1/10. Berkeley on Abstraction

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1 1/10 Berkeley on Abstraction In order to assess the account George Berkeley gives of abstraction we need to distinguish first, the types of abstraction he distinguishes, second, the ways distinct abstract ideas are formed according to him, third, in what sense he admits abstract ideas to be alright (his positive account of abstraction) and, then, fourthly, what his negative account of abstraction consists in or what it is that he is criticising when he attacks abstraction. Subsequent to the fourth point we will then be faced with our fifth question, namely, whether Berkeley has correctly understood Locke s account. Berkeley first starts to describe and distinguish types of abstract ideas in paragraph seven of the introduction to the Principles where he describes qualities or modes of things and says that we are told by those who uphold abstract ideas that the mind is able to consider each quality singly, or abstracted from those other qualities with which it is united. So here we are looking at specific ideas in the sense that they are ideas of specific, single qualities and not of combinations. The abstraction here is that whilst these qualities cannot exist separately from each other that, it is alleged, the ideas of these specific qualities can be presented to the mind distinct from each other. Thomas Reid, a later philosopher who was critical of Berkeley, is nonetheless helpful here in helping us to see this kind of abstraction as what Reid terms abstraction strictly so called. This first form of abstraction needs to be seen as something quite different from the second kind. The second kind is described in paragraph

2 2/10 eight where Berkeley discusses a most abstract idea, namely, that of extension. In this case Berkeley speaks of the mind having observed that in the particular extensions perceived by sense, there is something common and alike in all. Having noted this the mind considers apart or singles out by itself that which is common and arrives by this means at the most abstract idea. The difference here is that extension has not just been considered separated from qualities of other kinds with which it always appears but that it has also been considered distinct from specific or determinate qualities of its own sort. In other words, we don t here consider a specific extension in order to focus on extension, we rather move away even from such specificity. This is why this idea is most abstract or as Kenneth Winkler puts this, doubly abstract. Thomas Reid distinguished this form of abstraction from the first one by describing it as generalizing. Commentators generally agree on distinguishing these first two types of abstract ideas in Berkeley s account. Where there is some disagreement concerning the types of abstract ideas Berkeley lists concerns whether there are any others than these two. In paragraph nine it certainly appears that Berkeley introduces a third type when he speaks about abstract ideas of the more compounded beings, which include several coexistent qualities. Here Berkeley focuses on bodies rather qualities or, at any rate, on complex combinations of qualities. The example given here is like the second kind of abstract idea in that it involves recognition of common agreements of shape and other qualities. Berkeley talks here about how we arrive at the idea of humanity by considering the comparison

3 3/10 of Peter, James and John which requires leaving out that which is particular to each one of them and retaining only what is common to all so that we arrive at the abstract idea. This is often treated as a distinct kind of abstract idea and it is different from the second sort in the sense that it concerns compound beings but the abstract ideas of such beings seem to be arrived at in much the same way as the idea of extension was, by generalizing. There is, finally, a separate kind of abstract idea that is treated by Berkeley in some places in the Principles though not in its introduction. This involves such notions as being, existence and essence. The point about these is that they are specifically important for philosophers but generally not considered distinct or as involving anything specific by most people and Berkeley s argument against them is part of a general appeal for making philosophy attend to the data of common experience. In referring to them now it is only worth stating that these ideas seem to involve a kind of triple abstraction thus going further than the second kind of idea. Having looked at the evidence then it appears that Berkeley is, at least in the introduction, concerned principally with two kinds of abstract ideas and this is what he claims in paragraph ten where he refers to two proper acceptations of abstraction and speaks of them in the following way: I deny that I can abstract one from another, or conceive separately, those qualities which it is impossible should exist so separated; or that I can frame a general notion by abstracting from particulars in the manner aforesaid. Here we see that he distinguishes between an abstract idea that is separated from other ideas with which we always find it connected and one

