Psuche as Substantial Form

Psuche as Substantial Form March 24, 2014 1

After mentioning and discussing previous accounts of the soul, Aristotle states in De Anima II.1 his intention to begin his own definition of the soul: "Τὰ μἐν ὑπὸ τῶν πρότερον παραδεδομένα περὶ ψθχῆς εἰρησθω πάλιν δ' ὥσπερ ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς ἐπανίωμεν, πειρώμενοι διορίσαι τί ἐστι ψυχὴ καὶ τίς ἂν εἴη κοινότατος λόγος αὐτῆς." 1 Keeping his word, Aristotle begins to give a general definition of the soul. By the close of the chapter, he seems to have achieved his goal as he states: "τύπῳ μὲν οὖν ταύτῃ διωρίσθω καὶ ὑπογεγράφθω περὶ ψυχῆς" (413a9-10). 2 Having given a general definition, Aristotle is ready to begin a closer and more specific examination of the soul. In his essay "Aristotle's Definitions of "Psuche,'" 3 however, J. L. Ackrill asserts that the account Aristotle gives in De Anima II.1 is problematic. In Aristotle's application of his standard hylomorphic account to the body-soul composite, Ackrill argues that his account of the soul becomes "unintelligible" 4 in light of the homonymy principle. This difficulty Ackrill raises has spurred much discussion. Among the responses, Jennifer Whiting in her essay "Living Bodies" 5 claims to offer a solution. In this paper, I will first present Ackrill's articulation of the difficulty and his refutation of possible solutions. Then, I will present Whiting's response and her 1 Aristotle, De Anima, ed. W. D. Ross (New York: Oxford UP, 1959), 25: 412a3-6. For the rest of the paper, I will use in-text citation for this text, providing my translation in footnotes. "So then, the opinions concerning the soul handed down by those who came before have been recorded. Again, just as from the beginning, let us return to the point, attempting to define what the soul is and what might be its most general definition." 2 "So then, by this account let "soul" be defined and sketched out in outline." 3 J. L. Ackrill, "Aristotle's Definition of "Psuche,'" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, 73 (1972-1973): 119-133. 4 Ibid, 126. 5 Jennifer Whiting, "Living Bodies," in Essays on Aristotle's De Anima, ed. Martha C. Nussbaum and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (New York: Oxford UP, 2003), 75-91. 2

furthering of the discussion. Finally, I will present St. Thomas Aquinas' commentary on the text as providing a solution to the difficulty as well as my own evaluation and reflection. I Ackrill picks out three formulae that Aristotle offers for the definition of the soul in De Anima II.1: "(a) 'the form of a natural body that has life potentially'; (b) 'the first actuality of a natural body that has life potentially'; and (c) 'the first actuality of a natural body that has organs'." 6 In such formulae, Aristotle is relying upon the hylomorphic account of what a thing is that distinguishes three elements: matter, form, and the composite of these two. 7 Such an account, Ackrill claims, puts to use the "is" of constitution, so that: "An item designated under (1) is (constitutes) an item under (3) if it has the form (shape, character, power) indicated under (2). Under (1) will normally be found material- or stuff-words; under (3), sortals; and under (2), names or descriptions of properties, structures, powers, and the like." 8 Aristotle regularly makes use of the hylomorphic account and applies it to a range of various things. An axe, for instance is explained as wood and iron (matter) that possess the power to chop (form) and so constitute an axe (composite). Similarly, potentialities and actualities fit the same account. Thus, an orchestra's ability to perform a symphony (matter) can be actualized (form) and so constitute a performance (composite). It becomes clear, then, that in De Anima II.1, Aristotle is merely taking his familiar hylomorphic account and applying it to living things. Yet, Ackrill calls attention to a critical difficulty in transferring such an account to living things. In applying the hylomorphic account to 6 Ackrill, 119. My translation does not differ from Ackrill's significantly. 7 The hylomorphic account is fundamental to Aristotelean metaphysics. He relies upon hylomorphism in explaining what things are and it is crucial for his explanation of change. 8 Ackrill, 119. 3

