Hegel s Conception of Philosophical Critique. The Concept of Consciousness and the Structure of Proof in the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit (Ulrich Schloesser/ Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin) Among philosophers in the period of change between the late 18th and early 19th centuries it was a widespread conviction that, because the status of a demonstrative theory made up of axioms and proofs was neither available nor desirable for philosophy, philosophical critique would also not be external to the business of philosophy. Rather it was to belong to the essence of philosophy itself. Against this background Hegel occupied himself almost from the beginning of his philosophical thinking with the question of how a critique that is also able to convince an adherent of a theory differing from one s own should proceed. Initially it must provide him with a description of his standpoint that he himself can accept. Moreover, the critique must tie up with a method of examination that is part of this standpoint itself, because its adherent would not otherwise have to agree to the procedure. Hegel is interested in this matter not only as a description of the hermeneutic situation in which the adherents of two particular, opposing positions find themselves. Rather, he asks himself whether an idea for the procedure of philosophical critique that commits itself to such considerations can also be generalized. This would require giving a minimalist description of the starting point in a way that allows as large a spectrum as possible of positions that are to be the object of the critique to recognize themselves within it. And the procedure of the critique must be able to be developed from this description itself. Now, as is well known, Hegel s concept of consciousness and the feats of differentiation it provides, as set out in the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit, is intended to take on this task. Conversely, this description of roles then also fixes how what Hegel says about consciousness is to be interpreted. Obviously he is not concerned at this point with the clarification of a mental phenomenon e.g. with what we call experiencing something. For not all cases in which something is given or present to us can already meaningfully be the object of critique. This is the case only when the state is linked with a validity claim, and hence a reference to objectivity, by the person respectively finding himself in that state. At the same time, however, it still does not suffice to describe consciousness following Konrad
Cramer s influential interpretation 1 as an intentional structure merely in the sense, as in Kant s account in the A-Deduction, of relating to an object only as an X underlying appearance. For if criticism is to be possible, the possibility of examining whether its intentional relation obtains must be secured in the description of consciousness. And ultimately, even if Hegel s description of consciousness does justice to these requirements, anyone familiar with Hegel s philosophy will note that in Hegel s eyes this all still belongs to natural consciousness, part of the antecedent opinion to be criticized, and that in his intention to revolutionize philosophy the attempt to purify consciousness into spirit Hegel wants to criticize not only certain substantive positions, but ultimately also the general epistemological framework in which they are articulated. However, this too must result from the model of consciousness and the method it accepts, yet in such a way that it is not at all intended by consciousness itself. The present essay aims to reconstruct successively Hegel s concept of consciousness according to which knowing as the being of something for a consciousness is to be differentiated from truth as the fact that whatever is related to knowledge [ ] is also distinguished from it, and posited as existing outside of this relationship and the method of critique and transformation built on this in such a way that all the named requirements are discussed. To begin with, however, a more detailed explanation of our preliminary consideration: If the concept of consciousness and the method built on this are to provide something like a schema for philosophical critique, it must contain a gap to be taken up by the respective position to be criticized. These positions are thus to be input into the concept of consciousness. This results in a specification of the schema that is contentful and which must be distinguished from the manner of reference to the position itself and reality claimed within the schema once the position is taken up even when the position itself is supposed to be an epistemological one. Once I have differentiated between the content of a position and the form of reference it lays claim to, then it must further be noted that according to Hegel the initial position is surely not correctly described so long as one starts with one piece of content and then foregrounds the task of securing that the respective person not only relates this to itself, but simultaneously attributes it to an object. For the point of a model of philosophical critique capable of convincing an adherent of the criticized position lies, as already mentioned, in that this person not only makes some claim with this 1 cf. K.Cramer, Bemerkungen zu Hegels Begriff des Bewusstseins, in Guzzoni, Lang and Siep, eds., Der
