DCTONARY OF PHLOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY NCLUDNG MANY OF THE PRNCPAL CONCEPTONS OP ETHCS, LOGC, AESTHETCS, PHLOSOPHY OP RELGON, MENTAL PATHOLOGY, ANTHROPOLOGY, BOLOGY, NEUROLOGY, PHYSOLOGY, ECONOMCS, POLTCAL AND SOCAL PHLOSOPHY, PHLOLOGY, PHYSCAL SCENCE, AND EDUCATON AND GVNG A TERMNOLOGY N ENGLSH, FRENCH, GERMAN, AND TALAN WRTTEN BY MANY HANDS AND EDTED BY JAMES MARK BALDWN Ph.D.(Princeton), Hon. DSo.(Oxon.), Hon. LLD.(Glsgow) STUART PROFESSOR N PRNCETON UNVERSTY WTH THE CO-OPERATON AND ASSSTANCE OF AN NTERNATONAL BOARD OF CONSULTNG EDTORS N THREE VOLUMES WTH LLUSTRATONS AND EXTENSVE BBLOGRAPHES VOL. jj2eto gorfe THE MACMLLAN COMPANY LonHon MACMLLAN AND CO., Limed 1901
K KAMES Krnes, Lord: see Home, Henry. Knt, mmnnel. (17 24-1 804.) Born, lived, nd died t Konigsberg. Studied theology, philosophy, nd mthemtics in the Universy t Konigsberg. Engged s privte tutor, 1746 55. Becme doctor philosophy nd Docent in the Universy in 1 755i»ndpressorlogicndmetphysics in 1770. n 1797 hgecompelled him to retire. See the following topics lso del m, Eptemology, nd Philosophy. Kntin Philosophy : see Knts Ter minology. Kntin Terminology: see Knts Terminology. Kntinm (orkntm): Ger.Kntinmus Fr. Kntinm* tl. Kntmo, Kntinimo. The philosophy which holds to the dtinctive doctrines mmnuel Knt. See Knts Terminology, nd the principl philosophicl topics generlly. The fetures Knts philosophy, which hve given nme to lter thought s Kntin, re minly (1) the cricl method, which constsin cricm reson(vernunftsvermogen) wh view to dcovering the priori elements in knowledge (2) the doctrine priori mentl forms, which, s theory knowledge, chrcterized s formlm (3) theresulting nthesbetween the phenomenl, orthtworldthings or ppernces to which these forms re pplied, ndthe noumenl, orthtworldthings in themselves, the trnscendentl thoughtpostultes, to which the forms do not pply, ndwhich (4) reconsequently unknowble th the gnostic element in Kntinm, especilly s developed wh reference to the idesreson God,Freedom, ndmmor 588 tlythesoul ndinthetheorythe ntinomies or contrdictions which reson flls into in pplying the ctegory infiny (5) therecognion thevlidytheides reson s postultes the morl life(prcti cl reson). Thesefeturestlestshouldbe includedinkntinm, thoughnyonethem would justify the use the djective Kntin. Lerture: see Cricm, nd Biblioq. A, Knt inenglh,especillytheworks by Stirling, Cird, nd Wtson for Germn ctions see Eler, Wijrterb. d. philos. Begriffe, inloc study Knts Psy chology hs been mde by Buchnbb, Monog. Suppl. (No. 4) tothepsychol. Rev. Knt Bibliogrphy by Adickes, Monog. Suppl., i, to the Philos. Rev. (j.m.b.) Kntm : see Kntinm. KntsTerminology (in reltion tothe Kntin Philosophy). (1)Attheoutsetthehtoryphilo sophicl terminology, mongst the Greeks, the problem the thinker ws to dpt h ntive lnguge to the novel business ex pressing philosophicl ides. The word nd the conception then ten cme into extence together. The power mere trdion ws t s minimum. Cretion ws reltively free. At the outset, however, the efforts modern philosophers to dcuss their problems in the vernculr tongues, the sution wswhollydifferent. An elborte, nd in fct ten extremely difficult ter minology, the result severl successive gretmovementshumnthought theter minology Scholsticm stoodinthewy noveltyin expression. Themodernthinker sometimes, like Locke, endevoured to escpe ltogether from th trdion, nd ws then
driven, by th very effort, into certin dorgniztion technicl lnguge, which, upon occsion, gve to h terms cpricious seeming, whout freeing them ltogether from the influence the pst. Lockes struggles wh the term Substnce furnh n instnce the resulting inconveniences. Or gin, like Meter Eckhrt, or in nother wy nd time, like Wolff, one might mke systemtic effort to find trnsltions for gret number terms scholstic origin. The result vried ccording to the genius the thinker. Butinny such cse thltter procedure ws t lest guided by define principle. Newtermsrose, tobesure,sidebysidewh theold. Buttheprocessttempted towin certin uny nd continuy. (2)n the cse Knt, however, the sution still fr more complex nd pro blemtic thn tht present t the outset modern philosophy. Comprble though he, in originly conception, wh the gret thinkers ntiquy, Knt cnnot, like Plto or n Artotle, freely invent terms, in hown vernculr, tomeeth new needs. Hemustppeltotrdionndin sr he like h modern predecessors. On the other hnd, he not content to trnslte scholstic, nor yet simply to ccept Wolffin, terminology. Noryet he,likelocke, in conscious revolt ginst the trdions lnguge which ll the while bind him. He whes to reform whout unnecessry trns formtion. He intends to select nd to dpt for h own purpose. But since he cnnot selectnddptwhthefreedomnncient Greek, nd since the originly h ides eqully forbids him to remin content wh wht hefinds,inthewymensex pression, heledtoeffortstreformwhich follow no one principle, nd which seldom seem wholly to stfy even himself. H triningndhmethodtenppertousto svour pedntry. Yets fct,heloves h menings so much better thn h words, tht he imptient wh merely termino logicl reserches nd he hs n imperfect cquintnce wh the htory eher thought or usge. Moreover, while the terms used by h contemporries nd im mede predecessors re known to him in gret msses, h thoughts re still fr richer thn h vocbulry, nd t the cricl stges h mentl evolution they develop much fster thn h most elborte dplys ter minologicl skill cn follow them. n consequenc, there re extended pssges in Kntsworks, e.g.inthe Deduction the Ctegories inthekrikderreinenvernunft, where the terminology