Notes on Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful The Unity of Art 3ff G. sets out to argue for the historical continuity of (the justification for) art. 5 Hegel new legitimation based on the anthropological foundation and the dominant concept, of art. 6 The integration between community, society, and the Church on the one hand and the selfunderstanding of the creative artist on the other depended on art having a legitimate place in the world. This is what is lost in modernity and provides a fuller understanding of Hegel s thesis of the end of art. 7 Art as religion of culture and art as provocation. 8f Rupture between modern art and the pre-modern. 9 Basic Principle: Continuity of past and present art in spite of what appears to be a radical break. 10 [W]hat follows from this unity of what is past and what is present? [G. presupposes a unity of past and present in art.] The continuity is not simply at the formal (aesthetic) level. There is also a social interaction and participation called for by the art and artist. 11 What do we take for granted when viewing art of the past? Historical consciousness and modern self-consciousness are combined in our experience of art. Everything we see stands before us and addresses us directly as if it showed us ourselves. Our Modern Undertanding of Art Historical Consciousness Reflective Self-Consciousness What is taken for granted = background (not scholarly not a world-view) 12 PARTICIPATION SELF-RECOGNITION COMMUNICATION The problem is bridging the enormous gap between the traditional form and content of Western art and the ideals of contemporary artists. Art as it is understood today as fine art is a relatively new concept. 12f Knowledge, skill, and use are Plato s concerns with respect to art. The work points toward the sphere of common use and common understanding. But how do we distinguish the work of fine art from mechanical art? Mimesis is the key in relation to nature (phusis). The work is not real in the same way as what it represents is real. Art is poietike episteme productive knowledge that frees the work and puts it to use. 13 But art points to (or out ) the universal. This is one of the keys to understanding art. 13ff And then there s the beautiful.
15 The emergence of aesthetics coincides with 18 th century rationalism and the concept of the autonomy of art. It takes on a kind of religious function. The role of the beautiful and its relation to truth is the second key to understanding art. It bridges the chasm between the ideal and the real. 15ff The third key is found in philosophical aesthetics and Kant s Critique of Judgment. 16f 20f We moderns don t look for the universal in a beautiful thing, but relish the particular. Suspended between pure appearance and meaning (significance) without determinate concepts. 22 G. stresses once again the importance of the anthropological basis of our experience of art. Play 22f Play as free impulse (positive) vs. play as freedom from particular ends (negative). [Cf. Berlin on positive and negative freedom.] 1. This notion of play involves movement to and fro (e.g., play of light, waves, etc.) which is not directed toward a final end or resting place. 2. In art it has the form of self-movement and expression. [Cf. De Anima 1.3 & 1.4.405b33-408a34. Cf. also Wittgenstein on games.] 3. So play is self-movement that does not pursue a particular end or purpose [outside its self-expression?] 23f Play involves reason, i.e. self-discipline and order, but in a non-purposive way. [Here the use of non-purposive seems a bit too strong.] Constraints and rules are self-imposed and intentional something is intended in a particular way as a particular thing. [24] Self-reflection or awareness in this process is a feature of the activity that distinguishes it as art and can be understood as participation. This is part of what G. means by saying play is a rational process. Play, in other words, is an action something we do and understand as an activity a particular kind of activity that we choose. [T]he act of playing always requires a playing along with. 24f Play also includes a reduction in the distance separating the spectator and the work of art. This is part of its communicative aspect. Is the unity of the work lost then in the breakdown of distance? G. argues that the hermeneutic identity incorporates the unity with collaborative engagement playing along with. Ex. musical improvisation. 25 Hermeneutic Identity establishes the unity of the work and presupposes intention. 25f The work is not necessarily to be understood as tied to a classical ideal of harmony. But to fully grasp the work, one must play along. This puts the spectator in the role of an active agent. It also goes beyond mere memory. It requires a comparable intention or assent from the spectator, which itself gives rise to meaning and understanding. 2
