The Concept of Authenticity Sean Sayers ABSTRACT The concept of authenticity -- the idea of `being oneself' or being `true to oneself' -- is central to modern moral thought. Yet it is a puzzling notion. This article discusses two accounts of it. Essentialism holds that each individual has a `true' nature or self. Feelings and actions are authentic when they correspond to this nature. This approach is contrasted with views of the self as a complex entity in which all parts are essential, and in which authenticity involves the harmonious functioning of all parts together. This approach is illustrated from Freud and Plato, and defended against the charge of conservatism (Marcuse) and the postmodernist rejection of the very idea of an integral self (Rorty). 5400 words approx.
The Concept of Authenticity `Know thyself!' was written over the portal of the antique world. Over the portal of the new world `Be thyself' shall be written. (Wilde 1973: 27) The concept of authenticity Β the idea of `being oneself' or `being true to oneself' Β is widespread and familiar. It is one of the central notions of modern moral thought. Yet it is a puzzling and paradoxical notion. Surely I am always myself and necessarily so? How can it be otherwise? `I am I' is a trivial and logically necessary truth. How can I possibly not be myself? In what sense is it possible not to be true to oneself? How are authenticity and inauthenticity possible? There is no problem in understanding how one person can be true or false to another: for example, by giving a correct or misleading impression of their feelings and thoughts. In this sense, the language of `authenticity' and `inauthenticity' can be applied even to things. A painting or an antique, for example, is said to be `authentic' when it is genuine, when it really is what it appears or purports to be; and `inauthentic' when it is an imitation or a fake. But a mere thing cannot be authentic or inauthentic in Oscar Wilde's sense, in the moral sense Β it cannot be or fail to be itself or true to itself. A mere thing lacks a self and an identity in the relevant sense. It simply is what it is, immediately and directly. The same seems true of animals and, it is often said, of very young children too. They are immediately and directly themselves. Animals are creatures of instinct. Children, it is said, are `spontaneous' and `innocent'. These are quite different qualities than `authenticity' in the moral sense. Authenticity implies the possibility of inauthenticity, of being false to oneself. For this, a person must have acquired a degree of self consciousness and hence of internal complexity and self division. Below a certain age children have not yet developed this: they are simply and immediately themselves. In this respect, childhood innocence is more like animal instinctiveness, and cannot be equated with authenticity in the moral sense. Identity and modernity As Oscar Wilde suggests, authenticity understood in this way Β as an aspect of self identity Β is a distinctively modern concept. In pre-modern society identity is defined primarily by social `place'. Identity is determined by social role. In such societies, as MacIntyre says, the individual is identified and constituted in and through certain of his or her roles... I confront the world as a member of this family, this household, this class, this tribe, this city, this nation, this kingdom. There is no "I" apart from these.
3 (MacIntyre 1985: 160-1). 1 In the modern world, by contrast, the very notion of a social `place' has all but ceased to have any application. The individual no longer has a fixed and given position in society. The self has far greater independence from its roles, which are looked upon as external to the self and contingent for it. Identity is no longer a predetermined given. Individuals must now choose their social place and role and, in doing so, create their own identity. In this situation, the self becomes divided into an outward persona of social roles and relations, and a private inner self. Whether or not the individual is living authentically becomes an issue. For the self can stand back from its activity and ask itself whether it is being true to itself and living authentically. The mere fact that the individual is fulfilling their allotted social role is no longer a guarantee of this. Almost the reverse if anything. The view that runs through much of the literature of authenticity is that we can be true to ourselves only by emancipating ourselves from socially imposed roles. Hegel was one of the first authors to describe these changes. He maintains that what he calls `self-alienated spirit' emerges only in the modern period (Hegel 1977: 294-320; cf Trilling 1972: chap. 2). That is perhaps too simple. In some earlier periods of rapid social change, traditional roles and identities were widely questioned. Thus the Sophists and Socrates, in 5th Century BC Athens, discuss the identity of the self and many of the issues raised by the concept of authenticity, though not in these terms which are, indeed, distinctively modern. The Idea of an Essential Self This then is the modern moral concept of authenticity. What is involved in it? What is meant by it? I will first sketch out two contrasting kinds of answers to these questions; then I will indicate reasons for preferring the second of these and defend it from some common criticisms. The first sort of theory interprets the concept of authenticity in terms of the idea that there 1 Berger gives a similar account of such societies, `the individual discovers his true identity in his roles, and to turn away from these roles is to turn away from himself' (Berger 1984: 154).