lters in the course the sme dcussion. Such chnges re doubt lessten duetokntshbmking up h longer works out frgments, which were wrten down t vrious times, nd fterwrds collected nd ordered. But the result, swefindinknts printed text, ten bffling enough. H usge in such cses seems to bein sort Herclen flux, sothtwedonot twice stepintothe sme river expression while we wnder in serch the thought. Athorough htorykntstermino (3) logy still to bewrten. Muchim portnce lredy to be found in the uthortive, but too diffuse, Commenlr zu Knts Krik der reinen Vernunft, by Pro fessor Hns Vihinger, which two volumes hve so fr ppered Stuttgrt, 1881 (i, ii, 1892). But the most importnt portions the Krik nd s terminology still w their tretment in Vihingers work. Pulsen, in h dmirble volume, fmmnuel Knt, sein Leben und seine Lehre (Frommnns Klssiker der Philosophic, Stuttgrt, 1898), hs dcussed (especilly 144-55) number Knts most chrctertic nd importnt concepts nd expressions. Adickes, in h edion the Krik der reinen Vernunft (Berlin, 1889), hs introduced into h crply wrten notes lrge number explntions Kntin expressions. The generl h toricl reltions the Kntin terminology re treted by Eucken, Oeschichte der philosophr.hen Terminologie (139-50). The psychologicl vocbulryknt,wh especil reference to s reltions to the Ethics, 1). extensively nd crefully expounded by Alfred Hegler, Die Psychologie in Knts Ethik (Freiburg, 189 The fullest ll collec tions Knts terms nd expressions Mellins Encyclopdches Worterbuch der krchen Philosophie, oder Versuch einer fsslichen undvollstdndigen Erkldrung derin Knts krchen und dogmtchen Schriften enthltenen Begriffe und, Stze (Zilllichu nd Leipzig, 1797). Mellin, who lso pub lhed other contributions to the termino logicl comprehension Knt, here under tkes wht to betoncenencyclopedi Knts doctrine, nd n exposion the sense h expressions nd ides. The result, however, rther thesurus Kntin 589 sttements thn ny thorough explntion their forms nd menings. Mellin
hrmonizer, who smooths over difficulties s skilfully s Vihinger, in h commentry, emphsizes or even mgnifies them. Mellins book publhed in six volumes (hving eleven prts). Krugs Pkilosophches Lexikon contins lso the Kntin vocbulry, but whout the modern effort t philologicl tretment the Kntin usge. The recent Worterbuch der philosophchen Begriffe und Ausdriicke, by Eler (Berlin, 1899), so fr s hs yet ppered, contins much vluble mteril for compring Knts usge wh tht h predecessors. The monogrphic lerture upon Knt furnhes n immense number dcussions Knts terms, dcussionswhichre,however,gene rlly found only in subordintion to some more generl exposory or cricl interest. Nottempt cnherebemdetnybiblio grphicl nlys th lerture wh re ference to s berings upon Kntin ter minology. The originl mterils upon which Kntsown selection h terms bsed reto be found in theltin nd Germn works Wolff inthetextbooks Bumgrten, whose Metphysil (which reched sseventh edion in 1779) wslongknts fvoure textbook in tht subject nd finlly in the generl lerture, philosophicl nd psychologicl, Knts dy. n following the evolution Knts thought, upon the bs these contemporry influences, one hs constntly to del, course, wh ter minologicl questions, which ccordingly find their plce in the importnt monogrphic tretes Benno Erdmnn(Knts Kricmus in der ersten undin der zween Auflge der Krik der reinen Vernunft, Leipzig, 1878), nd Adickes(Knt-Studien, KielndLeipzig, 1895) treteswhich we my select from th whole lerture for especil mention in th connection. The student Knts lnguge should py due ttention to Jsches edion Knts Logik (publhed in the eighth volume the chrono logicl edion Knts works, by Hrtenstein, 1868, 1-141) nd, in regrd to Knts psychologicl terminology, should lso con sult h Anthropologic in prgmtclier Hinsicht, publhed in 1798. Knts own forml definions h terms re seldom to beccepted sfinlnor rehreports thehtoricl orthecurrent usge term, suchfor instnce s priori, to be regrded s uthortive. Knt ws once forll nohtorinthought orusge ndhresolutions stotheusehown terms re merely expressions present nd serious effort, which myor my not prove permnently efficcious, to use pr ticulr device for clrifying nd orgnizing hides. ngenerl, liegretlover nlys so tht while, like Artotle nd the Scholstics, he mkes systemtic use themethoddtinctionsfortheskeex plining or removing the contrdictions thought nd opinion, he much more rdicl thn ny h predecessors in the d tinctions tht he drws, nd h world lrgely consts definble brriers nd chsms. Knt loves, menwhile, synthes, butneverssuccessfulinthdirections intheother (see the excellent observtions Eucken, op. c., 143 5). ^ne synthetic spect h systemtic undertkings he especilly emphsizes, nmely, the idel n exhustive enumertion ll the provinces rely, ndlltheproblemsthought, which comewhinh scope. Mnythe deviceshterminology hvetodowh the pursu th idel. Thus the tble ctegories the outcome n effort, whose development occupied severl yers, to obtin complete tble the fundmentl con ceptions the understnding. Assoced whth tblelt,eqully intended to be complete, which enumertes the priori principles the understnding nd so on. n order to obtin such forml completeness, Knt sometimes led to rbrry inventions, whereby scheme filled out, in wy whose importnce cler only to himself. The methods Knts work while hews engged in the construction h doctrine nd s vrious expressions cn best be studied in the Reflexionen, eded by Pro fessor Benno Erdmnn, nd in the Lose Bltter us Knts Nchlss, eded by Rudolf Reicke. The Reflexionen re notes mde by Knt in connection wh h lectures upon Bumgrtens Metphysik. The Lose Bltter contins gret vriety frgmentry notes, mde upon vrious occsions. The termino logy used in these notes by no mens lwys in greement wh tht known through Knts publhed works. (4)Kntnever lived towrethesort encyclopedic sttement system philo sophy which he himself desired to produce. H most importnt works, the Krik der reinen Vernunft, the Krik der prktehen Vernunft, nd the Krik der Urthfilskrft, constute, in h own opinion, merely intro 59 ductory dcussions, indpensble, but needing
