University of New Hampshire University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository Philosophy Scholarship Philosophy 1988 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity Willem A. devries University of New Hampshire, willem.devries@unh.edu Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/phil_facpub Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988) This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Scholarship by an authorized administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more information, please contact nicole.hentz@unh.edu.
Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity Rights Copyright Willem A. devries. All Rights Reserved. This book is available at University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository: https://scholars.unh.edu/phil_facpub/19
HEGEL'S THEORY OF MENTAL ACTIVITY An Introduction to Theoretical Spirit WlLLEM A. DEVRIES CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS ITHACA AND LONDON
Copyright 1988 by Cornell University All rights reserved. Except
To Dianne
Contents Preface A Note xi
viii Contents Distinguishing Nature and Spirit 46 Externality and Self-determination 46 The Nature of Spirit 49 4 Sensation: Mind's Material
Contents
Preface I have high hopes for this book. First, it should fill a conspicuous
Preface xiii Logic, contains
xiv Preface ogy. People very familiar with Hegel will find that
Preface xv As I near the end of this project, I realize humbly how much help I have received.
xvi Preface Kiteley, John Connelly, Thomas Tymoczko, Janice Moulton, Thomas Wartenburg, Meredith Michaels, Lee Bowie, Herbert Heidelberger, Bruce Aune, William Lycan, Lynne Baker, Christopher Witherspoon, Steven Weisler,
A Note on the Texts Readers
xviii A Note on the Texts adventure that its title makes it seem; it was written to be a lecture guide for Hegel's students. By the time Hegel wrote the Encyclopedia, he thought he had developed a unitary, coherent system within which each philosophical topic, from logic through political theory to aesthetics and beyond, could be treated. The Encyclopedia is the outline
A Note on the Texts xix Recently Michael
xx
xxii
HEGEL'S THEORY
Science, Teleology, and.interpretation PHYSICALISM AND CAUSALISM A philosophy
Science, Teleology, and Interpretation 3 The scientistic philosophers share the assumptions that all objects and events arise within one causal order and that physics is the most general
4 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity Hegel breaks with
Science, Teleology, and Interpretation 5 The practical relationship to nature affords us only a thoroughly subjective, highly limited point
Science, Teleology, and Interpretation 7 ized. Unlike theory, practice cannot even superficially ignore the subjectivity of the agent without obvious incoherence. This general conflict between subjective and objective, theoretical
8 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity them with the intention that they serve as cutting devices. A subjectivity suffuses
Science, Teleology,
10 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity
Science, Teleology,
12 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity of that explanatory enterprise in favor of another, perhaps more general form of explanation. The natural kinds articulate the primitive structures of the world. The paradigmatic natural kinds
Science, Teleology,
14 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity absolutely independent and self-contained, even to the point of being self-explanatory.
Science, Teleology, and Interpretation 15 that
16 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity subserves the purpose of keeping the organism alive, which itself might subserve the purpose of keeping the species alive. 4. What something is, its kind, is determined not only by its immediate objective purpose but by its superordinate purposes as well. Similarly, understanding (completely) what something
Science, Teleology,
Hegel's Reconception
Hegel's Reconception of the Philosophy of Mind 19 when
2O Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity the construction or development of concepts that go beyond what can be found in sense experience, so that the use of such concepts cannot be what is wrong with rational psychology. 4 When he intimates what is wrong with rational psychology, Hegel criticizes the rationalists for having treated the soul as a thing; for having used abstract categories of the understanding which are, properly speaking, too lowly to grasp the nature of spirit; and, last
Hegel's Reconception of the Philosophy of Mind 21 The question of the immateriality of the soul can still be of interest only if a distinction is drawn in which matter is presented as true and spirit as a thing. Even in the hand of the physicists, however, matter has become subtler
Hegel's Reconception of the Philosophy of Mind 23 cepts are assigned externally to the subject; both have faulty views of predication.