4 4/10 that is general and emerges by abstracting from particulars, thus assimilating the means by which we arrive at the idea of humanity to that by which we arrive at extension. Finally, to the ideas arrived at by generalisation Berkeley frequently attaches the name abstract general idea which helps distinguish them from the abstract idea of the first type. Having distinguished between the types of abstract ideas let s now consider Berkeley s account of how these ideas are said to be formed. In the paragraph seven discussion of the first kind of abstract idea Berkeley talks about the mind considering each quality singly and this suggests that what we do is give our attention to a specific quality. However this conception is distinct from one to which Berkeley refers at the end of paragraph seven where he speaks of the mind framing to itself by abstraction the idea of colour exclusive of extension (emphasis added) as this involves an active process of separation of one idea from the other. Since both these models of formation of abstract ideas are discussed in connection with the determinate abstract ideas it would seem that these are understood by Berkeley to be alleged to be formed either of these two ways. By contrast, the abstract ideas that involve generalization, are only presented by him in terms of the separation model. Now, before we turn to the problems that Berkeley argues apply to the two different models of abstract ideas we should first consider what about abstraction he takes to be perfectly acceptable and non-problematic as this will give us his positive account of abstraction. This account is stated in paragraph sixteen of the introduction where Berkeley replies to the

5 5/10 objection how we can know an proposition to be true of all particular triangles unless we have seen it demonstrated of an abstract general idea of a triangle. This abstract general idea (introduced by Locke and to which we will return later) is dismissed by Berkeley and plainly is an example of the second kind of abstract idea though it also has some particularly strange features we will look at later. In this paragraph Berkeley defends the view that we can arrive at general truths without needing abstract general ideas of the sort he objects to and in the process helps us to see what scope he does allow to abstraction. On Berkeley s account the way we arrive at the general truths about triangles is by only selectively considering the particular triangle we are faced with so that any specific feature of this triangle is not considered in the demonstration. So Berkeley writes: it must be acknowledged that a man may consider a figure merely as triangular, without attending to the particular qualities of the angles, or relations of the sides. So far may he abstract (emphasis added). Not only does Berkeley admit this as a legitimate process but he adds that we can also consider Peter just as a human being or just as an animal in as much as all that is perceived is not considered. Since this selective process of attending is apparently something that can legitimately however and one of the processes by which the abstract ideas that Berkeley is objecting to was also in terms of attention being specifically applied to qualities then one wonders what it is about the latter process that has gone wrong for Berkeley? At this point then we can now turn to Berkeley s criticism of abstraction, a criticism that, it becomes clear when we arrive at

6 6/10 the discussion of the general idea of the triangle is thought of by him as indicating a serious difficulty with Locke s view of abstraction. If we look now at paragraph ten of the introduction we will find there that Berkeley describes here the difference he takes there to be between an abstraction we can legitimately perform from one we cannot when he writes: I own myself able to abstract in one sense, as when I consider some particular parts or qualities separated from others, with which though they are united in some object, yet, it is possible they may really exist without them. But I deny that I can abstract one from another, or conceive separately, those qualities which it is impossible should exist so separated; or that I can frame a general notion by abstracting from particulars in the manner aforesaid. Here Berkeley distinguishes between two forms of abstraction and the one that he attacks is also termed by him the proper acceptation of abstraction. In the first case that treats of particular parts or qualities Berkeley presents the illegitimate process as one by which qualities that cannot possibly be separated from each other being presented as conceivable separately from each other. In presenting this as illegitimate he attacks both ways in which such an abstract idea could be formed, whether by selective attention ( abstract one from another ) or separation ( conceive separately ). This is an illegitimate process whereas it is quite legitimate to consider some qualities distinguishable from each other if they really could exist separately from each other. The allowance that he has given is best thought of in terms of the contributions of distinct senses. So flowers can exist without having their