KANTS TERMNOLOGY intheirturntobefollowedbyreconstruction doctrine mdeintbelightthesecricl reserches. n generl, Knt conceives philo sophy s the sum totl wht he.terms reine Vsrnunfterkenntns us Begriffen n expression most esily trnslted sconceptul knowledge gined through pure reson lone. The two ntheses which define philosophy re(i) the contrst whmthemtics, nd (2) the contrst wh empiricl science. Mthemtics mkes use ides pure reson, but does so only by the intermedion the process construction, whereby Knt mens ny process such s gets expressed in digrm or figure, when the digrm or figure intended s the vible embodiment rtionl conception. Philosophy not thus dependent upon voluntry construction s objects in sensuous form. t conceives them in their pury, nd reflects upon their menings nd their connections. n contrst to empiricl science, philosophy uses no empiricl dt, s such, mongst s presup posions. Th ltter contrst in Knts definion philosophy ws, in s origin, Wolffin, nd the whole tendency Knts ownthought todeprive muchs posive mening since,skntintheend dcovers, there no theoreticl knowledge us rtiner Vernunft except the knowledge the necessry structure which must belong to the whole relm experience. n con sequence, better nme for Knts theoreticl philosophy would be the Theory Ex perience nd th nme, whose ccurcy implied by mny Knts expressions, hs been ctully dopted by some modern Kntins g.cohen). Philosophyin generl (e. divided into the two gret divions, Theo reticl nd Prcticl. Another, nd co ordinte, divion philosophy tht into s cricl or preprtory portion, clled Trnscendentlphilosophie, nd s systemtic portion, clled Metphysik. The Trnscen dentlphilosophie hs to del wh the sources nd scope our rtionl knowledge. Met physik hstosetforththesumtotlour purely rtionl, e. non-empiricl knowledge, concerning both the objects theory (God, Nture,the Soul) ndtheobjectsrtionl choicessuch,orfreedom(duty,themorl Lw,theAbsolute Good). t the Trnscen dentlphilosophie which Knt hs most fully developed. On Knts divion philosophy, onemyconsult hown essy UeherPhilotophie iiberhupt (1794) in Hrt en steins edion (1868), vi. 373 lso, the Krik i. der reinen Vernunft, Methodenlehre, 3tes Uuptstiick. On the contrst between mthe mtics nd philosophy, see the Methodenlehre, es Uuptstiick, 2nd ed. the Krik der reinen Vernunft, 751. [As now customry in ctions from Knt, the Krik der reinen Vernunft hereto beced fterthepges the second edion whileincsediffer ence between the edions, the pging the first edion tobeced for pssgestht occur only in tht edion. Other Kntin works re to be ced fter the Hrtenstein edion 1868.] One my compre, upon the sme topic, Mellins rticles Encyclopdie, Metphysik, Trnscendentlphilosophie nd ff. Pulsen, op. c., 108 Knt bynomens que uniform inhccount thesemin divions philosophy. (5) All further clssifictions Knts doctrines nd conceptions re gretly in fluenced by h psychologicl conceptions. We cn, he sys(werke, vi. 379), reduce llthepowersthehumnmindtothree : ntellect (Erkenntnsvermogen) Feeling {ds GefiildderLust undunlust, power lwys to be defined in terms th contrst plesure nd pin) ndwill(dsbegehrungsvernwgen, or the power whereby mentl sttes come tobeviewedsthecuses the extence objects). The Erkenntnsvermogen self first divided into pssive spect, the Sensi bily (Sinnlichke), thelower portion the Erkenntnsvermogen nd n ctivespect, the intellectuelles Erkenntnsvermogen, whose generl ctivy clled Dettken(Anthrojiologie, Werke, vii. 451). For th ltter, the higher portion the Erkenntnsvermogen, or the intellect proper, the words Verstnd nd Vernunft re upon occsion used lmost interchngebly, both them in broder or more inclusive sense (e.g. Verstnd in the Anthropologic, loc. c. Vernunft inthetle the Krik der reinen Vernunft, where lsoevenincludes thepriori spectthe Sinnlichke). n more exct usge, however, the Verstnd only one three specil divions the oberes Erkenntnsvermogen. The three re Verstnd, Urtlieilskrft, nd Vernunft. The Verstnd, in th more specil sense, the power tht forms concepts (Begriffe), or tht knows, or furnhes, or pplies the rules the forml constution conceptul objects. The Verstnd lso 59 the power to pprehend the uny which gets expressed in our judgments. And in th sense the Verstnd cn even be clled(kr. d.reinenvernunft, 2nded., 94) thevermogen