position, but must also be able to convince herself of its falsity. This implies, however, that with the differentiation in referential senses at least two pieces of content come into play. We would have not only to distinguish in the givenness of something for consciousness between that as which it is given and its being given itself, as is expressed in the ambivalence of the concept of knowledge chosen and simultaneously alienated by Hegel; but also to add a substantive qualification on the object side alongside or with the fact that the object is also supposed to be able to exist outside the relationship of being given. This underlies Hegel s fluctuation between the concept of truth and the true. If one does not pay attention to these slightly varying nuances in advance of interpretation, it results, for example, in the consequence that in the selfcritique of the position assuming the place of consciousness either a referential sense is compared with an object, or a piece of knowledge in Hegel s sense would already be false in referring to an object that is precisely not knowledge whereas this is in fact a condition for being able to be right. From this preliminary consideration a more precise expectation also follows regarding the structure of the critical method that Hegel wants to develop on the basis of the concept of consciousness. For now it becomes understandable how a twofold critique is possible. A position that takes up the place of consciousness can on the one hand be substantively wrong, meaning that by its own standards the referential feat claimed in connection with the content cannot be redeemed. It is also possible, however, that the model of the relational feats themselves, as distinguished from the content and by which the position is examined, proves to be in need of critique. This is the case because not only the characterization of the position, but also the way it is checked must correspond to the position to be criticized in order to be acceptable for that position. It is then possible, however, that this too must first be transformed into what Hegel considers the correct method. If Hegel wanted to consider both sides of the critique, then following consciousness s feats of differentiation two steps would first have to be reckoned with and it would be clear why Hegel, while pointing out the first comparison according to the position s standards, then concentrates on the second, more radical one in the text of the Introduction. For whether the content obtains or fails to obtain would need to be proven from case to case, in the respective individual critique in the sequence of chapters of the phenomenology carried out. By contrast it is at least possible to criticize directly the model of knowledge explicated in the sense of the self-understanding of the position to be criticized. Whereas the first critical step is based on bringing out the object side as opposed to mere presence as the source of validity in the interest of the self-understanding of the positions to be Idealismus und seine Gegenwart, Hamburg, 1976.
criticized, a second critical step apparently has to take exception precisely to the independence of the object laid claim to here, so as to remove the basis of the position s epistemological framework as an intellectual standpoint. Hegel proposes different arguments for this. Common to all of them, however, is that they are not, at least at first glance, identical with the coming about of a new, tenable position. However, this also no longer belongs to critique which is to proceed immanently, and could therefore have its justification in the scientific side of the knowledge process, i.e. the already established, correct philosophy. If one considers this aspect as a further trait, the result is that consciousness s feats of differentiation are followed by an argumentative sequence building on three further phases. On the basis of these preliminary considerations we can now turn to Hegel s conception from section 10 onwards in the Introduction in the Phenomenology of Spirit in detail. This takes place in two stages. The first examines the general determination of consciousness, the second the critical method that builds on this. A. Consciousness 1. The starting-point of the reconstruction is the determination with which Hegel begins the course of his own thoughts;...and the determinate aspect of this relating, or of the being of something for a consciousness, is knowing. But we distinguish this being-for-another from being-in-itself; whatever is related to knowledge or knowing is also distinguished from it, and posited as existing outside of this relationship; this being-in-itself is called truth. (52-3/64/58) 2 But it is not immediately apparent how Hegel thinks that the concept of consciousness is to be correlated to the concepts knowledge and truth. For different interpretations of this relation are possible, suggested not least through ambiguities in Hegel s own employment of the term consciousness. According to the standard interpretation suggested by this formulation, consciousness must be distinguished from knowledge and truth and from their relations with one another as a third, underlying term. It appears as a presupposed and undetermined basic concept, and the definition of the distinct concepts of knowledge and truth as relations in the determination cited above is dependent upon it: knowledge as the relatedness of an object to consciousness itself, and truth as the assumption made by consciousness that the object exists outside this relation. 2 G.W.F.Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, tr. AV Miller, Oxford 1977. References after the first slash are to the German editions: before the second slash to: Studienausgabe auf der Grundlage der kritischen Edition, ed. Wessels and Clairmont, Hamburg 1988; after the second slash to: Gesammelte Werke vol.9, ed. Bonsiepen and Heede, Hamburg 1980.
