RESEARCH AFTER POSTSTRUCTURALISM

RESEARCH AFTER POSTSTRUCTURALISM Alison Thompson Flinders University, South Australia alison.thompson@flinders.edu.au ABSTRACT The works of existentialist philosophers and post structuralist sociologists in the 19 th and 20 th centuries have weakened the foundation of Enlightenment ideals and the scientific method. Their criticism of research method and its practical use undermine a small part of the academic legitimacy that sociologists claim, specifically the appeal to scientific validity and objectivity. In this paper I will summarise the shortcomings of both qualitative and quantitative methodologies, with particular focus on mixed method research. I will then discuss Foucault s strategy of genealogy as an instrument for practical research and political action. Genealogy is not a solution, but an alternative that may evade some of the pitfalls of traditional methodologies. The aim of this paper is not to devalue sociological research per se. Rather, I argue the need for a philosophical grounding of research methodology in order for social science researchers to acknowledge the limits of what can be achieved by any research strategy. 1 INTRODUCTION The decision to use a particular method or combination of methods is commonly based on the appropriateness of the technique to the phenomena being studied. The purpose or intentions of the study largely mediate this, and these are contingent to the researcher s philosophical assumptions. It is the tendency of many researchers in the social sciences to either apply too much emphasis on falsely grounded assumptions in the selection or application of a research method, or developing conclusions from the study with a notion of absolute truth. At some point, preferably at the formative stage of the study, researchers ought to ponder the philosophical assumptions that underlie their beliefs about truth, validity and the position of the researcher relative to the participant. One cannot simply select methods that superficially best get the job done without creating paradoxes and inconsistencies within the analysis, that lead to poor assumptions in the results. Such an endeavor calls for a clear understanding of methodology not just as technique for the purpose of generating data, but as the epistemological justification of what can be achieved through research. In so doing, the reasons for doing the research are reflexively explored and the position and power relations inherent to the research process are considered. It can only be through the difficult process here outlined that present day sociologists can develop strong and useful research that can withstand the critical review of the poststructuralist enquirer. In assessing arguments in favor of a mixed method research approach I will discuss the differential use of the term methodology that is as the practical methods of research and as the epistemological justification for research practice. Related to methodology as epistemology, I will show that the weakest point of a mixed methods research project is consistently a philosophically based one. Such a discussion as this necessitates a summary of what has been described as the paradigm wars. In the second part of the paper I will explore the impact of poststructuralism on research practice and argue that Foucault s revival of Nietzsche s genealogical approach offers a practical and political role for sociological research. The purpose of this paper is not to discredit any methodological approach so much as to advise circumspection in how results are derived and analysis

developed. I am suggesting genealogy as an effective way of dealing with poststructuralist criticisms of social science research, and in all other social research I propose reticence in how results apply to or are used to reflect the social body. 2 DISCUSSION 2.1 METHODS AND METHODOLOGIES Writing with a spirit of methodological cooperation Guba and Lincoln developed extensive criteria for judging the value of qualitative studies (Smith and Heshusius 1986). Developed as parallels to the criteria for judging a quantitative study, they discussed qualitative rigor in terms of credibility as internal validity, dependability as reliability, and confirmability as objectivity. Smith and Heshusius argue such parallels shift the focus from differences in philosophical assumptions to viewing the two paradigms as foundationally comparable but with variation in technique (1986). Miles and Huberman have taken the same approach as Guba and Lincoln s, though they retain the relevance of philosophical assumptions in their discussions (Smith and Heshusius 1986). Pragmatically they advocate blending the two approaches on the basis that the old debate between the two is unlikely to be resolved soon, arguing that attention should focus on developing methods that give rise to valid meanings from qualitative studies. This of course negates the proposition of Smith and Heshusius who claim that such a resolution is unlikely, as attempts to apply rigor, validity or reliability to qualitative research have the result of accepting a positivist framework based on a quantitative assumption that belittles the significance of qualitative research per se (Bryman 1984, p.85). Smith and Heshusius identify as problematic the definition of methodology used by those advocating paradigm synthesis (1986). That is method as a sequence of procedures or techniques, rather than the European social philosophy legacy of method as an elaboration of logical issues and, ultimately, on the justifications that inform practice (Smith and Heshusius 1986, p.8). These two definitions are independent and incomparable given the former necessitates a return to philosophical issues of reality, truth and the investigator s relationship to the researched, in turn informing the technique aspect of method. For these researchers