Hume and Kant: Taste, Judgment, & Disinterestedness David Hume (1711 1776) Scottish philosopher and historian, usually classed together with John Locke and George Berkeley as the British Empiricists (in contrast to the Continental Rationalists). Portrait by Allan Ramsay (1766) In some respects, Hume is the most radical of the bunch: His commitment to empiricism is thoroughgoing and paves the way for much 20 th century analytic philosophy. (Kant says that it was Hume, together with Rousseau, who awakened him from his dogmatic slumber ) 1
Humean Skepticism I About causation: We speak of A causing B. We say that A and B are causally linked. But can we perceive (i.e., observe empirically) the causal connection between A and B? We cannot. So, Hume argues, our idea of causation amounts to nothing more than constant conjunction and the expectation thereof an instinct-like expectation that we cannot prove to be true. Humean Skepticism II About induction: Scientists (and many others) predict the future on the basis of past observations. But, a) we have no necessary reason to believe that the future must resemble the past (since we can imagine a universe that will change completely in the next moment). Yet, b) we cannot simply say induction has always worked up until now, so probably it will work in the future, since that is circular (i.e., it is itself an instance of inductive reasoning). So, (as with our belief in the reality of the external world), we have an instinct-like need for induction, but we cannot prove that it is veridical. 2
Humean Skepticism III About practical reason: We may say that some kinds of actions are more reasonable than others. Choosing a lifestyle solely devoted to watching soap operas and eating Cheetos, e.g., may seem unreasonable or irrational. But reason per se, says Hume, deals only in calculation in fitting means to ends that we have already chosen. It is of no help in choosing what ends to pursue So, reason can help you to realize yours desires to plan your viewing schedule; to help you to acquire the Cheetos but by itself it has no power to tell you which goals and desires to have. Hume: Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them. Treatise of Human Nature (II, iii, 1739-40) 3
Humean Skepticism IV About morals: It follows from Hume s skepticism about practical reason that immoral behavior is not immoral because it is against reason. Reason by itself does not motivate us to act one way rather than another. We do, however, act in accord with our desires and preferences. So, says Hume, to believe that X is wrong, is ipso facto to be motivated not do X, to blame others for doing X, etc. Moral and Aesthetic Judgment For Hume, moral (and aesthetic, i.e., critical ) judgments ultimately rest upon sentiment (in 18 th century usage, a generic term for feelings or emotions) At most, reason can only pave the way for judgments based on sentiment, through analysis of the moral or aesthetic matters at hand. Hume s theory of criticism (i.e., his aesthetic theory) could be called sentimentalism. (Though few use this term because of its later connotations.) 4
The Variety of Taste This variety, according to Hume, is obvious and perceived by nearly everyone. Yet this variety is found, upon examination, "to be still greater in reality than in appearance (37) Every language (every nation, every age) contains some words of approbation and disapprobation regarding works of art: elegance, propriety, simplicity, etc. vs. fustian, affectation, coldness, false brilliance Yet, as with morals, some of the apparent agreement about aesthetic judgments may be due the nature of normative language: The very word charity already implies be charitable ; to call a work of art elegant is already to praise it. The real problem of variety comes into focus when we ask about particular works. Which works count as elegant, as pleasingly simple, etc.? Which works count as fustian or affected? 5
A Standard of Taste Says Hume: It is natural for us to seek a Standard of Taste; a rule, by which the various sentiments of men may be reconciled (38). What makes this seem difficult, perhaps impossible, is the species of philosophy (to which, one might think, Hume s own philosophy belongs) which holds that All sentiment is right; because sentiment has reference to nothing beyond itself, and is always real wherever a man is conscious of it. (Compare: subjectivism in metaethics; the incorrigibility of the mental ) Subjectivism Beauty is no quality in things themselves [Hence reason and understanding will be of no great help in appreciating beauty] It exists merely in the mind which contemplates them; and each mind perceives a different beauty (38) So the old saying de gustibus non est disputandum has it right and, for a change, received wisdom is in agreement with skeptical philosophy. 6