4 is an `essential human nature' or `true self' which is located in each individual. This provides a standard against which the authenticity of our actions, feelings or thoughts can be assessed. I am being authentic or true to myself when I am following my true self or essential nature. The concept of truth involved here is the familiar one of correspondence to a given objective standard. I am being true to myself to the extent to which my thoughts and actions correspond to my true self. Such an account may take different forms. Perhaps the most familiar is the hedonist approach of simple instinct theory. According to this, we are pleasure-seeking pain-avoiding creatures, driven by our instincts. These embody our true nature, which is purely individual and self-interested. To some extent, therefore, these instincts have to be restrained and controlled for the sake of social life. An influential account of the self along these lines is given by Freud, particularly in the earlier phase of his work, up to the end of World War I. In this period Freud views the self as divided into two main parts: the conscious and the unconscious. Only a small part of our psychology is conscious. The larger unconscious part is the seat of the instincts, the determining forces of human life. At birth our instincts seek satisfaction in an uninhibited and unconstrained manner. We are governed by the pleasure principle. As a result of socialization we come to moderate our actions and thoughts. Our instincts are subjected to restraint and repression due to the demands of `civilization' and `civilized' morality. The `reality principle' takes charge. Many of our instinctive wishes are repressed. Important aspects of our real desires and feelings Β our true selves Β are denied active expression and driven into the unconscious. Our conscious actions and thoughts become false and inauthentic. The implication of these views seems to be that in order to be authentic and true to ourselves, we must throw off the repressions which are imposed upon us by the constraints of conventional morality and which we impose upon ourselves. Freud, it should be stressed, did not pursue his theory far in this direction. Although he acknowledged that some liberalization of nineteenth century morality was desirable, particularly for women, in order to alleviate `modern nervous illness' (Freud 1985a), he was cautious and conservative in moral matters. He believed that a considerable degree of repression is inescapably necessary in order to preserve `civilization' and social life (Freud 1985b). Others, however, have tried to read more radical implications into psychoanalytic theory.
5 Writers such as Reich (1968) and Marcuse (n.d.), for example, interpret Freud's work as implying a critique of conventional morality for its repressive impact upon the essential, instinctive self. Similar views are forcefully expressed by Nietzsche. He portrays human beings as primarily creatures instinct and desire. Our instincts embody the `will to life'; they make up our essential nature, our true self. Thus, on the Nietzschean view (or at least a common interpretation of it 2 ), living authentically consists in following one's instincts and affirming `life'; whereas modern European `civilization' and Christian-liberal morality, are inhibiting, repressive and `hostile to life' (Nietzsche 1990: 52). It forces individuals to suppress and deny their instincts, to be hypocritical, false to themselves and inauthentic. Radical hedonist views such as these, it should be noted, are in a long tradition of moral and psychological thought. As Nietzsche himself was aware, they stretch back ultimately to the ancient Greek Sophists. A similar account of human nature and radical critique of conventional morality is put forward by Callicles in Plato's Gorgias (1971) and by Thrasymachus in the Republic (Plato, 1987), though neither uses the language of `authenticity' to express their views. Nevertheless, what is common to all these thinkers is the view that there is an essential core of human nature, a true self, which is located in our immediate and purely individual instincts and desires. To be true to ourselves these must be asserted in defiance of social convention and other external demands. Will and Commitment The essentialist conception of individuality and the true self may take another form as well. It is embodied in what at first appears to be a very different sort of account of the self, an account which begins with the rejection of the very idea that the identity of the self can be specified in terms of instincts or needs. What is distinctive of human beings, on this view, is that they have no predetermined instincts or needs, they are free. Such views are expressed with great clarity by Sartre. With human beings, he says, `existence precedes essence' (Sartre 1948: 26-7; Sartre 1957: 438). There is no fixed and pregiven human nature. Our actions are not the determined effects of instincts, needs, drives, desires or any other aspect of our natural being; they are the product of free and purely individual choice. Of course, Sartre does not deny that human beings have drives, needs, and desires, and that these influence us. Such factors set the conditions in which we must choose. However, they never 2 I shall suggest a different account of Nietzsche below.
