Truth ChaseWrenn Cambridge,UK:PolityPress,2015;pbk,211pp.,$22.95,9780745663241 ChaseWrenn struthisanentryinpolitypress skeyconceptsinphilosophyseries.polity s websitefortheseriespromises conciseandaccessiblebooksthatintroducestudentstosomeof thecoreconceptsinphilosophy.eachauthorwillgettotheheartofthedebateaboutthese concepts tocharttheirevolution,thebattlesovermeaningandusage,andtodiscussany currentcontroversies. Wrennadmirablyfulfillsthispromise,providingaclear,concise,and vividintroductiontobothhistoricalandcurrentphilosophicalliteratureontheconceptoftruth, presupposing onlyasmuchbackgroundknowledgeoflogicandphilosophyasathirdqor fourthqyearundergraduatewouldhave (p.x).butdon texpectunbiasedreporting.asnoted inabackqcoverblurb,truthisan opinionatedintroduction. Forthat,however,Wrennshould notbefaulted.ihaveyettoseeanonqopinionatedintroductiontothephilosophyoftruth. Wrenn sfirstthreechaptersintroducethecentralissueswithrespecttounderstanding theoriesoftruth,establishingineachchapteradesideratumofanadequatetheoryoftruth.the nextfourchapterssurveythetheoreticallandscape.thefinalchapterdrawstogetherthe scatteredopinionsprovidedinthepreviousseventodefendadeflationarytheoryoftruth. DiscussionthroughoutfocusesmoreonissuesthanonablowQbyQblowofwhosaidwhat. Giventhisapproach,chaptersarenotheavywithcitations.Instead,eachchapterisfollowedby ahelpfuloneqortwoqpagenarrativeof furtherreading fortheinterestedstudent.overall,the
2 executionisreminiscentofstephenread ssuperbthinking*about*logic:*an*introduction*to*the* Philosophy*of*Logic(Oxford,UK:OxfordUP,1995). Chapteroneintroducesthecentralproblemofprovidinganaccountofthenatureofthe truthpropertyandarguesthatasuccessfultheoryofthatpropertymustsatisfytarski s materialadequacycondition(must,thatis,entailallinstancesoftheschema s istrueifand onlyifs, where s isreplacedbyadeclarativesentence).chaptertwoprovidesaverynice discussionofhowtheoriesoftruthengagetherealism/antiqrealismdebateanddefends amild formofrealism, accordingtowhichtherearesomepropositionsthatareobjectively,yet unknowably,true.chapterthreediscussestheproblemofthevalueoftruth,whichhasbeen centraltodebatesregardingtruthforthepastcoupleofdecades.herewrenndoesanexcellent joboflayingouttheissuesanddiscussingthemanydifferentkindsofvaluerelevanttothe questionofthevalueoftruth.wrenndefendstheviewthattruthhastelic*value,thataconcern fortruthinvolvespossessingmanydispositionsconducivetoleadingagoodlife.theupshotof thesefirstthreechaptersisthefollowingsetofdesiderataofanadequatetheoryoftruth:(1)it mustsatisfytarski smaterialadequacycondition,(2)itmustbecompatiblewiththeexistence ofunknowabletruths,and(3)itmustaccountforthetelicvalueoftruth. Inchapterfour,Wrennreviewsthemainepistemictheoriesoftruth(coherencetheories andpragmatisttheories),thenarguesthatallsuchtheoriesfailtosatisfydesiderata(1)and(2). Chapterfivesurveysthevarietiesofcorrespondencetheory:theclassicalcorrespondence theoriesofearlyrussellandwittgenstein,hartryfield scausalcorrespondencetheory,and truthmakertheories.wrennarguesthatcorrespondencetheoriesfarepoorlywithdesideratum (3),failingtoprovideanyprincipledaccountofthevalueoftruth.Butthemainproblemfaced
3 bycorrespondencetheories,wrennargues,is thescopeproblem. Whilecorrespondence theoriesprovideplausibleaccountsoftruthsaboutcatsonmats,theydon tplausiblyaccount fornegative,mathematical,ethical,andcounterfactualtruths.chaptersixthenturnsto deflationarytheoriesoftruth.herewrenndiscussesramsey sredundancytheory,quine s disquotationalism,andpaulhorwich sminimalism.whilethebestofthese(horwich s minimalism)solvesthescopeproblemandsatisfiesdesiderata(1)and(2),wrenndetailsthe waysinwhichdeflationismhashaddifficultyaccountingforthevalueoftruth. Thescopeproblemforcorrespondencetheoriesandthevalueproblemfordeflationary theoriesfocusthediscussionofpluralisttheoriesoftruthinchapterseven(crispinwright s pluralismandmichaellynch sfunctionalism).accordingtopluralisttheories,ourconceptof truthisaunitarynormativeconceptthatpicksoutdifferenttruthpropertiesindifferent discourses(pickingoutcorrespondenceinscientificdiscourse,forexample,butwarranted assertibilityinethicaldiscourse).pluralisttheoriesaredesignedspecificallytosolvethescope problemandtoaccountforthevalueoftruth,inthattheytaketruthtobeanormativeproperty inalldiscourses.but,wrennargues,pluralisttheoriesfacetheratherseriousandunique problemofindividuatingdiscourses.dodiscussionsoftheinstitutionalreviewboard,for example,belongtoscientificorethicaldiscourse?whereisthelinebetweenscientificand ethicaldiscourses?wrennconcludes,inchaptereight,bydefendingdeflationismagainstthe critiquesofpluralistsandarguingthatdeflationismcanaccountforthetelicvalueoftruth. Asshouldbeapparentfromeventhisbriefsketch,Wrenncoversalotofground,andhe coversitlucidly,providingthebestintroductoryundergraduatetextonthephilosophyoftruth currentlyavailable.richardkirkham stheories*of*truth:*a*critical*introduction(cambridge,