non-living things, there is a common trait: the matter is something that is able to be picked out. Wood and iron, for example, can be picked out as the matter of the composite axe; one can imagine the wood and iron before they became part of an axe and recognize that they need not have become an axe. Similarly, it is possible, in most cases, for the wood and iron to remain should the axe be destroyed. The same applies to potentialities and actualities. From this observation, Ackrill concludes that the hylomorphic account: "depend(s) upon the idea that something that is actually the case might not have been: this stuff might not have been so arranged, the capacity being now displayed might have remained undisplayed." 9 Yet, having established this requirement, the application of the hylomorphic account to living things becomes impossible, Ackrill argues, due to what is referred to as Aristotle's "homonymy principle." 10 According to this principle, something ensouled or functionally defined does not, properly speaking, exist prior to or after being ensouled or having the capacity to perform its function. Such a principle, Ackrill asserts, forces Aristotle's account of the bodysoul-composite to be "unintelligible." 11 For, according to the the hylomorphic account, the body of a living thing must be able to be picked out as that which might not have been the case. Yet, according to the homonymy principle, such a body could not possibly have been the case prior to being ensouled. Thus, Ackrill's "complaint" is that Aristotle's position: "commits him to something that he cannot allow to be possible in the case of living beings, namely that what has form might have lacked it that the same matter both has and might not have had the form." 12 In order to save Aristotle's account of the soul, Ackrill proposes three possible solutions. First, one could disregard the homonymy principle altogether. In doing so, one could point to 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid, 125-6. 11 Ibid, 126. 12 Ibid, 126-7. 4

Aristotle's lack of precision in his setting down of the principle as he is not clear in saying how strict the principle holds. For example, it is quite clear that Aristotle considers an axe that is no longer capable of chopping as an axe only in name. It is not so clear, however, if he would thereby consider an axe that has merely become blunt, and still capable of being re-sharpened, also as an axe only in name. 13 Indeed, it seems more reasonable that he would not. If, then, the homonymy principle would not apply in such cases, it seems it could also be argued as inapplicable to the body of a living thing if one considers the body as capable of being reanimated. Such a case would then allow for the body to be that which might not have been ensouled and that which will survive the loss of the soul. Though such thought experiments are increasingly credible with modern advancements in technology and medicine, Ackrill ultimately disregards this possibility. Not only is it foreign to Aristotle's thought, but it also fails to get at the root of the difficulty. 14 The second possibility Ackrill presents is for the homoiomerous parts, 15 such as flesh, bones, and blood, to serve as the matter of a living thing as opposed to the body. This proposal would apparently solve the difficulty. Yet, while granting that Aristotle often draws distinctions between the homoiomerous parts and the functionally defined parts, Ackrill denies that the former provides a solution to the original difficulty. For, in several texts, Aristotle attributes functions to the homoiomerous parts just as he does to the body and its organs. Thus, the homoiomerous parts, too, fall subject to the same charge laid against the body. Namely, the homoiomerous parts as such are necessarily alive. 16 13 In a footnote to his commentary on the text, Ronald M. Polanksy denies this argument by Ackrill. Rather, Aristotle is, in fact, aware of such considerations in which things are temporarily incapable of performing their functions. See Aristotle's De Anima: a critical commentary (New York: Cambridge UP, 2007), 164. 14 Ackrill, 127-8. 15 As the term suggests, a homoiomerous part is such that all its parts are similar to one another and to itself. It is a simple and uniform mixture. 16 Ibid, 128-30. 5

The third and final possibility Ackrill proposes is for the four elements to be the matter of a living thing. The elements, unlike the homoiomerous parts, are not functionally defined and are thereby not necessarily alive. Further, Aristotle holds that any material is ultimately composed out of the elements and even refers, at times, to the elements as the 'matter' of man. 17 Despite such accounts, Ackrill shows that other texts make clear that Aristotle would not consider the elements as the material of man or that the elements could even be said to be potentially a man, 18 for Aristotle regards them as too remote. Thus, the elements also fail to serve as as an alternative for the matter of a living thing. 19 So, having exhausted the possibilities, Ackrill concludes that the hylomorphic account is inadequate in explaining what the soul of a living thing is. 20 II Accepting the difficulty Ackrill raises, Whiting responds by asserting that it rests upon two assumptions: (a) that the homoiomerous parts are the ultimate matter of a living thing to the exclusion of the four elements, and (b) that the homoiomerous parts, being functionally defined, cannot survive the loss of the soul. 21 Whiting, however, cites two instances within the very passage of De Anima II.1 where Aristotle lays down the homonymy principle which both seem to indicate that something of the living thing does survive the loss of the soul. First, in applying the principle to the eye, Aristotle says: "ἧς ἀπολει πούσης οὐκέτ' ὀφθαλμός, πλὴν 17 Ibid, 130. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid, 130-2. 20 Ackrill does not think that living things are the only things that pose difficulties for Aristotle's hylomorphism. He mentions chemical mixtures as similarly resisting fitting the mold. For instance, in the example he gives, the ingredients that go into a cake cannot be picked out once the cake has been baked, see 132-3. 21 Whiting, 78. 6