the key to a legitimate mixing of techniques is not to confuse the justification of logic used by the two paradigms, since it is from this logic that one derives a meaning for the term valid. Marshall and Rossman fail to recognise the importance of this argument in suggesting methods be selected and mixed on the basis of balance and intellectual breadth and rigour (1989, p.17). In the same way a mixing of techniques, as suggested by Denzin s triangulating approach, maybe based on the recognition of both epistemologies having a valuable contribution to a given problem, but their founding assumptions should remain clear and freestanding from one another (1978). Support for mixed method research appears to be an expression of growing disillusionment with the extreme polarities indicated by the qualitative-quantitative debate (Bryman 1984). Avoiding the philosophical challenges outlined by Smith and Heshusius so as to continue productive research with the most appropriate mix of research methods, appeals to a quantitative justification of logic that a more accurate and credible depiction of reality is possible, and this will reduce researcher bias (1986). Researching the integration of qualitative and quantitative research in the analysis and discussion of data, Bryman found only one out of twenty mixed methods researchers interviewed was concerned with ontology, and this single account was only in relation to the assessment of a doctoral thesis (2007). On this very important foundational issue, pragmatism has won out to the extent that epistemology received scant consideration at any stage of the research development. In his discussion of barriers to integrating a mixed methodology in research practice, Bryman does not consider that some of the identified barriers are rooted in the ontological issues that remain unresolved, e.g. the

structure of the project, researcher preferences and specialisms, the nature of the data and the resultant lack of good examples to use as an ideal template. How can such an integrated study be achieved when researchers lack the philosophical grounding necessary in the planning, analysis and write up stages of research? The notion that combined methodologies should be mutually informative and illuminating is problematic, when such integration may be so difficult as to remain rare and elusive, illustrated by none of the twenty researchers Bryman interviewed being able to identify a single mixed methods study they considered exemplary in its integration of methods (2007). 2.2 VALIDITY For both qualitative and quantitative studies the issue of validity is problematised by the very possibility of some criteria which can judge an interpretation, from several people with divergent values, aspirations and interests. Smith and Heshusius, along with Bryman, argue that using the concepts validity and reliability in a similar manner for the two paradigms requires the acceptance of realist assumptions (1986; 1984). These include faith in the separation of investigator from the investigated and truth in the form of correspondence. The realist position assumes the existence of a reality that human minds can not only grapple with, but that this reality can be accurately depicted for others to see in a complete and unadulterated form (Silverman and Gubrium 1989). Lather, from a poststructuralist perspective, takes issue with the term validity, but does so in light of anti-foundational discourse theory and by capturing the term as an incitement to discourse where others might reject it (Gordon in Lather 1993, p.674). As such, validity is an inescapable and elusive factor that marks out the limits and bounds of research. Lather suggests researchers take a position on methodology as epistemology, as a first step in reflexively exploring ones practice of representation (1993). The validity that she imagines could follow in the wake of poststructuralism is one that rests on the researcher s resourcefulness with regard to the various discourses and practices of contemporary issues. By this Lather quotes Derrida s suggestion that we extend ourselves by force of play against the limits of the already said (in Lather 1993, p.676). 2.3 TRUTH While appearing to argue from polar ends of a methodological divide, both qualitative and quantitative proponents base their arguments on assumptions that lack a stable foundation. Silverman believes history consists of successive re articulations of the same and a growing number of discourses with no greater intrinsic value then the search for truth through progress based on reason (1989). He argues that while Enlightenment reformism works to substitute discourse for ever-newer discourse under the guise of reason, the romanticism of some qualitative approaches tends to avoid rules of reason by avoiding discourse and focusing on feelings and experiences. Strains of sociology like phenomenological sociology and some feminist approaches take up the romanticism in their focus on experience and perceptions. Interviews are frequently used to document authentic experiences, despite these being interpreted in light of the available discourses. Interpretation cannot escape discourse, and so romanticism offers the impossible dream of transcending the discourses that we speak/speak to us (Silverman 1989, p.38). This romanticism has already been adulterated by Enlightenment ideals, as the content of our narratives are infiltrated by the truths established through the human sciences and dispersed via the media. Both reformism and romanticism make claims to truth through their discourse assuming that access to reality escapes language and context. Saussure and Wittgenstein reject notions of a reality that underlies language, arguing instead that signs and words derive meaning from their use and their relation to other words and signs their use constitutes a significant degree of reality, but it can never reiterate pure experience (Silverman 1989). Similarly, Foucault brought to light institutional involvement with linguistic practice in the construction of such certainties as the past or progress. Going beyond the discourse of language, his studies of surveillance and documentation focus on power, specifically through texts that emanate

