HUSSERL AND INTENTIONALITY

HUSSERL AND INTENTIONALITY

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DAVID WOODRUFF SMITH Dept. of Philosophy, University of California, Irvine and RONALD McINTYRE Dept. of Philosophy, California State University, Northridge HUSSERL AND INTENTIONALITY A Study of Mind, Meaning, and Language D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY A MEMBER OF THE KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS GROUP DORDRECHT/BOSTON/LANCASTER

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Smith, David Woodruff, 1944- Husser! and intentionality. (Synthese library; v. 154) Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Husser!, Edmund, 1859 1938. 2. Intention (Logic)- History--20th century. 3. Thought and thinking-history- 20th century. 4. Semantics (Philosophy)--History-20th century. 1. McIntyre, Ronald, 1942- II. Title B3279.H94S55 1982 128'.2 82-9865 ISBN 978-90-277-1730-6 ISBN 978-94-010-9383-5 (ebook) DOl 10.1007/978-94-010-9383-5 Published by D. Reidel Publishing Company, P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, Holland Sold and distributed in the U.S.A. and Canada by Kluwer Academic Publishers, 190 Old Derby Street, Hingham, MA 02043, U.S.A. In all other countries, sold and distributed by Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, P.O. Box 322, 3300 AH Dordrecht, Holland First published in 1982 in hardbound edition by Reidel in the series Synthese Library, volume 154 All Rights Reserved 1982, 1984 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland and copyrightholders as specified on appropriate pages within No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any informational storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner

T ABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ABBREVIA TIONS PREFACE INTRODUCTION ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS vii ix xi xiii xix CHAPTER 1/ Intentionality and Intensionality CHAPTER II / Some Classical Approaches to the Problems ofintentionality and Intensionality 40 CHAPTE R III / Fundamentals of Husserl's Theory of Intentionality 87 CHAPTER IV / Husserl's Theory of Noematic Sinn 153 CHAPTER V / Husserl's Notion of Horizon 227 CHAPTER vi/horizon-analysis and the Possible-Worlds Explication of Meaning 266 CHAPTER VII / Intentionality and Possible-Worlds Semantics 308 CHAPTER VIII / Definite, or De Re, Intention in a Husserlian Framework 354 BIBLIOGRAPHY 407 INDEX OF NAMES 417 INDEX OF TOPICS 419

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We thank the appropriate parties for their kind permission to quote at some length, for the purpose of scholarly commentary, from the following works by Edmund Husserl: Cartesian Meditations, English translation by Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1960); Experience and Judgment (revised and edited by Ludwig Landgrebe), English translation by James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks (Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1973) (British Commonwealth rights licensed to Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd.); Ideen zu einer rein en Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologischen Philosophie, erstes Buch, herausgegeben von Walter Biemel (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1950), quotations being in our own English translations; Logical Investigations, Volumes One and Two, English translation by J. N. Findlay (Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., London, 1970) (American rights licensed to Humanities Press, Inc., Atlantic Highlands, N.J.).

