Researching and rebuilding a Marxian education theory: Back to the drawing board Introduction This paper is based on the premise that the Marxist theories of education which have developed in English-speaking countries over the last twenty years have for various reasons lost their explanatory and transformative power and need radical rethinking and that a return to Hegelian and Marxian sources especially in regard to the dialectical method is the only way to rebuild it. This is a particularly urgent task in view of the need to explain the radical changes taking place towards the marketisation of education in the late twentieth century variant of commodity capitalism, and in the absence of any recent attempts to formulate a credible alternative explanatory theory which might inform transformative action. A first step towards formulating such a theory is to grasp the logic and dynamic principles of the dialectical method and to appreciate how it worked in the analyses of Hegel, and particularly of Marx. This is essential in equipping the researcher not only to evaluate critically current Marxist education theory, for instance, but also to develop a form of the dialectical method which best suits the object of her or his investigation. For it must be emphasised that the dialectical method is not the application of a predetermined formula based on a set of presuppositions from outside the area of study but one which follows the internal movement and change of the object of study itself. With this understanding the next step is to critique current Marxist educational theories to test their dialectical credentials. In question is their credibility in explaining the organic connection between education and the production process of capital accumulation especially in the form that process is adopting at the present time. In dialectical terms education and capitalist commodity production are two productive sides of the capitalist mode of production. If this relation is not central to Marxist education theories, then it can hardly be claimed that these theories are Marxist. This critical evaluation then clears the way for a recovery of an authentic Marxian critique of education as a positive force for change. The following exposition provides some signposts of what is involved in rebuilding a dialectical education theory based on Marx's foundational analysis of capital. It is, however, only a preliminary foray into this complex issue, an issue which is part of my doctoral thesis on teachers' work in Australian Catholic schools. In this regard I am indebted to Glenn Rikowski (1996; 1997) whose extensive research into and critique of current Marxist education theories has opened the way for the development of a truly authentic dialectical Marxist theory. The paper is divided into four parts: 1) the context in which the critique takes place; 2) A brief encounter with the dialectical principles underlying the work of Hegel and Marx; 3) an overview of the reasons for the weaknesses of contemporary Marxist education theories; and 4) a brief illustration how the dialectical method works in a study of Catholic schooling in Australia.
1. The context Capitalist education is primarily concerned with producing by various means a skilled and disciplined workforce. The pattern of education which has developed is the result of this immediate goal. The overarching goal which determines the purpose of education is the accumulation of capital which has its source in hired labour power. Education is, as it were, the process of adding value to students' capacity to work according to the needs of capital and the market. In contrast the dialectical view of education based on the dialectical principles drawn from Hegel is reflecting on and thus gaining knowledge of the nature of the productive activity and its outcome. This is in order to judge its degree of correspondence with the ultimate purpose of creating social arrangements which express the human nature and ensure the autonomy of all. In the light of this assessment adjustments can be made either to the immediate purpose of production or to the product in the next round of production. Hegel assigns this reflective activity to Spirit, the rational creative life force which underlies the creation of the things of the world, carried out through human beings. Marx assigns it to human beings in their purposive productive activity of fulfilling their needs and aspirations through the exercise of their labour power. It is the Marxist assessment that capitalism does not offer the conditions which express the true rational and creative nature of human beings and so must be superseded when collectively people come to this realisation. How then might a Marxist education theorist explain the current radical changes in education. It is my contention that these changes amount merely to education's transformation into edu-business, in the same way that agriculture was transformed into agribusiness some thirty or forty years ago. It constitutes in other words a phase in the attempt to safeguard the needs of capital. Schools are being reorganised for maximum efficiency and effectiveness at minimum cost along the lines of the feed lot production process. On this account the worth of students is only as good as the price their labour power will fetch on the commodity labour market. The outcome of the management of schools