zu ttrtheilen. But s dtinct from the Verstnd, the Urtheiltkrft proper the power to find wht cses fll under given concepts, or the power tosubsume under rules. And the Vernunft, in contrst wh boththesepowers,thepowertosystem tize intouny,nd by mensinclusive j,rinciples, the less inclusive rules the Ver stnd (Kr.d.reinenVernunft, 2nded.,359). Thusthe Vernunft thepower which con ceives God, the Universe, nd the Morl Lw. Yet while Knt mkes these dtinctions, or relted ones, repetedly, he remins in h usge constent wh no one them (cf. Vihinger, Commentr, i. 123, 166, 454 note, nd in mny other pssges). Permnent only the tendency to define the Verstnd s the power thought in srs expressed in single ctsjudgment or conception, ndthe Vernunft sthesystem tizingtendencythoughtinsserchforll embrcing unies while the Urtkeilskrft, stnding between the two former powers, does excellent service tokntin completing the schemtm h ccounts intellectul processes, by tking chrge whtever the two other powers my seem to hve neglected. Tht the three powers the higher Erkenntnsvermogen hve peculirly pt one-to-one reltion, in their turn, to the three generl powers the mind (in tht our objective knowledge rely properly to be limed to the field the empiriclly pplied Verstnd, while the principles for the free self-determintion the Will belong to the Vernunft, ndthe Urtheilshrft especil servicein expressing thedefinble spect thevluespresent tothegefiihl), llth chrctertic thes which Knt expounds in the essy on Philosoj)hie iiberhupt, nd which enbleshimtoexplin thetleh Krikder Urtheilshrft thetretewherein Knts doctrine the Beutiful, nd h Teleology, re both contined (see theced essy, Werke, vi. 402 f.). (6) n generl,th psychologicl terminology Knt,whilethemostconstnt use s mens determining the divions h work, nd the trend h vrious reserches, bewildering complexy nd chngebleness. The bewildering effect however, duenot somuchtothemerechnges them selves, s to the fct tht Knt repetedly mkes much the importnce nd exctness dtinctions mongst the vrious mentl powers nd processes, while he himself the firstsoontolterorto ignore these very, dtinctions. Of considerble nd very bffling importnce, inknts psychologicl vocbulry, theterm Gemih,usedonthe whole very much s recent Englh wrers employ the term Mind. n generl, th word evidently felt by Knt to be reltively presupposionless, nd he so expresses himself, vi.458. Thustheterm seems nottoimply ny decion s to the problems rtionl psychology,orstothevrious spectsthe egoso tht, s Hegler well points out {Psychol, in Knts Ethik, 52), th term tkes the plce the more metphysiclly colouredtermseele,whereknths to spek the empiricl processes wherein the vrious mentl powers co-operte, nd so get their concrete expression. Yet, s the Gemih cn ffect self nd thereby produce the pheno men the innerer Sinn,nd hs life tht evidently goes beyond wht directly reveled by consciousness(eler, s. v., seems incorrectly to identify Bewusstsein nd Gemih inknts usge), thepreceimplictions the term become puzzling whenever we hve todelwhtheproblem stothesensein which the priori principles re originl, or reinnte (in srstheyrein nysense innte) in the Gemih. The mnifold uses the term Gemih hve been well collected by Hegler (loc.c.). (7) There remin two psychologicl terms Knt which cnnot be pssed over whout some mention even in the most generl sketch. These terms re innerer Sinn nd Einbildungskrft. The innerer Sinn term in very generl use in the psychology the 18th century. n origin dtes bck to the Artotelin-Scholstic doctrine the sensus commun but s 18th-century form ws lrgely due to Lockes well-known pssge upon thenoticethtthemind tkess ownopertions. Asthetermhdto compete, in s pre-kntin htory, wh the Leibnzin termapperception (lsousedbyknt), nd wh still other teims for the generl nture consciousness, s plce remined indefine. n Knts usge rendered perplexing becuse sreltions, spssive power,to the intimtely ssoced ctive processes consciousness wh which bound up. n very few pssges ( which two re given byhegler, op.c.,54),theinnersense even ppers s self ctive even s thinking nd judging. n th sense would ssume 592 thefunctions the Verstnd. n generl, however, cpcy,whinthemindor the ego, toreceive, pssively, the influence
the ctive understnding or Evnbildungskrft,ndsotogetpresentedthemoreorless orgnized fcts the inner life. Like the outer sense, presents tousphenomenlnd notultimterely,nddoesnotshowusthe egoinself, butonly theselfsempiricl. tsformtime,justsspcetheform the outer sense. But the prllel between inner nd outer sense proves to be hopelessly incomplete, ndtheterm nunhppy nd superfluous one despe s frequent use. The Einbildungskrft plys more importnt prt. t occupies, in Knts doctrine, the plce n essentilly meding principle. nllthehtory philosophy (nd lso theology) the principles tht my be clled in generl the medors hve plyed n impor tnt prt. The Logos in Stoic nd Alexn drine philosophy the Pneum in lter ncient psychologyndtheology thenousndthe Soul in the doctrine Plotinus the ttributes thesubstnceinspinoz, ndthe infine modes in the sme system the so-clled Pltonic ides s interpreted by Schopenhuer forthepurposeshownsystem: llthese re exmples such meding concepts. n terminology the nmes these medors re lwys confessedly more or less mbiguous. The mbiguy goes long wh the synthetic tendency which gives re to these conceptions, nd th mbiguy constutes t once the convenience nd the defect such terms. n depth impliction theyresuperior to the more shrply defined nd bstrct terms tht nme the opposed nd extreme principles which the medors re to bring into uny. But th depth purchsed by vgueness. The medors suggest the ctul life things better thn do the comprtively ded ex tremes but they hve the ddvntges their very concreteness. The Einbildungs krft such medor. t hs mny functions, reproductive nd productive. The former rethemorefmilirtheltterre the more importnt, since through them tht the dt sense re brought into synthes, nd the Verstndesbegriffe or forms the understnding the ctegories get pplied to experience. The Einbildungskrft, s productive, t once sensuous nd intelli gent. tthemintertheverstnd,nd infcttheverstnd inction, so thtin plces seems tomketheveryconcept the Verstnd self superfluous. ts functions remoreorlessntecedentto,ndprtfrom, our ctul consciousness. We re wre, from moment to moment, rther the results thn