ABBREVIA TIONS The following abbreviations of Husserl's works are employed in the text. Translations from Ideas and from works not available in English at the time of our writing are our own. Otherwise, we have made use of available English translations, and page references are to these editions. We have sometimes made translational changes in passages cited from English translations; on those occasions page references are followed by the notation 'with trans. changes'. CM Cartesian Meditations. Trans!. by Dorion Cairns. Nijhoff, The Hague, 1960. [Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vortriige. Edited by S. Strasser (Husserliana I). Nijhoff, The Hague, 1973.) Originally published in French in 1931, trans!. by J. Peiffer and E. Levinas. Crisis The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Transl. by David Carr. Northwestern University Press, Evanston, Ill., 1970. [Die Krisis der europiiischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phiinomenologie. Ed. by Walter Biemel (Husserliana VI). Nijhoff, The Hague, 1954.) EJ Experience and Judgment. Trans!. by James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks. Northwestern University Press, Evanston, Ill., 1973. [Erfahrung und Urteil. Ed. by Ludwig Landgrebe. Claassen, Hamburg, 1964. Originally published in 1939.) FTL Formal and Transcendental Logic. Trans!. by Dorion Cairns. Nijhoff, The Ideas Hague, 1969. [Formale und transzendentalelogik. Niemeyer, Halle, 1929.) Ideen zu einer reinen Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch. Ed. by Walter Biemel (Husserliana Ill). Nijhoff, The Hague, 1950. [Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. Transl. by W. R. Boyce Gibson. George Allen and Unwin, London, 1931.) Originally published in 1913. Ideas, III Ideen zu einer rein en Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologischen Philosophie. Drittes Buch. Ed. by Marly Biemal (Husserliana V). Nijhoff, The Hague, 1952. IP LI The Idea of Phenomenology. Transl. by William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian. Nijhoff, The Hague, 1964. [Die Idee der Phiinomenologie. Funj Vorlesungen. Ed. by Walter Bieme!. Nijhoff, The Hague, 1950.) Lectures delivered by Husserl in 1907. Logical Investigations. Revised ed. Trans!. by J. N. Findlay. Prolegomena and Investigations I-VI in 2 vols. Humanities Press, New York, 1970. [Logische Untersuchungen. Revised ed. 2 vols. in 3 parts. Niemeyer, Halle, 1913 and 1921. [Vol. I and Vol. II, Pt. 1 (Prolegomena and Investigations ix

x PP Time Zeit. ABBREVIATIONS I-IV) were published in 1913; Vol. II, Pt. 2 (Investigation VI) was published in 1921.) 5th printing, Tiibingen, 1968.) The flist edition of Logische Untersuchungen was published in 1900-1901 in Halle by Niemeyer. Phenomenological Psychology. Trans!. by John Scanlon. Nijhoff, The Hague, 1977. [Phiinomenologische Psychologie. Ed. by Walter Biemel (Husserlillna IX). Nijhoff, The Hague, 1962.) Lectures delivered by Husserl in the summer semester of 1925. The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness. Ed. by Martin Heidegger. Transl. by James S. Churchill. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Ind., 1964. [Vorlesungen zur Phiinomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstsein. Ed. by Martin Heidegger. Niemeyer, Halle, 1928.) Zur Phiinomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins. Ed. by Rudolf Boehm (Husserlillna X). Nijhoff, The Hague, 1966. In addition to Husserl's Vorlesungen zur Phiinomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstsein, this volume contains supplementary texts not translated in Time. References to these texts will be indicated by Zeit.'

PREFACE This book has roots in our respective doctoral dissertations, both completed in 1970 at Stanford under the tutelage of Professors Dagfmn F llesdal, John D. Goheen, and Jaakko Hintikka. In the fall of 1970 we wrote a joint article that proved to be a prolegomenon to the present work, our 'Intentionality via Intensions', The Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971). Professor Hintikka then suggested we write a joint book, and in the spring of 1971 we began writing the present work. The project was to last ten years as our conception of the project continued to grow at each stage. Our iritellectual debts follow the history of our project. During our dissertation days at Stanford, we joined with fellow doctoral candidates John Lad and Michael Sukale and Professors F llesdal, Goheen, and Hintikka in an informal seminar on phenomenology that met weekly from June of 1969 through March of 1970. During the summers of 1973 and 1974 we regrouped in another informal seminar on phenomenology, meeting weekly at Stanford and sometimes Berkeley, the regular participants being ourselves, Hubert Dreyfus, Dagfmn F llesdal, Jane Lipsky McIntyre, Izchak Miller, and, in 1974, John Haugeland. More recently, we enjoyed discussions and presented some of our results at the 1980 Summer Institute on Phenomenology and Existentialism, on 'Continental and Analytic Perspectives on Intentionality' (held at the University of California, Berkeley, directed by Hubert Dreyfus and John Haugeland, under the auspices of The Council for Philosophical Studies with support from the National Endowment for the Humanities). We are grateful to all the above-mentioned philosophers for intellectual inspirations of many forms. We should also like to thank our students and colleagues over the years and our audiences at various institutions and conferences for their responses to presentations of ideas that were taking shape for the present book. The book is for the most part thoroughly co-authored, with both content and wording being the result of inextricably joint efforts at several stages of writing. The only exceptions are as follows. Section 2.3 of Chapter II derives from Smith, 'Meinongian Objects', Grazer Philosophische Studien 1 (1975). Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of Chapter N derive from McIntyre, 'Intending and Referring: Some Problems for HusseTl's Theory of Intentionality', in Husserl, xi