therefore becomes crucial so that the labour market may assess the worth of student graduates. It is not beyond the realm of fantasy to suppose that, if these trends in the restructuring of education continue without vehement opposition, we could see schools listed on the stock exchange! This in Marxian terms, and in religious terms as well, is a travesty of human creativity and of the authentic purposes of education. That the creative capacity of human beings is perverted and reified to the level of a commodity is in Marx's terms the cause for fervent and revolutionary protest. While stock exchange listing may appear incredible, its impending reality could be the catalyst which motivates Marxists towards developing an explanatory and effective educational theory that could inform and help students, parents and educators to amalgamate, agitate, attack and advance beyond the oppressive confines of what is becoming increasingly a totalising capitalistic education regime. Unlike agribusiness the threat of edu-business could possibly prove to be the proverbial straw that breaks the camel's back. In Marxist terms changing times always signals opportunity for informed and transformative activity. Is current Marxist education theory up to fulfilling this role? I think not, and to gauge why it is necessary to return to sources in the works of Hegel and Marx. 2. The nature of the dialectical method
Three questions dominate the Hegelian-Marxian project: 1) what is the nature of change; 2) what constitutes the mechanism of change, and 3) armed with this knowledge what is the role of human beings, as participant but nevertheless spectators or as proactive participants. It is on this third question that Hegel and Marx part company. The primary interest of Hegel, however, lay in identifying and conceptualising the moving principle underlying movement and change which is intrinsic to the nature of existence. Hegel was the first to enunciate this moving principle as the dialectic and attempt to track its course in the natural, historical and mental worlds while Marx attempted to track it in the specific phenomenon of capitalism. 1. The nature of change. Hegel and Marx and their like-minded contemporaries recognised that change in the natural, social and mental worlds is not a mechanical but rather an organic process. This means that change does not occur as a result of some external force or power but is the result of internal tensions and contradictions within the change process itself, as for instance, within a developing organism. These tensions arise from the nature of the interrelation of the structural elements which constitute the organism as a whole. Each element reciprocally shapes and is shaped by other elements, an interrelation which is animated by the organism's impulse to realise fully what it is potentially. This rendering of purpose-driven and so rational change implies that the generative process possesses agency expressive of a subject whose potential can only be realised through the objects it creates. This structural relationship of subject and object articulates the dialectical principle which governs organic movement and change and is intrinsic to all living things. The source of tension which animates organic change is the conflict or contradiction between the imperative to realise a potential, the ultimate goal, and the means of attaining it which is to become manifest in concrete reality. For in order to reach its goal the subject must become an object, but becoming an object limits its power to realise its potential. The conditions or means of achieving its goal is in conflict with its drive to achieve it. The subject becomes an object but the object cannot be sustained because eventually it must succumb to the imperative to realise a potential. It begins to fetter the onward impulse of the subject. The object proves itself to be an inadequate expression of the ultimate goal. A new object must be generated which more closely approximates it. This process, however, constitutes two movements on the part of the subject, the movement of positing itself as an object and the movement of reflecting back upon that object to judge critically its adequacy with regard to the ultimate goal. If it is found wanting it must be superseded. For Hegel the subject is the purposive and therefore rational life of Spirit; for Marx it is the individual and his or her creative labour power; and the contradictions which arise as a consequence of differences between the goals associated with ends on the one hand, and means on the other is expressed in terms of pairs of opposites, that is, in relations, such as, negative and positive, universal and particular, in the work of Hegel, and use-value and exchange-value, capital and labour, in the work of Marx. 2. The mechanism of change. Organic development is a fertile ground for such pairs of opposites where the first term represents the creative impulse, namely, Spirit, or labour power; and the second term is the object as its manifestation. It is the tension generated by the interplay of these opposing aspects of the same impulse which for Hegel accounts for the internal mechanism of organic change. This interplay of elements sets up a continuous oscillating or dialectical movement between the opposing poles of the relation, a structure
