PLATO ON JUSTICE AND POWER

PLATO ON JUSTICE AND POWER

By the same author ART AND REALITY: John Anderson on Literature and Aesthetics janet Anderson and Graham Cullum) (editor with

Plato on Justice and Power Reading Book I of Plato's Republic Kimon Lycos Senior Lecturer, Department of Philosophy Australian National University

Kimon Lycos 1987 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1987 978-0-333-40663-2 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be repr6duced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 9HE. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. First published 1987 by THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 2XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world ISBN 978-1-349-08487-6 ISBN 978-1-349-08485-2 (ebook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-08485-2 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Reprinted 1993

To the memory of Mari Kuttna and John Lycos

Contents Preface I Introduction: 'T uming the Soul Around' viii I PART ONE: DRAMA TIC CHARACTERISATION 2 Old Recipes about Justice 3 Thrasymachus on Justice and Power 4 The Function of 'Thrasymachus' in Plato's Text 2I 40 54 PART TWO: THE ARGUMENT 5 Defining Justice 6 Limits on the Just 7 Power, Skill and Ruling 8 Excellence and the Motivational Structure of the Just 9 Socrates Sketches the 'Power' of Justice 10 Conclusion: the Socratic Vision Notes and References Bibliography Index 73 93 106 120 137 I 54 I75 I94 I98

Preface The idea for this book would not have occurred to me if I had not been confronted over a number of years with generations of puzzled, resisting, and, even, irritated students. Though these were not the only responses to being introduced to Plato's Republic, they were the most fruitful for me. For the probing criticisms and imaginative suggestions of such students I am deeply grateful. They made me realise that though the basic ideas in the Republic are clear enough, what a modern audience finds somewhat difficult to grasp is the intellectual motivation underlying the perspective on justice that inspires the work. It gradually dawned on me that the best way of making this clear was through a particular way of reading Book l-one which sought to bring forth its positive force as a philosophical intervention in the socio-political climate of Plato's time. Existing commentaries on the Republic, though sound and sometimes outstanding, read Book I as consisting of a set of negative arguments against existing views of justice, thus emphasising the argumentative aspect of Socrates' philosophising. These arguments are often found to be implausible and inconclusive. As a consequence the deeper, reflective, aspects of Socrates' philosophising remain unexposed, especially to students. The task. I thought. was to try to remedy this, hoping to achieve two interconnected objectives: to render intelligible and plausible the reasons why Socrates and Plato were critical of the state of thinking about justice in their culture; and to introduce a style of reading Plato's text that elicited the value and import of the questions it led to, rather than assessing the merit of the theories found in it. This method of reading could, of course, have been applied to the whole of the Republic, as well as to other dialogues. My decision to confine myself to Book I was dictated by the idea that, being a record of how Plato chose to introduce his major thought on justice, it would contain traces of what enlivened that thought as a reflective response to features of his own culture. My hope, in concentrating on that Book, was to revive in contemporary readers a sense of how relevant to our present situation is that type of response. I was concerned to make manifest the type of thinking and attitude that led to Socratic questioning; I was less concerned with Plato's positive theory of justice which, in any case, has been the subject of much excellent comment in recent times. My considerable intellectual debt to such comment, in particular to that of Irwin, Annas and White, will be evident to all those who consult the notes. I am also grateful for the comments and criticisms of all those colleagues, in Australia and elsewhere, who heard different versions of some of the chapters and who viii

Preface ix forced me to reconsider my views. A great debt of gratitude is also due to anonymous readers whose meticulous suggestions about many aspects of the book I wish I had been better able to follow. I owe a very special debt to my colleague Dr Genevieve Lloyd who kindly read the first draft of the book and who made comments which have been invaluable; without her encouragement I doubt whether I would have completed the work. Finally, my warmest thanks go to Jean Ryan for the enormous patience and understanding with which she approached the daunting task of converting my scribble into clear typing, and to Catriona MacKenzie and Petra Gilfedder for invaluable assistance with proof-reading and general help with the book. K.L.