ὁμωνύμως" 22 (412b21). Highlighting οὐκέτ', Whiting asserts that something is no longer an eye. 23 Likewise, in applying the principle to the whole body, Aristotle says: "ἔστι δὲ οὐ τὸ ἀποβεβληκὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ δυνάμει ὂν ὥστε ζῆν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔχον" 24 (412b25-6). Highlighting Aristotle's use of the perfect participle ἀποβεβληκὸς, Whiting concludes that something is no longer a potentially living thing. 25 Thus, in both cases, there is something of the living thing that survives the loss of the soul. To allow something to survive the loss of the soul, Whiting must address the two assumptions she introduces, and she starts with the second. Though most, including Ackrill, disregard the possibility of the homoiomerous parts surviving the loss of the soul, as they are functionally defined just as the body and organs are, Whiting argues to the contrary, citing a passage from the Metaphysics. 26 In this passage, Aristotle admits that it is not clear when the flesh and blood of a living thing perishes. 27 If, however, the flesh and blood are functionally defined strictly and rely upon the soul to persist, Aristotle's admission must be explained. Whiting's answer is to pick out two distinct accounts of flesh that Aristotle gives throughout his works, namely, functional flesh and compositional flesh. 28 The former is defined by its relation to the other functionally defined parts of the body. Thus, if this relation is destroyed, for instance, by the loss of the soul, it cannot survive; it looses its ability to function and is not the same flesh strictly. 22 "Which, if it (the power to see) is taken away, there is no longer an eye, except equivocally." 23 Ibid, 78. 24 "And that which has lost its soul is not which is potentially alive, but that which has a soul." 25 Whiting, 78-9. 26 Metaphysics, 4.12. 27 Whiting, 79. 28 Ibid. 7

Yet, Aristotle also discusses flesh as the various proportions of the elements that constitute the material of the functional parts. These proportions are casually necessary, though not sufficient, for the flesh or body of a living thing. 29 In this sense, flesh is not functionally defined, being purely material, and thus: "is only homonymous with functional flesh and so can survive the loss of the soul." 30 As the compositional flesh makes up the functional flesh of a living thing and can survive the loss of the soul even though the functional cannot, Whiting concludes that the compositional flesh is the matter that can allow for continuity between a living thing and its corpse. 31 Such a solution, however, relies upon the elements, albeit it in specific proportions, to serve as the matter of a living thing. Thus, in arguing against the second assumption, Whiting also argues against the first, namely, that the elements cannot be the matter of a living thing. The standard objections to such a solution rely upon two texts from the Metaphysics. Whiting claims that both, however, are misread. In the first, 32 Aristotle says that the elements should not be named as the material of man as they are too remote. Though Aristotle is seeking the most proximate (ἐγγύτατα) cause of man, Whiting denies that the elements are thereby incapable of being the matter of man whatsoever. Rather, the very use of the superlative displays that there are other, more remote causes of man. 33 Thus, though perhaps irrelevant to the specific task at hand, the elements are nevertheless part of the material of a living thing. 29 Whiting, 80. 30 Ibid, 81. 31 Ibid. 32 Metaphysics, 1044b1-2. 33 Whiting, 81. 8