6 completely determine the outcome of our choices. For our freedom to choose is absolute and exists in all conditions and all situations. In some important respects such views are the precise opposite of the instinct theory of the self that I have just described. This is particularly emphasized by Sartre, who insists that `there is no human nature' (Sartre 1948: 28). However, by this he means that there are no determinate, fixed and pre-given ends or purposes in human life, such as the instinct theory lays down, which can provide a standard for the authenticity of our actions. Nevertheless, there is at least one universal and essential characteristic which Sartre attributes to the self: namely, its freedom. According to Sartre freedom is a pre-given aspect of the self which we do not choose: we are `condemned to be free' (Sartre 1957: 439). Moreover, at least on the account he gives in Existentialism and Humanism (Sartre 1948), freedom also provides the standard for authenticity. Our freedom is something that we must exercise alone and individually, with no authoritative principles or rules to guide us, in `abandonment' and `isolation'. To the extent to which we do this consciously, avoiding `bad faith' and accepting the responsibility and anxiety this brings with it, we are acting authentically. 3 A similar philosophy is often attributed to Kierkegaard, who talks of the need of the authentic self to make a `leap of faith', a purely individual commitment which cannot be rationally justified or explained (Kierkegaard 1985). In this way, although this Sartrean philosophy locates the true self in choice rather than instinct, in will rather than drive, in the mental rather than the physical realm, it nevertheless involves on an essentialist picture of the self. It identifies the true self with simple, immediate, and purely individual free choice, which provides the standard for the truth or authenticity of our actions, feelings and thoughts. The One Dimensional Self In short, the concept of authenticity as correspondence to the true or essential self can be expressed in two quite different forms: either as an instinct theory or as a philosophy of will and commitment. Both involve essentialist and purely individualistic accounts of the self. And neither, I will now argue, provides an account of the self which is sufficiently rich or complex to 3 This is what Sartre maintains in Existentialism and Humanism (1948), and it is how his philosophy is often interpreted. In Being and Nothingness (1957), however, Sartre treats bad faith as a universal and inescapable fact of the human condition and appears to question the very possibility of authenticity.
7 allow for the self-division and self-consciousness which are involved in authenticity and inauthenticity. As regards the attempt to explain the notion of authenticity on the basis of the instinct theory, this often involves an over-simple picture of the self which is put forward as much for polemical reasons as to understand human psychology. It is true that we are bodily beings with appetites and instincts, and that our physical desires must be satisfied if we are to achieve happiness. It is true also that conventional morality is often repressive and constricting of our desires. However, this is only one aspect of the self, and there are others. This tends to be forgotten or denied by the writers I am discussing in pursuit of a polemic against the repressiveness of established society and conventional morality. This does not apply to Freud, it should be emphasised. His theory is of a divided self. By contrast, the instinctivist or crude `Nietzschean' approach often involves the attempt to identify a `true' or `essential' part of the self by splitting it off from parts which are supposed to be false and inessential. What is overlooked in this is that the socialised and `civilized' part of the self Β the part responsible for the repression and control of the instincts Β is not simply an externally imposed set of moral inhibitions and repressions. It is just as essential to the self as the instincts and desires. It cannot simply be repudiated and discarded as `false' or `inessential'. As I shall argue in a moment, the aim should rather be to integrate these different parts and bring them into harmony. The Sartrian account of the self is open to similar objections. It too portrays just one aspect of the self Β will, choice, commitment Β as essential. Conversely, it regards desires, instincts and physical needs as external to the true self and inessential. The result is an equally simplistic and one dimensional picture of human psychology. Up to a point it is possible to hold one's needs and instincts in check by the force of will. However, to attempt to deny them altogether is to repudiate essential bodily aspects of human nature and ultimately to negate life itself. This is not to deny that there is a phenomenological basis for the Sartrean account. It captures a way in which some people actually experience themselves. For some people feel that they are split into an inner, mental, `true' self and an outward, bodily, `false' self which conforms to external social demands but which is not essential to the person they think they really are. However, even though this may be the way in which the self is experienced it is not the truth of
