This pge intentionlly left lnk
THE CAMBRIDGE EDITION OF THE WORKS OF IMMANUEL KANT Generl editors: Pul Guyer nd Allen W. Wood Advisory ord: Henry Allison Reinhrd Brndt Rlf Meerote Chrles D. Prsons Hoke Roinson J. B. Schneewind Theoreticl Philosophy, 1755 1770 Critique of Pure Reson Theoreticl Philosophy After 1781 Prcticl Philosophy Critique of the Power of Judgment Religion nd Rtionl Theology Anthropology, History, nd Eduction Nturl Science Lectures on Logic Lectures on Metphysics Lectures on Ethics Lectures on Anthropology Lectures nd Drfts on Politicl Philosophy Opus postumum Notes nd Frgments Correspondence
IMMANUEL KANT Critique of the power of judgment edited y PAUL GUYER University of Pennsylvni trnslted y PAUL GUYER University of Pennsylvni ERIC MATTHEWS University of Aerdeen
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cmridge, New York, Melourne, Mdrid, Cpe Town, Singpore, São Pulo Cmridge University Press The Edinurgh Building, Cmridge CB2 8RU, UK Pulished in the United Sttes of Americ y Cmridge University Press, New York www.cmridge.org Informtion on this title: www.cmridge.org/9780521344470 Cmridge University Press 2000 This puliction is in copyright. Suject to sttutory exception nd to the provision of relevnt collective licensing greements, no reproduction of ny prt my tke plce without the written permission of Cmridge University Press. First pulished in print formt 2002 ISBN-13 978-0-511-33745-1 ebook (EBL) ISBN-10 0-511-33745-0 ebook (EBL) ISBN-13 978-0-521-34447-0 hrdck ISBN-10 0-521-34447-6 hrdck ISBN-13 978-0-521-34892-8 pperck ISBN-10 0-521-34892-7 pperck Cmridge University Press hs no responsiility for the persistence or ccurcy of urls for externl or third-prty internet wesites referred to in this puliction, nd does not gurntee tht ny content on such wesites is, or will remin, ccurte or pproprite.
Contents Generl editors prefce Editor s introduction Bckground: The possiility of critique of tste nd teleology An outline of the work The composition nd puliction of the work Note on the trnsltion Biliogrphy pge ix xiii xiii xxiii xxxix xlvi xlix First Introduction to the Critique of the Power of Judgment 1 Critique of the Power of Judgment 53 Prefce 55 Introduction 59 First Prt: Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment 87 First Section, First Book: Anlytic of the Beutiful 89 First Section, Second Book: Anlytic of the Sulime 128 Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgments 160 Second Section: The Dilectic of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment 213 Appendix: On the Methodology of Tste 228 Second Prt: Critique of the Teleologicl Power of Judgment 231 First Division: Anlytic of the Teleologicl Power of Judgment 235 Second Division: Dilectic of the Teleologicl Power of Judgment 257 Appendix: Methodology of the Teleologicl Power of Judgment 285 Method of cittion nd revitions 347 Editoril notes 351 Glossry 399 Index 413 vii
Generl editors prefce Within few yers of the puliction of his Critique of Pure Reson in 1781, Immnuel Knt (1724 1804) ws recognized y his contemporries s one of the seminl philosophers of modern times indeed s one of the gret philosophers of ll time. This renown soon spred eyond Germn-speking lnds, nd trnsltions of Knt s work into English were pulished even efore 1800. Since then, interprettions of Knt s views hve come nd gone nd loylty to his positions hs wxed nd wned, ut his importnce hs not diminished. Genertions of scholrs hve devoted their efforts to producing relile trnsltions of Knt into English s well s into other lnguges. There re four min resons for the present edition of Knt s writings: 1. Completeness. Although most of the works pulished in Knt s lifetime hve een trnslted efore, the most importnt ones more thn once, only frgments of Knt s mny importnt unpulished works hve ever een trnslted. These include the Opus postumum, Knt s unfinished mgnum opus on the trnsition from philosophy to physics; trnscriptions of his clssroom lectures; his correspondence; nd his mrginli nd other notes. One im of this edition is to mke comprehensive smpling of these mterils ville in English for the first time. 2. Avilility. Mny English trnsltions of Knt s works, especilly those tht hve not individully plyed lrge role in the susequent development of philosophy, hve long een inccessile or out of print. Mny of them, however, re crucil for the understnding of Knt s philosophicl development, nd the sence of some from English-lnguge iliogrphies my e responsile for erroneous or linkered trditionl interprettions of his doctrines y Englishspeking philosophers. 3. Orgniztion. Another im of the present edition is to mke ll Knt s pulished work, oth mjor nd minor, ville in comprehensive volumes orgnized oth chronologiclly nd topiclly, so s to fcilitte the serious study of his philosophy y English-speking reders. ix
Generl editors prefce 4. Consistency of trnsltion. Although mny of Knt s mjor works hve een trnslted y the most distinguished scholrs of their dy, some of these trnsltions re now dted, nd there is considerle terminologicl disprity mong them. Our im hs een to enlist some of the most ccomplished Knt scholrs nd trnsltors to produce new trnsltions, freeing reders from oth the philosophicl nd literry preconceptions of previous genertions nd llowing them to pproch texts, s fr s possile, with the sme directness s present-dy reders of the Germn or Ltin originls. In pursuit of these gols, our editors nd trnsltors ttempt to follow severl fundmentl principles: 1. As fr s seems dvisle, the edition employs single generl glossry, especilly for Knt s technicl terms. Although we hve not ttempted to restrict the prerogtive of editors nd trnsltors in choice of terminology, we hve mximized consistency y putting single editor or editoril tem in chrge of ech of the min groupings of Knt s writings, such s his work in prcticl philosophy, philosophy of religion, or nturl science, so tht there will e high degree of terminologicl consistency, t lest in deling with the sme suject mtter. 2. Our trnsltors try to void scrificing literlness to redility. We hope to produce trnsltions tht pproximte the originls in the sense tht they leve s much of the interpretive work s possile to the reder. 