But Not Relativism Since, at the same time, common sense also holds that some artists and artworks clearly are better than others: It would be absurd and ridiculous (39) to maintain that Ogilby is better Milton; Bunyan better than Addison. But how, then, can we formulate a standard of taste, rules of criticism, if aesthetic judgment is ultimately founded on nothing but sentiment? Experience Hume says: None of the rules of composition are fixed by reasonings a priori, or can be esteemed abstract conclusions of the understanding (39) Instead, rules of criticism are to be found in general observations, in the experience of what has universally been found to please in all countries and in all ages Similarly, the rules of art are discovered by authors (artists) either through observation or through genius. 7
Hume s Theory of Taste Recap d A strongly empiricist view. By the same token, Hume s view suggest some antiformalist implications. Cf. his discussion of Ariosto: If they are found to please, they cannot be faults; let the pleasure, which they produce, be ever so unexpected and unaccountable. (39) So why so much variety? But though the general rules of art are founded only on experience and on the observation of the common sentiments of human nature, we must not imagine that, on every occasion, the feelings of men will be conformable to these rules (39) After all, sometimes our sensory apparatus is clearly in disarray: A feverish person is not a good judge of the taste of food; the jaundiced person is not a good judge of colour (40) So, sometimes, disagreement may be due, in effect, to having different equipment 8
Rules of Criticism but that sort of disagreement, presumably, is relatively rare and/or temporary. So, once again, to locate rules of criticism (or the rules of art), we must look to what has been universally found to please in all countries and in all ages. This, Hume suggests, is the job of specialists who have refined their taste through extensive experience of the art of different ages and cultures Critics Qualifications: Delicacy of taste Constant practice The experience/habit of making comparisons Freedom from prejudice Good sense So, in contrast to his empirical account of taste based on (subjective) sentiment, Hume s argument for a standard of taste depends on educated critics who establish and transmit judgments of aesthetic value. 9
But where are such critics to be found? By what marks are they to be known? (44) This, Hume admits, is an embarrassing question. When doubts occur, we can only acknowledge a true and decisive standard to exist somewhere. A Problem But why must we accept that a true and decisive standard exists somewhere? Critics sometimes disagree (!), after all. Must we assume that when two critics disagree one of them must have a defective sensory apparatus (the aesthetic equivalent of jaundice or fever) or insufficient practice, prejudice, etc.? Hume s ultimate conclusion seems to be that the standard of taste is set by whatever survives the test of time; but this is in some tension with his subjective/sentimentalist account of aesthetic judgment. 10
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) German philosopher of the Enlightenment, whose work revolutionized philosophy (in ethics, epistemology, metaphysics ) and which continues to set the agenda in contemporary aesthetic theory. One contemporary analytic philosopher says: "You can do philosophy with Kant or against Kant, but you cannot do philosophy without him." Two (Inadequate) Keywords Because he wrote about nearly every topic in philosophy, and because his influence has been so immense, it is nearly impossible to provide a tidy, simple summary of Kant s philosophy. There are, however, two key themes which run through and unite all of Kant s mature ( Critical ) work: Reason (vs. experience) Autonomy (vs. heteronomy) 11
Kant s Critical Philosophy Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (1763) An early, rather conventional work in 18 th century aesthetics taking up, to no especially great effect, themes in Hume and, especially, Edmund Burke. X is beautiful; Y is sublime, etc. Kant s awakening : Critical philosophy The Critique of Pure Reason (1781) The Critique of Practical Reason (1788) The Critique of Judgment (1790) In the Critical works, Kant sets out to put epistemology (the theory of knowledge) and metaphysics ( what exists and how we know it ) on a new foundation, one which is consistent with Newtonian science and which responds to Humean empiricist skepticism. So, in Kant s project, a theory of judgment is not simply a theory about art and beauty, separable from the rest of the Critical project, but is instead the completion of the Critical project as a whole. 12