xii PREFACE Intentionality, and Cognitive Science: Recent Studies in Phenomenology, ed. by Hubert Dreyfus (MIT Press/Bradford Books, Cambridge, 1982), and McIntyre, 'Husserl's Phenomenological Conception of Intentionality and its Difficulties', Philosophia (forthcoming). Section 3.4 of Chapter IV derives from Smith, 'Hussed on Demonstrative Reference and Perception', also in the Dreyfus anthology just cited. Finally, Chapter VIII was written by Smith, with benefit of commentary by McIntyre. A version of most of Part 2 of Chapter IV appeared as McIntyre and Smith, 'Husserl's Identification of Meaning and Noema', The Monist 59 (l975). We wish to thank Professor F llesdal for his encouragement of our project and especially for introducing us to Hussed's philosophy in a way that made its importance so clearly evident. We are deeply grateful to Professor Hintikka, both for the intellectual stimulation he has provided over the past fifteen years and for his efforts and kind support as advising editor for D. Reidel Publishing Company. We thank as well the editors at Reidel, especially Ms. J. C. Kuipers, for their cooperation, encouragement, and patience. And we thank Lynne Friedman for her expert typing of most of the manuscript, and Wanda Roach and Virginia Drew for their equally able typing of remaining parts. Our deep gratitude goes to Mary Douglas (Smith) and Jane Lipsky Mc Intyre for their enduring support for our project. Irvine and Los Angeles August, 1981 DAVID WOODRUFF SMITH RONALD McINTYRE NOTE On some prior occasions we have referred to the present book under an earlier title, Intentionality and Intensions: Husserl's Phenomenology and the Semantics of Intentional Modalities. That title gave way to another more accurately indicating the focus of the f"mished work.

INTRODUCTION The theme of our study is intentionality, the property of a thought or experience that consists in its being a consciousness "of" or "about" something. 'Intentionality' is a technical term of philosophy, but there is nothing more familiar to any person than that for which it stands: it is the characteristic feature of what is commonly called "being conscious" or "being aware". By virtue of being conscious, a person stands in a special kind of relation to his or her environment: we are not merely affected by physical things, events, states of affairs, and other persons; we are also conscious of all these things, of numbers, propositions, our own mental states, and of anything else that we bring before our minds. This relational character of being conscious is "intentionality". It manifests itself in every instant of our mental life, in perceiving, desiring, remembering, fearing, loving, doubting, judging, and even dreaming or day-dreaming. Intentionality, then, characterizes that aspect of a person that is called "consciousness" or "mind". And so the study of intentionality is a central part of the philosophy of mind. Specifically, it is a study of the unique way in which mind or consciousness relates to its objects and of the features of consciousness by virtue of which it has this relational character. The focus of our study is the theory of intentionality developed in the early part of the Twentieth Century by the Czecho-German philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). Our approach is part scholarly and part systematic. Approximately half our efforts will be toward formulating and understanding Husserl's theory of intentionality, by interpreting his texts and by relating it to work by other thinkers both of his day and of recent years. The other half of our efforts will be toward evaluating and extending the type of theory of intentionality that Husserl advocated, assessing its strengths and weaknesses and indicating how it can be developed beyond Husserl's own achievements. There are both historical and theoretical reasons for studying Husserl's theory of intentionality. Husserl, of course, was the founder of the discipline called "phenomenology" and the father of the influential Twentieth-Century movement of phenomenological philosophy and psychology. Phenomenology began with Husserl as a kind of descriptive psychology, analyzing experiences xiii