3. The prgrph, nd even more the sentence, is often Knt s unit of rgument, nd one cn esily trnsform wht Knt intends s continuous rgument into mere series of ssertions y reking up sentence so s to mke it more redle. Therefore, we try to preserve Knt s own divisions of sentences nd prgrphs wherever possile. 4. Erlier editions often ttempted to improve Knt s texts on the sis of controversil conceptions out their proper interprettion. In our trnsltions, emendtion or improvement of the originl edition is kept to the minimum necessry to correct ovious typogrphicl errors. 5. Our editors nd trnsltors try to minimize interprettion in other wys s well, for exmple, y rigorously segregting Knt s own footnotes, the editors purely linguistic notes, nd their more explntory or informtionl notes; notes in this lst ctegory re treted s endnotes rther thn footnotes. We hve not ttempted to stndrdize completely the formt of individul volumes. Ech, however, includes informtion out the context in which Knt wrote the trnslted works, Germn English glossry, n English Germn glossry, n index, nd other ids to comprehension. The generl introduction to ech volume includes n x
Generl editors prefce explntion of specific principles of trnsltion nd, where necessry, principles of selection of works included in tht volume. The pgintion of the stndrd Germn edition of Knt s works, Knt s Gesmmelte Schriften, edited y the Royl Prussin (lter Germn) Acdemy of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reimer, lter Wlter de Gruyter & Co., 1900 ), is indicted throughout y mens of mrginl numers. Our im is to produce comprehensive edition of Knt s writings, emodying nd displying the high stndrds ttined y Knt scholrship in the English-speking world during the second hlf of the twentieth century, nd serving s oth n instrument nd stimulus for the further development of Knt studies y English-speking reders in the century to come. Becuse of our emphsis on literlness of trnsltion nd on informtion rther thn interprettion in editoril prctices, we hope our edition will continue to e usle despite the inevitle evolution nd occsionl revolutions in Knt scholrship. Pul Guyer Allen W. Wood xi
Editor s introduction i. ckground: the possiility of critique of tste nd teleology The Critique of the Power of Judgment ws pulished t the Leipzig ook fir t the end of April 1790, in the week following Immnuel Knt s sixty-sixth irthdy (Knt lived from 1724 to 1804). The ook completed the series of Knt s three gret Critiques, egun with the Critique of Pure Reson in 1781 nd continued with the Critique of Prcticl Reson in 1788. However, Knt clerly hd no pln for such series of works on the foundtions of philosophy when he pulished the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reson nor even when he ws writing the Critique of Prcticl Reson during 1787, which itself egn life in 1786 merely s prt of the work for the revision of the first Critique, the second edition of which ppered in the spring of 1787. Knt s originl ssumption ws tht the Critique of Pure Reson lone would provide the foundtion on which he could erect system of theoreticl nd prcticl philosophy, or s he clled them the metphysics of nture nd the metphysics of morls (the first of which Knt did indeed provide in the 1786 work entitled The Metphysicl Foundtions of Nturl Science, nd the second of which he finlly provided, fter decde of dely occsioned not only y the Critique of the Power of Judgment ut lso y the 1793 Religion within the Boundries of Mere Reson nd such politicl works s the 1795 essy Towrd Perpetul Pece, in the 1797 Metphysics of Morls, which is comprised of two prts, nmed in nlogy to the work on the foundtions of nturl science, The Metphysicl Foundtions of the Doctrine of Right, contining Knt s legl nd politicl philosophy, nd The Metphysicl Foundtions of the Doctrine of Virtue, contining the finl form of Knt s ccount of our noncoercively enforcele duties of respect nd love to ourselves nd others). Yet only few weeks fter completing the mnuscript for the Critique of Prcticl Reson Knt suddenly nnounced, in letter to the young Jen professor Krl Leonhrd Reinhold (1757 1823), whose Letters on the Kntin Philosophy of 1786 87 were doing gret del to populrize Knt s philosophy, 1 tht third Critique ws in the offing. Here re his words: My inner conviction grows, s I discover in working on different topics tht not only does my system remin self-consistent ut I find lso, when sometimes xiii
Editor s introduction I cnnot see the right wy to investigte certin suject, tht I need only look ck t the generl picture of the elements of knowledge, nd of the mentl powers pertining to them, in order to mke discoveries I hd not expected. I m now t work on the critique of tste, nd I hve discovered new sort of priori principles, different from those heretofore oserved. For there re three fculties of the mind: the fculty of cognition, the fculty of feeling plesure nd displesure, nd the fculty of desire. In the Critique of Pure (theoreticl) Reson, I found priori principles for the first of these, nd in the Critique of Prcticl Reson priori principles for the third. I tried to find them for the second s well, nd lthough I thought it impossile to find such principles, the nlysis of the previously mentioned fculties of the humn mind llowed me to discover something systemtic, which hs given me mple mteril t which to mrvel nd if possile to explore, sufficient to lst me for the rest of my life, nd hs put me on the pth now to recognize three prts of philosophy, ech of which hs its priori principles, which cn e enumerted nd for which one cn precisely determine the scope of the knowledge tht is possile through them theoreticl philosophy, teleology, nd prcticl philosophy, of which the second is, to e sure, the lest rich in priori grounds of determintion. I hope to hve mnuscript on this completed lthough not in print y Ester, under the title of the Critique of Tste. 2 This mkes it sound s if oth the pln to write Critique of Tste nd even the triprtite division of the humn mind into fculties of cognition, feeling, nd desire (the lst of which cn e governed y reson), which could explin the need for three Critiques, one for ech fundmentl fculty of the mind, re entirely new. At the sme time, it ppers to shift the suject mtter of critique of tste from wht one would expect, nmely the ncient rnch of philosophy, dting ck to Plto ut first dued esthetics y the Germn philosopher Alexnder Gottlie Bumgrten (1714 1762) in 1735, which studies the feelings of euty nd sulimity produced y works of oth nture nd humn rt nd the principles of judgments out such feelings, 3 to something quite different, the prt of nturl philosophy tht explictes the purposes [finis] of things, which hd first een nmed teleology y Christin Wolff (1679 1754) just few yers erlier. 