CHAPTER VIII UNDERSTANDING HERMENEUTICS IN NATURAL SCIENCE In inquiry into what constitutes interpretation in natural science will have to reflect on the constitutive elements of interpretation and three approaches to hermeneutics. It is observed that the classical hermeneutics was essentially objectivist. Notwithstanding the individual thinkers' inclination away from the natural sciences, and their denial of 'unity of method' between natural and social sciences, hermeneutics retained the autonomy of the object and the interpreter and the possibility of historical objectivity in making valid interpretations. CI With Schleipacher, hermeneutics was no longer restricted to textual analysis but became general hermeneutics. He defined his aim as the framing of a general hermeneutics as the art of understanding. And understanding for him involves experiencing of the author's mental process. Even explanation falls outside the domain of hermeneutics. To understand what is spoken is different from formulating something and bringing it to speech. This difference between speaking and understanding paved the way to a systematic basis for hermeneutics in the theory of understanding. The distinction between grammatical and psychological interpretatr tion is of great significance in SchltiAnacher' s works. He points out that since all texts are in language, grammar can be used to know the meaning of a sentence. The meaning that we seek is the result of the interaction between the grammatical structure and the general idea. The grammatical interpretation, for him, proceeds by locating the assertion according to objective and general laws. It is this commitment that makes.er Schleimacher's 'hermeneutics' objectivist.
Dilthey, though influenced by Schleirmacher, extended his scope of hermeneutics. His aim was to gain objectively-valid knowledge. Though Dilthey opposed the tendency of the Social sciences to borrow norms and ways of thinking from natural sciences, the objective influences of natural sciences can be seen in his ideas. While criticizing the tendency of the social or human sciences to use the natural science methodology, he engages himself in the task of having a methodology for gaining objectively valid interpretations of human life. The relatively unchanging nature of object enhanced the possibility of objectively valid knowledge. Dilthey was unable to rise above the objectivity and Cl A r: '1 1/4.) scienticism and falls into the familiar subject-object distinction of natural sciences. His goal of gaining objectively valid knowledge itself reflects, the scientific ideals totally opposed to the historicality of our selfunderstanding. Emilio Betti aimed at defending objectivity in social sciences, when he tried to formulate a general theory of how ' objectivations ' of human experience could be interpreted. He argued that one can gain objectivity of interpretation by separating the meaning of the phenomenon from its significance to the interpreter. Betti' s insistence on objectivity in historical interpretation does not mean that he neglected the subject of interpretation, but he merely brought to our notice that inspite of the subjective element in interpretation, the object still remains an object and can be interpreted objectively. This obsession of hermeneutical theory in keeping away the subjective element from interpretation stressed the idea of return to objectivity. A historian, in studying history should leave behind his own present standpoint. Hermeneutics, according to hermeneutical theory
-1 0 ' should supply the principles of objective knowledge. This hope of hermeneutical theory to find a basis for the scientific investigation of meaning is what hermeneutical philosophy rejects as objectivism. Hermeneutic philosophy expressed the other extreme view point from that of hermeneutic theory. It did not aim at objectivity but instead asserted that the subject has a preunderstanding of the object to be interpreted. This makes it important to start with a mental framework of the subject's mind. Hermeneutic philosophy concerned itself with the interpretation of Dasein. They wanted to remove objectifying procedures from hermeneutic. The attempt of the hermeneutic theory to give objectively valid interpretation is naive. The concern of the hermeneutic philosophy with the interpretation of Dasein brought about the transition from objective interpretation to subjective interpretation. Bultmann, Heidegger, Gadamer fall under this category. Following Heidegger, Bultmann tried to carry out a deepening of Dasein's methodological analysis. He concerned himself with the dialectic problem between the existential understanding of the interpreter and the mythological language in which the Kerygma found expression in the New Testament. What the holy texts want to convey lies hidden in its existential appeal. This existential core of the text needs to be explicated. The mahner in which we interpret the text depends on our interest and our preunderstanding. The idea of objective meaning which plagued hermeneutic theory is an impossibility because meaning can arise only in the interpreter's relationship to the future and also because history can be known through the historian's subjectivity.