Three central epistemological/metaphysical claims: 1. Sensible and conceptual presentations of the world must be understood to be two quite distinct sources of possible knowledge. ( I see two doughnuts ; the concept of two) 2. Knowledge of sensible reality is only possible if some concepts (such as substance, unity, plurality) are already available to the intellect. (I.e., some concepts are a priori) 3. Sensible presentations are of appearances only and not things as they are in themselves. (E.g.: Things appear to us in space and time, but this is a function, an artifact, of our mind. Space and time are not like existent things, they are a priori structures in the mind of the perceiver.) Overall Structure of the Third Critique Does the faculty (or power ) of judgment provide itself with an a priori principle? I.e., what, if anything, does judgment do for itself? Normally: Understanding -> supplies concepts (a priori or a posteriori) Reason -> draws inferences Judgment -> mediates between reason and understanding 13
Determinate Judgment You see (perceive) something (or a representation of something) You judge that it is an instance of some concept ( that s a doughnut! ) through the understanding, which polls for concepts that might fit with your perception, and reason, which infers whether or not the candidate concept is an adequate fit for the perception. ( subsumption under a concept ) In cases of determinate judgment, the concept contains sufficient information for the identification of any particular instance of it: Judgment has a merely mediating role. Reflective Judgment But what about cases where there is no prior concept or cases where the concept is not sufficient to identify a particular instance of it? How could a judgment take place without a prior concept? How are new concepts formed? Are there judgments that neither begin nor end with determinate concepts? This is where aesthetic judgments fit in. These are, Kant thinks, especially interesting instances of reflective judgment. 14
Kant: The Analytic of Beautiful: Judgment of Taste The First Moment (Quality) Taste is the faculty of judging an object or a method or representing it by an entirely disinterested satisfaction or dissatisfaction. The object of such satisfaction is called beautiful. ( 5, 52) I.e.: The judgment of taste (an instance of reflective judgment, you ll recall) has the quality of being disinterested (it involves no reference to the faculty of desire). 15
Interest/Disinterest X is agreeable (is pleasant) a judgment about sensations (e.g., a yummy doughnut; a sexy body). X is good a judgment about concepts (e.g., a good house to live in; a good person) Genuine aesthetic judgments are free from any interest (a free satisfaction 5, 51). Interest attaches to real desires, real (possible) actions; in aesthetic judgment, by contrast, the real existence of the object does not matter. Pleasure Aesthetic judgment results in pleasure, but it is not a judgment about pleasure. (Compare: Hume) For example: I may desire to own a picture (or a copy of it) because it gives me pleasure, but the pleasure that comes from satisfying that (acquisitive) desire is distinct from, parasitic upon, the pleasure that accompanies aesthetic judgment (which, Kant insists, is properly always disinterested). 16
Formalism Just because it is supposed to be disinterested, Kant insists later on ( 13, 14) that aesthetic judgment per se concerns itself mainly with the form of the object (shape, arrangement, delineation) and not its sensible content (colour, tone, etc.). Why? Well, Kant says, sensible content is deeply connected to sensory pleasure, to the agreeable (i.e., to desire). Focusing on sensible content can lead us back to interest and inclination. (Pure colours, pure tones, may be beautiful, however, just in so far as they are pure, i.e., formal.) Kant: Often taken to be the great initiator of formalism in modern aesthetics. Note that his formalism follows directly from the doctrine of disinterestedness. (Compare: Bell and, later, Greenberg) 17
Critics of Disinterestedness Nietzsche, Freud: All art relates to the will (to desire, to the Id) (Some) Expression Theories: Art specifically involves the affective response of the artist (and/or the viewer). Anthropological/Marxian Theories: Art is form of cultural production; it must inevitably involve some shared cultural or political meaning. Purely formal (e.g., highly abstract) art may lack such shared meaning. (Cf. Freeland on The Ritual Theory ) The Second Moment (Quantity) The beautiful is that which pleases universally without [requiring] a concept. ( 9, 56) I.e., judgments of taste are universal (as opposed to particular) 18