the originl synthetic processes the Einbildungskrft. nour prcticl life the sme power hs lso s importnt plce. The stress lid upon the Einbildungskrft in s dtinction from the rest the higher Erkenntnsvermbgen thus thretens to destroy the finly the usul threefold divion the ltter butknt preserved from dmting th consequence becuse the intimte reltions which the Einbildungskrft llthewhile estblheswhs neighbours. SeeuponthtermAnthropologic, vii. 495 7 Kr. d. reinen Vernunft (1st ed.), 103 ff., especilly 119, where the Einbildungskrft brought into reltion to Verstnd nd Apperception (2nd ed.), 151 Onemylso consult Hegler (op. c., 143ff.)Adickesin thenotestothedeductionsthetwoedions the Krik nde.f.buchner, Study 1 1 7. ff. A Knts Psychology (Monog. Suppl., No.4,to the Psychol. Rev.), 4-1 See lso Pulsen, op. c., 175. (8) BetweenKnts psychologicl nd h eptemologicl terminology stnd the im portnt terms Apperception nd E ntu, der Apperception, the generl nmes for the ctive uny consciousness, principle whose tendency expressed by the fct tht, in viewthepresenceth pperception, or inview theuny pperception, every conscious stte cpble being viewed s mine,ors,insform, theproduct my ctivy. n s most explic form, Appercep tion identicl wh self-consciousness, since when know my sttes definely, know them s my own. But one cn spek pperception when the ch denke viewed merely s the possible ccompniment every conscious stte. The idethe self, the consciousness tht who think th, my be eher cler orobscure t ny moment but,sysknt (1st ed.,117note): The possi bily the logicl form ll knowledge necessrily depends upon s reltion to th pperception s cpcy (Vermvgen). So too,inthe2nded.,131-2,heuses theten quoted expression Dschdenke musslle meine Vorstellungen begleen konnen. Th : chdenke, however,must be nctspon tney, opposed in nture to the pssivy sense. Through the work the Einbildungs krft, which pplies the forms the Verstnd tothedtsense, cometobethusbleto sy,chdenke. The oneoriginlctre ferringlltotheself tthe bsthe entire process, nd the result expresses the mening th ct, which t first 1. Qq 593
ltent or subconscious ct, in conscious form. The term Apperception comes to Knt from Leibnz. Descrtes hd erlier employed the corresponding verb. (9) The specil terminology the theory knowledge in the Kr. d. reinen Vernunft so complex, nd the interdependence the vrious terms so intimte, tht no complete ccount th terminology could be given whout lengthy exposion the whole system. One must confine the following sttement to very few importnt points nd in generl, the reminder th rticle must be devoted merely to specimens Knts terminology. (10) Knts theory knowledge, s well known, mintins tht the internl process pplying the forms the understnding to the fcts sense introduces into our whole conceptul world tht conformy to lw which the erlier rtionltic theories knowledge bd supposed to be the reveltion n bsolute externl truth, but which Knt views s no reveltion nything bsolute. While ourexperiencehstoconform tolw,nd knownindvncetobethussubjecttoneces sry principles, the lwful connectedness our experience duetotheunyppercep tion, to the synthetic work the Einbildungskrft, to the ctivy the Verstnd, to the spontney our thought (Denken) in generl, nd not to our knowledge ny bsolute or externl truth. All these expres sionsdwell, swehvenowseen,uponvrious spects wht forknt,the sme gret t, fct. the intellect tht weves the uny s own world. Menwhile, the intellect, or the Einbildungskr.fi in prticulr, indeed produktiv but not cretive (schopferch). t needs, nmely, mteril for s weving, nd whout such given mteril cn do nothing. A i. Th mteril furnhed to bythesinnlichke. The ltter, lthough pssive, hs s Forms. These re usully clled the forms the nsclmuung, e. perception. They respcendtime nd theseforms (espe cilly the ltter form, time) predetermine wht schemes, or generl types objects (Schemt), the Einbildungskrft cn weve, when pplies theformstheverstndto thefctssense. Thusthereretwotypes forms, or chrctertic condions knowledge, which re determined for us by theoriginlntureoursort intelligence: viz.theformstheverstnd,ndtheforms the Sinnlichke or the Anschuung. The forms the Anschuung Knt considers in the first divion the cricl nlys our knowledge in the Krik. Th divion clled the Aesthetik, s being the doctrine sense. TheformstheVerstndrestudiedin the Anlytik,vrhoBe nme Knt derives from the known terminology the Artotelin Logic. (11) The most generl terms which express the centrl thoughts the resulting theory knowledge cn be brought together by mens series theses. As Knt teches : () Wecnknowonlyphenomen (Erscheinungen), not things in themselves (Dinge n sich), or Noumen. (b) Butwecnknow, priori or us reiner Vernunft, tht the Erscheinungen re subject to universl nd necessry lws (Regeln), so tht priori Grundstze, upon which ll empiricl science depends, re possible, nd cn be exhustively stted,onthebs complete enumertion ll the ctegories or the understnding or the fundmentl concepts or Begriffe. (c) n view th limtion nd ccompnying necessy to be found in theworldour knowledge, the field humn insight cn be defined s Erfhrung. Erfhrung constutes, in sense, one whole for lthough empiricl fcts re countless, nd lthough the brute dtsenserenotcontrolled bytheunder stnding, the order the relm experience duetothectegories,ndtheeinheder mbglichen Erfhrung, or uny possible experience, ssured in dvnce, by virtue the reltion ll specil fcts experience tothech denke ortotheoriginluny Apperception, (d) The knowledge th, whole theory for Knt, trnscendentl knowledge. Applied to the interprettion theproblems philosophy, frees us from the Antinomien wh which humn thought hs thus fr been beset. tridsusfrom bondge to the necessry illusions, the Di lecticthe Vernunft ndsotoncesetsthe due lims to our knowledge, nd ssures us the sovereignty rtionly whin the sphere tht open to our science. Hereby the possibily(moglichke) experience, science, nd synthetic judgments priori, estblhed. (12) Allthetermsthusnmedrecentrl importnce for Knt ndmnythemre difficult. We my begin here wh one the most fmous nd puzzlingthelt the djective trnscendentl. The word hd in scholstic terminology s estblhed usge, which very different from the Kntin 594 usge. t ws n djective pplied to those predictes which the scholstic doctrine re