4 But ll of this is, to put it mildly, t lest somewht misleding. Knt hd een interested in oth esthetics nd teleology from very erly in his philosophicl creer, nd hd ccepted the triprtite division of humn mentl powers for t lest two decdes if not longer efore the letter to Reinhold. And the Critique of the Power of Judgment tht he would finish just over twenty-four months fter writing this letter would hrdly replce esthetics with teleology, s the letter might seem to suggest, lthough it would certinly try to connect them. So just wht could Knt hve newly discovered in the few weeks efore writing this letter? xiv
Editor s introduction A rief review of some of Knt s erlier thinking out oth esthetics nd teleology my help us to see wht is new nd wht is not in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. As mentioned, oth esthetics nd teleology figured mong Knt s philosophicl concerns from very erly in his creer. Knt s first group of pulictions, in 1755 56, hd focused on science nd metphysics, nd did not include nything on either esthetics or teleology. 5 However, works in Knt s next min group of pulictions, written etween 1762 nd 1766, touched on oth esthetics nd teleology. Knt took cutious position on teleology in his 1763 work on The Only Possile Bsis for Proof of the Existence of God, which included, in ddition to version of Knt s critique of Descrtes s fmous ontologicl rgument, tht is, the ttempt to prove the existence of God directly from the concept of him s completely perfect eing, detiled critique of the populr rgument from design, tht is, the ttempt to infer to n intelligent uthor of nture from the evidence of intelligent design within nture; Knt touched upon teleology when he rgued tht lthough no such rgument could prove the existence of perfect eing s conceived y theology, such eing, if proven to exist on other grounds, could certinly e conceived of s working to chieve its purposes through the mechnicl nd regulr lws of nture tht we could discover y mens of nturl science. 6 Then in 1764, in ddition to n essy upon philosophicl method tht is his first rel explortion of the foundtionl questions tht would led to the Critique of Pure Reson 7 nd nother on negtive quntities, which introduced cler distinction etween logicl nd rel reltions, such s the logicl reltion of ground nd consequence nd the rel reltion of cuse nd effect, which mrked fundmentl step in Knt s rek with the rtionlist philosophy of Leiniz nd Wolff, 8 Knt pulished work clled Oservtions on the Feeling of the Beutiful nd Sulime. 9 The title of this ook ws clerly influenced y Edmund Burke s 1757 A Philosophicl Enquiry into the Originl of Our Ides of the Sulime nd the Beutiful, 10 lthough Knt does not provide n extensive psychologicl nd physiologicl nlysis of these feelings, s Burke did, ut is insted primrily concerned with differences in the cpcities for these feelings etween the two sexes nd mong diverse cultures nd ntions. Knt lso discussed questions of esthetics in his lecture courses (of which, given tht he hd no income except wht students pid him directly, he offered gret vriety!) from very erly point. In the printed nnouncement of his courses for the winter semester of 1765 66, Knt offered courses on metphysics, logic, ethics, nd physicl geogrphy, nd explined why his course on logic would lso include some discussion of esthetics: xv
Editor s introduction I shll e lecturing on logic of the first type [ critique nd cnon of sound understnding]. To e more specific, I shll se my lectures on Meier s hndook, 11 forhe...stimultes us to n understnding, not only of the cultivtion of reson in its more refined nd lerned form, ut lso of the development of the ordinry understnding, which is nonetheless ctive nd sound. The former serves the life of contempltion, while the ltter serves the life of ction nd society. And in this, the very close reltionship of the mterils under exmintion leds us t the sme time, in the critique of reson, to py some ttention to the critique of tste, tht is to sy, esthetics. The rules of the one t ll times serve to elucidte the rules of the other. Defining the limits of the two is mens to etter understnding of them oth. 12 Meier (1718 1777), following Leiniz, Wolff, nd Bumgrten, hd distinguished esthetic response from logicl thought s confused (or perhps etter fused ) rther thn distinct cognition, form of cognition in which wht is importnt is the richness of ssocitions rther thn nlyticl clrity, nd Knt intended to explore this distinction in his lectures. The evidence tht we hve of his logic lectures from 1770 onwrd show tht he did just tht; 13 nd the 1765 66 nnouncement shows tht Knt considered the critique of tste s prt of his suject from this erly period, lthough it does not imply tht t tht time he hd lredy formulted n intention to write ook tht would crry tht title. Knt included more extensive discussion of topics in esthetics in the suject tht he entitled nthropology on which he lectured eginning in the winter semester of 1772 73. 14 By nthropology, Knt certinly did not men wht we now cll physicl nthropology; ut on the other hnd, he did not strictly limit himself to wht we would now cll culturl nthropology either, lthough this ws certinly prt of his interest. Insted, these lectures, for which Knt used s his text the chpter on Empiricl Psychology from Bumgrten s Metphysic, the ook tht ws lso the sis for his metphysics lectures, 15 concerned oth the proper nd errnt functioning of humn cognition, feeling, nd desire, with n emphsis on oth individul nd culturl differences in the function nd use of these fculties. Thus, s erly s 1772 73 Knt lredy orgnized his thought out the humn mind round the triprtite division into the powers of cognition, feeling, nd desire tht he mentions in the letter to Reinhold s if it were new discovery. In these lectures, issues in esthetics re discussed t severl plces, s Knt ws stimulted to touch upon them y Bumgrten s topics. Thus, the nture of poetic invention, differences mong the rts, nd genius s the source of rtistic cretion were discussed in the first prt of the lectures, on the fculties of cognition, where Bumgrten treted them lthough the discussion of genius ws considerly enlrged fter the 1776 Germn trnsltion of Alexnder Gerrd s xvi
