The Mind-Dependence of the Relational Structure of Time (or: What Henri Bergson Would Say to B-theorists)

The Mind-Dependence of the Relational Structure of Time (or: What Henri Bergson Would Say to B-theorists) Sonja Deppe Abstract Tenseless theorists assert that the relational structure of earlier/ later is the essential structure of time. Using B-notions, so they think, we speak about time as it is in a metaphysical sense and hence from the outside of our subjective perspective on it. I suggest on the contrary that the relational structure of earlier/later is part of our own intellectual structuring within the access to temporal phenomena. Furthermore it is essentially characterized by the structure of juxtaposition which originates in spatial experience rather than in temporal. In order to show this I consult Henri Bergson s analysis of our temporal experience on the one hand and of our intellectual practice on the other hand. I will conclude that it is not unplausible to take the relational account of time to be more closely connected to the nature of our intellect than to the nature of time itself. Keywords: Philosophy of Time, B-Theorie, Henri Bergson, mind-dependence 1 Introduction The debate between tensed and tenseless theories of time, i. e., between A- and B-theorists traces back to J. Ellis McTaggart s seminal paper The unreality of time [12]. Unlike McTaggart, however, neither of the opposed theories contests the fact that time is real, hence that reality is structured in a temporal way (cf. [10, p. 9]). The metaphysical dissent between A- and B-theorists concerns rather the question of what is essential to the nature of time [12, p. 458]. The core of the debate, I would say, is to identify the essential, i. e., fundamental structure of time; and in doing so, to expose an essential structural aspect of reality. Kriterion Journal of Philosophy, 2016, 30(2): 107 124. http://www.kriterion-journal-of-philosophy.org c 2016 The author

108 KRITERION Journal of Philosophy, 2016, 30(2): 107 124 On the one hand, advocates of a tensed theory of time or A-theorists believe that time is essentially structured in a way that can be referred to by so called A-notions as past, present, and future (cf. [7, p. 3]). Those notions refer to the concept of now that A-theorists take to be metaphysically important. For them, referring to the present and to its constantly varying contents is indispensable for grasping the essential structure of time. Tenseless theorists or B-theorists, on the other hand, claim that A- notions are not necessary to characterize time in metaphysical respects. What is real about time, so they tell us, is that events are related among each other in a way that can be described by so called B-notions such as earlier than, later than, and simultaneous with (cf. [13, p. 15]). Thus, for them, time is essentially structured in a relational way. Actually B-theorists wouldn t necessarily deny that A-notions can be useful to describe our experience of temporal phenomena. They contest, however, that some objective feature is referred to by this way of speaking (cf. [13, p. 42 et sqq.]). As Heather Dyke puts it: According to this [tenseless] view the distinction between past, present and future is not a characteristic of time itself, but merely a distinction that we project onto time, from our perspective. [8, p. 332] The A-structure 1 is hence understood as a structuring that merely reflects the subject s access to and particular perspective upon temporal reality. In this respect, B-theorists treat now in a similar way like here, which usually is not taken to refer to the structure of space itself but to our own perspective-depending structuring of space in relation to ourselves. In this sense, B-theorists sometimes claim properties referred to by A-notions to be merely mind-dependent (cf. [1]). Usually the core of the dispute between tensed and tenseless theorists seems to be the metaphysical status of the A-structure, 2 although the initial question appears to be a symmetrical one: Both of the opposing parties try to prove that one structure of time - the one that they favour - is the essential one in the metaphysical respect and try to find reasons for taking the other structure to be derivative. However, the A-structure and its metaphysical relevance is usually the core issue discussed between tensed and tenseless theorists, presumably because of the following reasons. Firstly, since McTaggart we have to face the question whether the A-structure is self-contradictory (cf. [11, p. 24 et seqq.]). Secondly, (based on the first point or independently of it) there is an argument