2. If one proceeds on the basis of this interpretation of phenomenology, one must keep in mind that phenomenology is carried through by means of a critical examination of validity claims. For the natural conception, which is oriented to a correspondence theory of truth, this examination must be thought of as a way of measuring knowledge against truth. Yet, from the premises that a) consciousness is to be thoroughly distinguished from knowledge and truth, and b) that the course of the phenomenological development is essentially to be conceived of as a mediation of knowledge and truth, it follows that consciousness cannot itself be included in the development. It would remain in this case a foundation for the occurence itself untouched by the alteration, and a development from consciousness to mind would be impossible. 3. Thus, if consciousness is to be able to alter itself within the phenomenological process, it cannot be entirely separated from the conceptual pair knowledge and truth. This requirement is met by the second interpretation of the relationship between consciousness and knowledge and truth. On this view, consciousness is to be identified with the element of knowledge as the givenness of contents. The employment of both concepts does not merely justify such an identification, it even suggests it. Yet in this case the initially presented determination would have to be corrected. For if we equate consciousness and knowledge and determine knowledge as the relationship to consciousness, we attain a regress: The expression consciousness in the term relationship to consciousness would have to be replaced by the determination of knowledge, i.e. by the very term which itself again contains the term to be replaced, etc. There are two possible reactions to this difficulty. First, one can conceive of knowledge as the relatedness of something to a subject as that which is conscious of something when the relation in question holds, rather than as the relatedness of something to consciousness. Yet this opposition of a conscious entity and consciousness would employ a differentiation that Hegel does not conceptually carry out in the Phenomenology and which he makes no systematic use of. If one takes this omission to be deliberate, one is left with the second interpretation, according to which Hegel has a strong tendency to replace the notion of consciousness as a relation within the context of a model consisting of subject, object and relationship by means of an interpretation of consciousness as the determination of states of affairs, in the sense of the presence of contents. 4. Though this last interpretation may be made consistent, it fails to fit the phenomenological program, for it is not constructed in such a way as to allow the natural examination conception to link onto it without difficulty. For a critical examination can only be carried out if validity claims are raised with reference to knowledge that must be thought of as concretion, i.e. if the claim is made that that which one apprehends has, independently of the
apprehension, just those qualities ascribed to it. But dreams and phantasies also meet the criterion of the presence of contents to mind. Yet in the case of dreams and phantasies we regard raising validity claims as senseless, not only because of their particular concrete qualities, but also because we generally presume that that which is present in them is exhausted by this very presence (i.e. the events disappear with the experience and do not continue to lurk in wait for us). 5. If there is to be a meaningful possibility for raising validity claims, those states of consciousness which we classify as merely subjective must be excluded from the concept of consciousness on which Hegel bases phenomenology. The foundation for the phenomenological development must rather be comprised by forms of consciousness which claim to appear as the consciousness of a reality in such a way that what is apprehended in them is also granted an independent side. In other words, the object of the referential relation in the presence of a given must itself be differentiated from that which is only to be ascribed to the apprehension, as something which exists independently of whether it is given or not and which in its own character is not bound to the particularity of its apprehension. In this sense, the independence of the object is not, as it was for the previous interpretation, something that lies entirely outside the concept of consciousness, but rather, as the characterization of that to which the conscious apprehension is related, itself the defining criterion for the presence of any consciousness of an object. This consciousness cannot accordingly be sufficiently characterized by means of the determination of knowledge; it must be grasped as a differentiation between knowledge and truth--as that very act of distinguishing the object from its presence which we carry out whenever we presume that the object persists even after I turn away from it.3 6. Once we have determined consciousness as the consciousness of a reality, we have satisifed the condition under which it makes sense to raise validity claims, whether they be justified in particular or not. As long as the content is not, as in the case of phantasy, completely exhausted in its presence, we have also gained something that can serve for evaluation of knowledge. But we have not yet ensured that this evaluation can initiate an alteration of knowledge, for that can only be the case if the correspondence or non-correspondence of knowledge and reality is available to us. 7. Thus, if Hegel wants to secure within his model of consciousness the premise immanent to the natural understanding, according to which consciousness is capable of comparing its knowledge with reality and of arriving at a revision of its position as a result of this comparison, he must show that the reality distinguished from its apprehension in the basic operation characterized in the previous section is not in principle indiscloseable. Yet this 3 On points 4 and 5, cf. K. Cramer, Bemerkungen..., op. cit., esp. pp. 78 and 88 f.