Editor s introduction Essy on Genius of 1774. 16 The min discussion of the suject of tste, however, is found from the outset squrely in the middle of the second section on the fculty of feeling, y which Knt mens ove ll the feeling of plesure or displesure. Thus, the ssocition etween tste nd the fculty of plesure tht Knt mentions in the letter to Reinhold ws hrdly new, ut hd een the sis for Knt s esthetic theorizing for the etter prt of two decdes. Indeed, wht ws to ecome the centrl thought of the nlysis of esthetic judgment in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, the ide tht in judgment of tste person cn clim intersujective vlidity for the feeling of plesure tht she experiences in response to eutiful oject ecuse tht plesure is produced, in n ttitude of disinterested contempltion, not y prcticl concern for utility or dvntge in the possession of the oject, ut y the free nd hrmonious ply of the cognitive fculties of imgintion nd understnding tht the eutiful oject induces, nd tht she cn rightly clim such vlidity for her feeling ecuse we ll shre these cognitive fculties nd they must work pretty much the sme wy in ll of us, ws lredy well developed in these lectures, if not t the outset in 1772 73 then certinly y the middle of the 1770s, t lest decde efore the letter to Reinhold. 17 Agin, the prominence of tste s topic in Knt s nthropology lectures does not prove tht he hd formulted the intention to write Critique of Tste prior to Decemer of 1787. However, there is seprte evidence tht even Knt s ide of writing Critique of Tste ws y no mens new, ut dted ck to time t lest some months prior to the commencement of his first course on nthropology. In his epochl letter of 21 Ferury 1772 to his prize student Mrcus Herz, then studying medicine in Berlin, in which he first nnounced his intention of writing wht would ecome the Critique of Pure Reson, 18 Knt clerly included the suject mtter of esthetics in the scope of his plns. He wrote: I hd lredy previously mde considerle progress in the effort to distinguish the sensile from the intellectul in the field of morls nd the principles tht spring therefrom. I hd lso long go outlined, to my tolerle stisfction, the principles of feeling, tste, nd power of judgment, with their effects the plesnt, the eutiful nd the good nd ws then mking plns for work tht might perhps hve the title, The Limits of Sensiility nd Reson. I plnned to hve it consist of two prts, theoreticl nd prcticl. The first prt would hve two sections, (1) generl phenomenology nd (2) metphysics, ut this only with regrd to its nture nd method. The second prt likewise would hve two sections, (1) the universl principles of feeling, tste, nd sensuous desire nd (2) the universl principles of morlity. As I thought through the theoreticl prt, considering its whole scope nd the reciprocl reltions of ll its prts, I noticed tht I still lcked something essentil, something tht in my xvii
Editor s introduction long metphysicl studies, I, s well s others, hd filed to consider nd which in fct constitutes the key to the whole secret of metphysics, hitherto still hidden from itself. 19 Now, there need e nothing surprising out the fct tht in spite of this sttement in 1772, it ws the end of 1787 efore Knt ws redy to strt writing systemtic tretise on the universl principles of feeling [nd] tste : It would tke Knt nerly decde to write the first prt of wht he descried to Herz s the tretment of generl phenomenology nd the nture nd method of metphysics tht would ecome the Critique of Pure Reson of 1781; nd then Knt would e constntly occupied until few weeks efore the letter to Herz with the defense of the first Critique in the Prolegomen to ny future Metphysics of 1783 nd the revision for its second edition on which he worked in 1786, with the Metphysicl Foundtions of Nturl Science pulished in 1786, nd with lying the foundtions for his morl philosophy in the Groundwork for the Metphysics of Morls tht he pulished in 1785 nd in the Critique of Prcticl Reson tht he wrote in 1787. So Knt could hrdly hve strted ny serious work on third critique on tste much efore the dte of his letter to Reinhold. But tht still does not explin the ir of discovery tht we sense in the letter. Why did it pprently come s surprise to Knt, more thn twenty yers fter he hd nnounced his intention to lecture on the critique of tste, tht he should now e in position to write one? In the fmous letter to Herz, Knt hd clerly ssumed tht single work on the nture nd method of metphysics would e ll tht ws needed efore he could construct his prcticl philosophy, which would del with the principles of oth tste nd morlity. At tht time, then, he did not envision writing three Critiques, ut only one. This ws clerly still his ssumption when he wrote the Critique of Pure Reson, since he thought tht upon its completion he could quickly proceed to write the systemtic metphysics of nture nd morlity. 20 So t this point he might hve thought tht he could write systemtic tretment of the principles of feeling nd tste kin to the metphysics of nture nd morls, ut not tht he would need to prefce ny such tretment with critique of the fculty of feeling ny more thn he would need n dditionl critique of the fculty of desire or prcticl reson efore he could write his metphysics of morls. However, this is not exctly wht Knt thought when he wrote the first Critique: not only did he not see the need for seprte critique of tste, ut now he ws not even sure tht there ws room for ny systemtic tretment of the principles of tste t ll. At lest tht seems to e the impliction of striking footnote to the Trnscendentl Aesthetic of the first Critique, the section in which Knt presents his theory of spce nd time s nothing ut the pure forms of the humn mind for the intuition of xviii