from sites of particular social practices (Foucault 1971). Focusing on specifics, as against formalities, leads one to see the impossibility of a single logic of totality that can explain society. Rather, there exist totalising practices which researchers should attempt to make clear to all affected how such practices operate in specific institutional settings, and who benefits by their existence (Foucault and Deleuze 1973). What is common to all totalising practices, through particular discourses of truth, is the formal aim of social cohesion, achieved through the standardization of individuals, based on apparently naturally occurring properties. Social science research, qualitative and quantitative, has contributed significantly to the justification of totalizing practices for the purpose of control and social cohesion. 2.4 GENEALOGY If one seeks an alternative path to those proposed via the debate between divergent methodologies, satisfaction might be found in the distinctly political anti method of Foucault (Shiner 1982). The work of Michel Foucault, in particular his thesis on the capillary form of power and its inextricable relationship with knowledge, undermines all realist assumptions about enlightened research (1979). Poststructuralists like Foucault seek to deconstruct the most problematic polarities of Western thought and in so doing challenge the assumptions that give impetus to much social research, particularly forms of positivism (Silverman and Gubrium 1989). Through genealogies of social phenomena he theorized the lack of linearity in progress; the micro political forms and functions of power apart from centralized and terminal forms once discussed; the positive potential for power outside of the juridical model, illustrating its potential to incite voice as well as censor; a focus on the conditions through which truth is produced and the participation of social scientists in the surveillance and normalization of individuals; and finally (though perhaps not) the deconstruction of subjects within specific discourses and through particular technologies, shows how people come to recognise themselves within certain models, as subjects (Silverman and Gubrium 1989; Foucault 1979). The reforming principles of the social sciences thus provide the mechanism for the continued subjectification of the body. For Foucault, the universal intellectual, with their globalizing theories have become an apparition they hold an untenable position in light of poststructuralist critique. The role of Foucault s specific intellectual is to provide the tools necessary to identify and deny the exercise and exchange of power through discourse and the political use of knowledge (Shiner 1982). Politically, poststructuralism helps us to uncover essentialist propositions of the past, but rightfully undermines the elitist position of reformers in questioning the legitimacy of intellectuals changing the situation of others (Foucault and Deleuze 1973; Foucault 1979). Howard Becker, directed by concerns for the moral basis of law, proposed that in a highly differentiated social world, researchers could not possibly produce a single, uniform expression of reality that does not de-legitimate the experiences of at least some (Silverman and Gubrium 1989). His partisan position has informed the practice of a range of ethnographers, their aim being to make visible the experience of marginalised members of society. The approach, however, has the twofold effect of disguising the discourse of exclusion that exists to protect the domain of disciplines and ensure their continued existence (Silverman and Gubrium 1989). In light of this, Derrida argues that one may choose the denigrated side of a polarity, not to privilege it in the way positive discrimination might, but to unsettle the arbitrary ascription of such polarities. Similarly, Foucault believes it necessary for us to pass over to the other side from the good, in order for us to see the binaries for what they are choices and alternatives tainted by values that have an apparently natural status (Foucault in Silverman 1989, p.44). Upsetting the balance of socially constructed polarities lays bare the assumptions that ground their social value. No researcher can escape the exercise of power that exists in the formulation of knowledge, since power does not exist simply at the level of human interest or intentions, but within and through discourses that purport to produce truth (Foucault and

Deleuze 1973; Foucault 1979; Silverman and Gubrium 1989). The crisis of representation is characterized by the poststructuralists as the end of pure essence, where anti-foundationalist positions argue that representative validity cannot exist once the phenomena itself is absent (Lather 1993, p.675). The idea is not looking harder or more closely, as thick description or highly focused surveys may attempt, but to reveal those aspects of the social web which frame and construct what is understood to identify those nuances which represent power/knowledge (Lather 1993, p.675). Genealogy is an attempt to trace the emergence and descent of social phenomena rather than identify origins, and in so doing attempts to make visible what has previously been unseen it exposes both the nature of power and its connection to knowledge (Foucault 1971). Rather than developing and contributing to established discourse, genealogy develops/discovers its own discourse by stating what others fail to see or choose to ignore. Genealogy is not an alternative methodology to be used