xiv INTRODUCTION as their subject experiences or "lives" them. Ultimately, however, he developed phenomenology into a transcendental analysis, somewhat like Kant's, of the basic functions of the ego that are necessary for the very possibility of intentional experiences of various fundamental kinds. Phenomenology is perhaps most widely known for the method Husserl proposed for carrying out his phenomenological investigations - a method that includes a kind of internal reflection, called "epoche", that "brackets" concern with the external world and focuses on the internal structures of experiences, on the "contents" of consciousness. However, Husserl was a systematic thinker who developed interlocking doctrines of epistemology, ontology, logic, and phenomenology, as well as a methodology for developing these doctrines. And the foundation for nearly all his work was his theory of intentionality. Husserl's phenomenology has been succeeded in European thought by existential (as opposed to transcendental) phenomenology, hermeneutics, structuralism, and now post-structuralism. All trace in one way or another to the work of Husserl, by extending or modifying it, by using it as a springboard to new ideas, or by reacting against it or against the Cartesian-Lockean-Kantian heritage that some say culminates in Husserl's philosophical system. So Husserl's philosophy, fundamentally grounded in his theory of intentionality, has considerably influenced the intellectual currents of contemporary continental Europe. And although it has been less influential elsewhere, there are signs of an emerging interest in Husserl's work among English-speaking philosophers. Husserl's major works are now available in English translation, and Anglo American philosophers are beginning to find that Husserl speaks to central concerns of their tradition. As the breadth and depth of Husserl's thought become evident, Husserl may indeed take his place among the other great systematic philosophers of the West. Perhaps the most important reason for studying Husserl's theory of intentionality, though, is that there is still much to be learned from it, especially as it forms a basic part of a theory of mind. For most of this century, at least in the English-speaking world, the dominant philosophical theories of mind have been behaviorist, physicalist, functionalist, or causal theories. These theories would study mind from the outside, from a third-person point of view. Indeed, some would defme mind in "external" terms. The phenomenological theory of mind is a vital alternative to these theories. With roots in Descartes and Kant, Husserl's philosophy is perhaps the most developed form of a theory of mind studied from the first-person point of view. And Husserl's theory, unlike its antecedents, is founded in a fully articulated theory of intentionality. Though Cartesian in spirit, a phenomenological

INTRODUCTION xv theory of mind is worthy of the attention of contemporary philosophy, which tends to classify 'mind' as a four-letter word that is too ontologically embarrassing to be used in polite society. For it is not a Cartesianism that takes an ontological distinction between mind and body as basic; what is basic is intentionality. A phenomenological theory of mind must account for intentionality, but it need not necessarily rule out an ultimately physicalist ontology. (Interestingly, modern cognitive science adopts a theory of mind based on a notion of mental representation that is similar to Husserl's notion of intentionality, while yet it remains basically physicalist.) An externalist theory of mind will likely omit intentionality, however, and in so doing will fail to account for the fundamental feature of conscious life as we all experience it. So it is important to study Husserl's theory of mind, which emphasizes the intentionality of mind while remaining neutral about further issues of physicalism. Husserl's theory is one of the very few theories of intentionality (or mental representation) to have been systematically developed. And where philosophers recently have attended to intentional states of mind, especially the so-called propositional attitudes such as belief, they have almost unanimously focused on the "objects" of these attitudes or experiences. Their results reflect an important assumption about the problem of intentionality: the assumption that the objects of our consciousness are not ordinary things, such as physical objects, and that, therefore, the problem of intentionality is to discover what kinds of entities the objects of intentional attitudes and experiences are. Husserl offers an important alternative to this approach, an alternative that focuses on the "contents" rather than the "objects" of intentional experiences. At first he adopted what would today be called an "adverbial" theory, to the effect that the intentionality of an experience, such as seeing a dog or imagining a unicorn, is a non-relational state of being conscious in a certain way. But later he offered a more weighty theory of the "content" of an intentional state, a theory whose goal was to explain how the content of an experience can succeed in relating it to an entity of some ordinary sort, such as a physical object. We shall be developing this phenomenological, "content", theory of consciousness in detail so that it may be evaluated for both its doctrinal and its historical importance. Husserl's developed account of the phenomenological content of an experience is his theory of "noesis" and "noema". (The terms derive from the Greek word for perception or mind.) Our emphasis will be on the noema of an experience, which is its abstract content or form. A noema embodies the "way" in which the object of an experience is presented or intended in the