Editor s introduction externl ojects nd our own inner sttes. 21 In explining why he felt he could pproprite Bumgrten s coinge to lel his exposition of his theory of our priori knowledge of the properties of spce nd time, which hs nothing to do with the trditionl sujects of esthetics t ll, Knt hd gone so fr s to write this: The Germns re the only ones who now employ the word esthetics to designte tht which others cll the critique of tste. The ground for this is filed hope, held y the excellent nlyst Bumgrten, of ringing the criticl judging of the eutiful under principles of reson, nd elevting its rules to science. But this effort is futile. For the puttive rules or criteri re merely empiricl s fr s their sources re concerned, nd cn therefore never serve s priori rules ccording to which our judgments of tste must e directed, rther the ltter constitutes the genuine touchstone of the correctness of the former. For this reson it is dvisle gin to desist from the use of this term nd to sve it for tht doctrine which is true science. 22 In other words nd this is quite consistent with wht Knt usully held in his lectures on nthropology judgments of tste, even though they mke clims out how others cn e expected to respond to ojects on the sis of our own feelings of plesure (or displesure) in them, re empiricl: they do not rest on ny priori concepts or principles; rther we lern to mke them in firly relile wy y oserving the responses of those round us nd correlting them to our own responses. Indeed, for this reson Knt hd frequently mintined tht people could not lern how to mke judgments of tste except y growing up in society; someone growing up in the circumstnces of Roinson Crusoe could never lern how to determine whether his own responses corresponded to those of others, even if the ide of doing so somehow occurred to him. 23 Thus, it seems, in 1781 Knt no longer thought there could e systemtic philosophicl tretment of the principles of feeling nd tste, let lone critique of tste, which if it were to e nything like critique of pure reson would hve to discover foundtions for priori principles of tste. And while in revising the first Critique in 1786 Knt meliorted this hrsh ssessment to the extent of dding tht the rules of tste re merely empiricl s fr s their most prominent sources re concerned nd llowing tht the term esthetics might e shred with trnscendentl philosophy, tking it prtly in trnscendentl mening, prtly in psychologicl mening, 24 he still gve no indiction tht he intended to vil himself of this loophole in order to write critique of tste. Knt s 1785 Groundwork for the Metphysics of Morls ws not ment s seprte critique of prcticl reson; Knt s primry intention in this work ws to provide sufficiently cler formultion of the fundmentl principle of morlity principle which he took every person to e tcitly wre of nd inherently to cknowledge, lthough not in xix
Editor s introduction sufficiently cler form to prevent its corruption y tempttions lso present in ordinry humn nture 25 to llow him to proceed to the detiled formultion of our legl nd ethicl rights nd oligtions, in wht would eventully ecome the Metphysics of Morls. The reception of this work, prticulrly of its ttempt to derive the inding force of the morl lw from the freedom of the humn will in its section III, convinced Knt tht he hd to do enough dditionl work on foundtionl questions to merit seprte Critique of Prcticl Reson, lthough this hd not een prt of his originl pln of 1772. This new Critique gretly mplified Knt s tretment of the prolem of freedom of the will, nd reversed the rgument of the Groundwork y holding tht the fct of the freedom of the will could only e inferred from our wreness of the inding oligtion of the morl lw, rther thn the vlidity of the morl lw eing inferred from ny independent proof of the freedom of the will. But while this mplified the rgument of the Critique of Pure Reson y showing how the ctulity nd not merely the possiility of the freedom of the will could e estlished on morl rther thn theoreticl grounds, it did not fundmentlly lter the rgument of the first Critique in ny wy, fortiori it did not lter tht work s negtive ssessment of the possiilities for critique of tste. The second Critique in fct lmost ends with n llusion to wht would ecome the centrl rgument of Knt s tretment of tste in the third: in contrsting plesure in the euty of ojects with morl interest in their existence sed in pure prcticl reson, Knt chrcterizes the former, plesure in euty, s consciousness of the hrmony of our powers of representtion...in which we feel our entire cognitive fculty (understnding nd imgintion) strengthened... stisfction tht cn lso e communicted to others. 26 However, this sustntive view out the nture of esthetic experience, which Knt hd lredy held in very much this form since the time of the first Critique, 27 did not signl chnge in Knt s recent view out the possiility of critique of tste; once gin, nothing sid in the second Critique gives ny indiction tht Knt intended to write third one, let lone immeditely strt working on it. So we return to where we egn, nd sk gin wht Knt could suddenly hve discovered in the few weeks fter finishing the second Critique tht persuded him tht third one ws possile nd necessry fter ll. We know now tht it could not hve een simply the connection etween tste nd the fculty of feeling, s contrsted to the fculties of cognition nd desire, for tht division hd een prt of Knt s views for close to two decdes. However, we lso now know wht ostcle Knt elieved he hd to overcome in order to write critique of tste: the Critique of Pure Reson hd dshed Bumgrtin hopes for philosophy of tste on the ground tht tste permitted only xx
