Issue 5, Summer 2018 Published by the Durham University Undergraduate Philosophy Society
Is there any successful definition of art? Sophie Timmins (University of Nottingham) Introduction In order to define art there must be some set of conditions that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient; however, I will argue that it is impossible to limit art to these conditions. I will ultimately endeavour to show why attempts to define art are misguided. I will first briefly outline two popular definitional approaches, before explaining why I believe attempts to define art are futile. To set out my argument, I will draw on the work of three key philosophers, Wittgenstein, Weiz and Gaut, as I present three key sections: I will explain my general scepticism about definitions, then I will consider the case for creativity and open concepts, and thirdly I will discuss the argument from induction. Finally, I will conclude that it s impossible to understand art in terms of a traditional definition and hence there cannot be a successful definition of art. 1 Defining art The traditional approach, which I will ultimately reject, seeks to define art. According to Abell (2012) these definitions fall under two main categories: functionalist theories and procedural approaches. Functionalist theories suggest that something is art if, and only if, it has some specific function. For example, Zangwill (2002) suggests that the point of art is to have an aesthetic function. Conversely, procedural approaches claim that artworks can be defined in relation to procedures or practices, such as Dickie s institutional account (1969) that: x is art if, and only if, the members of the institution of art are prepared to accept x as art. However, both definitional approaches face criticism because they fail to fully capture the concept art : for example, many avant-garde works seem to have no apparent function. Equally, whilst Dickie s definition accounts for avant-garde works, institutional definitions are often criticised for being circular as they appeal to art in relation to the institution of arts but fail to independently define this institution. However, the purpose of my essay is not to individually assess the various versions of definition. Rather, my aim is to answer the question of why definitional accounts constantly fail, by demonstrating that art is an indefinable term. Some philosophers have expressed general scepticism over the utility of definitions altogether. This is because previous attempts to define philosophical terms have been inconclusive. For example, philosophers frequently face challenges when considering how we might define knowledge, as traditional definitions are unable to overcome the counterexamples posed by Gettier cases (see Zagzebski, 1994). Therefore, we might consider that the project of defining such concepts is misguided. Wittgenstein s approach (1953) indicates that this scepticism may be justified. Using the analogy of games he displays how we observe similarities appearing and disappearing when we look from one type of game to another, but that we cannot pinpoint a common element to all these different games and hence are unable to reach a definition. The similarities that emerge are no more than a complex link of relations or family resemblances (Wittgenstein, 1935: 32). As with games, so we can apply this idea to art. We can spot resemblances between different artworks and so they interlink in some intricate chain of similarities, however, we cannot identify any exact characteristics that are intrinsic to all artwork. Hence, we cannot depict any necessary or sufficient conditions of art. 2 Open Concepts Another reason some philosophers express scepticism in this area is because it seems counterintuitive to bind art to a formal definition. Restricting art to necessary and sufficient conditions would limit 20
the concept s essential creative potential. Moreover, artists, by nature, aim to push the boundaries of traditional art and challenge these preconceptions to create unique, original pieces. Therefore, even if we were to locate some definition, it would hold true only until the next artist thinks outside the box and creates a counterexample. If nothing else, having a definition that is constantly changing is impractical and seems to undermine the purpose of having a definition at all. Weitz (1956) draws the parallels between the task of defining art and Wittgenstein s family resemblance theory since he sees no common property of artworks. He argues that definitions fail because they are based on a fundamental misconception of art; it does not make sense to ask: What is art? Rather, we should consider what type of concept art is. Weitz argued that closed concepts are either logical or mathematical. Hence, we are consequently unable to pinpoint a definition of art because it is a creative medium, and thus remains an open concept (1956: 30). One interpretation of Weitz s argument follows: (P1) If art is an open concept then it is possible to imagine a situation in which the concept art would need to be extended to cover the new case. (P2) It is possible to imagine such cases (e.g. avant-garde works). (C) Art is an open concept. This argument is sound and seems useful since it accounts for the plurality of art forms and supports the idea that an artist s creativity cannot be bound by definition. Davies (1991), however, remains unconvinced by Weitz. He criticises the open-concept-argument by questioning how these concepts can be instantiated in the real world. He postulates that open concepts are vague and seemingly have no limits, thus posing an epistemic problem. He also claims that the resemblance argument is ineffective since we might claim anything resembles any other thing in some way. The worry is that without limits, concepts may merge into one another, and this does seem problematic for our knowledge, understanding and clarification of the world. However, instead of wholly rejecting Weitz argument, I suggest refining the way in which we understand the idea of an open concept. Everyone apparently holds some concept of art, and there are things we individually distinguish as art or non-art, even if we cannot identify the exact boundaries of this distinction. There are nevertheless things that I would definitely consider to be art, for example, if I see someone drawing a lifelike picture of an apple I consider this to be art, yet this is not a necessary feature of art. Therefore, I might claim that while there are no necessary conditions, we can have innumerable sufficient conditions of art, but that these conditions will vary on the grounds of subjectivity and creativity. While our concept of art may still be vague, we are able to avoid confusion because individually, people are certain of what they believe to be art, even if their idea differs from someone else s. Hick (1968) also draws on Wittgenstein s ideas in his argument for religious language. However, I think his argument may well be applicable to our understanding of art. He claims that we do not just experience things, but rather we experience them as something (1968: 22). Thus, all experience involves interpretation. From this idea, it is impossible to determine any single definition of art since, given the subjective nature of the concept, we will all experience and interpret it differently. So, all we are truly able to do is sort the ideas, words and concepts, to convey what we experience. Some philosophers, however, suggest a need to combat this idea of open-endedness by appealing to definitions, such as relational theories like Davies institutional account (1991). However, Kaufman (2007) claims that relationalism offers no less of a solution to the problem of open-endedness since we cannot predict what kinds of relationships artwork will have to human institutions in the future. Moreover, I would argue that it is better to accept some vagueness associated with open concepts than accept a definition that wholly misunderstands the concept of art. 21