xvi INTRODUCTION experience; and, as an abstract entity, it can be shared by other experiences that present the same object in the same way. Husser! characterized this abstract content of an experience as its "meaning" or "sense" (Sinn). As Dagfmn F >llesdal has stressed, the notion of meaning that Husser! here invoked is very similar to Gottlob Frege's notion of sense, which has been so influential in contemporary semantic theory. It is through this notion of noema that our study of Husserl's theory of the intentionality of mind becomes, in a central way, also a study of meaning and language. As the content of an intentional experience, a meaning or noema is what gives the experience its intentional character: the noema prescribes an object, and if there is such an object then that is the object intended in the experience. And Husserl sees an analogous role for noemata in language. Husserl himself developed a Frege-like theory of linguistic meaning and reference, based on the classical view that language is expressive of thought. The "thoughts" expressed in language, he held, are the abstract, shareable contents - the meanings or noemata - of speakers' judgments and other experiences of thinking. Accordingly, the meanings that words express are themselves the noemata of the various intentional experiences that underlie the use of words. And as expressed in language, meanings or noemata are what give language its "referential" character: they prescribe objects of reference, so that language, too, is "of" or "about" something -- and for the very same reason that experiences are intentional. Accordingly, there derive from Husserl's interlocking doctrines about mind and language important parallels between intentionality and reference. Indeed, the meanings that HusserI proposes as the proper objects of study in semantic theory and the contents of experience that he proposes to study through phenomenological analysis are the very same entities. We hope to show, therefore, that semantic theory in the Frege-HusserI tradition and theory of mind in the phenomenological tradition can illuminate each other in fruitful ways. For HusserI, the phenomenological content of an experience - its meaning or noema - can be grasped in inner reflection by the phenomenological method of epoche or bracketing. But, he held, the meaning of an experience can be further explicated by laying out what he called the "horizon" of the experience. There are two different, but cognate, notions of horizon. As HusserI usually defined it, the horizon of an experience is the range of possible further experiences (especially perceptions) of the same object, experiences that could present the same object from different perspectives in ways compatible with the content of the given experience. This notion of horizon aligns in some ways with a verificationist or pragmatist analysis of meaning

INTRODUCTION xvii in t ~ rof m possible s evidence or experience. But Husserl's cognate notion of horizon, the horizon of an object with respect to a given experience, points in another direction. This horizon consists of the range of possibilities left open by the experience, possible circumstances in which the object presented in the experience takes on various further properties and relations to other objects in ways that are compatible with what the content of the experience prescribes. We shall show that this notion aligns more closely with recent analyses of meaning, derived from Rudolf Camap, in terms of "possible worlds". The explication of meaning in terms of possible worlds is central to the semantic analyses of intentional idioms like "believes" and "perceives" given by laakko Hintikka, Richard Montague, and others. The notion of horizon is thus a crucial link connecting this part of semantic theory with Husserl's phenomenological theory of intentionality and mind. Our study may be perceived as consisting of three interconnected parts. The first (Chapters I and II) introduces the topic of intentionality and presents some of the historical and philosophical background of Husserl's theory. In particular, we discuss some of the problems that a theory of intentionality must solve and relate them to logical and seman tical problems concerning the analysis of so-called "intensional" contexts (e.g., 'Smith believes that --'). We then discuss the "object-approach" to intentionality, especially as exemplified in the accounts of intentionality offered by Franz Brentano and Alexius Meinong, and Frege's theory of sense and reference and his analysis of intensional contexts. The second part (Chapters III, IV, and V) is our study of Husserl's theory of intentionality per se.we contrast his phenomenological approach to intentionality with the object-approach and discuss his conception of phenomenology and phenomenological method. We trace the development of his notion of content from Logical Investigations to Ideas, drawing on related doctrines of Kasimir Twardowski, Bernard Bolzano, and Frege. We argue for and defend a basically F ~ l l e s dinterpretation a l i a n of noema as meaning, but we also fmd that Husserl's analysis of intentionality in terms of noema alone is inadequate for certain important kinds of experiences. We then develop Husserl's cognate notions of horizon in detail and indicate some fruitful ways in which they extend his basic phenomenological theory of intentionality and meaning. The third part (Chapters VI, VII, and VIII) extends Husserl's theory of intentionality in further ways, primarily by relating the notions of noema and horizon to the possible-worlds explication of meaning. This discussion draws significantly on related ideas of Camap, Hintikka, C. I. Lewis, and Montague. We develop a theory of intentionality that makes heuristic use of possible-worlds but also retains a more basic