Editor s introduction empiricl generliztions, not priori principles; so for Knt suddenly to hve emrked on critique of tste, he must hve ecome persuded tht in some wy or other tste does hve some kind of priori principle. Yet the reder will quickly see from the third Critique itself tht Knt did not chnge the view, frequently evinced in his lectures, tht there cn e no mechnicl nd determinte rules for individul judgments of tste, such s the supposedly Aristotelin rule of drmturgy tht ll the ction of ply must trnspire within twenty-four hours, which could guide esthetic judgment in the sme wy tht one geometricl theorem cn led to the next. 28 So wht kind of priori principle for tste could there e? Here is where the connection etween tste nd teleology to which Knt lludes in the letter to Reinhold my come in. The letter is certinly too rief for us to know precisely wht Knt hd in mind in writing it, nd ultimtely it cn only e the pulished work itself tht tells us how Knt thought he could finlly put the critique of tste on n dequte philosophicl footing nd connect it in n illuminting wy with teleology suject out which he hd lrgely een silent since his comments lmost twenty-five yers erlier in the Only Possile Bsis. But the thought nturlly suggests itself tht in reflecting upon the connection etween esthetics nd teleology Knt somehow cme up with the ide of new kind of priori principle tht would let him write critique of tste without undermining his scruples out determinte rules for judgments on the euty of ojects. And wht would such new kind of principle e like? It would hve to e one tht cn ground judgments out similrities mong humn minds, for tht is wht judgments of tste clim, without depending upon determinte predictes of prticulr ojects, for tht is wht Knt jures. And perhps this is wht in the most generl wy teleology suggested to Knt: n priori principle out the reltion etween the humn mind nd the nture tht surrounds it, including other humn minds, tht cn give us confidence in the vlidity of our judgments without directly giving us new concepts of ojects. The two versions of the introduction to the Critique of the Power of Judgment suggest tht Knt did indeed see the formultion of new kind of priori principle s the key to critique of oth tste nd teleology, ut lso tht it ws no simple tsk for him to formulte such principle; 29 nd whether he did succeed in doing so hs certinly een one of the fundmentl issues in the interprettion of the third Critique. Knt s introduction will lso revel nother connection etween judgments of tste nd teleology tht ppers to e quite new in Knt s philosophy, nmely the ide tht oth judgments of tste nd judgments out the purposiveness of nturl ojects re forms of hitherto unrecognized kind of judgment, which Knt clls reflecting judg- xxi
Editor s introduction ment. This is not mentioned in the letter to Reinhold, ut t lest seems to ply centrl role in Knt s ccount in the work itself of why he hs linked wht hd hitherto seemed the unrelted topics of tste nd teleology. While previously he hd recognized the ordinry function of judgment s tht of susuming prticulr under universl tht is ntecedently given to us, such s pure concept in mthemtics or n empiricl concept in scientific clssifiction, he now clls tht function determining judgment, in order to distinguish it from the quite different cse of reflecting judgment, in which we re not given concept under which to susume prticulr ut re insted given prticulr for which we must seek to find universl, concept or rule of some kind tht we re not immeditely given. 30 Another fundmentl question for the interprettion of the third Critique is certinly how this notion is to e understood, how well it succeeds in connecting esthetic nd teleologicl judgments, nd in prticulr, given how much of Knt s detiled nlysis of the chrcter of judgments of tste hd een in plce for so mny yers, whether this notion relly dds nything sustntive to Knt s longstnding views. Knt s deepest connection etween tste nd teleology, however, my e something he does not hint t in the letter to Reinhold t ll, lthough it would explin why he ecme convinced of not only the possiility ut lso the necessity for third Critique so soon fter finishing the second. In the concluding section of the pulished introduction to the work, Knt clims tht the power of judgment provides the mediting concept etween the concepts of nture nd the concept of freedom, which mkes possile the trnsition from the purely theoreticl to the purely prcticl, from lwfulness in ccordnce with the former to the finl end in ccordnce with the ltter, in the concept of purposiveness of nture; for therey is the possiility of the finl end, which cn ecome ctul only in nture nd in ccord with its lws, cognized. 31 The mening of this sttement cn hrdly e immeditely cler, ut it is enough to suggest tht Knt hd ecome convinced tht oth esthetics nd teleology hve something profound to tech us out the reltion etween nture nd morlity, nd tht the foundtions of his philosophy would not e complete until he hd fully explored wht this is. Somehow, without violting the distinction etween the eutiful nd the morlly good tht he hd long dvocted or the exclusion of humn or superhumn ims from scientific explntion of nturl phenomen tht he hd likewise long ccepted, Knt suddenly sw how he could tke the existence of oth nturl nd rtistic euty nd our sense of the purposiveness in the orgniztion of nture s evidence tht humn eings s morl gents cn nevertheless e t home in nture, nd even s of vlue in prepring ourselves for the exercise of our morl gency. Indeed, it my hve een xxii
Editor s introduction precisely this insight tht, fter decde of lredy enormous lor, during most of which he hd een skepticl out the possiility of critique of tste, gve Knt the strength to write n mitious nd complex third Critique in less thn qurter of the time it hd tken him to write the first n extrordinry ccomplishment. This introduction is not the plce to expound detiled interprettion of the motivtion nd mening of the work to e presented. 32 Wht follows offers succinct outline of the min themes of the work nd then rief ccount of the ctul circumstnces of its composition nd puliction. ii. n outline of the work Introduction(s). Both the first drft of Knt s introduction nd the version tht he finlly pulished re trnslted in the present volume (the circumstnces tht left us two versions will e explined in the next section). The first drft consists of twelve sections, while the pulished version hs only nine, nd only out hlf s mny words. But the min points of the rgument re similr, nd my in ech cse e reduced to four min steps. In the first prt of ech introduction, Knt correltes the triprtite division of the higher fculty of cognition s contrsted to the lower fculty of cognition, which, in the trdition of Bumgrten, is ssumed to consist of sensiility nd imgintion into understnding, judgment, nd reson division lredy ssumed in the first Critique with the triprtite division of the powers of the mind more generlly into cognition, feeling, nd desire, nd then suggests, s n hypothesis, tht since understnding hs een found to furnish priori principles for cognition nd reson the priori principle for the fculty of desire (the morl lw), perhps the fculty of judgment will e shown to supply n priori principle for our ility to feel plesure nd displesure. 