26 The work of art becomes a focal point of recognition and understanding, with variation and difference. It issues a challenge which expects to be met. In meeting this challenge we fill out or complete the work for ourselves. 27 Each viewer needs the freedom and flexibility to fill in creatively and meaningfully. This is part of what makes the work a hermeneutic object. 28 Summary So what The identity of the work is not guaranteed by any classical or formalist criteria, but is secured by the way in which we take the construction of the work upon ourselves as a task. Cf. identity in variation [29] 28f 30f Perception and Aesthetic Nondifferentiation ( indeterminate reference ) In addition to perception, the moment of interpretation is crucial. Cf. Kant seeing art as if it were nature, and nature as if it were a work of art. The two come together in our understanding of beauty in art and nature. 31 Modern art raises the issue of how we see and how art informs what we see outside of art. Indeterminate reference links to G s discussion of symbol. Symbol 32f The significance of the beautiful work goes beyond what is immediately present and intelligible or understood. There should be something else that can also be experienced immediately. A symbol was understood by the Greeks as that which completes whatever corresponds to it. It completes a particular and makes it whole by adding a kind of missing fragment. This means that in any encounter with art, it is not the particular, but rather the totality of the experienceable world, man s ontological place in it, and above all his finitude before that which transcends him, that is brought to experience. But it does not mean that the indeterminate anticipation of sense that makes a work significant for us can ever be fulfilled so completely that we could appropriate it for knowledge and understanding in all its meaning. 33 On G s view, the symbolic in art rests upon an intricate interplay of showing and concealing. There is a leap between the planning and the executing on the one hand and the successful achievement on the other. 33f G. replaces the notion of work with creation to mark the sense in which the irreplaceable emerges stands and is there Ge-bilde. He claims this is analogous to Benjamin s concept of aura. 34 Thus, art achieves more than meaning. Heidegger s concept of truth is the key to understanding that additional something that which resists meaning yet makes itself present or shows up as insurmountable. But how is the hidden related to the symbolic that which allows meaning to present itself? 34f G. tries to articulate the sense of art as irreplaceable and symbolic. 35 [This notion, or conviction in, the irreplaceability of the work of art brings to mind the debate over a perfect copy of a work of art. If the indistinguishable copy is not as good as the original, it may be due to the additional something. But that seems to suggest an idealist or mystical notion of something that goes beyond the material being of the work. Perhaps 3
we could resolve this issue by understanding static works of art (paintings, sculptures, etc.) as temporal. If they have hermeneutic identities to which we contribute, perhaps the multiple realization of the material being of the work is not a problem.] 36 G. approaches the issue of representation vs. reproduction, but does not push it to the indistinguishable. What is it that cannot be reproduced? The key lies in mimesis. Something is represented or brought forth in sensuous abundance. 37f There is an increase in being that something acquires by being represented. This is linked to the activity of the participant/spectator as in play. The particular manifestation of truth is crucial here. That s what keeps the work from being a mere manifestation of the Idea (Plato, Hegel). Art is only encountered in a form that resists pure conceptualization. The work moves us and changes us when we engage with it in the appropriate way. [W]hat the work of art has to say can only be found within itself. 38f This shareable potential in art is linked to our sense of language and communication, or communicability. It s the basis for creating a community. Festival 39 A festival is an experience of community. 40 We celebrate in as much as we are gathered for something, and this is particularly clear in the case of the experience of art. It is not simply the fact that we are all in the same place, but rather the intention that unites us and prevents us as individuals from falling into private conversations and private, subjective experiences. [This is in stark contrast to what we see happening today in museums, where the visit is a form of tourism captured in photo ops in front of the work of art. There may be a fine line between festival and carnival, or tourism where one collects experiences a kind of perverse variation on technological consumption.] 42 [How does this festival time apply to reading a novel? Is it comparable to modern ways of looking at a painting? Is absorption outside festival?] 43 Autonomous Time 44 Is there not also an aspect of rhythm involved? Yes, and G. steps in here with it. Time (tempo) and rhythm are both aspects of our temporal engagement with a work on its own terms. [Seems a covert appeal to purity in G s discussion of the poem.] 45 Summary 47 The excess of play is the real ground of our creative production and reception of art, but also the more profound anthropological dimension that bestows permanence. Recognition means knowing something as that with which we are already acquainted. 48 A shared community of meaning is essential to understanding a work of art. This imposes a kind of responsibility on the spectator/participant. 50 If art shares anything with the festival, then it must transcend the limitation of any cultural definition of art, as well as the limitations associated with its privileged cultural status. It must also remain immune to the commercial structures of our social life. 4
52 [S]omething can only be called art when it requires that we construe the work by learning to understand the language of form and content so that communication really occurs. [Cf. Schapiro, The Liberating Quality of Avant-Garde Art ] Questions Can we even talk about the legitimacy of art today? What could possibly legitimize it? According to whom? According to whose interests would it appear legitimate? Is the invitation of a challenge to the spectator a form of legitimacy? Would taking up the challenge be a form of legitimacy? Are both required? 5