xviii INTRODUCTION commitment to meanings as contents of intentional experiences. Finally', we apply this theory to some kinds of intentional experiences that Hussed addressed in suggestive but inconclusive ways; these experiences are what we call "defmite" or "de re" intentions, and they include both perceptual experiences and experiences in which an object is "individuated" for the person who intends it.

ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1/ INTENTIONALITY AND INTENSIONALITY 1. The IntentiOfUllity of ACf$ of Consciousness 1.1. Intentionality 1 1.2. "Acts" of Consciousness 3 1.3. The Objects of Acts 5 1.4. Direct-Object Acts versus Propositional Acts 6 1.5. Propositional Acts and Intending "About" Something 8 2. Some Main Characteristics of "Intentional Relations" 10 2.1. "Intentional Relations" 10 2.2. The Existence-Independence of Intentional Relations 11 2.3. The Conception-Dependence of Intentional Relations 13 2.4. Conception-Dependence and the Individuation of Intentions 15 2.5. The "Indeterminacy" in Intentions of Transcendent Objects 16 2.6. Definite and Indefinite Intentions 18 3. The Intenllionality of Act-Contexts 21 3.1. Intensionality 21 3.2. The Failure of Substitutivity of Identity for Act-Contexts 25 3.3. Failure of Existential Generalization for Act-Contexts, Case 1: Failure of Existence 28 3.4. Failure of Existential Generalization for Act-Contexts, Case 2: Indefiniteness 30 3.5. "De Dicto" and "De Re" Modalities 31 4. Intensionality vir-a-vir Intentionality 33 CHAPTER II / SOME CLASSICAL APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEMS OF INTENTIONALITY AND INTENSIONALITY 40 1. Theories of Intentionality as Theories About the Objects of Intention 40 1.1. The Object-Approach to Intentionality 40 1.2. "Intentional Objects" 42 1.3. Ambiguities in the Notion of "Intentional Object" 44 2. Object-Theories of Intentionality 47 2.1. Mind-Dependent Entities as Objects of Intention: An Interpretation of Brentano's Early Theory 47 xix