7 7/10 characteristic smells for example so there is nothing problematic about abstracting in this sense the smell from the flower. But if we separate colour, for example, from a surface then we distinguish things from each other which are incapable of being presented in such a distinct way (at any event the colour cannot be without the surface even if the surface can be transparent and thus apparently without colour). If we attempt to present colour separately from surface the idea we arrive at will be lacking something that is essential to it so that it will be intrinsically incomplete as well as descriptive of something impossible. Earlier I suggested that the first kind of abstract ideas concerned determinate particulars but when we consider the notion of colour we can see that the discussion of the impossibility of separating qualities in conception that cannot be distinctly given in reality concerns types as much as tokens. That is, colour is in general not distinct from surface just as redness is not or a given specific shade of red. None of these three can be presented separately from surface although they are different in that only the specific shade is a determinate particular, with redness being a species and colour a genus. There is a difference between them in the sense that a specific shade of red appears in a specific setting and may well not be apparent without that setting. When we pass to redness then clearly this does not attach to any given setting or any given surface but is attached to surface as such as is colour. This explains Berkeley s reasons for thinking that we cannot respond to qualities by abstraction in the sense of separation but we have yet to consider why he also thinks that qualities are not able to be selectively attended to.

8 8/10 If we are considering particulars the case is not much different with selective attention to what it was with regard to separation since the particular perception would still be of properties that have to belong together. With types there is a distinction between the type of surface and the type of colour so that one can be distinguished from the other but, again, even selective attention doesn t enable the formation of an idea of the colour that is distinguishable as such from surfaceness. In looking at Berkeley s view of the first type of abstract ideas we have effectively had to use reference to the second kind of abstract ideas and then we have to account again for how Berkeley thinks he can use them legitimately and what is an illegitimate use of them. Berkeley now explicitly turns to Locke and begins citing the Essay including the view that abstract ideas have something to do with language. The first correction Berkeley explicitly makes of Locke is to deny that words are signs of abstract general ideas stating that they are instead signs of several particular ideas, any one of which is indifferently suggested to the mind (para. 11). So, in explaining how we can state such propositions as whatever has extension is divisible Berkeley argues that we are not here attending to abstract general ideas but only selectively attending to extension without taking account of any specific form of it. This point is followed up in paragraph twelve by the claim that an idea becomes general by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort. This in itself is allowed if we bear in mind that this is what has been done, namely that an idea has

9 9/10 become a representative of others to which it is related but not that it has become a new kind of idea such as an abstract general idea would be. It is at this point that the problem with abstract general ideas gets formulated by means of reference to Locke s notion of a general triangle. There are two problems with Locke s description as understood by Berkeley. Firstly, the conception of the general triangle is in itself inconsistent as Locke describes it as involving all and none at once of the qualities of all the specific triangles it is supposed to represent. Secondly, it implies, contrary to Locke s general assertion that all that exists is particular, that there is something, called triangularity, that exists, at least for thought, separately from all the particulars it is representative of. However, the second problem only applies to Locke s account of the general idea of the triangle if Locke does not himself hold to a form of the selective attention view of this triangle as if he does hold to this view then there appears to be a problem with Berkeley s criticism. Furthermore, Locke does refer to such processes of selective attention as when he describes arriving at the idea of whiteness by generalizing from the specific instances of the colour shades and then arriving at the general idea by selectively attending to what is similar in each case. It is true that Locke sometimes also speaks of separation as a basis by which abstraction works but he could nonetheless appeal against Berkeley to selective attention as the means by which the general idea is formulated. The charge of inconsistency with regard to the abstract general idea is more difficult and is the real point of Berkeley s case. It is true that Locke

10 10/10 describes the general idea of a triangle as containing all and none of the particular ideas of particular triangles but this can be given a sense that is not logically inconsistent. The determinations of none of the specific triangles are included in the idea due to the selective attention that is at work in forming the idea and yet it applies to all the triangles that have these determinations. When Locke describes the abstract general idea as imperfect and not something that exists, by contrast, it is plausible that he means that it is an incomplete or partial idea which cannot exist in reality. It does not follow from this the idea does not describe a kind of intentional object. On these grounds then it is not clear that Berkeley s attack on the general idea of a triangle really succeeds.

1/9. Descartes on Simple Ideas (2)

1/9. Descartes on Simple Ideas (2) 1/9 Descartes on Simple Ideas (2) Last time we began looking at Descartes Rules for the Direction of the Mind and found in the first set of rules a description of a key contrast between intuition and deduction.