1 MARXISM AND MORALITY Sean Sayers University of Kent Discussion of Marxism in the Western world since the nineteen-sixties has been dominated by a reaction against Hegelian ideas. 1 This agenda has been shared equally by the analytical Marxism which has predominated in the English speaking world and by the structuralist Marxism which has been the major influence in the continental tradition. The main purpose of my own work has been to reassess these attitudes. Of course, it is also true that Marx differs from Hegel and criticises many of his views. In particular, Marx rejects Hegel's idealistic and teleological account of history. However, to understand Marx's thought it is vital to see that Hegel's philosophy remains a central and fundamental influence on it, not only in Marx's early work, but throughout. 2 In my work, I attempt to demonstrate this and to show how a knowledge of Hegel's philosophy can contribute towards an understanding of Marx's thought. Recently, I have focused particularly on the role of moral values in Marxism and on the nature of Marx's critique of capitalism. 3 This has also been the central focus of work by analytical Marxists in recent years. I How does Marx criticise capitalism? On what grounds does he advocate socialism? Marx's answers to these questions have long been regarded as problematic. On the one hand, Marx claims to have a `scientific' theory of history, according to which moral values including his own are social and historical products. On the other hand, he condemns capitalism and advocates socialism. Most analytical Marxists regard these two aspects of Marx's thought as incompatible. A social account of values, they say, leads inevitably to relativism, and this undermines the possibility of a critical perspective. Marx's condemnation of capitalism must rely on an appeal to transhistorical values, even though Marx himself explicitly denies this. 1 These enjoyed a brief period of influence before this, in the New Left `humanist' critique of Soviet Marxism, see Sayers 2007 forthcoming 2 Although there is a development in Marx's work away from Hegelian language and themes, I do not believe there is sufficient evidence of a radical `break' between his early and later philosophy. 3 Sayers 1998 (Chinese translation by Feng Yanli, Renmin Publishing House, Beijing, forthcoming), Sayers 2003, Sayers 2005, Sayers 2006, Sayers 2007.
2 Analytical Marxists then give various accounts of what these values are supposed to be. These reproduce familiar positions of liberal moral philosophy. Either Marxism is interpreted as a form of utilitarian naturalism that relies on a universal concept of human nature, or it is said to appeal to Kantian-style universal standards of justice and right. Marx's approach cannot be understood in these terms. Marx's critical method does not rely on transhistorical values, it is immanent and historical. It seeks the grounds for a critical perspective within existing social conditions themselves. Actual societies are not monolithic unities, they contain conflicting forces within them. Some support the established order; others oppose it. Social reality is contradictory. Negative and critical tendencies exist within the present situation, they do not need to be brought from outside in the form of transcendent values: they are rooted in forces which are immanent within existing conditions themselves. Thus Marx's social theory, so far from undermining his critical perspective, provides the basis on which it is developed and justified. This approach seems open to the charge of relativism. For it appears to suggest that Socialism is just one among a number of conflicting outlooks with no more claim to validity than any of the others. However, according to Marx's theory of history, social conflicts lead to historical development. The present order is destined to change and ultimately to be superseded by a new and different form of society. Moroever, historical change is not an arbitrary succession: it takes the form of a development through stages and involves progress. These Hegelian notions are crucial to the Marxist account of history and essential to its response to relativism. Historical development is divided into a number of distinct stages or modes of production. Feudalism is followed by capitalism and then by socialism. Each stage arises on the basis of the previous stage as a higher historical form. Each is thus a necessary part of the process. Each initially constitutes a progressive development, justified for its time and relative to the conditions which it supersedes. 4 But each constitutes only a transitory stage, destined ultimately to perish and be replaced by a higher and more developed one. In the process of development, the conditions for the emergence of the next stage gradually take shape within the present. 5 To the extent to which this occurs, present conditions cease to be progressive and become, instead, a fetter and a hindrance to the process of development. 6 4 `Supersession' is the usual translation of `aufheben'. Hegel uses this term to describe a dialectical process of development in which an earlier stage is both negated and preserved by a later one (Hegel 1969, 107). 5 Cohen 2000, chapter 4, calls this Marx's `obstetric metaphor'. 6 Hegel 1988. See Cohen 2000, chapter 4 for a brief summary and criticisms of these ideas.