xx ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS 2.2. Problems with Mind-Dependent Entities as Objects of Intention 51 2.3. Intentional Objects as "Objects Beyond Being": Meinong's Theory of Objects 54 2.4. Intentional Objects as "Fictions": Brentano's Later Theory 57 3. Frege's Approach to Meaning, Reference, and the Problems of Intensionality 61 3.1. Parallels Between Frege's Semantics of Act-Sentences and the Object- Approach to Intentionality 61 3.2. Frege's Theory of Meaning and Reference 63 3.3. Meanings as Abstract "Intensional Entities" 67 3.4. Frege's Semantics for Sentences of Propositional Attitude 69 3.5. Intensional Entities in Intentionality: Objects or Mediators of Intention? 75 CHAPTER III / FUNDAMENT ALS OF HUSSERL'S THEOR Y OF INTENTIONALITY 87 1. Husserl's Phenomenological Approach to Intentionality 88 1.1. Husserl's Conception ofintentionality 88 1.2. Husserlian Phenomenology and Phenomenological Method 93 1.3. Toward a Phenomenological Theory of Intentionality 104 2. "Phenomenological Content" 108 2.1. Act, Content, and Object: Twardowski's Formulation of the Distinction 109 2.2. Husserl's Conception of Content in Logical Investigations 112 2.3. Husserl's Mature Conception of Content: Noesis and Noema 119 2.4. The Structure of an Act's Noema: its "Sinn" and "The tic" components 125 2.5. Content, Noesis, and Noema in Review 135 2.6. The Content of Perception: its Sensory (or Hyletic) and Noetic Phases 136 3. Husserl's Basic Theory: Intention via Sinn 141 3.1. Noematic Sinne as Mediators 141 3.2. The Theory and Its Account of the Peculiarities of Intention 145 CHAPTER IV / HUSSERL'S THEORY OF NOEMATIC SINN 153 1. Interpreting Noematic Sinn 154 1.1. Noema as Content and as Meaning 154 1.2. What is the "Intended as Such"? 157 1.3. Sinne versus Meinongian "Incomplete" Objects 165 1.4. Noema versus Essence 167 2. Husserl's Identification of Linguistic Meaning and Noematic Sinn 170 2.1. Husserl's Conception of Linguistic Meaning 171 2.2. Husserl on Meaning and Reference 176

ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS 2.3. Every Linguistic Meaning is a Noematic Sinn 2.4. Every Noematic Sinn is Expressible as a Linguistic Meaning 2.5. Qualifications and Extensions of the Expressibility Thesis 2.6. Noematic Description 2.7. Noemata as a Kind of Propositions (Siitze) xxi 179 182 184 187 192 3. How Is Intention Achieved via Sinn? 194 3.1. Husserl's Account of the Structure of a Noematic Sinn: the "X" and the "Predicate-Senses" 195 3.2. Some Problems for a "Definite-Description" Model of Intentionality 204 3.3. The Problem of Definite, or De Re, Intentions 208 3.4. The Sinn of Perception as "Demonstrative" 213 3.5. Intentionality and Pragmatics: Contextual Influences on Intention 219 CHAPTER V / HUSSERL'S NOTION OF HORIZON 227 1. Meaning and Possible Experience: The Turn to Husserl's Notion of Horizon 227 1.1. The "Indeterminacy" in Intentions of Transcendent Objects 227 1.2. Husserl's Notions of Object-Horizon, Act-Horizon, and Manifold 229 1.3. Horizon-Analysis as a New Method of Phenomenological Analysis 233 2. Husserl's Conception of Horizon 236 2.1. Early Notions of Object-Horizon: Ideas (1913) 236 2.2. The Horizon of Possible Experiences Associated with an Act: Cartesian Meditations (1931) 239 2.3. Act-Horizon and Object-Horizon 240 2.4. The Central Role of Perception in Horizon 241 2.5. The Maximal Horizon of an Act: An Act's Manifold of Associated Possible Acts 244 3. Horizon and Background Beliefs 246 3.1. The "Pre delineation" of an Act's Horizon 246 3.2. Horizon and Fundamental Background Beliefs 249 3.3. Horizon and Concrete Background Beliefs; Background Meaning 252 3.4. Counter-Evidence within an Act's Horizon 255 4. The Structure of an Act's Horizon 256 4.1. Internal and External Horizon 256 4.2. Temporal Structure in the Horizon 258 4.3. The Horizon's Breakdown into Verification Chains 259 4.4. S y n t hof e Identification ~ i s Within the Horizon 261 4.5. Summary of Husserl's Account of Horizon-Structure 261 5. Toward a Generalized Theory of Horizon 262