Universality We may say that beauty is in the eye of the beholder, that de gustibus non est disputandum, etc., but that is not how we act. We try to justify aesthetic judgments, we debate, we argue. (Think: Hume on Milton). Kant: Judgments about beauty involve a claim or expectation about the agreement of others just as if beauty were a real property of objects. I like doughnuts No expectation of agreement since (we know) some people don t like them (the judgment is particular to me and my desires); a strictly subjective judgment (based on ultimately on sensation). Doughnuts are usually high in glucose and glycerides and are fattening Strictly objective, but its universality depends on concepts (a determinate judgment). Einstein on the Beach is a beautiful opera A reflective judgment which has no concept (since it not the application of a concept, but the attribution of a feeling), yet we behave as if such judgments are objective. 19
Free Play Aesthetic judgment/judgment of taste, says Kant, is judgment apart from a concept (i.e. it is an instance of reflective judgment that does not end with a concept) In ordinary determinate judgments, reason and understanding are simply coordinated by the faculty of judgment. (Of, if you prefer, judgment is simply a name for the process of coordination.) In aesthetic judgment, understanding and imagination are in free play, each furthers or quickens the other in a self-perpetuating cycle of thought and feeling; a harmony of the faculties. The Third Moment (Relation) Beauty is the form of the purposiveness of an object, so far as this is received without any representation of a purpose. ( 17, 65) I.e., judgments of taste are based on purposiveness without purpose 20
Purpose The purpose (or end ) of an object is the concept according to which it was made. (knife: cutting; chair: sitting, etc.). Beautiful things, says Kant, appear to be purposive (i.e., to have been designed) but without any definite purpose. A lamp, e.g., is designed according to an external purpose (providing light); we judge it according to its utility. A certain breed of dog, e.g., may not actually be designed per se, but we can know its internal purpose (what it is meant to be like ); we judge it according to its perfection Yet beauty, says Kant, is not equivalent to utility or to perfection, but it too somehow involves purpose. Beautiful natural objects appear to us as purposive, but their beauty shows no ascertainable purpose they are purposive without purpose. Consider, e.g., a flower scientifically (or, perhaps, theologically) speaking, the flower s design serves certain purposes (attracting insects; protecting the stamen, etc.), but when I judge it beautiful, I m not judging in respect of those purposes yet, somehow, it should be as it is 21
Particular works of art may have been designed with some purpose in mind (e.g., to express the feelings of the artist, or to glorify God, etc.). But when we judge the beauty of artworks (or other objects) we abstract from what we know about the purpose for which the artwork was made in order to judge it aesthetically (i.e., to judge it beautiful). The Fourth Moment (Modality) The beautiful is that which without any concept is cognized as the object of a necessary satisfaction. ( 22, 67) I.e., Judgments of taste are not simply contingent (possible or actual), but necessary 22
A Tricky Sense of Necessity My aesthetic judgment is necessary, according to Kant, not because it is infallible or follows as a matter of logic, but because it follows as a matter of principle. An aesthetic judgment is exemplary. But not because it is founded on a (predetermined) concept of beauty. Instead, it exemplifies (free, disinterested) aesthetic judgment. All objects like this one should be judged beautiful even though we cannot say exactly how other beautiful objects will be like this one. Common Sense The necessity of aesthetic judgment is also conditioned by (i.e., founded upon) what Kant calls common sense (sensus communis) But Kant does not mean by this anything like our ordinary idea of common sense as practical intelligence about things. Beauty behaves as if it was a property of objects, but it is ultimately a product of how our minds work (i.e., how the faculty of judgment works in relation to the other faculties) 23
Common sense, then, as Kant describes it, is the ability of the faculty of judgment to bring sensation/imagination and understanding into a self-reinforcing harmony. This helps to explain how aesthetic judgments can be said to be necessary: They arise from the normal functioning of the same faculties, present in every rational being, that are involved in ordinary cognition. We all have a (common) sensing ability that works this way. The Sublime > Latin sublimis ( under the lintel/frame as in looking up from under the lintel ; lofty, elevated) Experiences that inspire awe by overwhelming us: storms, seemingly limitless vistas, huge buildings. A great preoccupation in Enlightenment and Romantic art and criticism 24