Hegel's Reconception of
26 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity humanity
Hegel's Reconception of
28, Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity
Hegel's Reconception
Hegel's Reconception of
Nature
Nature and Spirit 35 And though we need to distinguish nature and spirit, we must also distinguish subjective spirit from objective spirit and from absolute spirit. Finally, we must be able to explain the relations between the various levels within the philosophy of subjective spirit. One noticeable feature of the progression in the Encyclopedia is that at the higher levels the distinctions correspond fairly well with
36 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity Hegel is trying to reveal the ideal language pointed at by our present, imperfect, ordinary languages of the understanding. But
Nature
38 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity tionism is the token-identity version of noneliminative materialism. According
Nature and Spirit 39 The doctrine
40 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity ical that captures
Nature and Spirit 41
Nature and Spirit 43 without losing sight
Nature
46 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity there is a set of concepts in which the objects of that stage can be described and explained; these concepts are neither eliminable nor reducible. The empirical sciences are consequently also irreducible; each develops and applies the concepts peculiar to a particular level to describe and explain individual phenomena at that level. Inquiry is not, however, exhausted by these empirical disciplines. We can inquire further into
Nature and Spirit 47
48 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity mutually external objects. In the realm of spirit, the universal is to come into
Nature
Nature
52 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity stands, therefore, in an external relation.... Here, consequently, spirit still
Sensation: Mind's Material If the question of sensation or perception arises in a discussion of Hegel,
Sensation: Mind's Material 55 The Nature of the Animal Organism The animal organism is a highly organized chunk of nature, composed of the objects of the lower levels of nature, the physical and the chemical. But it is not simply a conglomeration of such objects (see 350, Zusatz). What, then,
Sensation: Mind's Material
Sensation: Mind's Material
Sensation: Mind's Material 61 are, however, extra complications arising because
62 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity which
Sensation: Mind's Material
64 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity
Sensation: Mind's Material 65
Sensation: Mind's Material 67 important relations,
68 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity cable. 15
Sensation: Mind's Material 69 Hegel claims that this beginning is ultimately overcome, that true thought, free of any sensory admixture, is ultimately achieved. Hegel's theory does
7O Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity
Feeling In sensation mind is passive, receptive, unorganized, aimed at
72 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity acquire some
Feeling
Feeling 75 upon finding, i.e., upon the immediacy of feeling's determinateness, feeling refers more
76 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity start applying
Feeling
78 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity Yet,
Feeling 79 immaterial, even in its concreteness, and proof that it is capable of this substantial identity with another is to be found in the somnambulent [hypnotized] individual's sensing within itself the tastes and smells present within the individual to whom it is thus related.... In this substantial identity, consciousness
8o Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity particular sensations and feelings, as quite independent entities in their
Feeling
82 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity concrete being
Feeling 83 nience base determines
Feeling 85 unity within them. When
Phenomenology:
88 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity we find in the Encyclopedia is much briefer. Spirit is no longer included (many of the topics discussed there show up in the philosophies
Phenomenology: The I Emerges 89 is also a form of consciousness and vice versa. It is to demonstrate that neither abstract discussions of the foundations of our knowledge, such as Descartes's, nor psychological explanations, such as Hume's, adequately portray the concrete, social reality of the subject-object relation. Thus scientific observation, morality, and religion are all treated as manifestations of knowledge, as forms of consciousness, which means interpreting them
Phenomenology: The I Emerges 91 only
92 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity Denying our ability to refer to individuals is unnecessary to Hegel's goals; the arguments he presents actually assume that we can successfully refer
Phenomenology: The I Emerges 93 together with "here," "now,"
Phenomenology: The 1 Emerges 95 particular states; that
96 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity One might try to give the demonstrative a smaller scope and take
Phenomenology: The I Emerges 97 The Reference of "I" Taking "this thinking subject" as our understanding of the sense of "I," we can now ask what the normal reference of a use of "I" is. Traditionally, one of four alternative referents for "I" has been defended:
98 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity
Phenomenology:
ioo Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity concrete actuality is due to the fact that the coherence of counterfactual suppositions about x is controlled by the sense of the expression used to refer to x. Because the sense of "I" is highly abstract, there
Phenomenology: The I Emerges 101 viewed naturalistically,
io2 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity
Phenomenology:
Phenomenology:
106 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity The important difference between the I and the Idea is that the I is,
Phenomenology: The I Emerges 107 abstract structure (explored in the Logic) realized by the worldwhole. The only form fully adequate to this content is the worldwhole itself.