33 By descriing this correltion s provisionl, 34 Knt mkes it cler tht it cn e proven only y the detiled rguments tht will comprise the ody of the work, thus tht he does not expect the persusiveness of the work s whole to depend upon this highly strct nd one might well think rtificil mneuver. Knt concludes the first prt of the introduction y introducing his new distinction etween the determining (estimmend) nd reflecting (reflectirend) uses of the power of judgment. In the determining use of judgment, we re supposed to e given universl, such s concept of pure mthemtics or physics, nd to hve the tsk of finding n individul to susume under it, while in the reflecting use of judgment, we re supposed to e presented with n individul, such s eutiful scene or n intricte orgnism, nd to seek universl under xxiii
Editor s introduction which to susume it. 35 It will turn out, however, tht the kinds of universls tht my e sought y reflecting judgment will hve to e understood rodly: while in teleologicl judgment of n intricte orgnism the universl tht we seek my e understood to e the concept of purpose, such s the purpose of prticulr orgn within the internl economy of the orgnism, in the cse of esthetic judgment Knt will explicitly deny tht we seek to susume the oject under ny prticulr or determinte concept t ll. In this cse, s Knt s rgument will revel, the only universl tht we seek is the ide of interpersonl greement in plesure in eutiful oject or in we t sulime one (which is ctully oth wful nd plesurle). Much of the detil of Knt s ccount of judgments of euty in prticulr ws worked out long efore Knt introduced this new conception of reflecting judgment, nd it is n issue of continuing dete just how much of role this notion plys in the ody of the text. Although the min ody of the Critique of the Power of Judgment is divided into two prts, the Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment nd the Critique of the Teleologicl Power of Judgment, the introductions ctully consider not two ut three min forms of reflecting judgment. The second of these is esthetic judgment, which Knt initilly trets s if it is directed only t eutiful ojects in nture, lthough it will eventully turn out to comprise oth the eutiful nd the sulime in oth nture nd in rt; nd the third of them is teleologicl judgment, initilly presented s concerning only purposiveness in the internl orgniztion of orgnisms lthough it will lter turn out to include judgment out the purposiveness of nture s whole. But the first form of reflecting judgment tht Knt considers, which is not susequently treted in the min ody of the ook t ll, is judgment out the systemticity of the ody of our scientific concepts nd lws itself. Here Knt s rgument, presented in Sections IV through VII of the first drft nd in Sections IV nd V of the pulished version of the Introduction, is s follows. The Critique of Pure Reson is tken to hve ssured us tht we cn lwys ring the prticulr items in our experience under some concepts nd lws, nd to hve provided us with the most generl forms of concepts for the ojects of our experiences in the ctegories or pure concepts of the understnding (concepts such s those of sustnce or custion) s well s with the most generl lws of nture in the form of the principles of empiricl thinking (such s the principle tht every event hs cuse). But ll of this still leves us the tsk of finding more prticulr concepts under which to susume our experiences for exmple, more concrete concepts of custion such s the concepts of crystlliztion or reproduction nd of orgnizing these concepts nd the nturl lws ssocited with them into system with vrious forml properties tht Knt spells out. 36 The tsks xxiv
Editor s introduction of seeking such prticulr concepts intermedite etween the ctegories nd our ctul oservtions or empiricl intuitions nd of orgnizing them into coherent system re ssigned to the reflecting power of judgment s n instnce of its generl tsk of seeking to find universls for given concepts, nd Knt ssumes tht reflecting judgment hs to hve n priori principle y which to e guided in crrying out these tsks. But he is creful to mke cler tht this priori principle of reflecting judgment is indeed of different chrcter from the priori principles of understnding or reson. It does not directly determine wht kinds of properties our experiences must hve in order to represent ojects (e.g., eing experiences of enduring sustnces) or wht our mxims of ction must e like in order to e morlly cceptle (i.e., universlizle). Insted, it mounts only to the generl ssumption, supposed to e necessry for guiding nd encourging the conduct of our scientific inquiry, tht nture itself hs the kind of systemtic orgniztion tht we seek to find in it. As Knt puts it in the first drft of the introduction, the priori principle of reflecting judgment is simply tht Nture specifies its generl lws into empiricl ones, in ccordnce with the form of logicl system, in ehlf of the power of judgment. 37 This principle merely confirms our uthoriztion to seek for systemticity in our concepts nd lws, or is wht the pulished Introduction clls principle of the heutonomy of judgment, lw prescried not so much to nture s to judgment itself. 38 One question tht suggests itself t this stge in Knt s rgument is just how much of model this sort of priori principle cn provide for the priori principles of esthetic nd teleologicl judgment tht re susequently to e sought. Another question is, wht hs ecome of the connection etween judgment nd the feeling of plesure tht ws the strting point for Knt s rgument? In the first drft of the introduction, Knt does not ddress this question t ll. In the pulished introduction, perhps hving noticed the omission, Knt does ddress it, rguing tht since the ttinment of every im is ccompnied with plesure, success in relizing our ojective of finding systemticity in our concepts nd lws of nture must lso hve een ccompnied y plesure, lthough we tke this success so much for grnted tht we rely notice this plesure. 39 This rgument seems perfunctory, ut it provides n importnt premise for the ccount of esthetic judgment tht Knt next introduces: It implies tht if plesure is lwys the result of the ttinment of n end, nd if, further, universlly vlid plesure must e the result of the reliztion of universlly vlid ojective, 40 then there must e some universlly vlid ojective tht is fulfilled in the cse of our plesure in euty s well. Knt s ensuing ccount of esthetic judgment is thus the third min stge of oth introductions. Section VIII in the first drft nd Section xxv