8 the situation. No matter how `false' and `artificial' a person's outward and social being may seem to them, it is just as necessary to them, just as constitutive of what they are, as their purely inner and supposedly `true' self (Laing 1965: 75-6); and authenticity cannot be achieved by repudiating it. Fragmentation Furthermore, the two sorts of essentialist account that I have been describing both have the effect of fragmenting the self into a series of separate and unconnected momentary instants or `points'. The instinctivist approach portrays the individual as driven by a series of distinct and separate, independent and immediately felt, desires or impulses. The Sartrian philosophy dissolves the self into a succession of separate, absolute and instantaneous choices which are not determined by anything external to them: neither by the individual's past history, present situation and relationships nor by any commitments for the future. For if the self is constrained by anything past, present or future, to that extent it has ceased to be itself and become inauthentic. These views are untenable. To have an identity, the self must have some unity over time. At the minimum, this must involve some settled commitment to a specific pattern of activity or way of life; and being true to oneself is a matter of maintaining such a commitment in the face of contrary pressures. This holds true even if the commitment is only to avoid any fixed pattern of activity and to change and experiment: as, for example, in Kierkegaard's `rotation method' in which life is governed by the principle to `constantly vary [one]self' (Kierkegaard 1959: I, 294). It may appear that the two lines of criticism I have been making of essentialist accounts of authenticity are in danger of conflicting and cancelling each other out. For I seem to be arguing the such theories portray the self both as a simple unity and that they dissolve the self into a series of fragments and deny its unity. The paradox here is only apparent. Both features arise from treating the self as a simple, momentary particular, as a sort of `point' Β or rather as a series of such momentary particulars or points. They are implied by what Charles Taylor calls the `punctual' theory of the self (Taylor 1989: chap. 9). Like Taylor, I am arguing that the self cannot be understood in these terms.
9 The Self as Complex These criticisms point towards a more satisfactory and promising tradition of thought about the self. This sees the self as a complex entity, made up of a number of different functional parts or aspects. None of these has a privileged status, none is uniquely definitive of the self: all have an essential role to play in the functioning of the self as a whole. A different notion of truth is also involved in this approach. Being authentic or true to oneself does not consist in correspondence to a pre-given essence. Rather, it is a matter of coherence, harmony, integrity or unity. Authenticity involves acknowledging and accepting all parts of the self, and acting in such a way that they function together as harmoniously as possible, with none repudiated or repressed. Freud develops such an account in the later phase of his work. From the early 1920s on, he divides the self into three main parts: the ego, id and super-ego. He treats all these parts as essential and ineliminable constituents of the psyche. Well-being consists in the optimal functioning together of these parts, under the control of the ego. The notion of psychological integration is also basic to the psychoanalytic theories of Melanie Klein, although in her work it is developed in quite different terms. The optimal functioning of the personality which, oddly, Klein calls the `depressive position' involves holding together opposite aspects and tendencies of the self Β positive and negative feelings of good and bad, love and hate Β and not splitting them off from each other or denying either (Frosh 1987: chaps 4-5; Segal 1973). In contrast to the essentialist approach, these accounts portray the self as a complex whole, composed of often conflicting parts or aspects. Truth or authenticity is a matter of coherence not correspondence. It does not involve prioritizing one aspect as essential over another. Rather, it is a matter of holding together and integrating the disparate and conflicting elements of the personality in the context of the self as a whole. As Freud was aware, this way of thinking about the self can be traced back ultimately to Plato's tripartite account of the self in the Republic and the Phaedrus. It is graphically expressed in the Phaedrus (Plato 1973: 246ff) in the image of the self as a charioteer with a team of two imperfectly matched horses. The charioteer represents reason, the highest part of the self which, Plato believes, should be in control of the personality. The horses represent the other parts of the self, the appetites and `spirit'. The individual is happiest and the self functions best when the two