2, A 7 Gadamer, in an allempl lo eliminate objectifying procedures from hermeneutics stressed the impossibility of objectively-valid interpretations. For, to have objectively-valid interpretation it would mean that one can understand history from some standpoint outside history. This, according to Gadamer is an impossibility since we always exist within traditions and this is no objectifying process. The, tradition here is not viewed as something other but as a part of us. Gadamer argues that the Historical, attitude therefore, is not restoration of the past but 'thoughtful mediation' with contemporary life. This mediation is brought about by 'fusion of horizons'. Hermeneutics in Gadamer, takes a language philosophical turn. Understanding in the end, rests on language itself. Language brings about a fusion of horizons of the interpreter and the historical object, which characterizes the act of understanding. Gadamer argues for the universality of hermeneutic experience which helped him to overcome dogmatic metaphysics and scientistic restriction on knowledge. These exponents of hermeneutical philosophies lacked the 'completeness' as they failed to answer many questions about the existential, historical and cultural embedding of their language and communication. Critical hermeneutics of Apel and Habermas had to retrieve something of this classical hermeneutics and combine the methodical and objective approach to arrive at practically relevant knowledge. They challenged the idealist assumption of hermeneutic philosophy and theory and the unjustifiable claim to universality put forward by the hermeneutic philosophy. While hermeneutic philosophy and hermeneutic theory placed conflicting emphasis on the role of the interpreter, they joined hands on one dimension, namely the questioning of the content of the object of interpretation. Any reflection on. the truth of the text was
(.1 b excluded as falling outside the concerns of an epistemology and methodology of the understanding process. This brought about incomplete understanding of understanding. Apel and Habermas as the exponents of critical hermeneutics aimed to arrive at practically relevant knowledge. ' Apel acts as a synthesizer of the two earlier positions. While accepting a common ground for natural and human sciences, he refused to reduce it to the idea of unified science. While recognizing the autonomous and nonreductive character of social sciences he did not neglect the scientific attitude of the natural sciences. These two attitudes according to him are complementary to one another. Interpretation in human sciences is not to be restricted to a mere mediation between past and present, but is a process which produces knowledge. Natural as well as social sciences according to Apel have their roots in the inter-subjective sphere of a given speech-community as their. common apiori. Better understanding of these sciences can be achieved in tr--- free society which permits open discussion. Our understanding of the texts allows us to critically evaluate them and transcend the truths contained in them because we are in possession of the idea of a more truthful way of life. Habermas, like Apel, aims at relating the interpretative and explanatory approaches. The positivists reduce history to a static present and to mere empirical facts. He, therefore, tried to mediate the objectivity of historical process with the motives of those acting within it. In order to get rid of the objectivism in scientistic approaches to the social world, he introduced hermeneutical thought into the methodology of the social sciences. Through a synthesis of hermeneutic philosophy and
q ri p!.-,ychoanalysis, Ilabermas arrives al an outline of a dialectical-hermeneutical theory of action. Psychoanalysis provides a model which allows us to transcend the communicative consensus metahermeneutically. The critical philosophy of Apel and Habermas thus attempts an appraisal of "existing states of affairs that derive from the knowledge of something better than already exists as a potential or a tendency in the present; it is guided by the principle of reason as the demand for unrestricted communication and self-determination". 1 In tracing the contemporary hermeneutics, three different, mutually incompatible strands rose to the surface, namely hermeneutical theory,. - which tried to solve the problem of objectively understood meaning; hermeneutic philosophy which tried to get rid of objective elements in social sciences; and critical philosophy which seeks out the causes of distorted understanding and communication which operate underneath normal interaction. They tried to combine the objective and methodical approaches to arrive at practically relevant knowledge. Paul Ricoeurs' work, vvhile not representing a clearly separate idea, brings into sharp relief the three strands, and attempts to integrate them into a larger framework. While acting as a mediator, he outlines the role of the structuralist analysis of a system of signs in relation to the hermeneutical interpretation of a text. While pointing out the divergent approaches to interpretation of symbols, Ricoeur felt the impossibility of forming universal canons of interpretation. We can have, according to Ricoeur therefore only separate theories regarding the rules of interpretations. His theory of interpretation does not restrict itself to text but is also applicable to actions,
which helped him to overcome the 'understanding-explanation' dichotomy. An inquiry into the possibility of hermeneutical interpretation in the natural sciences was taken seriously after Kuhn's analysis of history of science. Kuhn's notion of 'paradigm' became central to the interpretative analysis of philosophers of science to such an extent that 'laissezfaire' interpretations became the order of the day. Science lost its 'preciseness', 'objectivity', 'neutrality', 'progress', 'continuity', etc. The excessive historicist conception of science formualted by Kuhn is based upon his notion of 'paradigm', which, paradoxically lacked precise conceptual articulation. Margaret Masterman 2 observed the term 'paradigm' being used in 21 different senses. These senses ranged from paradigm being a 'myth' to 'a universally recognized scientific achievement'. Masterman recognized three different sets of 'paradigm' uses: the metaphysical, the sociological and the artifact or construct paradigm. William J. Gavin 3 notices certain relations between the three sets or clusters and these relations can be best understood from phenomenological rather than analytic perspective. Gavin quotes Kuhn to show that he unconsciously practiced hermeneutics: "What I, as a physicist had to discover for myself, most historians learn by example in the course of professional training. Consciously, or not, they are all practitioners of the hermeneutic method. In my case, however, the discovery of hermeneutics did more than make history seem consequential. Its most immediate and decisive effect was, instead, on my views of science". 4 What type of hermeneutics Kuhn practiced is as unclear as his notion of paradigm. However much he tried to be historicist and consequently anti-positivist, Kuhn could not account. for the growth of scientific knowledge. In other words, Kuhn was caught "in the idio m of