In the second passage, 34 Aristotle states that the seed, not earth or any other element, is that which is potentially a man. 35 Yet, Whiting draws attention to Aristotle's use of temporal adverbs. 36 Aristotle says that the elements are not potentially a man or any living thing yet. Once present in a seed in the right conditions, however, then they are potentially the body of a living thing. 37 Thus, having addressed both passages, Whiting concludes that the elements can constitute the compositional matter of a living thing. Having established this, Whiting moves to elucidate the relation between functional flesh and compositional flesh in order to allow for the matter of a living thing to be both accidentally and contingently ensouled. To do so, she cites a different text, one from Aristotle's De Partibus Animalium 2.3. 38 In this passage, Aristotle describes a mixture of earth and water and picks out certain relations and characteristics. One, despite becoming part of the mixture and assuming a liquid character, the earth is capable of being separated from the mixture. Should it be separated, the earth would return to being dry. Two, the earth is only accidentally liquid when it is part of the mixture. 39 As flesh and the other homoiomerous parts of a living thing are mixtures of the elements, Whiting applies the above characteristics to the body-soul composite. Just as the earth survives its mixture with water, so the elements, survive their mixture with the soul. As the earth takes on the liquid character of the mixture accidentally, so the elements are accidentally and not 34 Metaphysics, 1049a1-3. 35 Aristotle mentions this same idea briefly in De Anima II.1 412b25-7: "ἔστι δὲ οὐ τὸ ἀποβεβληκὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ δυνάμει ὂν ὥστε ζῆν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔχον τὸ δὲ σπέρμα καὶ ὁ καρπὸς τὸ δυνάμει τοιονδὶ σῶμα." "And that which has lost its soul is not which is potentially alive, but that which has a soul. The seed and the fruit are potentially such a body." 36 Whiting, 81. 37 Ibid, 82. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. Whiting actually discusses a third in addition to the two above. The third is Aristotle's comment that the water is both potentially and actually liquid. This point, too, bears on the discussion of the body-soul relation, but it is not specifically relevant to my paper. 9

essentially ensouled. Thus, Whiting concludes, when the body loses its soul and the composite dissolves, the elements, which comprise the compositional flesh, survive for they are not essentially ensouled. 40 That the elements are accidentally and not essentially ensouled, Whiting emphasizes, is key. Aristotle understands the elements as constituting the material that make up different things at different times. Though they underly all material, of animate and inanimate things alike, the elements do not, in cases of generation and destruction simpliciter, undergo a mere rearrangement. 41 Unlike artificial things, the change from a living body to a corpse is not fully explained by a change in its composition. To make this distinction clear, Whiting proposes a precise articulation of the relation between the elements and the things they make up. Rather than stating that earth becomes flesh and then becomes a pot, one should say the flesh that was earthen was destroyed and the pot that is earthen comes to be. 42 The latter articulation makes clear that the matter merely predicates the different subjects: "the matter is now the matter of a different subject." 43 Living things, however, are an "intrinsic unity"; their form is the form of their specific matter and their matter is the matter of their specific form. 44 In this way, Whiting concludes, the functional body is essentially ensouled even though the compositional body, made up of the elements, is only accidentally ensouled. Thus, Whiting demonstrates how the body-soul composite can fit the hylomorphic account: the compositional body provides the matter that might not have been ensouled. As a final remark, Whiting explains why Aristotle opts to use the examples of an axe and an eye in his 40 Ibid, 82-4. 41 Ibid, 85. 42 Ibid, 83. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid, 86. 10

discussion of the body and soul of a living thing. 45 She posits that Aristotle uses the two examples to draw out a distinction. In order to actualize its power to chop, the axe requires an external agent to move it. Similarly, the eye, on its own, is unable to see apart from its relation to the rest of the body. Thus, neither possess an internal principle of movement, 46 and yet, Aristotle asks that one hypothesize as if they did. In doing so, Aristotle draws out the distinct character of the body-soul composite, namely, that the soul is the internal agent of the body. The body does not, like the axe, rely upon an external agent or, like the eye, upon a relation in order to perform its activity. Rather, its actuality is the source of its own movement. Thus Whiting concludes: "A natural body is potentially alive only given the presence of an internal efficient cause of its being alive, that is, only in presence of its soul." 47 III In response to the presumed difficulty of De Anima II.1, I propose an examination of St. Thomas Aquinas' commentary on the text. From the very onset, Aquinas provides guidance in reading and understanding the passage by calling attention to Aristotle's distinction in his Metaphysics between defining substance and defining accidents. 48 In defining substance, Aquinas reviews, nothing extrinsic to the substance is included in its definition as a substance is complete and wholly defined by giving only its matter and form. In defining accidents, however, something extrinsic must be referenced to as accidents exist only in relation to a substance. 45 Ibid, 90-1. 46 Aristotle calls attention to this himself in De Anima II.1 412b15-7: ""οὐ γὰρ τοιούτου σώματος τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ ὁ λόγος ἡ ψυχή, ἀλλὰ φυσικοῦ τοιουδί, ἔχοντος ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως ἐν ἑαυτῷ." "Yet, the soul is not the essence and definition of such a body, but of a natural body, as having a principle of motion and rest in itself." 47 Whiting, 91. 48 Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima, ed. and trans. Kenelm Foster, O.P. and Silvester Humphries, O.P. (Notre Dame, IN: Dumb Ox Books, 1994), 72. 11