7 Intuition THE ROLE OF INTUITION IN THE PSYCHOLOGY Intuition
Intuition 109 hired. The objectof intuition is a spatiotemporally extended object, possessing causal properties and sometimes intentions, desires, and reason. It is only at this relatively late stage that Hegel finds a place for the rich_perceptual-experience-of-the-world with which we are all so familiar. 1 This is important, for the fact that our ordinary perceptual consciousness of the world is dealt with under intuition means that it is not under consideration in the Phenomenology. This reinforces our earlier claim that Hegel's Phenomenology is not the proper place to look for his theory of perception. Sensation providesjhejnaterial for intuition. "The content that
110 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity objective, rule-governed constructive processes that constitute intuitions. 2 Intuition is for Hegel, like Kant, the constitution of that form of our cognitive experience in which we relate immediately to the singular
Intuition
112 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity that there
Intuition
ii4 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity space
Intuition 115 possibility of other forms of intuition and can offer no reason why space and time happen to be the forms of our intuition. For Hegel, though, such a question does not really arise. Space and time are the determinate forms of self-externality in general (see the arguments in PN 254ff.); this is why they are not merely subjective forms
n6 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity for the mind, thus sharpening the split between mind and object while also fostering
Intuition 117 into various aspects, but a totality, a connected profusion of determinations." ( 449, Zusatz). "True intuition," he goes on to say, "apprehends
n8 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity sence of the object is what any kind of intuition is about. In intuition
Representation and Recollection 8
Representation
Representation and Recollection 123 of the sensations. The standard relations between the causal and semantic characteristics
124 Hegel's Theory of Mental Actimty beautiful skies, thus escaping the drear of a winter's day. This need
Representation and Recollection 125 spirit's free self-determination
126 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity grasping of the rational connection present between these forms, in recognizing the sequence of the organic development of intelligence within them" ( 451, Zusatz). Recollection, the first of the three main stages of representation, is itself divided triadically. This creates some technical difficulties for
Representation and Recollection 127 and futures, and beyond the sensible altogether in the contemplation
Representation
130 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity parts
Representation and Recollection 131 powers
132 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity Can we think of conditions under which "He has the ability to perform Harry" is justifiably assertable but "He has the ability to perform other Harry-like actions" is not? It seems to me that this makes sense only in a world so thoroughly determined that Harry is
Representation
134 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity performance. This does not mean that in the performance of the skill
Imagination: Universality
136 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity determinations
Imagination: Universality and Signification 137 attention
Imagination: Universality and Signification 139 purported associative laws which is the focal point of Hegel's criticism Hume avowed only three
140 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity my tr.). This remark of Hegel's immediately brings to mind one of Hume's: after discussing the principles of association that govern the mental world, Hume notes that "here is a kind of attraction, which in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to shew itself in as many and as various forms. Its effects are every where conspicuous; but as to its causes, they are mostly unknown" (A Treatise of Human Nature, bk. I, pt. i, sect. iv). But, says Hegel, it is silly to treat the bond between different images
Imagination: Universality and Signification 141 standing
142 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity tions a "hovering presence" or a ghost. It exists in the representations
Imagination: Universality
Imagination: Universality
146 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity make itself into being, into
Imagination: Universality
Memory: Language 10
Memory: Language as the Material of Thought 151 Hegel does
152 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity situations that count as democratic.
Memory: Language as the Material of Thought 153 been treating having
154 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity which the sign is, its own, intelligence raises the single connection to a universal, that is enduring connection, through this recollection, in which name and meaning are objectively combined for it, and makes the intuition, which the name initially is, to a representation, so that the content, the meaning, and the sign are identified,
Memory: Language
Memory: Language
158 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity sentation to thought even though it seems itself to be the antithesis
Memory: Language as the Material of Thought 159 that
Memory: Language as the Material of Thought 161 abilities have been acquired
162 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity inwardly into
Memory: Language as the Material of Thought 163 this process come to an end; could we reach a point at which there
11 Representing versus Thinking In Hegel's account of the increasing generality of spirit's productions, the theory of the structure of representations may seem an attempt
Representing versus Thinking
i66 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity relation to the universal which defines this approach can be variously interpreted and need not be thought of as a relation to an internal representation of the universal. The following table roughly sketches
Representing versus Thinking
168 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity the thought and the symbol are identical. Such a view leads toward the possibility of having a concept by having a symbol present to the mind which
Representing versus Thinking 169 Hegel
Representing versus Thinking
172 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity such accidental predications
Representing versus Thinking
174 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity it
Representing versus Thinking
12 Thought As central
Thought
Thought
Thought 181 Hegel emphasizes that judgment is a kind of distinguishing by playing on the etymological structure of the German Urteil "original or primordial division or partition."
182 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity uals
Thought
Thought 185 ment,
Thought 187 Thus "This rose,
i88 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity understand much about nature, (b) There is no order in nature; an order is imputed to nature by us. But then, Hegel would argue, our "knowledge" of nature
Thought 189 highest forms
190 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity need no longer be involved in contingent, arbitrary relations, as they are often in nature or in Vorstellung. Pure thought perceives only those relations between concepts which are intrinsically involved in the concepts. 4 Thus removed from the imperfection and recalcitrance
Thought 191 enough
192 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity comes
Thought 193 ties. This sequence
194 Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity Idea)
Thought
Thought 197 judgment.
Thought 199
aoo Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity spirit, nature falls short, and spirit must undertake to work its will on nature. This process is itself subject to a complex dialectical progression, but that lies beyond the bounds of this essay. CONCLUSION Hegel maintains that,
Thought 201 tails,
References Ameriks, Karl. Kant's Theory of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982. Anscombe,
2O4 References E.
References
206 References Kim, Jaegwon. "Supervenience and Nomological Incommensurables." American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (April I978):i49-i56. Kitcher, Patricia. "Kant's Real Self." In Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy, edited
Index Absolute, self-realization of, 3, 13-14, 45-46,
208 Index Hofstadter, Douglas, 17511 Holderlin, F., i8m Hume, David, i,
Index 209 Reductionism, 36-37, 42 Reference, linguistic, 90-93, 97-99, Representation: explanations of, 122 23 generality of, 131-34, 136-37, 142, 151 53, 155, 160 62,