in preference to the aforementioned approaches. Rather, it is as much a political act as a sociological one, and it too requires a consideration of the issues of truth, validity and representation. Foucault s work makes the practice of social research challenging, but by no means ineffectual. That power has a capillary nature means there are as many multiple points of resistance as there are multiple points of its exercise and effect (Foucault 1979). How we conceive our world is mediated constantly by our experience of the configurations of power/knowledge. Thus inquiries into the social world offer a position of resistance to the intangible influence of power, discourse and social constructs. Propositions of new models and theories that promise truth serve all but those under study, as they tend to rearticulate those elements which already exist in present discourse, justifying assumptions put in place through power relations. According to poststructuralist arguments research should resist incessant classification and categorization, since it is through these things that control over individuals and populations are exerted through their punishment, cure, rehabilitation or recuperation (Silverman 1985; Turner 1989). 3 CONCLUSIONS Giving up on methodology because philosophical foundations do not withstand a poststructuralist critique would be a parsimonious enterprise. Rather, recognising the integrated design and analysis of mixed methodology is a difficult one to justify philosophically may lead us to simpler pursuits of a more practical nature. Focus could be attuned to the ways in which one paradigm could inform or draw from another without claiming or assuming they have comparable foundations. The aim maybe to focus on appropriate methodological choices while establishing a sensible, even conservative estimate of representative value. Whilst acknowledging the need for pragmatism, some knowledge of the epistemological issues that have thus far been outlined is required. The basis of my pragmatism being not so utilitarian as to disregard the very important issues that could confound a research topic in great need of attention: at best the research analysis is weakened by unaddressed philosophical contradictions; at worst models and theories developed from the research feed into poor public policy. The issue of paradigm synthesis and social research is not simply a navel-gazing exercise - research results are used to affect social lives and thus become embodied by individuals as well as institutions. Ultimately, discursive legitimacy and applicability is mitigated by the researcher s understanding of the issues surrounding truth, validity and the position of the researcher relative to the participant. While they have in some respects made justifying research difficult, the work of such theorists as Foucault and Derrida have informed and altered the reasons why many sociologists conduct research. Given the inextricable link between power and knowledge, the poststructuralist inquirer seeks meaning in their projects which do not primarily serve themselves or their discipline. Instead their research aims to enable particular groups at a practical level, while disrupting the hierarchies and binaries that go unquestioned at a theoretical level. Research may undermine common held absolutist assumptions, help

people to recognise and resist their social situation and encourage understanding between systems of thought with divergent foundations. In this way, it can do more than justify classificatory systems or distance experiences from their contextual meaning through academic language. Given the methodological weaknesses of qualitative and quantitative methodologies, I propose genealogy be used as a research approach that best satisfies the aims of a poststructuralist sociology. For more practical pursuits of sociology, researchers could only improve the strength of their arguments by addressing and where possible accommodating the criticisms poststructuralist scholars have leveled at research methodology. 4 REFERENCES Bauman, Zygmunt (2000). On writing sociology. Theory, Culture and Society, 17(1), 79-90. Bryman, Alan (1984). The debate about quantitative and qualitative research: a question of method or epistemology? British Journal of Sociology, 35(1), 75-92. Bryman, Alan (2007). Barriers to integrating quantitative and qualitative research. Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 1(8), 8-22. Denzin, Norman K. (1978). The Research Act. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. Foucault, Michel (1971). Nietzsche, genealogy, history. In (1984) The Foucault Reader (139-164.) London: Random House. Foucault, Michel (1979). Truth and power. In Morris, M. (ed.) Michel Foucault: Power, Truth, Strategy (29-48.) Sydney: Feral Publications. Foucault, Michel and Deleuze, Gilles (1973). The intellectuals and power. (Mark Seem, trans.) Telos, 19, 103-109. Lather, Patti (1993). Fertile obsession: Validity after poststructuralism. The Sociological Quarterly, 34(4), 673-693. Marshall, C. and Rossman, G. B. (1989). Designing Qualitative Research. Newbury Park: Sage. Owen, David (1994). Maturity and Modernity Nietzsche, Weber, Foucault and the Ambivalence of Reason. London: Routledge. Shiner, Larry (1982). Reading Foucault: Anti-Method and the genealogy of powerknowledge. History and Theory, 21(3), 382-398. Silverman, David (1989). The impossible dreams of reformism and romanticism. In The Politics of Field Research (30-48). London: Sage. Silverman, David and Gubrium, Jaber F. (1989). The Politics of Field Research. London: Sage. Smith, John K. and Heshusius, Lous (1986). Closing down the conversation: The end of the quantitative-qualitative debate among educational enquirers. Educational Researcher, 15, 4-12. Turner, Roy (1989). Deconstructing the field. In The Politics of Field Research (13-29). London: Sage.