Sonja Deppe: Mind-Dependence of the Relational Structure of Time 109 whether referring to now is necessary (and/or possible, and/or plausible) in order to characterize time in a metaphysical respect. Crucial to this discussion is the aforementioned question of whether A-notions are objectively relevant (cf. [8, p. 332 et seqq.]). Observing the debate, one could gain the following impression at first glance: If the tenseless view of A-notions being merely mind-dependent turned out to be right, B-theorists would be entitled to triumph because the relational structure of B-notions would remain alone to be the essential feature of time in the metaphysical respect. This reasoning, however, in my opinion is premature for it omits to return the question to the B- theorists, i.e. to examine critically if, from a metaphysical point of view, the B-structure itself can convincingly be thought as the essential feature of time. What is disregarded here is the possibility that the B-structure might have problems on its own. 2 Challenging the mind-independence of the B-structure In this article I will attempt to provide a reverse approach: I will aim directly at the relational B-structure and challenge the plausibility of its role as a mind-independent feature of the essential characterization of time. My question is: Is it really convincing, as often implied, to think of the relational B-structure of time as being inherent in time itself, independently from our grasping of it? The question whether a certain feature is something we encounter in the external world or whether it only belongs to ourselves, structuring our own access to the external world, is obviously a decisively metaphysical question. What are our instruments for tackling it? In metaphysics, as I understand it, we are establishing models of reality (or just single theses about it) and inquire into their consistency on the one hand and their accordance with our experience on the other hand. The results of both will render a particular model (or thesis) more or less plausible. In this paper I am going to claim that a view that takes the temporal B-structure to be mind-dependent is by no means unplausible. More precisely I will motivate its plausibility from two directions: Firstly I will indicate that there is an access to time - in fact a very basic one, namely our original experience of temporal phenomena - where the B-structure is not encountered. Rather quite contrary structures seem to dominate here. This result may surprise at first glance since within our everyday handling of time obviously the structure of earlier/later does play a quite effective role. Hence, in order to give my thesis consistency and

110 KRITERION Journal of Philosophy, 2016, 30(2): 107 124 plausibility I have to explain why the structure in this context may be considered as secondary and thus is not metaphysically relevant. That s why my second argument will tackle the possible mind-dependence from the issue of the mind: I will consider typical structuring processes that human subjects use when accessing reality. I will then claim that our mind has the tendency to impose a certain kind of structure for the purpose of simplification in the context of acting and that the temporal B-structure may very well be of this type. For both arguments I will bring into play the perspective of the French philosopher Henri Bergson whose detailed reflections about time also focus on the subject of the structure of time, even though they are quite different from the debate between A- and B-theorists. 3 In contrast to those theorists, he does not start directly within the field of metaphysics, but prepares the metaphysical reasoning by thoroughly analysing our temporal experience first. More precisely, he tries to reveal the essence of temporal experience by exposing its specific structure and by contrasting it with the structure of spatial experience. Having carved out those different structures he contends that, in some contexts, we have a tendency to favour spatial structures with respect to temporal structures for practical reasons. He points out that ordering contents within spatial structures is part of our intellectual practice. Bergson s reasoning may lead us to reflect in more detail on the connection of temporal structures, spatial structures and intellectual practice. This consideration may challenge an overhasty ascription of certain structures to mind-independent reality (in particular spatial structures within the context of time) and in this sense have an impact on our metaphysical reasoning. Hence, following Bergson, I will leave the area of metaphysics behind for a while, in order to present his analysis of human experience in its spatial and temporal form. Subsequently we will see his analysis of intellectual structuring mechanisms of human mind in more detail. Afterwards I will turn back to the issue of metaphysical reflection. 3 Henri Bergson: Spatial and temporal experience Referring to Kant, Bergson exposes two forms of intuition that underlie human experience. As I will now explain in more detail, he takes the spatial and the temporal way of grasping contents of experience to be contrary in many aspects: Analysing our spatial approach to experienced contents, Bergson

Sonja Deppe: Mind-Dependence of the Relational Structure of Time 111 carves out a structural pattern that can be summed up by the key word juxtaposition. Juxtaposition allows us to consider several things together but separately (cf. [5, p. 75-99], [3, p. 56-74]). This structure of juxtaposition suggests itself when it comes to our concrete experience of perceptual space, e. g. in our visual perception of extended objects within space. Bergson illustrates this by our perception and/or representation of a flock of sheep: Let us assume that all the sheep in the flock are [qualitatively] identical; they differ at least by the position which they occupy in space, otherwise they would not form a flock. [5, p. 77] (cf. [3, p. 57]) The spatial structure allows us both to perceive several objects at once and at the same time to discriminate them referring to their differing position in space. The mathematical understanding of space sharpens this structure of juxtaposition which is at the same time accumulating and differentiating within the conception of a set of equal and discrete positions. I will have to say a little bit more about the structure of juxtaposition later. But first, let s see what Bergson tells us about temporal structure (cf. [5, p. 85-128], [3, p. 63-96]). Again, Bergson takes his start from our experience. What kind of structure can we discover within our original experience of temporal phenomena? For Bergson it is most obvious that this structure is definitely not the same as in the spatial context, i.e. juxtaposition: This claim seems almost trivial if we think that the temporal experience is characterized by the fact that contents are encountered not together at once but rather successively. Furthermore, and here it becomes a bit more complicated, Bergson thinks that it is essential to temporal experience that its contents are not at all separated as we spelled it out for juxtaposition: Grasping things or positions separately next to each other, means to take each of them to stand for itself in a way. However, Bergson tells us that parts of temporal experience, i. e. moments, can t be taken to stand for themselves in the same way (cf. [5, p. 99-102], [3, p. 74-76]). Or at least they can t without disregarding an aspect that seems to be an important one for their being structured in a temporal way and which has to do with the interdependence of moments: From Bergson s view the elements of an experienced temporal succession are interconnected and organised among each other in a way that is in turn essential to every individual element, i.e. moment itself. Considering moments as sharply distinguished from each other and as isolated from their being bound into the succession is only possible by

