that the value for the student must be a concern at all times in order that the student might be well-prepared for present and future musical experiences: Whatever the curriculum hypothesizes to be good musical health must be validated in relation to students actions outside the classroom and later in life in the real world. 40 Regelski explained that he envisions several important results stemming from such an approach to curriculum. First, all knowledge will be approached as a skill (for example, doing, making, creating, and listening) and not as abstract concepts or inert information. Those who learn music in schools in which a praxial curriculum guides their learning will come to return music-making and music consumption to the private sphere (that is, to the home and to amateur circles), and

13 34 PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC EDUCATION REVIEW public support for music in educational contexts and elsewhere will increase. As a result of undergoing such a curriculum, no one in society will feel the need to say anything more than I am a musician (the qualifiers amateur and real will be unimportant). Most notably, music will come to be seen not as a frill but as basic cultural capital necessary to making a life worth living. 41 Regelski described succinctly the kind of music education he envisions in the following statement: A praxial approach to music education... will stress getting people into action musically. It will stress the kinds of musical praxes that have the greatest likelihood of contributing to a life that is more fully lived through musical involvement. It will provide choices for such musical meaning-making by modeling valuable alternatives for musical involvement and by insuring that students are both capable of and interested in regularly making music a meaningful part of their lives. In sum, a praxial approach to music education will demonstrate and teach what music is and is good for in the broadest and most relevant functional terms. 42 SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN ELLIOTT S AND REGELSKI S PRAXIAL VIEWS Elliott and Regelski have independently sought to provide philosophical accounts that embrace all musical practices, and both scholars thus hold theses about what is universal in the various practices undertaken by the world s diverse peoples that they regard collectively as music. 43 In Elliott s view, MUSIC is a diverse human practice that is manifested in many different ways in different world cultures. 44 For Regelski, music is (as ethnomusicologist John Blacking once proposed) a universal human trait. 45 On this point, the two scholars appear to be in agreement, generally speaking, as it is easy to imagine that a universal human trait might be manifested in different human practices in different cultural contexts. However, we should also note that this apparent congruity in the views of the two scholars is not shared by all ethnomusicologists or even by all music educators. Cultural relativists oppose efforts to universalize like those of Regelski and Elliott, and they assert that the various different practices involving sound undertaken by different cultural groups (which some people might call music ) must be understood on their own terms (that is, in the terms of their unique conceptual systems). It is important, therefore, to keep two points in mind. First, that though Elliott and Regelski appear to be in general agreement about this, the concept music itself is not a cultural universal, 46 and, second, that they are members of a profession that has a vested interest in seeing it as such. This point notwithstanding, each of these scholars used his foundational, uni-

14 J. SCOTT GOBLE 35 versalizing thesis as the basis for setting forth a philosophy of music education that he (presumably) advocates as a basis for school curricula in the pluralistic society (that is, the nation) in which he lives. (Neither scholar has indicated specifically the intended scope of his recommendations.) According to Elliott s philosophy, engagement in performing within one musical tradition (or more) represents a unique and important way of effecting flow and bringing order to consciousness, and it can lead to self-growth, self-knowledge, and raised self-esteem. Therefore, he has asserted, the goal of music education should be to develop the musicianship of learners, thereby effecting their self-growth through progressive musical problem-solving in balanced relation to appropriate musical challenges. 47 In making these assertions, Elliott grounded his philosophy in a particular branch of Western psychology, albeit one that seeks to take in and account for different cultural practices and perspectives, and his philosophy is thus strengthened and limited by the strengths and limitations of that psychology. Regelski, on the other hand, has predicated his philosophy on somewhat more loose, and thus perhaps more culturally inclusive, concepts of music and music education. For Regelski (as I noted above), musical engagement is a way by which moments in life are made special, and it is a key means by which life is well-lived. While he would likely agree with the notion that engagement in music-making may lead to some sorts of personal growth, he has emphasized instead that the goal of learning a particular kind of music-making should be in line with the individual, social, religious, and/or cultural practices, traditions, and contexts within which it usually takes place. In making his curricular recommendations, Regelski has promoted general musicianship the kind of knowing and doing that travels well and thus has potential relevance for use across a variety of styles. 48 In establishing his philosophy on this basis, Regelski kept it open to the ways of knowing held in different cultural traditions. (His conception thus seems closer to Alperson s original praxial account.) By the way, Elliott is a citizen of Canada; Regelski is a citizen of the United States. Numerous musical traditions are alive and well in both of these pluralistic nations, though the systems of government under which the two nations operate differ in important ways. It thus seems curious that Regelski, as a citizen of the United States a one official language nation in which national unity is actively promoted by its government and national media under the banner e pluribus unum holds a philosophy more culturally embracing in its central motivation than that of Elliott, a citizen of Canada a two official language nation in which cultural diversity is actively supported by its government and national media. On the basis of their citizenship, one would think that each of their respective orientations would be held by the other. Both scholars apparently seek to explain music education in such a way that it