Forms, like accidents, are incomplete in of themselves and require that their proper subject be referred to in definition. Thus, it becomes clear that Aristotle's definition of the soul as form will thereby require a reference to and explanation of the soul's proper subject, namely, the body. Further in his commentary, Aquinas builds upon the distinction between substance and accident in discussing the distinction between substantial and accidental forms. 49 An accidental form does not cause a substance to be, rather, it only qualifies its existence. Thus, musical does not cause a musical man to be, rather, it qualifies the existence of man. Substantial forms, on the other hand, do give simple existence to their matter. Thus, the matter or proper subject of a substantial form cannot exist apart from that form. Throughout his commentary, Aquinas emphasizes that Aristotle understands the soul to be the form of the body as a substantial form. Where an accidental form presupposes an actually existing subject that it may qualify, the soul, as a substantial form, presupposes only: "a potentiality to existence, i.e. bare matter." 50 From this understanding of the soul as substantial form, the "difficulty" that Ackrill raises and Whiting accepts dissolves. To properly define the soul which is a form, Aristotle must refer to its proper subject. Yet, the soul is not only a form, but a substantial form. Thus, the proper subject or matter of the soul cannot exist as such apart from the soul. The soul, as its substantial form, gives such a body its basic existence. The body, therefore, which is the proper subject of the soul only exists in union with the soul its substantial form. Thus, in demanding that the matter of a living thing might not have been the case and can be picked out of the composite, Ackrill misguidedly limits the hylomorphic account. 51 In doing so, he misses the distinction between accidental and substantial forms and wrongly excludes such 49 Ibid, 75. 50 Ibid. 51 Polansky agrees, 155. 12

a distinction from the hylomorphic account. Following this error, he then fails to understand the significance of the homonymy principle. In explaining the proper subject of a substantial form, the homonymy principle is crucial in making clear the intrinsic relation between the two. Once the matter loses its substantial form, it no longer exists in the same way. Rather, the matter of the living thing undergoes a substantial change. Its body is no longer the proper subject of the soul. Instead, what remains is a corpse, a different substance altogether, for: "When the soul leaves the body, another substantial form takes its place; for a passing-away always involves a concomitant coming-to-be." 52 Ackrill's hasty judgment of the hylomorphic account prevents his understanding the significance of Aristotle's appeal to the the homonymy principle. Aristotle does not claim that either the axe or the eye offers a perfect analogy to a living thing. In fact, Aristotle's repeated use of εἴ, ἂν, and the imperfect tense makes clear he is speaking hypothetically, for instance: "καθάπερ εἴ τι τῶν ὀργάνων φυσικὸν ἧν σῶμα, οἷον πέλεκυς ἧν μὲν γὰρ ἂν τὸ πελέκει εἶναι ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦτο" (412b11-3), 53 and: "εἰ γὰρ ἦν ὁ ὀφυαλμὸς ζῷον, ψυχὴ ἄν ἦν αὐτοῦ ἡ ὄψις" (412b18-9). 54 As Aquinas rightly notes, Aristotle uses both the axe and eye in order to draw out the soul's distinction as a substantial form. 55 In artificial bodies, such as the axe, the relation of the form to the matter is more evident and easier to grasp than that of the soul to the body. As more evident, the example helps one conceptualize the meaning of the soul as the substantial form of the body. Yet, unlike living things, when artifacts, such as the axe, 52 Aquinas, 75. 53 "Just as if some instrument were a natural body, for example an axe, its essence would be its being an axe, and this would be its soul." 54 "For if the eye were a living thing, the power to see would be its soul." 55 Aquinas, 77. 13