yrded s trnscending in generly even the Artotelin ctegories themselves. These trnscendentls were uny, truth, nd good ness, together wh thing nd something. But the term trnscendentls referred solely to the high degree generly these predictes, ndhdnoreltion tothepossibilyour knowingthem, orto the condions our knowledge them. n Bumgrtens Metphysic ( 72-123), while these sme pre dictes, unum, verum, bonwm, re treted upon the bs the scholstic trdion, stress lid upon the fct tht, in every being, these predictes re in some sense present necessy nd unum trnscendentler trnslted, in Bumgrtens note ( 73), by the Germn phrse wesentlich eins, while Vers trnscendentl ( 89) trns lted in the note by nothwendige metphysche Whrhe. The twold chrcter the ephet trnscendentl, s thus known to Knt in former usge, ppered to him to wrrnt n nlogous, but novel usge. For trnscen dentlhdthus been () nodirectpredicte ny object, but predicte techniclly pplied to certin predictes, viz., s we hve seen, to the predictes unum, verum, bonum. (b)thdlso (in Bumgrtens usge)come to imply certin necessy nd universly boutthese predictes themselves. Hvingonce proposedtohimselftheproblemtheory necessryknowledge,or knowledge vlidin dvnce ll experience, Knt needed pre dicte to chrcterize the type knowledge which should constute th new theory. He chose trnscendentl, nd declred(kr. d. reinenvernunft,2nded.,25) thtbytrnscendentleerkenntnshe intended () tomen notnykindknowledge objects,but knowledge concerned wh prticulr type knowledge(erkenntnsrt), viz. tht type knowledge which ( 3) hnewtheory the necessry principles the understnding ws to embody. Th new usge thus imted, for the purposes Knts theory, both the spects Bumgrtens formerusge. (13) But the mening trnscendentl s theoreticl knowledge bout the necessry prin ciples ll knowledge bout objects never reminsstedfstinknts usge,justbecuse he hd so long lectured upon Bumgrtens text, nd becuse the old usge entered into ll sorts curious psychologicl complictions, inh own mind,whthe ides ssoced wh h new enterpre. The term otherwe explined in the Kr.d.reinenVernunft,z$2-$. t otherwe used in fshion which Adickescllsweherzig (see hnoteto p. 25 the2nded.thekr.d.reinenvernunft), nd which Vihinger declres to constute the mostdifficultterminologicl problem in Knt, nd even inll modern philosophy (Commentr, i. 467). The term ten confused wh trnscendent, nd then mens going beyond, or trnscending, the lims humn knowledge. Of the other menings, no complete ccount hs yet been publhed byny student. They must be mde out from the context, ech time fresh. (14) Our necessry knowledge bout the world experience foundeduponpriori principles. The term here used hs s origin in the well-known Artotelin dtinction betweenwhtpriorinnture ndwht priorforus. nmodernthought, eversince the scholstic period, the Artotelin d tinction hd been fmilir nd the specil expressions priori nd posteriori, used s djective phrses qulifying especilly th noun demonstrtion, hd been employed since the lter scholsticm. To know or demon strte priori inth sense, to know through cuses or principles, s opposed to knowledge gined wholly through the prti culr fcts experience. Knt gives the term new nd more specil mening. Know ledge priori for him knowledge in dvnce ll experience, ndhence knowledge the content ny the necessry concepts or principles thought. These necessry principles re themselves priori, becuse they re independent experience. (15) But by virtue th knowledge, which we getthrough theprioriprinciples, we become cquinted wh phenomen, nd not wh Noumen, wh Erscheinungen, nd not whdingensich. Thetermshereusedhve become extremely fmilir in recent lerture. Their Kntin usge still suggests, however, mny topics controversy. The phrse n sich goesbcktothewell-knowngreekusge, both Plto nd Artotle, ccording to which in, nything tht truly exts, or tht truly known, exts or known ko6 <wt6, e.per i. seorinse (cf.artotle,met.,v. 4.1029b). Knts reltive novelty in usge lies in the fctthtin speking thedingn sichhe emphsizes the thing in self, not in n bstrct contrst tootherthings in generl, ortosreltions tosuchotherthings,but 595 in contrstwh knowledgeonly. Thcon trstthethinginselfwhthethings seeming or ppernce ws indeed not new but Knt expressly emphsizes s ginst Q q 2