3 This theory provides the basis on which Marx criticises capitalism and advocates socialism. He regards both in historical terms. He does not attempt to criticise the present on the basis of universal principles, or to spell out a timeless ideal of how a future society ought to be. His critique does not appeal to transcendent standards; it is immanent and relative. Relative to the feudal conditions which it replaces, capitalism constitutes a progressive development. From the perspective of capitalist society, feudal society, with its fixed hierarchy of ranks and privileges, and its restrictions on commerce and trade, appears oppressive and unjust. However, as the conditions for a higher socialist form of society take shape within it, capitalism in turn becomes a fetter to further development. From the standpoint of this higher society, capitalist social relations appear to be a hindrance to human development and unjust. This standpoint which emerges only with the development of capitalist society and is relative to it provides the basis for Marx's critique. Marx's conception of socialism is similarly historical and relative. It does not attempt to envisage an ideal future society on the basis of transcendent principles. For it does not regard socialism as the realisation of a moral ideal, but rather as a concrete historical stage which will supersede capitalism, and which will be the outcome of forces which are at work within present capitalist society. 7 `Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things'. 8 II So far I have focused on the historical and immanent form of Marx's critique. What is its content? What is Marx's conception of progress? On what basis does Marx criticise capitalism and advocate socialism? Two opposed approaches dominate recent analytical accounts of Marx's critique. On the one hand, some attempt to locate Marx in the utilitarian and naturalistic tradition. They maintain that he criticises capitalism on the basis of a notion of universal human nature and that he argues that socialism will better promote human flourishing and the human good. 9 Others insist that Marx criticises capitalism for its exploitation and inequality, on the basis of universal 7 Marx's progressive theory of history has been much discussed and criticised, but this is not my topic here. 8 Marx and Engels 1970, 56-7. See Sayers 1998 for a fuller presentation of these ideas, and Geras 1992, Geras 1995 for criticisms. 9 Lukes 1985, Wood 1980.
4 standards of justice and right. 10 The same two approaches dominate liberal enlightenment moral thought. They are often treated as exclusive alternatives, but they not: both Marx's and Hegel's philosophies involve both. Marx's work clearly involves a conception of human happiness and the human good. He criticises capitalism for the way it systematically impoverishes the lives of working people, even while it leads to a massive increase in social productive power. `Machinery, gifted with the wonderful power of shortening and fructifying human labour, we behold starving and overworking it; The newfangled sources of wealth, by some strange weird spell, are turned into sources of want'. 11 Conversely, he sees in socialism a form of society which will enable human beings of all classes to develop and flourish more fully. Material and economic values thus play an essential role in Marx's thought. Development of the productive forces is the main index of historical development. He is not a romantic. However, his conception of human flourishing is much wider than that of a narrow utilitarian economic hedonism. He does not see economic development solely as a means to satisfy the given needs of homo economicus. `By... acting on the external world and changing it [man] at the same time changes his own nature'. 12 The development of the productive forces goes together with the development of human nature, of needs and capacities; and this is the main source of its human value. Marx's account of human nature is developed most fully in the idea of alienation and its overcoming in his early writings. There it is clear that he sees the human being not simply as a creature of material needs, a mere individual consumer, but as a productive and social being. Some have argued that these ideas are drawn from Aristotle, 13 but there is little evidence for that view. Their most important source is in Hegel, as Marx acknowledges: Hegel s `outstanding achievement', he says, is that he `conceives the self-creation of man as a process... he therefore grasps the nature of labour and comprehends objective man true, because real man as the result of his own labour.' 14 These views are contained in the concept of `species being'. Although Marx uses this term for only a brief period in 1844, the ideas it embodies remain fundamental to his thought. The notion of `species-being' has its immediate roots in Feuerbach's philosophy, where the term 10 Geras 1985, Geras 1992, Geras 1995, Cohen 1988b, Elster 1985. 11 Marx 1958b. 12 Marx Marx 1961, 177. 13 Meikle 1985, MacIntyre 1998. 14 Marx 1975, 386.
5 condenses a variety of ideas about human nature in a rather cloudy way. The ideas of conscious, free, universal (i.e., rational), social and productive being are all contained in it. 15 The notion is a direct descendant of the Hegelian idea of `spirit' (Geist) which also combines these elements. 16 Our species-being is our distinctively human being. According to Marx, this consists in the fact that we are conscious, universal, active, productive and social beings. Social productive activity is our `species-activity' which distinguishes human beings from other animals. 17 This implies an account of human nature and of the role of work in human life very different from the utilitarian views of the classical economists. Productive activity need not necessarily be unpleasant toil, a mere means to the end of satisfying our consumer needs. Human beings get satisfaction from shaping and forming the world and seeing their powers objectified and confirmed in the product. We can get satisfaction from actively exercising our powers and being productive. This thought is central to Hegel's philosophy. 18 It is taken up and developed by Marx as the basis for a moral critique of capitalist society. Our productive activity, instead of being a source of fulfillment, is made into hated toil. Similarly, modern technology and industry constitute enormous developments of our social productive and creative capabilities. We should be able to recognize and affirm them as our powers and find realisation in and through them. But for the most part we do not do so. Rather they appear to be out of our control and working against us. To describe our situation, Marx uses the graphic image of a Genie which we ourselves have summoned up, but which `by some strange weird spell' has now become an alien and hostile force. 19 This need not, should not and, in future society, will not be the way in which we relate to our own products and powers, Marx argues. This is the critical force of the concept of alienation, and a fundamental basis for Marx's critique of capitalist society. 15 Feuerbach 1957, 1-4; Toews 1980, 341, 347; Kamenka 1970, 47-8. 16 The language of `species being' was perhaps preferred by Feuerbach and the young Marx because it avoids the religious connotations of Hegel's `spirit'. 17 `The practical creation of an objective world, fashioning of organic nature is proof that man is a conscious species-being... It is true that other animals also produce... But they produce... one-sidedly, while man produces universally, they produce only when immediate physical need compels them to do so, while man produces even when he is free from physical need and truly produces only in freedom from such need.' (Marx 1975, 328-9) 18 Sayers 2003. 19 Marx and Engels 1977, 226.