and pattern which is intrinsic to all living things. It is a necessary pattern if movement and development is to occur at all and this gives it the status of a principle or law. This dialectical principle functions in the same manner as the law of motion in physics, that is, as a universal and objective law or principle based on the nature of the change process itself rather than a researcher's construct. If a thing does not conform to the law of motion, whether organic or mechanical, then there is no movement and this constitutes the validity of the law. Thus, it is because our experience of reality is of a world organically in constant movement and development that we know the dialectical principle governs its motion. Because Hegel and Marx make this universal and objective principle their reference point, in the same manner as the law of motion is a reference point for physicists, their analyses tend towards the nature of a science rather than that of a subjective, theoretical construct. It follows from this that the true nature of reality is not only of things as they appear to us, but also as they intrinsically are in themselves because the phenomena we observe are only the end result of the generative process. The complete or Absolute truth consists of both the phenomenal form as well as its content, namely the dialectical principle responsible for its existence which Hegel (1952, p. 143) expresses as the necessity of actuality. It consists of the necessary dispersal, or division, of the universal generative impulse into definite particular shapes or differences within the whole organism and that out of this division emerges a definite object. It has, however, only a transient existence. It must be superseded by what is retained in its negation and incorporated into the new definitive object is the living impulse that generated it. The impulse or Spirit is the constant amid the transient succession of objects. Marx (1968) also expresses this process but in terms of forces and relations of production. When the relations begin to impede or fetter the development of the productive forces, they must be superseded. This is the basis of Marx's theory of revolution and it is in this light that we can come to an understanding of the shifts and changes we are experiencing in all aspects of social life including education. The social relations of production are continually being changed to correspond with the needs of capitalist accumulation. These changes are only temporary, however, because according to the principle of dialectical necessity capitalism's promise of human autonomy for all remains unfulfilled. Capitalism begins to be racked by internal contradictions which will signal its impending demise, but the aspiration of ultimate autonomy will continue to be the driving force underlying the new pattern of social relations that emerges. The developmental rhythmic pattern of degeneration and regeneration, or to use the Hegelian expression, the negation and the negation of the negation, occurs in stages and moves in circular fashion rather than in a linear progression. Its movement is circular because it involves an ascending dialectic of positing an object and a descending dialectic of reflection which returns to the beginning. It is a seamless progression in which the end becomes the beginning and the beginning becomes the end. These two interconnecting sides of the same generative process expresses Hegel's notion of the Absolute. 3. The role of human beings. It is, however, only human beings who have developed rationality to the point of self-consciousness, and who on that account can perform the reflective activity. Human beings because they are embodied rationality are the link between Spirit and the objects of reality and thus function as mediators in Hegel's schema. They are in a sense participants yet observers since Spirit could not reach its goal without them. Marx, on the other hand, sees human beings as proactive participants in change.
So far I have mostly concentrated on Hegel's philosophy of the dialectic but the question of the role of human beings leads into a discussion on Marx's form of the dialectic method. Marx identified the work of the dialectical principle in the historically specific phenomenon, the capitalist mode of production. This mode is characterised by the division of human beings into two opposing social classes, the capitalists who own capital, in other words, the means of production, and waged workers who produce it but who own only their labour power. There is therefore a contradiction in the alienation or separation of workers from their own creative capacity to labour which they must sell in order to subsist. The relation of capital and labour defines the structural pattern of capitalism and the contradiction animates its development. The ultimate goal is still autonomy but the means in this historical mode of production entails more and more accumulation of capital through commodity exchange. Thus Marx took the commodity as the simplest and most basic category which would express the capital-labour relation and articulate the nature of the whole capitalist mode of production. On analysis the simple commodity is found to contain two values, use-value and exchange-value. Its exchange value signifies the goal to which capitalist productive process is directed but the commodity's exchange is dependent upon its use-value. In a mode of production bent on