10 horses are pulling together under the direction of the charioteer. In the Platonic, Freudian and other versions of this view, authenticity is often equated with control of the `higher' over the `lower' parts of the self: reason over the appetites in Plato (as in the Phaedrus image just quoted); ego over id in Freud. Freud sometimes writes as if the instincts are simply a mass of dangerous impulses threatening the control of the ego and the integrity of the personality. Plato even goes so far as to treat appetites and physical desires as a sort of `enemy within', as an alien threat to the `true', rational self. He appears to forget that their satisfaction is essential to life itself and to imply that we would be better off getting rid of them and being released from the body altogether. In their calmer and more considered moments, however, both Freud and Plato realise that the instincts and desires are an essential part of the self. They cannot be suppressed or repudiated without negating the very existence of the self. In short, the self comprises both higher and lower parts, and a tenable account of its authenticity can be given only by recognising that all parts have a role in producing it. The Integration of the Self An account of authenticity along these lines is not vulnerable to the objections raised earlier against the essentialist approach. It does not dissolve the self into a series of disconnected moments or points. By treating the self as a complex whole it avoids the problems which arise from the `punctual' view of the self. On this view, being true to oneself involves holding together the various different and often conflicting parts of the self and integrating the personality. Authenticity resides not in a series of immediate and momentary expressions of instinct or acts of commitment, but in a continuing pattern of activity extending through different situations and relationships and the contradictory pressures they exert and enduring over time. Being true to oneself thus involves a relatively enduring commitment to a particular way of life which must be sustained against countervailing pressures both from within and without. It involves building and maintaining an identity as a self in the face of these influences. Thus authenticity is not a simple and immediate characteristic but rather a concrete unity which encompasses difference within it and which extends over time. It is a project, a goal which must be striven for and maintained, and which can be realized to a greater or lesser degree. Clearly this conception of the integration of the self needs to be developed and explained
11 more fully. This is work that still remains to be done. It can perhaps be spelled out in terms of the idea that the self has a `narrative unity= (MacIntyre 1985: ch. 15; Nehamas 1985). However, this narrative, I want to insist, must have some claim to truth. It must be possible to distinguish false from true narratives (even if there can be more than a single `true= narrative). In any case, this account here diverges from the Platonic picture, in which the harmony of the self does not involve a temporal dimension. However, such views are developed by a number of existentialist writers. Thus Kierkegaard (1959) emphasises the enduring commitments involved the `ethical= by contrast with the immediacy of the `aesthetic= attitude to life. Nietzsche is best interpreted as putting forward such views, too. Despite my earlier remarks, it is too simple to portray Nietzsche as a mere instinctivist. Throughout his work he insists that we should affirm life as a whole Β the bad and the good, the lower and the higher Β and seek to go `beyond good and evil= by combining `all of one=s features and qualities, whatever their traditional moral value, into a controlled and coherent whole= (Nehamas 1985: 227). This is not the outcome of mere spontaneous instinct according to Nietzsche, it demands self-discipline and strength of will. Similarly, Heidegger talks of the `resoluteness= required for authenticity. Unlike the essentialist account, moreover, this approach does not lead to the picture of the authentic self as an isolated individual, pitted against others and against the social world. On the contrary. The theory that the self is complex implies that human beings are social creatures. The modern, self-conscious self, capable of authenticity or inauthenticity, is a social phenomenon. The socialised and `civilized' part of the self is just as much a part of our essential being as instinct and will. To repudiate the social part of the self is to repudiate an essential aspect of one's identity, it is to try to turn oneself against oneself. Being true to oneself is the very opposite of this. It is a matter rather of acknowledging and accepting both the public and the private, the social and the individual aspects of oneself, and of trying to hold these together and integrate them in one whole, as coherently and as harmoniously as possible. The Charge of Conservatism In conclusion I will briefly defend this sort of account of authenticity against two lines of criticism which are often aimed against it, and particularly in recent years against Freudian versions of it.