4 MA:MITPress,1992)has,sinceitspublication,beenthestandardintroductiontothe philosophyoftruth.butkirkham sbookisbettersuitedtobeginninggraduatestudentsthan undergraduates,anditisnowsomewhatdated.kirkhamconcludeswithabriefdiscussionof Horwich sminimalism(ashorwich struthhad,atthetime,onlyrecentlybeenpublished),but Horwich sworkstimulatedagreatdealofliteratureontruth,allofwhichpostqdatedkirkham s book.pascalengeldescribeshistruth(chesham:acumen,2002)asan opinionated introduction, butitsprimaryaimistoarticulateanddefendatheoryoftruth,andits(first three) introductory chaptersarereallywrittenforprofessionalphilosophers,notinitiates.if youknowtheliterature,engel sbriefsynopsesandswiftargumentativemovesmakesense,but ifyoudon tknowityouwon tgainmuchunderstandingofitfromhisquicktour.finally, WolfgangKünne sexcellentconceptions*of*truth(oxford,uk:clarendonpress,2003)provides verydetailed,andverygermanic,scholarshiponthewholehistoryoftheliteratureontruth. Butit,too,isbettersuitedforgraduatestudentsandprofessionalsthanundergraduates,andit isroughlythreetimesaslongaswrenn sconcisevolume.wrenn struthismoreaccessible thananyoftheseforanundergraduateaudience,anditismorecurrentthananyofthese, providingexcellentcoverageoftheworkofthepastcoupleofdecades. ButWrennachievesconcisionatthecostofomittingdiscussionofsometheoriesthatI thinkareinterestingandimportant(andthatarecoveredbykirkhamandkünne).youwon t findanydiscussionofdavidson sprimitivism,ofprosententialism(asdevelopedprimarilyby DorothyGrover),orofwhatarebroadly expressivist theories(fromstrawson s performative theory torobertbrandom s expressivedeflationism ).Also,discussionofDummettis confinedtoacoupleofpagesinthechapteronthevalueoftruth,mentioningonlyhis
5 comparisonofassertionwithchess,whichsetupananalogybetweenwinningastheaimof chessandtruthasthe aim ofassertion. Dummett smostimportantcontribution,however,ishisdevelopmentofantiqrealism. AsDummettarguedstrenuously,semanticscomesbeforemetaphysics,andDummett santiq realistmetaphysicswasbasedonasemanticsderivedfromconsiderationofintuitionistlogic. Wrennstatesupfrontthatheisnotgoingtodealwith theformaldetailsofalternativesto classicallogic (p.x),whichprecludesanycarefulexaminationofdummett santiqrealism.on theonehand,it shardtofaultwrennfordecidingagainstgettingintosuchdetailsinan introductorytextforupperqdivisionundergraduates;thatisareasonablechoicegiventheaims ofthebookandoftheseriesinwhichitappears.ontheotherhand,chaptertwodoescontaina discussionofdummettqstyledantiqrealistmetaphysics,whichwrenncriticizesonthegrounds thatit comesatthepriceofclassicallogic (p.33).but,asallthelogicianswhohaveworked ondevelopingalternativelogicshavepointedoutovermanyyears,thereareacoupleweird pricestopayforacceptingclassicallogic.togivedummettianantiqrealismafairhearing,it s necessarytogointosomeofthereasonswhyintuitionistsrejectclassicallogic,sincethose reasonsconstitutethebasisofdummett sargumentsforantiqrealism.asitis,wrenncritiques themetaphysicswithoutexaminingdummett sstrongestargumentsforit.ithinkthatwrenn couldhavepulledoffanicediscussionoftheintuitionistbasisofdummett santiqrealism.for chaptertwoalsocontainsonethemostaccessiblediscussionsoffitch sparadoxofknowabilityi haveseen.anyonewhocanpullthatoffcanexplainintuitionistlogictoadvanced undergraduates.notonlywouldthisprovideadeeperunderstandingofantiqrealism,butit wouldhelpstudentsbetterunderstandwhat satstakeinwrenn sownappealtoclassicallogic.
6 Despitetheseomissions,Wrenn struthtrulyisabeautifullittlebook,whichisfarand awaythebestintroductorytexttothephilosophyoftruth.anyonelookingforsuchan introductorytextforanupperqdivisionundergraduatecoursewillservetheirstudentswellby assigningwrenn.althoughtherearesomeimportantideasintheliteratureontruththat studentswillnotencounterinwrenn sbook,afterworkingtheirwaythroughittheywillbe wellpositionedtotacklethoseideas,andothers,intheprimaryliterature. David*J.*Buller,*Department*of*Philosophy,*Northern*Illinois*University,*DeKalb,*IL*60115;* buller@niu.edu*