capital accumulation even the creativity of labour power is reduced to a reified commodity because the source of capital accumulation lies not in the exchange of commodities in the market place, but in the relations of production where workers' labour power, however, that special commodity, is hired as a force of production by capitalists, and applied to add use value to commodities in order to heighten the latter's exchange value. The primary conditions which make capitalist production possible consists of: 1) the legitimation of capitalists' appropriation and control of the means of production in the form of capital; and 2) the 'freedom' of workers to sell their labour power. Under these conditions capitalists can exploit the workers' situation and make their profit from the difference between the wages they pay to workers and the total value added by worker's labour to the commodities. While this differential is the source of capital accumulation, it is also the cause of the antagonistic relations which are endemic to the capitalist mode of production and infects the rest of society that is patterned on it. This antagonism is for Marx the negation which is the starting point of revolutionary change. On this account it is fruitless to try to harmonise the relation between capital and labour on ethical, moral, religious, or philanthropic grounds without also dissolving it and making way for a new social relation which is more in tune with humanity's ultimate goal. The work of Hegel and Marx in their respective analyses shows how they sought to demonstrate the working out of the dialectical principle, or the dialectical method, in the various forms they chose for analysis. Their demonstrations, however, cannot constitute a formula which can be abstracted from their analyses and simply applied to education for instance. One of the reasons is that, while the dialectical principle remains constant as content, the forms it takes and the categories used to express its actualisation will change according to that aspect of reality being investigated. This means that it would be
inappropriate and fail in its purpose if the form of method as tracked in the work of Hegel and Marx was slavishly applied to other studies. The role of the dialectical method is to follow the course of dialectical necessity and it is on that which a critique of contemporary theory of education must be based. 3. A critique of contemporary Marxist education theory From the dialectical perspective of Hegel and Marx education must be classified as one side of the totality that constitutes the Absolute (Hegel) or the capitalist mode of production (Marx). It therefore cannot be separated from that side of the totality which posits or produces. Education and economic activity constitute a theoretical and practical relation, not a duality. That education is regarded at all as a relatively autonomous site of social productive activity disregards its essentially dialectical nature. It indicates a lack of appreciation that the dialectical method requires going beyond the mere appearance of things as isolated entities and employing the logic of inference to reveal from appearance their underlying dialectical necessity. The role of a dialectical method is to penetrate the surface appearance of education's apparent autonomy and to reveal the essential force which organically unites it to all other aspects of society. In evaluating existing contemporary Marxist education theories for their credentials in relation to their conformity to the dialectical principle two factors must be considered: 1) those factors which derive from external influences; and 2) those which arise from internal theoretical contradictions. There is, however, only space for providing the barest outline for what is a developing new direction in Marxist education critique. It is Rikowski's contention (1997 p. 551) that contemporary Marxist education theory is beyond redemption as a truly dialectical and therefore critical method and must be rebuilt This paper is not the place to pursue a full and detailed analysis but it will name some of the factors and refer readers to a more detailed exposition in two articles by Rikowski (1996; 1997), who claims that contemporary Marxist education theories have so degenerated that a new beginning is the only course of action. External factors contributing to the depoliticisation, and therefore degeneration, of Marxist education theories are as follows: 1. Hyper-academic Marxism. Within the last two decades Marxist academics have become increasingly isolated from class politics and thus subject to swings of fashion; the adoption of ideological positions, such as, pluralism, Left postmodernism, and new liberalism; the pressures of careerism; and the demands of publishing houses. 2. The rift between theory and practice. This is a consequence of the isolation of Marxist academics. In many cases Marxist writings have not resonated with those directly involved in actual class, gender and race struggles and with teachers' classroom experience. Nor have Marxist academics had much impact on the general public debate regarding education. This is in marked contrast to the work, for instance, of the revolutionary academic, Raya Dunayevskaya (1958; 1973), whose writings are marked by a degree of passion and were always informed by the experience of American workers with whom she associated. The effect of this isolation on Marist theory has been to undermine it within academic life and to marginalise its impact beyond it. In terms of the dialectic principle Marxist scholarship has become one-sided and as a consequence abstract. 3. The challenge of postmodernism. In Rikowski's estimation this is by far the biggest challenge for Marxism especially in America. Its antithesis to almost everything that Hegel