llotherspectsthensick. TheDingn sich then the thing s exts independently ndprtfromllknowledge. Theprin ciplproblems stothedingnsichre: () whether Knt relly ssumes s extence s posivefct(6) howheconceivesthtex tence nd how he reconciles such ffirm tion thethings extencensichwhthe (c) theory the subjectivy ll our knowledge. While dcussion these problems belongs elsewhere,there cnbenodoubt thtknt does ssume the independent rely Dinge nsich s posive fct, nd does not mke ny serious ttempt to demonstrte tht rely. Thecorrelte thedingnsich the Erscheinung, to which, however, Knt ttributes not mere extence in our privte nd olted experience from moment to mo ment, but certin secondry type rely, orobjectivy,duetothefctthttheer scheinung follows universl lws, which re equllyvlidforllmen.an Erscheinung no mere Schein fctforllusmen, verifible content possible experience. (16)nddion tothetermdingnsich, Knt uses for the objects the metempiricl relm two other terms :Noumenon ndtrnscendentler Gegenstnd. The former these terms comes tokntfromhown dogmtic period (cf. hnugurldserttion, Werke, ii. 403). t the relic the stge when he still opposed to the phenomenl world the world true Being, knowble, in bstrction from ll sensuous fcts, through the pure intellect. Noumenon rely A suchsonewould knowwhocouldseizeulti mte truth through h understnding lone, whout the id sense. As posive con cept, th whollyrejected byknt inh cricl period. Viewed negtively, the con ceptthenoumenon stheobjectwhichwe (who reboundtosensewheneverweseekto win ny posive knowledge) do not know nd cnnotknow, thnoumenon becomes, inde nottion, identicl wh the Ding n sichbut the two concepts hve different origin. The Dingnsich concept expressing selbstverstdndliche Vorussetzurtg (see Benno Erdmnns work before ced, Knts Kricmus), viz. the presumption tht phenomen somewht independently rel must correspond. The Noumenon concept reched by first conceiving n object the pure intellect, nd bythenobservingthtsuchnobjectmustfor everlie beyondourken,sincewht weknow phenomenl world, where sense-fcts re subjecttothepriorilwstheverstnd. (17) The trnscendentler Gegenstnd concept still different origin. The Verstnd refersllcontentsense tonob ject. Th the very nture the Ver stnd. Hereby ccomplhes s tsk conceiving thefctssense sinuny. But ny object once conceived, through n intel lectul synthes sense-dt, e.g. th house, thstone,remins, snobjectpresenttoour experience, still but Vorstellung, i.e. pr ticulr ide, or content our consciousness. Sosoon sweview thvorstellung ssuch, weregin ledto seek forsobject nd soon. Thelimthprocessreferring the contents experience to still further objects s their bs given bythe con ceptnetws=x,where wecnonly sy tht n Etws, something in generl. Th the trnscendentler Gegenstnd, the object tht m trying to know through every prticulr ct my empiricl knowledge. Th object, the permnently sought beyond my empiricl serch for truth, cn never be presented in experience. therefore cn only define s beyond every experience. t the lwmyconsciousnessthusto seek for,but nevertind,theultimte correltemyown conscious ctivy, nmely, the finl object tht m trying to know. While the Noumenon, then, s such, first posively conceived s the object the pure intellect, nd there fter found to be nothing knowble tous, the trnscendentler Gegenstnd, s such, first conceived s tht which would finlly 59 determine, nd present would stfy, my empiricl serch for thetruthmy own objects. The ltter, then, der gndich unbestimmle Gednke von Etws Uberhupt, or der Gegenstnd einer sinnlichen Anschuuiig uberhupt. Since cn never be found whin experience, but driven, through the essentil endlessness the serch, beyond ll if experience, the trnscendentler Gegenstnd comes tlstto denote, oncemore,thebso lute beyond, forwhich theding nsichws the first nme. (18) The three terms then, wh different origin nd connottion, come, in most pssges where they re used, to denote the sme object, the inccessible rely. See Kr. d. reinen Vernvmft, 1st ed., 109, nd the section Von dem Grunde der Unterscheidung oiler Gegenstdnde Uberhupt in Phenomen und Noumen, in both edions. Compre the Doctor- Dserttion Budolf Lehmnn, Knts Lehre vom Ding n sich (Berlin, 1878) Cohens dcussion in Knts Theorie der Erflirwtg
KANTS TERMNOLOGY (2nd ed., Berlin, 1885), 501 nd the ccounts BennoErdmnn (op.c.) nd Pulsen (pp.153-5 hop. c.). (19) The relm our ctul knowledge Erfhrung. Here gin we hve word mbiguous mening. n generl used in two senses: (1) sthesumtotlfctsso fr s they re determined not by necessry principles, but by the immede dt ff. sense (2) s thesumtotl fctsinsr stheyredetermined tounybytheppli ction the principles the Understnding. ndresobrought undertheuny pper ception. n the first sense, Erfhrung the source knowledge in sr s not priori. n the second sense, Erfhrung relm possibleperceptions, llwhich re woven into uny by their universl nd synthetic reltions to the self. (20) The judgments which we cn mke, in dvnce, concerning ll objects possible experience, re synthetic judgments priori. Such judgments re opposed, s synthetic, to nlytic judgments. The ltter judgments express in their predictes nothing but wht ws lredy contined in the explic or known mening their subjects e.g. Everytringle hs three ngles. Butsyn thetic judgment psses beyond the direct mening s subject to bring th mening intounywhthtnewpredicte e. Everychngeh-i cuse. Tht suchsyn thetic judgments priori cn be mde re grding the whole constution our ex perience Knts principl thes in h Deduction the Ctegories. The ctegories themselves(by no mens identicl eher in nme or in chrcter wh the originl Cte gories Artotle, despe some points greement) re the fundmentl concepts priori the Verstnd, the forms in conformy wh which the Einbildungskrft weves into unythedtsense. Theltthecte gories cn be given exhustively, s Knt thinks, nd upon th bs n eqully exhus tive lt the Grundstze the under stnding, the principles or bsl synthetic judgments priori,cnbedrwnup. (21) The Anlytik Knts Krik devoted to the development th theory Erfhrung. The Dilektik devoted to n g. exmintion the inevble clims nd efforts the Vemunfl,our orgn prin ciples, to trnscend ll experience by ttempt ing to weve the