112 KRITERION Journal of Philosophy, 2016, 30(2): 107 124 abstract thought [5, p. 101] (cf. [3, p. 75]) - and this abstraction means just to prescind from the temporal structure of our experience. A well known, vivid example in this context is the listening to a melody (cf. [5, p. 100 et seq.], [3, p. 75 et seq.]). To describe the experience one has at a certain moment of the listening, it doesn t seem to be appropriate to take the single tone as standing for itself and being separated from the others. Consequently, we do not seem to grasp all aspects of the melody if we conceive it exclusively as a series of discretely juxtaposed tones. If you think, for example, of the harmonic resolution of a dissonance heard before, it becomes clear that the experience of the presently perceived tone is not separable from the experience of the previous tones: as Bergson puts it, they permeate one another [5, p. 100] (cf. [3, p. 75]). Building on this concept of moments being closly connected among themselves, it seems that the continuity of their arising from each other plays a particular role when it comes to temporal structure. In contrast to spatial contents that present themselves as together and separated, temporal contents, therefore, seem to be presented successively on the one hand and closely connected among each other on the other hand, where this inner connection can be specified as a permeation of moments or as their continuous development from one another. Of course, these notions of permeation and continuity are still unclear. Remember, however, that until now we are not yet talking about metaphysics but about the structure of our temporal experience. It is thus not problematic to specify these notions as qualitative ones: it is with respect to the way of how I experience one single tone within the melody, that its continuous arising out of the previous series of tones is indispensable. 4 Intellectual practice and spatial structure I will now focus another observation that becomes apparent in connection with Bergson s reflections and that will be important for my issue: Beyond the immediate experience of spatial phenomena, we use the spatial structure of juxtaposition to arrange all kinds of mental contents that are not necessarily connected to spatial experience. Hence, regardless of whether juxtaposition is the objective structure of space or not, it seems definitely true that it plays a role in structuring mental contents and, thus, seems to be part of our own epistemological toolbox (cf. [5, p. 99-137], [3, p. 74-102]).

Sonja Deppe: Mind-Dependence of the Relational Structure of Time 113 In order to make this clearer, it helps to consider a more virtual form of juxtaposition. We have the ability to take into account different things together, but separately. In fact, Bergson believes that this ability is essential to our intellectual capacity. He claims that the structure of juxtaposition is involved in many activities of human intellectual practice in a constitutive way. Consider for instance the practice of counting and quantification, within which Bergson sees the spatial structure of accumulation and differentiation to be represented in a most explicit way: Imagine for instance a shepherd counting the sheep of his flock (in the meadow or in his mind). From Bergson s view, in order to do so, he needs to juxtapose his sheep within a spatial structure: they have to be set separately - in order to form units - and together - in order to form a sum (cf. [5, p. 75], [3, p. 57]). One might object that temporal structures may serve the same purpose as well. 4 When, for instance, the shepherd counts the flock pointing at (or thinking of) the sheep one by one this process of counting seems to use time instead of space to separate the sheep. Considering this objection, Bergson points out that spatial, juxtaposing structure is nevertheless relevant in this case - otherwise we would not succeed in accumulating, adding up and hence counting the sheep. He says: For if we picture to ourselves each of the sheep in the flock in succession and separately, we shall never have to do with more than a single sheep. In order that the number should go on increasing in proportion as we advance, we must retain the successive images and set them alongside each of the new units which we picture to ourselves: now, it is in space that such a juxtaposition takes place and not in pure duration. [5, p. 77] (cf. [3, p. 57-58]) Obviously Bergson doesn t mean that every time we are counting or calculating we have to create explicitly a mental picture representing the objects to be counted next to each other within an ideal space. What he tries to show us, however, is that, in principle, our ability of quantitative thought depends on spatial structuring. In a similar way as in the context of counting, we could spell out the actual or virtual use of a juxtaposing structure in the context of comparing things: Only considering things at once but separately allows us to ascribe equal or different properties to them. Comparison in turn plays an important role within the practice of classifying entities, and