15 36 PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC EDUCATION REVIEW will henceforth be well supported in the curriculum of schools in pluralistic, democratic societies. In this respect, Elliott s philosophy may be more readily embraced by many people (especially citizens of the United States), since methods of education to promote self-growth and increases in self-knowledge and self-esteem are potentially accessible to empirical measurement and refinement, and they have pragmatic value for persons living in a democratic capitalist society. Regrettably, however, Elliott has not yet demonstrated that musical learning is in some way unique in effecting personal growth in these areas. Regelski s philosophy, on the other hand, is more in line with the ideas of cultural inclusiveness and equality alive in all pluralistic, democratic nations, and he has asserted that in the different contexts in which it appears music serves a wonderfully complex variety of social and other human goods. Since he is at pains to make his philosophy as culturally inclusive as possible, he has regrettably not identified many of these goods in any but the most general of terms. In 2000, Regelski presented a paper in which he identified six general themes in Elliott s work that differed with his own views and critiqued them with the aim of making the concept of praxis even more broad based and richly productive. 49 These may be worth noting here, as they provide insights into the two scholars different ways of thinking. First, Regelski challenged Elliott s claim in Music Matters that only those who have experience as performers of music can fully experience music. Regelski explains that, in Elliott s view, the ability to listen to music intelligently or competently is directly and necessarily dependent on cognitions and insights that only result from the ability to perform music intelligently or competently, and vice versa. 50 Indeed, in Music Matters, Elliott wrote, achieving an experience [as a listener] of the special kind of event-performance we call a musical work requires an understanding of musical performing; it requires that students learn how to perform and improvise competently themselves, as well as to compose, arrange, and conduct. 51 Regelski challenged this statement by asserting that while the praxis of listening may be governed by unique conditions of its own, an individual can develop listening skills without forming performance competencies. This seems a minor point of difference, since it is clear in the writings of the two scholars that they both regard listening as a distinctive and important praxis in its own right, and both see a place for the teaching of listening in music education curricula. 52 Second, Regelski took issue with Elliott s decision to ground his argument on the relatively complementary conceptions of mind held by Dennett and certain other contemporary philosophers of mind, saying Music Matters is based on a materialist reduction of mind to brain... and an equating of human consciousness with self. 53 He observed that while such a view usefully challenges the focus on propositional knowing and abstract concepts found in Reimer s aesthetic

16 J. SCOTT GOBLE 37 philosophy and elsewhere (primarily by calling into question dualistic models of mind), Elliott s account downplays consideration of affectivity and subjectivity and also fails to address intentionality adequately. In Regelski s view, Elliott s conception thus risks losing the mind in the brain and of falling into the reductionist conclusions of some cognitive scientists that the mind/brain is nothing but a computer and its programs. 54 Philosopher Pentti Määttänen raised related issues about Elliott s philosophy in his paper Elliott on Mind Matters. 55 For his part, Elliott either sensed that his philosophy was in need of adjustment or felt the need to challenge these claims of Regelski and Määttänen, as he published the paper Music and Affect: The Praxial View in Whether he succeeded in addressing Regelski s and Määttänen s concerns to their satisfaction is uncertain. Third, Regelski asserted that Elliott s discussions of praxis tend to focus more on the concerns of experts, especially theoria and techne (theory and technique), and that they do not adequately take into account the notion attendant to the Greek notion of praxis of phronesis, according to which the quality of a given musical performance would be judged on the basis of what the music is good for (that is, is intended for, or trying to achieve) in the situation in which it is undertaken and whether it achieves that good result. 57 Regelski went on to say that in his view, A praxial philosophy of music for general education should provide an account of the kinds and levels of performance which, though falling considerably short of the knowledge and skill of experts, is nonetheless proficient enough for the individual(s) concerned to be personally satisfying It is true that Elliott s philosophy does seem to emphasize mastery of technique over praxial understanding of the musical practices undertaken by different cultural groups, but we should also note that in this he is in line with much public school music teaching of the past and present. In the United States, at least, music educators have seldom given in-depth attention to the socio-cultural backgrounds or contexts from which different forms of music stem, though lip service has often been paid. 59 Fourth, Regelski turned to the topic of value in music. He questioned Elliott s focus on Csikszentmihalyi s notion of flow in his praxial account, charging that flow does not adequately account for all the values people experience in connection with music in their daily lives. He suggested that while flow may provide a good description of the ways in which people are often caught up in performing or listening at concerts (for instance), it does not explain what we find valuable in other, more ubiquitous musical praxes. (I discussed this well-taken point previously.) Fifth, Regelski took issue with Elliott s discussion of musical creativity, observing that even though Elliott allows that musicing and its outcomes are always practice-specific, his discussion of creativity seems only to include musical prac-