12 The way of thinking about the self that I have been defending is attacked as an inherently conservative outlook which leads inevitably to a morality of social conformity. This point is made strongly by Marcuse (n.d.: appendix). Freud's early instinct theory, Marcuse argues, provides the basis for a radical critique of the repressiveness of established society. Whereas Freud's later theory, particularly as it was taken up by `neo-freudian revisionists' in the United States (Horney, H.S. Sullivan, Fromm, etc.), abandons the `explosive' critical content of the earlier approach. These later `ego-psychologists' suggest that individual happiness consists in the self finding a harmonious accommodation with a repressive social order. It is no doubt true that some psychoanalytic versions of this approach have conservative implications of this sort; though it should be added that this charge applies in equal measure to Freud himself. However, there is nothing inherently conservative about this approach per se. Nor is there anything inherently radical or critical about the instinct theory or other forms of essentialism. It all depends upon how they are interpreted and how they are used. As regards the latter, the instinct theory can well be used to ground the view that human beings are inherently self-interested and anti-social, and to maintain that a considerable amount of repression, `everyday unhappiness' as Freud calls it, and hence inauthenticity is necessary for the very possibility of social life. In other words, instinct theory can be used to justify the necessity of social repression rather to criticise it. Indeed, Freud himself uses it in just this way (Freud 1985b). As regards the view that the self is complex, this does acknowledge that the self is social. It does not pit the would-be authentic individual or true self headlong against society. Hence it recognises that some form of `accommodation' of the individual with the existing social order is necessary. But this is a strength of this approach not a weakness. It is simply an acknowledgement of the reality that the individual lives and must live in society. This may appear to imply that people should accommodate themselves to whatever social conditions they find around them. It may seem to be saying that we should accept and harmonize ourselves with the existing social order whatever it may be like. That is indeed a conservative philosophy, and an absurd one. But the idea of authenticity as integration need not be interpreted in this way. It can equally be used as a critical concept. The idea of psychic integration can be put forward as an ideal which is systematically thwarted by the conditions of modern social life. For in modern society individual is pitted against individual. Hence individual and social interests
13 conflict and different parts of the self are set against each other. In these conditions, the idea of integration can serve as an ideal standard against which existing conditions can be assessed. It can function as a critical concept which points towards the possibility of a social order in which individuals can live authentically and be true to themselves (Fromm 1956; Sayers 1999: chap. 6). Postmodernist Criticisms The very idea of integration of the self is attacked these days by thinkers loosely identified as `postmodernists' (Frosh 1991). The self, it is said, is a mere construct, it is inherently multiple and fragmentary. Unity and integration are not natural or inherent to the self; they are illusory Β alien and external Β impositions. The idea of a unitary self is a piece of moral and philosophical mythology which has the effect of limiting, restricting and impoverishing the self. Rather, we should seek to `enlarge' the self (Rorty 1991). We should accept the multiplicity of the self; we should revel in its fragmentation and celebrate its diversity. These thinkers are right to maintain that the goals of integration and psychological harmony are imposed and enforced socially (although it is possible that there is also an inherent tendency towards integration in the individual). As I too have been arguing, the unitary self is not an immediate and inherent given. There is also some basis for the view that the idea of authenticity is illusory, in as much as it is true that authenticity is not the actual condition of the self, nor its initial state, but rather an ideal. But that does not make it illusory. On the contrary, it specifies a valid end worth striving towards. This ideal involves some limitation of desires and choices, it involves self-discipline and self-control. The purpose and effect of this is not simply negative, it is not simply to limit and restrict the satisfactions and activities of the self. On the contrary. To reject all discipline and organization of the self is a recipe for frustration and lack of self-realization. Being true to oneself involves some overall commitment and control, and the self-restraint that these imply. The aim of this is to avoid haphazard and futile activity. It is to recognise and allow all parts of the self to be expressed and realised, and thus to maximize the satisfaction of as many aspects of the self as possible to the maximum possible extent. This is an enabling and liberating
14 philosophy. 4 562A). 4 Similar points are made in Plato=s discussion of the `democratic= personality (1987, 558C-
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