condition would fail to be met if reality were posited merely as a sphere of objectivity as such, i.e. as an X that remains indeterminable and only underlies the totality of the given as a point of reference. Instead, the positing of reality must be conceived of as a confrontation within that which can be given to us. The real, then, does not lie beyond the boundaries of that which is present to mind, but belongs rather to the latter. It is that part of what is present to mind which-- so it is claimed--is also capable of existing independently. Thus a particular something is affirm(ed)... as being-in-itself or the True (53/65/59), which is to say that the real is distinguished as one form of the state of affairs from knowledge as another form of the state of affairs and in this manner determined as real. In asserting the validity claim to be examined, however, the unity of these two sides is assumed. In a real process of scientific research it would be possible to think of the difference between the theory and the, likewise given, evidence used to examine it. Or in the case of philosophy of action, which plays a large role in Hegel s Phenomenology, one might think of the difference between the concept of an intention and its implementation, according to which its validity is to be measured. 8. Though the availability of the object be a necessary condition for the ability of consciousness to attain to a revision of its position in the course of an examination of its correspondence, it nonetheless does not suffice. For the object must also be of such a nature for the position subject to critique that it can compel the alteration of knowledge. This is the case if and only if, among the manifold of givens, we select those which are recognized as a relevant truth not merely by a superior instance, but also from the point of view of the position under criticism. Were it arbitrarily imported, it could not demonstrate the basis of the validity of its truthfulness to this position. 9. If then the natural point of view is to be brought to alter its position, the perspective to be criticized cannot be considered only as knowledge (in Hegel s sense). Those acts of recognizing something as an object of relevance for it which are carried out from this perspective must be taken into consideration. In this way, the position itself comes to be viewed as a concrete model of consciousness. Thus we can understand why Hegel says that the comparison by means of which consciousness is to be examined is transformed into a a comparison of consciousness with itself. (53/64/59) These considerations lead us, then, to the conclusion that we cannot ascribe to Hegel the idea that a description of our familiar assumptions about consciousness sufficient to illustrate our
natural ideas with respect to a critical examination could be won already through the definition of consciousness as one element of a relation or as the givenness of contents. The requirements derived from the phenomenological program can only be met if consciousness is conceived of as an operation of differentiation: We distinguish what is given to us from our apprehension of it and address our validity claims to it. Yet this objectivity is not for us a reality that remains indeterminate, rather it has concrete content and is available for us, in such a way that a comparison of our apprehension with it is possible and an alteration of consciousness in the event of non-correspondence necessary. B. Structure of Proof We must, in a second step, turn our attention to the argumentational procedure in which Hegel posits his immanent critique against those very natural basic assumptions and seeks to attain a revision of them on their own basis. 1. The starting-point for the argumentational sequence is the fundamental operation of differentiation between knowledge and truth characterized above as consciousness. This was determined in such a way that it becomes possible to move on to a corresponding examination of knowledge against truth, in the mode of the natural idea, as a second phase of the steps in the proof. For if 1) both knowledge and truth are given, and if 2) they are not only aspects of the structure of consciousness per se, but always contentful determinations as well, then it is always given together with them whether 3) a contentful correspondence holds or not. Thus Hegel can claim as well that consciousness itself is the comparison (53/65/59)--a comparison that condemns to failure all those forms of consciousness in which the underlying unity of the given has become unintelligible through the differentiation of the aspects. 2. In the event of failure in the examination, the particular form of consciousness is destroyed, and Hegel s critical goal has been apparently reached. To the extent that the claim of the unity of both sides is an element of consciousness, it seems as well that a revision of knowledge has become necessary as the next phase in the proof, and that the transition to the next position is thereby secured. Yet Hegel wants to begin his criticism of the forms of natural consciousness one level below this. In the previous step, he linked on to the conception of control proper to the natural attitude. In the third step, then, he wants to get beyond this conception and to demonstrate that not only the claim of the correspondence of the two sides of consciousness concerning the content misses its mark; he wants to show as well that the claim that the side of truth provides us with an independent touchstone is itself untenable....what first