and Marx have sought to articulate classifies it as a nihilistic ideology which cannot be sustained on its own in a dialectically positive sense as a contribution to the structural transformation of capitalism. The realisation, however, 'that educational postmodernism does little directly to challenge capitalist social relations...may see a return to Marxism' (p. 433). 4. The challenge of new 'Left' liberalism. This arises from the focus of this ideology on establishing social justice within the existing framework of society. It provides a moral critique based on rights of what it sees as the abuses of capitalism while seeking to safeguard and enlarge the rights of citizens. In education it seeks to address education needs, to establish educational rights and entitlements for various groups of learners, and apportion fairness (p. 433). An essential corrosive factor, according to Rikowski (1996 p. 434) in the demise of Marxist educational theory has been the adoption of liberal methods of analysing issues especially the trend towards individualist critical self-reflection, and the emphasis on liberation from ones own individual history as well as oppressive institutional arrangements. It is evident from these comments that from a dialectical perspective 'Left' liberalism's ideals of distributive justice will have no clout in transforming an unjust society unless the abolition of structural antagonisms is addressed. 5. The 'death of Marxism' syndrome. The degeneration of Marxist educational theory cannot be separated from the cultural climate that has followed in the wake of the collapse of the state socialist regimes of Eastern Europe. Because of this 'attempts to rethink Marxism is seen as doomed, swimming against the "tide of history' or eccentric' (p. 434). The internal inconsistencies marking the degeneration of contemporary Marxist educational theories arise from what constitute a determinstic misinterpretation of Marx's base/superstructure analogy and subsequent attempts to correct this. The cumulative effect of these 'corrections' has further advanced degeneration. 1. Base/superstructure model & functionalism. Bowles and Gintis were the first in English speaking countries to formulate a Marxist education theory. Their work has been criticised for being deterministic because it is based on Marx's base/superstructure analogy. On this view education is part of the superstructure which is determined by the economic base. The radical nature of Bowles and Gintis' theory is further undermined by the inclusion of a functionalist explanation of capitalist schooling. 2. The role of agency. As a corrective to what were perceived to be defects in Bowles and Gintis there developed theories which emphasised the role of agency. The work of the American Critical pedagogy School, Giroux and Apple are representative of this trend. The result, however, ended in a structure-agency dualism.(p. 555). 3. Relative autonomy. A further factor which became part of this 'development' was the inclusion of the notion of education as a relatively autonomous sphere drawn from the theories of Althusser and Bourdieu. This promised to integrate the structure-agency dualism by opening up social space within educational sites 'for student resistance, significant teacher politics, and the possibility of radical pedagogic practice' (p. 558). This tended to distract attention even further from the crucial and central question about education, namely, the nature of its integral link with the productive process under capitalism. 4. Resistance Theory. Relative autonomy theory also had the effect of persuading Marxist education theorists that it allowed space for 'resistance' of both students and teachers to the dictates of Government education policy and the influence of employers with regard to
education issues (p. 561). Resistance theory seems to ignore, however, the covert control that being a salaried worker can exert on teachers to conform. 5. Education for autonomy or revolution. This has been the perennial problem for the development of a truly dialectical education theory in the context of the way education is structured within capitalism. The issue of the relationship between autonomy and revolution constitutes a tension between conflicting educational goals: whether education should be directed towards assisting students to become critically reflective, autonomous individuals or towards informing collective action towards changing capitalist society (p. 562-563). This dilemma is in reality a formulation of the end-means relation. In dialectical terms the development of critical reflective autonomous individuals is possible but only under social conditions where there exists already interchange among individuals for the common purpose of creating a society which sustains and nurtures freedom and institutions which give effect to it. 