lose their ability to perform their function, they still exist substantially as: "the substance of artificial things is their matter which remains when the artificial form and, with this artificial form, the actuality of the artificial body as such, is removed." 56 Living things, however, are not substances by virtue of their matter. Rather, they rely upon the union of the soul with its proper subject. Loss of either destroys the substance and what remains is only referred to as the same thing equivocally. The eye is a closer analogy to a living thing. It, too, along with the other functionally defined parts of a living thing, relies upon its form to exist as such. It is not, like artificial things, a substance simply by virtue of its matter. Rather, it relies upon its form, the power of sight as: "sight is the essential form of the eye." 57 Having grasped the dependence of the eye on its power to see, Aristotle invites one to grasp the relation of a living thing to its soul, moving from part to whole (412b21-5). 58 The example of the eye makes it easier to grasp the way in which the soul is the form of the body of a living thing, for, the function of a living thing is much more complex than that of an eye. Having grasped how the power to see is intrinsically related to the eye, it becomes clearer how the soul is related to a living thing. As her very acceptance of Ackrill's difficulty reveals, Whiting also fails to understand the soul as the substantial form of a living thing. It is worth noting that the concepts are understandably difficult to grasp. Yet, precisely for this reason, Aristotle offers the example of the axe and eye to help one reach a difficult understanding through more evident things. 56 Ibid, 78. 57 Ibid. 58 "δεῖ δὴ λαβεῖν τὸ ἐπὶ μέρους ἐφ' ὅλου τοῦ ζῶντος σώματος ἀνάλογον γὰρ ἔχει ὡς τὸ μέρος πρὸς τὸ μέρος, οὕτως ἡ ὅλη αἴσθησις πρὸς τὸ ὅλον σῶμα τὸ αἰσθητικόν, ᾗ τοιοῦτον." "Certainly we ought to apply what belongs to the part to that of the whole living body. For, an analogy holds: just as part of the sensitive power is to part of the body, so the entire sensitive power is to the entire sensitive body, as such." 14

Further, although Whiting takes Aristotle's use of οὐκέτ' and ἀποβεβληκὸς to indicate that something survives the loss of the soul, it is rather the most obvious and, perhaps only, way for Aristotle to convey what he is trying to explain. Similarly, though Whiting's account of compositional flesh and functional flesh is compelling, it again displays her failure to grasp the soul as substantial form. Though she very nearly hits upon this distinction in her discussion of the elements comprising compositional flesh as being accidentally ensouled as opposed to functional flesh, Whiting fails to articulate the soul as substantial form as accounting for such differences. Similarly, in explaining the Aristotle's requirement of essentially living bodies as allowing for generation and destruction simpliciter, Whiting displays an understanding of the body-soul composite as an intrinsic unity. She fails, however, to understand this distinction as a result of the soul being a substantial form. Whiting again displays her good instincts in her refection on why Aristotle compares the body and soul to the axe and the eye. She intuits that Aristotle is drawing out a distinction. Whiting's conclusion, however, that they serve to show the distinction between external and internal efficient causes, although a true observation, does not get at the heart of the matter. Thus, the presumed "difficulty" that Ackrill and Whiting center their discussions on De Anima II.1 reveal a fundamental misunderstanding of Aristotle's intention. Thus, both fail to grasp the meaning of the text. Understanding that the soul is the substantial form of the body is the key to a correct reading of the text and Aquinas is correct in his drawing out this distinction throughout his commentary. Thus, though Aristotle's account of the soul is still, as he says, in outline (τύπῳ), it is not one that presents insurmountable difficulties. 15

Bibliography Ackrill, J. L. "Aristotle's Definitions of "Psuche'," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, 73 (1972-1973): 119-133. Aquinas, Thomas. Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima, edited and translated by Kenlem Foster, O.P. and Silvester Humphries, O.P. Notre Dame, IN: Dumb Ox Books, 1994. Aristotle. De Anima, edited by W. D. Ross. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. Gendlin, Eugene T. Line by Line Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima. Spring Valley: Focusing Institute, 2012. Hicks, R. D. Aristotle: De Anima. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1907. Polansky, Ronald M. Aristotle's De Anima: a critical commentary. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Ross, David. Aristotle: De Anima. New York: Oxford University Press, 1961. Whiting, Jennifer. "Living Bodies." In Essays on Aristotle's De Anima. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 75-91. 16