17 38 PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC EDUCATION REVIEW tices in which standards of professional excellence are in place. Regelski went on to point out that there is notorious difficulty in getting agreement on what constitutes excellence from the practitioners of any musical practice, and that, in any case, criteria should vary, expand, and flex according to the situated needs of different musical praxes. He cautioned that by equating creativity with the highest standards of excellence, the important contribution that musical composition could make to the curriculum would be obscured. It seems important to note that Elliott encouraged attention to the cultural-ideological dimension of musical creativity not only in Music Matters, but also in a paper he published in 1997, but he did not suggest in either of these places means by which students might learn to think praxially in Regelski s sense (that is, in terms of broader personal, social, and cultural efficacy) in their musically creative efforts. 60 Finally, Regelski suggested that Elliott s praxial orientation to curriculum should be broadened, especially his idea that the aims of self-growth, self-knowledge, and flow are the central values of MUSIC and, therefore, the central aims of music education. Where Elliott advocated focusing on musical actions, transactions, and interactions that closely parallel real music cultures, Regelski has promoted engagement in real life musical actions. In Regelski s view, Curriculum as practicum... will be an apprenticeship for nurturing and advancing amateurism in the best avocational and recreational sense He concluded by underscoring the point that true praxis is guided by the ethical need to make a difference in the quality of people s lives through one s musical endeavors. SUITABILITY FOR THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF PLURALISTIC, DEMOCRATIC NATIONS In summary, it seems fair to say that both Elliott s and Regelski s praxial philosophies are highly important contributions to the literature in philosophy of music education. Both have helped to extricate music education philosophy from certain conceptual limitations under which it has suffered for many years. In particular, Elliott s effort to locate the origins of musicing in human biological processes seems commendable, in that, if it is developed further, it has the potential to move music education philosophy into the range of an arguably more ideologically neutral lens through which different cultural forms of musicing can be considered. Even without further development, his philosophy as it stands now has the potential to focus the efforts of music educators around values that are shared by many parents, students, and school administrators in pluralistic, democratic nations. At the same time, one can also say that Regelski s praxial philosophy provides a useful compass for considering what music is good for (that is, the personal

18 J. SCOTT GOBLE 39 and social impact of different forms of real musical practices) and predicating the practice of music education on such bases. In this important respect, his philosophical account is closer to both the original Greek notion of praxis as well as Alperson s idea of how this notion might be applied to music education. Regelski s curricular recommendations provide a guide for a music education by which students may become not only deeply interested in music, but also capable of making musical engagement a meaningful part of their lives. Both scholars philosophical efforts warrant enthusiastic applause, not only for the power of their ideas, but also because they are now motivating other scholars and teachers to reflect seriously on the reasons for their instructional choices. To conclude, I want to consider one more point of commonality in Elliott s and Regelski s praxial strategies (as Alperson might call them), that concerns their suitability for the practice of music education in the public schools of pluralistic, democratically governed nations (such as the U.S. and Canada). Both of these scholars have gone to great lengths to challenge on various bases the aesthetic philosophy they believe to be tacitly held at present by many if not most music educators in the United States and Canada. Regelski has studied the ideas of the ancient Greeks (especially Aristotle), the writings of Enlightenment philosophers (including Baumgarten, Kant, and others), and the strategies of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory (including Jurgen Habermas and others) in order to expose the roots of the aesthetic philosophy in his writings, and to argue (as noted previously) that the aesthetic paradigm of the fine Arts is predicated largely on a social ideology that is essentially at odds with... schooling as a social institution. 62 Elliott, on the other hand, has critically reviewed the writings and assertions of such aesthetic philosophers as James Mursell, Susanne Langer, and Bennett Reimer, and concluded that their philosophies of music education as aesthetic education are ill-founded, illogical, and not credible, owing to their focus on the object music as a form of art, their adherence to the notion of aesthetic experience as a highly questionable special realm of human experience, and an attendant reductive view of music education as the education of feeling. 63 Elliott s and Regelski s historical analyses are generally well-founded, and it would be difficult if not impossible to challenge their conclusions logically. Both of these scholars seek to replace the aesthetic philosophy as he has characterized it with the praxial view as each has conceptualized it. However, there is one aspect of the aesthetic philosophy (or, perhaps better, the ideology of the aesthetic ) that neither scholar has considered fully in his writings and that it would seem must be handled with the greatest of care in any praxial philosophy. Philosophy historian Terry Eagleton has noted that, historically speaking, the emergence of aesthetics as a branch of philosophy was attendant upon the marginalizing and commercializing of art (including mu-