positivism and logical empiricism that he sought to criticize and replace". 5 If one wants to appreciate the ' hermeneutical dimension' of natural science, one has to reflect on the fact that the contents of perception and scientific observation are never unique, final, and absolute, and apart from the history and particular social and cultural milieu. Again', different models or paradigms of methods result in distinguishably different interpretations of the same physical phenomena. For example, light at one instance is interpreted as wave motion and at another instance as constituting of particles. Hermeneutics, therefore enters natural science through perception (observation) and through the study of literary, graphic and mathematical materials - which is the corpus of science. Patrick Heelan puts this idea more lucidly when he says that "visual perception - and by analogy, all perception - is hermeneutical as well as causal: it responds to structures in the flow of optical energy but the character of its response is hermeneutical, that it has the capacity to 'read' the appropriate optical structure in the World ( ' texts' ), and to form perceptual judgements of the World about which these 'speak' ". 6 Two points need consideration at this stage. One, if hermeneutics enters into all perception, how are we to avoid the cross subjectivism and 'laissez-faire' interpretation that follows from it? Secondly, how do we retrieve the objectivist hermeneutics useful for the scientific community as a whole? It may be noted that Patrick Heelan and other philosophers of science adopt a Kantian framework in accepting perceptual judgements as both hermeneutical and causal. Secondly, they argue for the thesis that hermeneutical interpretation (i.e. 'reading', 'writing', 'speaking' ) of texts "by nature share a common hermeneutical structure with reading and interpreting the linguistic artifacts of human authors; that to use such
v.., rj expressions about perception and scientific observation is not to indulge in a mere metaphor but to probe into the common primordial hermeneutical structure of all human understanding, an understanding which subtends both linguistic, perceptual, and scientific activity". 7 Traditionally, natural sciences were viewed as non-hermeneutical. This was deemed to be the distinguishing mark between natural and social sciences. That natural sciences are also hermeneutical is of recent origin, partly due to Kuhn's historicist concerns and partly due to the fact that considerably different accounts of nature have arisen at diverse times, places and circumstances. A scientific realism, a la Popper, is seen as too difficult to sustain and defend. Different types of realist theories (as seen in Chapter VI and VII) have been proposed. Patrick Heelan, however, attempts to retrieve the realist elements of scientific enterprise within the context of hermeneutics in a form of hermeneutical or horizonal realism. Patrick Heelan' s 'horizonal realism' consists in showing that 'things in themselves' "come to be understood, recognized and named, not just through a hermeneutic of the literary, graphic and mathematical materials of a scientific theory... but through 'reading' of text-like materials", 8 ( ' text' which is The Book of Nature 9 )... "the pages on which Nature 'writes' its 'text' ", according to Heelan "is a scientific-instrument used as a readable technology". 10 Our concern in this Chapter is not to analyse the varied hermeneutical interpretations of science. What we have argued here is that hermeneutics enters science in a very crucial manner. But the existence of alternate and valid ways of interpteting the natural world does not
diminish or compromise the results of scientific research. As J.A. Mazzeo puts it: "The quantum physicist may use matrix algebra and wave mechanical formulations with relative indifference, since both formulations are isomorphic and both permit him to interpret physical data. The fact that an electron may be viewed as a charged particle, or a charged cloud, or even as the area under a curve, that it may be imagined as "solid" point or a "disturbance" spreading out in a region of space, simply means that the scientist has moved a little closer to the exegete confronted with a plurality of valid interpretations of his text". 11 The Book of Nature requires interpretation because its functions are hidden, and what we 'see' is not necessarily 'what is going on'. NOTF,S 1. Joseph Bleicher, 'Contemporary Hermeneutics' (London: Routledge and Kegan paul, 1980), p.4. 2. Margaret Masterman, "The Nature of Paradigm" Criticism and the growth of knowledge; ed. I. Lakatos and A. Musgrane, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 61. 3. William J. Gavin, "Science As Interpretation: The Hermeneutic Inter-Relationship of Masterman's 'Paradigm Clusters", Contemporary Philosophy, XI, 3, 1986, p.2. 4. Ibid, 5. R. Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1976), p. 52. 6. Patrick Heelan, "Natural Science As A Hermeneutic Of Instrumentation", Philosophy of Science, 50, 2, '1983, pp. 181-182.
r 7. Ibid,. 182. 8. Ibid,. 188. 9. 'Science as the reading of "The Book of Nature" ' is an old concept which Patrick Heelan revives but with a difference. For Augustine, Galileo and Spinoza 'The Book of Nature' is written in final and complete form by God. For P. Heelan, "The 'text' which science 'reads' is an artifact of scientific culture, caused to be 'written' by Nature on human instruments within the controlled context of a scientific environment". (Ibid. p. 188). 10. Ibid. 11. Jos,Dh Anthony Mazzeo, 'Varieties of Interpretation' (NotreDame: University of NotreDame Press, 1978); p. 2.