Sublimity Kant s discussion deals not with representations of the sublime (like Friedrich s), but with personal experience of it (i.e., in nature, architecture, mathematics). We might expect to find that being overwhelmed provokes fear or discomfort. And it does, sometimes. But it can also be pleasurable. (Recall: Bullough) As with judgment of the beautiful, Kant maintains that the real object of the sublime is not the threatening cliffs or the tall building itself, but the operations of our mind. In particular, what is properly sublime are the ideas of reason and morality; the ideas of absolute totality and absolute freedom. However tall the cliffs, reason assures us that they are puny in comparison with infinity. However vast and powerful the storm, it is as nothing in comparison with absolute freedom. 25
Now, unlike beautiful things, objects that occasion the sublime are typically formless (e.g., a storm at sea) or at least appear to be so. The sublime also seems to be counter-purposive: It serves no obvious purpose (for us), but instead does violence to our faculties of sense and cognition. Our mind (our imagination) can only hold so much in view at any one time; the sublime overwhelms our imaginative capacity but this is still (at least potentially) pleasurable, since we can temporarily check or repress our fear and, by (once again) adopting a disinterested stance, subdue awe-inspiring experiences through the operation of reason. The experience of the sublime, then, is a rapid alternation between the fearful sense of being overwhelmed and the pleasure of, so to speak, having that overwhelming overwhelmed. Even if we can t grasp a sensible presentation of very big or very powerful things, we can think of them. When we do, we become aware of the power of reason to direct our sensibility and our judgment. 26
Genius Turning from the reception side to the production side, Kant notes works of art can be tasteful (i.e., beautiful; in accord with principles of aesthetic judgment), yet still be soulless lacking a certain something. So what is this something? Yet again the answer, for Kant, lies in the nature of our minds Aesthetic Ideas What provides a soul to works of art are aesthetic ideas sets of sensible presentations (i.e., possible sensory experiences) to which no concept is adequate. The talent of the genius consists in generating aesthetic ideas. (Art, Kant says, is not science; Science can, in principle, be fully taught, but art is a skill which, while it is responsive to training, depends upon native, in-born talent.) 27
Tasteful Expression That s to say, for one thing, the artistic genius does not simply present aesthetic ideas as ideas. (Possible counter-example: conceptual art) Instead, the artistic genius must find a mode of expression that allows a viewer not simply to understand her artwork, but to reach something like the same harmonious state of mind that the artist experienced in producing it... (Compare: expressionist theories like Collingwood s) Genius is the talent (or natural gift) which gives the rule to art. Since talent, as the innate productive faculty of the artist, belongs itself to nature, we may express the matter thus: Genius is the innate mental disposition (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art. ( 46, 82) 28
Proto-Romanticism (Potted Version) Kant is among the most important predecessors of the literary/artistic/cultural/political phenomenon known as Romanticism (together, especially, with Rousseau, who was a great influence on Kant s thought). The High Enlightenment: An empiricist view of art and the world (e.g., Hume s) assigns relatively little importance to human creativity and individuality. A determinist view of the world (e.g., Paley s) that leaves little room for human freedom. Joseph Wright, A Philosopher Giving a Lecture on the Orrery, 1766 29
From Kant to Romanticism For Kant, as we have seen, we do not have access to things in themselves, instead we have no alternative but to understand the world through our mind, from our human point of view. Taken to an extreme, this view becomes idealism: The idea that the external world is somehow created by our minds. (Kant does not go quite that far: noumena, presumably, are out there somewhere.) In art and aesthetics, idealism seems to gain some additional support from Kant s idea of genius... Romantic Genius so much so that some early German Romantics transpose Kant s coordinating functions of the mind into creative functions that somehow make the world (as the artist creates an artwork) Novalis: The world is a dream, and the dream becomes a world. This leads to a near deification of genius in Romantic art and aesthetics 30
Some Revolutionary Slogans Nothing and no one can place rules upon genius. Genius is a law unto itself. There is no reality outside the reality that genius creates. Genius can be bound by no limits, not even by the limits of its own achievements. Cf., Coleridge: Every great and original writer, in proportion as he is great or original, must himself create the taste by which he is to be relished. Eugene Delacroix, Liberty Leading the People, 1830 31