xxii ANAL YTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER VI/HORIZON-ANALYSIS AND THE POSSIBLE-WORLDS EXPLICATION OF MEANING 266 1. Horizon-Analysis as Explication of Sinn and Intention 267 1.1. Horizon-Analysis and the Verification Theory of Meaning 267 1.2. Horizon-Analysis and the Carnapian, or Possible-Worlds, Theory of Meaning 268 1.3. Sorting Husserl with the Carnapian 270 1.4. Horizon-Analysis as "Pragmatic" Explication of Intention 271 1.5. Husserl's Appraisal of Horizon-Analysis Revisited 274 1.6. The Significance of Horizon-Analysis: Beyond Frege to New Horizons 275 2. The Explication of Meaning in Terms of Possible Worlds 278 2.1. Intension and Extension 278 2.2. Intension and Comprehension 279 2.3. Intensions as Functions on Possible Worlds 281 2.4. Intensions as Functions: Explication versus Definition 283 2.5. Two Kinds of Intensional Entities and Their Explication 285 2.6. "Individual Concepts", or Individual Meanings 289 2.7. Rigid and Individuating Meanings 290 2.8. The Explication of Noematic Sinn in Terms of Possible Worlds 292 2.9. "Pragmatic" Explication of Intention in Terms of Possible Worlds 295 3. The Basis in Husserl for a Possible-Worlds Explication of Meaning and Intention 296 3.1. Possible Objects and Possible Worlds in Husserl 296 3.2. The Equivalence of Horizon-Analysis and Possible-Worlds Explication of Sinn and Intention 300 3.3. The Eliminability of Possible Entities from Husserl's Theory of Horizon 304 CHAPTER VII / INTENTIONALITY AND POSSIBLE-WORLDS SEMANTICS 308 1. Intentionality in Possible- Worlds Theory 309 1.1. Husserl's Theory of Intentionality With and Without Possible Worlds 309 1.2. The "Husserlian" Possible-Worlds Theory of Intentionality 310 1.3. The Pure,Possible-Worids Theory of Intentionality 313 1.4. The Possible-Worlds Approach to Intentionality 315 2. Possible-Worlds Semantics for Propositional Attitudes 316 2.1. Fregean, Tarskian, and Possible-Worlds Semantics 317 2.2. Hintikka's Possible-Worlds Approach to Semantics for Propositional Attitudes 322 2.3. The Account of Intensionality in Possible-Worlds Semantics for Propositional Attitudes 325

ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS xxiii 2.4. Meaning Entities in Possible-Worlds Semantics for Propositional Attitudes 328 2.5. Background Beliefs in Possible-Worlds Semantics for Propositional Attitudes 332 3. Intentionality in Possible-Worlds Semantics for Propositional Attitudes 333 3.1. Object and Content of Belief 334 3.2. The Aboutness of Indefinite, or De Dicto, Belief 336 3.3. The Aboutness of Definite, or De Re, Belief 339 3.4. EXistence-Independence and Conception-Dependence of Aboutness 341 3.5. States of Affairs as Objects of Belief 343 4. A Husserlian Possible- Worlds Semantics for Propositional Attitudes 345 CHAPTER VIII I DEFINITE, OR DE RE, INTENTION IN A HUSSERLIAN FRAMEWORK 354 1. The Characterization of Definite, or De Re, Intention 354 1.1. Modes of Definite Intention 354 1.2. Must the Object of a Definite Intention Exist? 357 1.3. Expressing and Describing Definite Intentions: Proper Names, Demonstrative Pronouns, and Quantifying-In 358 1.4. The Explication of Definite Intention in Terms of Horizon and Possible W o r l ~ %1 2. Perceptual Acquaintance 362 2.1. The "Demonstrative" Acquainting Sense in Perception 363 2.2. The Explication of Perceptual Acquaintance in Terms of Possible Worlds 366 3. Identity, Individuation, and Individuation in Consciousness 369 3.1. Concerning Identity and Individuation 370 3.2. The Identity of a Natural Individual and Its "Transcendence" 375 3.3. Husserl on Individuation Through Time 379 3.4. Husserl on Trans-World Individuation 383 4. Toward a Phenomenological Account of Individuative Comciousness 387 4.1. The Phenomenological Structure of Individuative Intention: Toward a "Pragmatic" Analysis of Individuative Definiteness 387 4.2. Knowing-Who and Individuative Consciousness 391 4.3. A Closer Look at the Structure of Individuative Intention 394