'Freedom seems to require both individual independence and integration into a larger life'. This perspective seems to imply that the means or conditions which are expressive of autonomy come before the development of an autonomous person and not vice versa. As Marx proclaimed: 'It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness'. To pose the problem as an either/or proposition, however, is to ignore that both ends and means, while opposed, are at the same time dialectically related. Both autonomy and revolution develop dialectically. The question is how do we get things started in a school culture marked by antagonistic social divisions that are tolerated as normative. On this account one can only speculate what Marx might have said about the woes of contemporary Marxist theories of education given his talent for razor sharp polemic. There is, however, signs of a revitalisation according to Rikowski. He cites the Open Marxism theories of Bonefeld et al. (1992a,b) and Bonefeld et al. (1995) which feature: 1) a rejection of all forms of determinism; 2) the re-assertion of the centrality of class struggle; 3) a critical Marxism rooted within a method of form-analysis; and 4) seeking to refute all forms of fetishism. This sounds promising especially the method of form analysis if this recognises the dialectical principle underlying all forms expressive of society. In this regard it is as a capitalist form of education that I propose to illustrate in a minor way how the dialectical method works in the analysis of Australian Catholic education. Since capitalism is based and survives on the exploitation of labour power, this category has to be at the centre of a dialectical education theory which asks the question what are the constraints and possibility for the creation of a truly effective and transformative education. In this process the role of teachers is crucial, a role that must take account that teachers too are essentially wage workers, the value of whose labour power enters the material production process as part of the value of students' labour power. This would in Marx's terms make it constant capital. 4. The analysis of Catholic education as a form of capitalist education In comparison with the Government sponsored sector, the 'independent' or private sector has attracted little attention from Marxist education researchers. Because the Catholic sector in Australia constitutes approximately one third of all teaching personal, students and resources, and because of the values of social justice which it espouses, it has the potential to influence the direction of education in Australia that takes account of social justice. This
remains a potential, however, so long as it lacks the self-criticism to recognise that it is a form of capitalist education. A dialectical method begins with the known, and this first phase of the investigation consists of tracing the conditions or circumstances which led to the emergence of Catholic education. Suffice it to note that Catholic education emerged in Australia as an alternative education system towards the end of the nineteenth century in response to two perceived threats to the Catholic faith tradition: 1) the threat posed by the emergence of compulsory, secular education; and 2) the threat posed by what was perceived to be the weakening of the moral and spiritual life of impoverished Catholics. True independence, however, could not be sustained as a viable option because of two factors: 1) the normalisation of capitalist economic relations precluded subsistence outside its influence, and 2) the systematisation of all forms of education under state control. By the 1970s there emerged a crisis of identity for a number of reasons: the consequences of Vatican II; the replacement of religious by predominantly lay staff; the dependence on government funding; and the introduction of bureaucratic structures. From a historical overview the dialectical method then switches to an analysis of the contradictions in Catholic education that come to light in comparing the goals of Catholic schools and what actually takes place. This shows that there are endemic contradictions which derive from the effort, which mainly devolves on teachers, to implement two opposing goals. These are the imperative, on the one hand, to educate students in Catholic values and norms based on the 'image of God' doctrine and to actualise the Catholic ideal of a 'loving, caring and sharing' community within schools, and the imperative, on the other, to produce the skilled and disciplined labour power commodity so sought after by employers based on values of individualism, competitiveness and exploitation. The third phase is to propose in the light of the knowledge gained by critique possible avenues for transformative action which must begin with the recognition that classroom teachers are the ones who must negotiate with students on the implementation of education policy and practice. Conclusion There is a lot to be done, not only in a rediscovery of the dialectical principle as the true measure of the working with the Hegelian and Marxian but also in formulating a new direction for Marxist education theory based on it, and working with the principle in the study of whatever aspect of education that is under investigation. These three projects are intertwined Bibliography Wood, Allen (1981) Karl Marx, London, routledge & Kegan Paul Zeleny, Hindrich (1980), The logic of Marx, Oxford UK, Basil Blackwell Publisher Ltd.