appears as the object sinks for consciousness to the level of its way of knowing it, and since the in-itself becomes a being-for-consciousness of the in-itself, the latter is now the object. (56/67/61). This step too may not remain merely external to consciousness. Thus it must be linked up to the previous step--to the examination in comparison. But it is by no means obvious how that which is a recognized standard of the examination for consciousness can, within the context of this very examination, transform itself for consciousness in the manner described. Thus Hegel s argument must be successively worked through. a) It is at first obvious that the step in question cannot be an immediate consequence of the failure in the examination. For if I assume that truth, and not only knowledge, can become precarious as a result of this miscarriage, and conclude that truth is diminished to knowledge in the very moment that I question its unimpeachability, I already presuppose the loss of the validity of the true. b) In the event that this step of the proof cannot be established immediately as a consequence of the failure of knowledge in the examination, and that as a result of the structure of consciousness the demand for an alteration of knowledge then becomes inevitable, we are left with the possibility of showing it to be an implication of this revision of knowledge. And just this is Hegel s strategy. If the comparison shows that these two moments do not correspond to one another, it would seem that consciousness must alter its knowledge to make it conform to the object. But, in fact, in the alteration of the knowledge, the object itself alters for it too, for the knowledge that was present was essentially a knowledge of the object; as the knowledge changes, so too does the object, for it essentially belonged to this knowledge. Hence it comes to pass for consciousness that what it previously took to be the in-itself is not an it-itself, or that it was only an in-itself for consciousness. (54/66/60) In order to employ this argument as an underpinning, one must reconstruct it by way of its own presuppositions. Since we have already accepted the premise that a revision of knowledge appears necessary, we must know clarify the second presupposition: the claim that the previous knowledge was knowledge of objects. c) We must take heed not to understand this as the thesis that knowledge is that which comprises the object as such, for in that event there could be no non-correspondence between knowledge and truth. In that case a revision of knowledge would be unnecessary, and we would have invalidated one of the premises out of which the transformation of the object was to be derived in this very argumentational strategy. d) Since the relation between knowledge and truth cannot be understood as their correspondence or as an identity of content, we are left only with one alternative interpretation: the idea of a correlation of both in which an alteration of one side entails an alteration of the
other, but in which correspondence need not hold. And, indeed, Hegel is entitled to make use of the premise that such a correlation holds. For the re-coupling of the supposedly independent true is granted already by the fact that it is itself the result of conscious positing. In addition, it is correlated, through the differentiation carried out in the positing, with that in opposition to which it received its contours and definition. For to differentiate means that,within a basic concept (here that of the content corresponding to the level of consciousness), a dividing line is drawn (here between the side of knowledge and that of truth ). The elements separated by means of a line common to them remain connected with one another through this line, and an alteration of one results in an alteration of the other. The Introduction s idealism is thus in the end grounded in a holism of content. e) Under the premises that 1) an alteration in knowledge has taken place or is simply being considered in thought, and 2) the particular determinate piece of knowledge is correlated with truth precisely in and through their differentiation, I am able to conclude that an alteration in truth must occur. Yet it still remains unclear whether a deflation of truth into knowledge occurs in or with the alteration of the object. We have reached a point, however, at which we can immediately explain why this is the case and how this idea should be precisely determined. For the correlation of both sides becomes evident to the extent that an alteration of the object emerges together with an alteration of knowledge. This correlation, which is given together with the differentiation of the two sides, is opposed to the distinction of one side as an independent reality that is carried out through this differentiation--the idea of differentiating something which is independent of that from which it is distinguished is itself aporetic. And once the connection becomes apparent, the distinction of one side as truth must be retracted. This does not make truth identical to the knowledge from which it was distinguished, yet it does belong to knowledge as such. And if this is the case, then