provionl unies the Verstnd into bsolute unies. These efforts the Vernunft resnecessrystheyre doomed to filure. We cnnot primrily void the illusions reson, but we cn detectthem. n doing sowedel,first,wh the Antinomien or necessry conflicts between contrdictory proposions, to which the Ver nunft led. We solve these contrdictions byshowing thttheyreduetoourtendency toview sbsolutely truethingsinthem selves, principles which pply only to pheno men. The lter dcussions the Dilektik led to the problems Rtionl Psychology nd Rtionl Theology. Buthenceforth,inthe Kr. d. reinen Vernunft, while the termino logy remins intricte enough, tener in touch wh tht the older metphysic nd one who hsproceeded srhsgrppled wh the most serious the terminologicl difficulties the Krik. (22)The foregoing must servemerely s specimens some the most fmous Knts terms, nd s instnces the generl principles regrding the nture nd growth husgewhich hvebeendcussedinthe erly portion th rticle. No spce cn herebegiven totheterminology thelter works Knt, except in sr sthefore going dcussions lredy give guidnce. GLOSSARY. [The numbersrefertotheprgrphs th rticle.] A priori, 14. Aesthetik, O. Anlytic Judgments, 20. Anlytik, 10, 21. Anschuung, 10 Antinomien, 11. Apperception, Begriff, 5, Ctegorien, 7, 7, 8, 11. 11. seelsotkbminology (Germn). 11. Den ken, 10. Dilektik, 11, 31. Dingnsich,11,15 inreltion tonoumenon ndto trnscendentler Gegenstnd, 16-18. 5, Einbildungskrft, produktive, 10. Einhe der Apperception, Erfhrung, 11. Erfhrung, 11, 19. Erkenntnsvermogen, Erscheinung, 11,15. 7 5. Forms Sense nd Understnding, 10. Gefuhl, Gemth, 6. Grundstze priori, 11. 597 5. 8 Einhedermoglichen ch denke, 1. nnerer Sinn, ntellect, 10. Krik der reinen Vtrnunjt, generl chrcter terminology, terminology s principl theories, ic 11. 8, 1 6, 7. 9
KARMA KATATONA Metphysik, 4. Moglichke der Erfhrung, 11. Noumenon,, 16-18. Obere Erkenntnijvermogen, 5. Phenomen, 11. Philosophic in generl, 4. Prktche Philosophic, 4. Produktive Einbildungskrft, 10. Regeln, 5, 11. Schein, 15. Schemt, 10. Seele, 6. Sinnlichke in generl, 5. See lso 10. SynthetUche Urtheile, 1r, JO. Theoretche Philosophic, 4. Trnscendent, 13. Trnscendentl, 11-13. Trnscendentler Gegenstnd, 17, 18. Trnscendenttphilosophie, 17, 18. Urtheilskrft, 5. Vernunft, 5, i. Verunfterkenntnp, 4. Verstnd, 5, 17. (ML) Krm [Snsk. Krmn,fromKr,todoor crete]. n Hindu philosophy, the principle individul extence by virtue which the summorldesertinthelifeonesentient being becomes the germ which develops nother in whose destiny predetermin ing fctor. Whether the Brhmtic metphysic the Vednt or the more negtive conceptions which underlie Buddhm be regrded s the truer expression Hindu thought, still true tht in the phenomenl world custion nd chnge the only perstent feture the process metempsychos, which n endless re-cretion the world in obedience to morl necessy. The source th necessy Krm,which theseedoutwhich new life emerges. A mn dies but leves h Krm, the sumh morl desert,which necesstes nother life s the berer s retribution. The process unending, but the motive Krm exerting the pressure morl destiny tht imperhble nd inexorble. The only escpe from th ftly through the suppression Krm self, which cn be ttined only by trvelling the Hindu rod slvtion. The suppression Krm mens freedom from the necessy extence nd bsorption into Nirvn, which eher Brhm, the universl life, or nothing ness. SeeOrientlPhilosophy (ndi). Lerture: Deussen, Die Sutrs des Vednt (Leipzig, 1887) Appendix to h Metphysics nd rt. Buddhm, in Encyc. Br.(9th ed.) Buddhm, in Orientl Re ligions Series (ed. bymx Mtiller). (A.t.o.) 598 Kryokines [Gr. mpvov,nut,+nivr/cns, movement] :Ger. (thesme)fr.criocinese tl. criocinesi. ndirect nucler divion, involving the formtion spireme or nucler thred, s segmenttion into Chromosomes (q. v.), nd the splting the chromosomes. A term suggested by Schleicher in 1878 equivlent to the mos Flemming(i882). See Mos. Lerture : Schleicher, Die Knorpelzelltheilung Flemming, Zellsubstnz. (C.U.M.) Kryoplsm [Gr. mpvov, nut,+irxo-p, thing formed] : Ger.Zellkernxubstnz Fr. crioplsme tl.crioplmn. Thenucler, s opposed to the cytoplsmic, substnce the cell. Aterm duetoflemming (1882). nthe sme yer Strsburger introduced the term nucleoplsm for the sme substnce. Lerture: Flemming, Zellsubstnz Strsburger, Ueber den Theilungsvorgng der Zellkerne. (c.ll.m.) Ktbolm [Gr. Kr,down, -f-/3dxxftv,to cst] : Ger. Ktbolmus Fr. ctboligme tl. ctbolmo. The dtinctive Metbo lm (q.v.) whereby complex orgnic sub stnces brek down into less complex forms wh concomnt libertion energy. A term introduced by Gskell in 1886. Cf. Anbolm. (c.ll.m.) ^Cttoni [Gr. Kr, down, +rnw, to stretchtightly]:ger.ktionie, Spnnungsirrsinn Fr. cttonie tl. cttoni. A mentl dorder wh mrked neuro-musculr symptoms,describedbykhlbumin 1874. Although not dmted by ll wrers s dtinct dorder, but only s the presence group symptoms in cses mentl stupor orcirculrinsny, &c, yetclini clly, s well s theoreticlly, the term hs been recognized in recent lerture (cf. Krepelin, Psychrie, 441 ff.). n typicl cses thedeseshowstfirst condion depression, melncholi, nd dtress which condion t times preceded by period nervousness, unsettlement, hedche, lnguor, desire for solude, nd the like. Wh the depression re pt to occur hllucintions nd illusions, mostly connected wh the self-ccustions nd dtress the ptient. The depression gives plce to, or t times replced by, condion excement nd gtion, wild, senseless ctions nd excing hllucintions nd in th stgetht themoredtinctive symptoms kttoni reobserved. There n beynce or bsence movements, even movements