Kaufman also draws on the work of Putnam. Putnam (1970) divides the meaning of words into (i) the stereotype of a particular term, and (ii) the extension connected with it. Looking at natural-kind terms, he concludes that a list of concepts associated with such terms offers neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for determining extension. We find no sufficient conditions since any list of observable characteristics might pick out more than one natural-kind, while there are no necessary conditions, as we might find counterexamples that defy our definition (e.g. black swans) but also because we cannot be certain the world will stay the same for example, it s possible that we wake up tomorrow to find all lemons have become black and wrinkly. Kaufman applies Putnam s general ideas to art. He argues that, even if it were possible to close the concept, it would reveal little in terms of understanding what people mean when they use the word. Art is invariably subjective by nature; hence we are unable to capture its understanding in these terms. For example, take Damien Hirst s The Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone Living ; it is unclear what separates this from a museum exhibition of a shark in a tank. One is considered art, while the other is not; yet in terms of some descriptive traditional definition, it becomes hard to distinguish one from the other. 3 Cluster Accounts The move away from definitions calls for some other way of understanding the concept art. Gaut (2005), who also defends a Wittgensteinian family resemblance view of art, clearly rejects Weitz s ideas. Gaut does not think that art is indefinable on the basis of originality or creativity but, rather, he appeals to the objections of traditional definitions. He argues inductively that because previous attempts to define art have been unsuccessful, we might, therefore, turn to cluster accounts as an alternative. Gaut adduces ten specific conditions that attempt to distinguish art from non-art (2005: 274). He claims that: (i) None of the conditions are necessary, and (ii) It might be the case that they also aren t sufficient either. This clearly marks his move away from the traditional definitional approach. If something meets none of his conditions, he would not consider it an artwork, but similarly, something may meet a few of his conditions and either be an artwork or non-artwork. Gaut is not trying to prove the truth of cluster accounts, but rather that they are at least a possible option. Taken at face value, Gaut s account seems plausible and preferable to traditional definitions. However, Adajian (2003) raises the criticism that cluster accounts are, in practice, no better than definitions of art. Although I would not follow Adajian s approach to revert to definitions, I would agree that Gaut s case seems somewhat muddled. Within his account, there will be numerous inbetween cases that might or might not be considered artwork, and this vagueness comes from the fact that art is indefinable as a concept, not just because previous attempts at definitions have failed. Thus, in my opinion, Gaut has misunderstood the meaning of art as he tries to determine any level of necessary or sufficient conditions. It appears to me that philosophers have been mistaken in their pursuit to define art, as though under some pressure to prove that philosophy can provide knowledge, or through fear of facing the fallacy of equivocation. Here, I would like to clarify that in arguing that there is no successful definition of art, I do not mean to conclude that all language is indefinable, just that there are certain indefinable terms within our language. These indefinable terms still have value and meaning. For example, when we consider foreign words that are untranslatable and indefinable within our language, we do not mean to say that they are without meaning. Moreover, philosophers still struggle to identify the exact definition of 22
concrete terms like table, yet this struggle doesn t affect our use of the word in everyday life. The fact that we are unable to define art does not disturb its meaningfulness; art has undeniable intrinsic value, and the inability to restrict it to a definition should not affect the art world. Concluding Remarks Overall, the arguments I have discussed in my essay aim to show that there cannot be any successful definition of art. Art is a creative and subjective concept and thus cannot be bound by a definition in any traditional sense, as highlighted by Weitz open-concept argument. Although we may have to accept that art is a vague concept, this is preferable to accepting any form of definition, which will undoubtedly fail to communicate and capture what we individually mean to be art or non-art. Ultimately, therefore, I reach my conclusions; that there cannot be any successful definition of art, that attempts to define art are misguided, and that, subsequently, such attempts prevent any progression in the mission to understand the term art. 23
Bibliography Abell, C. (2012). Art: What it is and why it matters. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 85(3): 671-691. Blackwell Publishing. Adajian, T. (2004). On the Cluster Account of Art. The British Journal of Aesthetics, 44: 297-300. Oxford University Press. Davies, S. (1991). Weitz s Anti-Essentialism' in Definitions of Art: 4-21. Cornell University Press. Dickie, G. (1969). Defining Art. American Philosophical Quarterly, 6(3): 253-256. University of Illinois Press. Gaut, B. (2005). The Cluster Account of Art Defended. The British Journal of Aesthetics, 45(3): 273-288. Oxford University Press. Hick, J. (1968). Religious Faith as Experiencing. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, 2: 20-35. Cambridge University Press. Kaufman, D. A. (2007). Family Resemblances, Relationalism, and the Meaning of Art. The British Journal of Aesthetics, 47(3): 280-297. Putnam, H. (1970). Is Semantics Possible?. Metaphilosophy, 1(3): 187-201. Wiley-Blackwell. Weitz, M. (1956). The Role of Theory in Aesthetics. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 15: 27-35. Wiley-Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical Investigations. Anscombe, G.E.M. (trans.). Wiley-Blackwell. Zagzebski, L. (1994). The Inescapability of Gettier Problems. The Philosophical Quarterly, 44(124): 65-73. Oxford University Press. Zangwill, N. (2002). Are there counterexamples to aesthetic theories of art?. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 60(2): 111-118. Wiley-Blackwell. 24