a sphere of reality in the strong sense that was demanded can be given, at most, as an indeterminate beyond. The opposition as we have examined it so far, by contrast, has slipped over to one of the two sides. And this slipping over to one side constitutes the meaning of being in itself for it. And with this, we have attained an understanding of the third step in its critical turn. 3. The first step of the proof was the basic operation of differentiation which determined consciousness. That was followed by a phase of critical examination which still met the natural requirements. In the third step, then, the claim that we have with truth a reality was challenged, and a situation emerged in which both sides now belong to knowledge. The landmark anchored in natural consciousness has thereby been lost in the transition to the new position, and we can
no longer attain a methodologically secured progression on the basis of the initially assumed concept of consciousness. Hegel himself provides no developed justification for the fourth step of the proof. If we are to understand it, and if we can no longer have recourse to the general constitution of the forms of consciousness that are to be destroyed as the reason for the necessity of this step, we must take as our starting-point the more problematic group of premises which must be satisfied in order that the target set by the Phenomenology be attainable in principle. This step appears justified at the stage we have now reached, since the destruction of the forms of consciousness in which immanent argumentation was required has now been completed. A two-step sketch of a derivation shows that this last step can be made under the premises mentioned above: a) Our goal is a form of knowledge with a claim to comprehensiveness and an ordered inner structure. In order to be comprehensive, such knowledge must be able to integrate into itself post factum the path that led to it. Yet, because of the ordering character of the knowledge that is to be attained, this remains impossible so long as the forms of consciousness subject to criticism appear in the manner of an unordered quantity. There must instead be a relation of continuity among them which can be understood as a rational progression. If one form of consciousness is to appear as the successor of a previous conception within a series of successive forms of consciousness, we must be able to presume that it contains what was true in the preceding knowledge (56/67/61), i.e. the subsequent conception must be capable of adopting the content of the previous. That has two consequences for the methodological progression: - Since the content that is to be integrated into the new concept belonged in the previous stage of the proof to the field of knowledge, Hegel must, in order to secure the continuity of the forms, posit a transition of the content from mere knowledge, as one side, to a total conception out of which a new truth is to be brought into position in its contentful concretion. - We had seen that consciousness was essentially characterized by the separation of knowledge and truth. Thus a transition of this kind, which would be impossible under this premise, can neither be ascribed to consciousness as its own activity nor demanded of it as a thesis. Thus the separation between the level of consciousness as it is itself qua understanding of the natural predispositions on the one hand, and that which discloses itself to an observer who perceives the process from outside on the other hand, becomes inevitable for Hegel at this point. (cf. 56/68/61). b) But this thought alone still does not suffice. We must also ensure that the very difficulties belonging to the previous stage do not arise with the adopted contents as well. Otherwise, the movement would continue in an endless cycle, and its goal would remain
unattainable. Thus the contents cannot be incorporated into the new form of consciousness in the mode of mere being-together which necessarily characterized the givenness of both sides in knowledge. Instead, their relationship must be concreticized by means of a conceptualization that can be understood as an integration of both sides, i.e. as an integration which enables us to see how it can solve the previous problems. The connection of these two premises gives rise to the idea of a rationally motivated transition to the next form of consciousness. Yet Hegel s claim that this step is necessary cannot be justified with the considerations named above. However, it has even been called into question whether Hegel is, in the Science of Logic, justified in claiming a stronger sense of necessity than that which is immanent to the development of scientific theories.4 Thus we shall view the abovenamed considerations as sufficient. We have thereby gained, on an unusual path, the transition to the next concept. This must in turn be considered as a case of consciousness and leads thereby to a new yet structurally similar sequence of the proof. This progression repeats itself until a lattermost unity of knowledge and truth has been reached, a unity which, rather than cancelling the difference between knowledge and truth, is able to persist in their difference. 4 Cf. Dieter Henrich, Hegels Logik der Reflexion, new version, in D. Henrich, Die Wissenschaft der Logik und die Logik der Reflexion, Bonn, 1978, eg. pp. 309, 315, 317, 321.