6 III Marx also criticises capitalism for its injustice. He portrays capitalism as exploitative, oppressive, unjust. What is Marx's conception of justice? According to both Cohen and Geras, Marx operates with a `transhistorical' and `universal' principle of justice. It is noteworthy, however, that these writers give quite different accounts of the content of this supposed principle. Moreover, neither says how this principle is to be justified. This is one of the greatest philosophical problems for the idea that there are universal standards of justice. Sometimes, these are held to be `self-evident' (as in the US `Declaration of Independence'). That is untenable: what appears self-evident varies historically. Others, following Kant, argue that principles of justice are principles of universal reason. This is equally untenable. Universal principles of reason are purely formal, they have no specific content, they cannot give rise to determinate standards of justice. As regards the content of the principle of justice, according to Cohen private ownership as such is unjust, private property is `theft'. 20 As Cohen acknowledges, Marx did not believe this, but according to Cohen he should have. 21 That is doubtful. According to the account that Marx gives in Critique of the Gotha Programme, in the first stage of socialism, private ownership of the means of production is abolished. However, private property in the means of consumption remains, and it provides the basis of their distribution to individuals. Abolition of private property altogether does not occur until full communism, the second stage. 22 Cohen gives no grounds for thinking that anything short of this is `unjust', or that Marx thinks it is. On the contrary. Marx holds that a stage `between capitalism and communism' is necessary. It embodies a higher conception of right than prevails within capitalism and provides an immanent standard by which capitalism can be criticised. To judge now that all individual property is unjust is to adopt a utopian position unrelated to real historical possibilities. Right can never be higher than the economic structure of society and its cultural development conditioned thereby'. 23 Geras, by contrast, maintains that it is a universal principle of justice that those who labour are `entitled' to the product of their labour, on the ground that `it violates a principle of moral 20 Cohen 1988a, 301ff. 21 Cohen 1988a, 301ff. Cohen implies that common ownership is a `natural right'. Marx specifically repudiates such views. 22 Marx 1958a, Part I. 23 Marx 1958a, 24.
7 equality if the efforts of some people go unrewarded whilst others enjoy benefits without having to expend any effort'. 24 This is similar to the principle of entitlement that will apply in the first stage of socialism in which reward is proportional to work done and no one can gain an income simply by owning capital. When Marx uses this principle to criticise capitalism he is not appealing to a transhistorical or universal standard as Geras believes. Rather, he is adopting the standpoint of this higher form of society a standpoint that, he argues, is immanent in the present and one, moreover, that is destined to pass with the transition to full communism. 25 Both Marx and Hegel reject the idea of universal or transhistorical principles of justice. Marx's Hegelian historical approach implies that there is no single, universally right social order. Different social relations require different principles of justice. 26 These principles arise in specific conditions, and are necessary and right for their times; but with time, as the conditions for a new social order develop, they also lose their necessity and rightness. Principles of justice and right are social and historical phenomena. It is in these terms that Marx's critique of the injustices of capitalism must be understood. The purpose of my work is not only to explain Marx's ideas and show how a knowledge of their Hegelian provenance is essential for understanding them, but also to develop these ideas and to defend them in the context of contemporary debates. These relate particularly to the questions of 1) whether it is tenable to regard history as progress, and 2) whether economic progress is ultimately for the human good. The former question is frequently raised in relation to the history of the last century which seems so violent and disastrous in many ways; not the least of which has been that it appeared to culminate in the defeat of progressive movements all over the world. The latter question is raised particularly acutely by the threat of environmental catastrophe. These issues are fundamental to much of the recent criticism of Marxism and need to be addressed if Marx's ideas are to be used and defended today. 24 Geras 1985, 160. 25 Marx 1958a, 24. 26 For Hegel, principles of right must been seen as connected with particular forms of `ethical life' or Sittlichkeit (literally, customariness).
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