Editor s introduction VII of the pulished introduction present cpsule summry of the ccount tht will e expounded in detil in the Anlytic of the Beutiful of the min text. Knt egins y connecting esthetic judgment or the judgment of tste to wht he clls sujective purposiveness, condition in which fundmentl purpose of the cognitive suject is fulfilled, ut fulfilled in such wy tht it is ccompnied y feeling of plesure, the only kind of senstion tht we do not utomticlly trnsform into predicte of ojects nd thus interpret exclusively s sign of our own mentl condition. 41 Knt s sic ide is then tht when the free ply of the imgintion with the representtions offered to us y n oject, unguided nd unconstrined y ny predetermined concept of wht the oject is or ought to e in order to serve ny prticulr theoreticl or prcticl purpose, nevertheless seems to us to stisfy the generl im of the understnding to find unity in ll of our experience, we respond to this fulfillment of the underlying im of cognition with plesure, nd plesure tht is noticele nd enduring ecuse the stisfction of our generl cognitive im in these circumstnces seems contingent nd is not tken for grnted y us. This is Knt s fmous conception of the response to euty s free nd hrmonious ply of imgintion our ility to tke in nd reproduce sensory impressions nd imges nd understnding. 42 Knt then signls tht he intends to rgue in the min text tht since we ll hve the sme cognitive fculties nd they cn e expected to work in the sme wy this premise is, in fct, the priori principle of esthetic judgment s form of reflecting judgment it is resonle for us to expect tht t lest in idel circumstnces others will hve the sme responses to ojects tht we do, nd thus we cn clim universl vlidity for our plesure y mens of judgment of tste. 43 After this rief ccount of the judgment of euty, Knt moves directly (in Section IX of the first drft nd Section X of the pulished version) to the lst of the three min forms of reflecting judgment tht he considers in the Introduction, teleologicl judgment on the purposiveness of some ojects in nture, the ones we now cll orgnisms ut tht Knt tended to cll orgnized eings. Here Knt does not tell us s much out wht is to follow s he does in the cse of esthetic judgment; he contrsts esthetic judgment on the form of prticulr ojects s such with teleologicl judgments out the correspondence of [n oject s] form with the possiility of the thing itself, in ccordnce with concept of it which precedes nd contins the ground of this form. 44 Wht this mens is oscure, nd we hve to wit until the min ody of the text to lern tht Knt mens tht orgnisms hve kind of internl orgniztion tht is for vrious resons difficult for us to understnd unless we see it s the product of n ntecedent concept of the oject on the prt of designer of it, nd tht once we introduce xxvi
Editor s introduction the ide of designer it ecomes inevitle for us to see the orgnism nd even nture s whole s hving some sort of rtionl purpose lthough the principle tht nture hs purpose, which is the unstted priori principle of teleologicl judgment, cn only e regultive principle for reflecting judgment, not constitutive principle for determining judgment tht ctully contriutes to our scientific knowledge of nture. (It my lso e noted tht neither here nor in the ody of the text does Knt ttempt to drw ny specil connection etween teleologicl judgment nd the feeling of plesure.) In the pulished introduction, Knt concludes with the clim lredy lluded to t the end of the previous section, tht the fculty of judgment llows us to ridge the gulf etween the legisltions nd domins of theoreticl knowledge on the one hnd nd freedom on the other. 45 Wht he mens y this is gin unexplined t this stge, lthough the sequel will show tht he hs numer of clims in mind: tht our disinterested ffection for euty prepres us for the non selfregrding respect nd love for mnkind tht is required of us y morlity; tht the existence of euty in nture gives us hint tht nture is hospitle to humn morlity; nd tht we cn only give content to the ide of purpose for nture tht we re led to y our reflection on the purposiveness of orgnisms y thinking of humn morl development s the ultimte end of nture. 46 These links etween euty nd purposiveness on the one hnd nd Knt s morl vision of the plce of mnkind in the world on the other re the sustntive links etween esthetics nd teleology tht lie ehind nd give importnce to their superficil connection y mens of the technicl conception of reflecting judgment. Hving discussed only the judgment of euty in the ody of the introduction, Knt surprises us t the end of the first drft y dividing esthetic judgment into judgment on the eutiful nd on the sulime, nd teleologicl judgment into judgment on the internl purposiveness of orgnisms nd on the reltive or externl purposiveness of them, or their contriution to the purposiveness of nture s whole. 47 The first of these distinctions is reflected in the division of the Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment, the first min prt of the whole Critique, into two ooks, the Anlytic of the Beutiful nd the Anlytic of the Sulime. The second distinction is not reflected so explicitly in the orgniztion of the second min prt of the Critique, the Critique of the Teleologicl Power of Judgment, ut in fct underlies the division etween its Anlytic nd its Methodology (which re seprted y Dilectic ). We will now riefly descrie the contents of these prts of the min text of the Critique. Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment : Anlytic of the Beutiful. The twenty-two numered sections of this prt of the xxvii