114 KRITERION Journal of Philosophy, 2016, 30(2): 107 124 again classification is an important feature of language. Hence, classification and many aspects of language depend ultimately on juxtaposing structures (cf. [5, p. 97], [3, p. 73]). Bergson uses another term to describe the structure of grasping things together and separately: actual or virtual space allows us to perceive or conceive things as being external to one another [5, p. 99] (cf. [3, p. 73]). Considering different sheep at a time, they are obviously not allowed to permeate each other if we are going to count, compare or classify them. Bergson asserts rather that externality is the distinguishing mark of things which occupy space [5, p. 99] (cf. [3, p. 73]). Here it becomes clear that as a matter of fact Bergson thinks spatial and temporal structure to be properly opposed to each other: In contrast to spatially structured contents, the contents of our temporal experience, i.e. the experienced moments, are never really external to one another. We saw this in the case of listening to a melody: within the hearingexperience of the single present tone itself the preceding tones played an indispensable role. Besides the fact that temporal moments appear to be ordered in a successive way (rather than being presented together at once), they were hence characterized as being closely connected among themselves. The crucial feature of temporal structure, from Bergson s perspective, is that the experience of the present moment is only to be understood against the background of past moments. The term external to one another illustrates in what way for Bergson applying a juxtaposed structure also concerns the possibility of taking objects to stand for themselves, of considering them as such, i.e. (at the greatest possible extent) independently from our own situational - and hence temporally bound - experience of them. Here we get an idea of how even our intellect s focusing upon abstraction and objective thought might require contrasting juxtaposition and hence the capacity of spatial structuring. Bergson points out: indeed, if we notice that abstraction assumes clean-cut distinction and a kind of externality of the concepts or their symbols with regard to one another, we shall find that the faculty of abstraction already implies the intuition of a homogenous medium [i.e. space]. [... ] This latter, clearly conceived by the human intellect, enables us to use clean-cut distinctions, to count, to abstract, and perhaps also to speak. [5, p. 97] (cf. [3, p. 72-73])

Sonja Deppe: Mind-Dependence of the Relational Structure of Time 115 5 Spatial structuring within the context of acting In the previous section we saw how the practice of applying juxtaposition is a powerful tool of our intellect in order to represent contents in a structured way and - as we will see now - to render them more easily accessible for possible actions. Indeed, it is Bergson s idea that the tendency of our mind to structure phenomena in a spatial way is ultimately owed to practical needs. For him, it is the context of acting that demands dealing with differentiated states: namely, they can be starting positions, motivations or targets of an action. Let us have, for instance, a closer look upon the role of results and/or our reference to them within our acting: The function of the intellect is to preside over actions. Now, in action, it is the result that interests us; [... ] and thence it comes also that only the goal where our activity will rest is pictured explicitly to our mind: [... ] Let us consider a very simple act, like that of lifting the arm. Where should we be if we had to imagine beforehand all the elementary contractions and tensions this act involves, or even to perceive them, one by one, as they are accomplished? But the mind is carried immediately to the end, that is to say, to the schematic and simplified vision of the act supposed accomplished. [... ] The intellect, then, only represents to the activity ends to attain, that is to say, points of rest. [2, p. 325] (cf. [4, p. 298-299]) The idea seems to be the following: very well may the execution of an act be a continuous process; when considering the act, planning it, or ticking it off, however, we have the tendency of grasping it as a leap between different states. But how do we obtain the conception of those states that serve as point of action on the one hand and as aimed outcome of our acting on the other hand? This is a crucial point in Bergson s reflections: What we need here is situations grasped as external to one another. In order to apply our acting correctly, we have to juxtapose its starting position and its desired result. So, what does not help us here is a view that takes into account the continuous arising of one situation out of another, i.e. a temporally structured view in Bergson s sense. Rather a juxtaposing approach to the temporally structured experience is required. In the first place this context clarifies again that applying a juxtaposing structure to our experienced contents is a useful tool of our

116 KRITERION Journal of Philosophy, 2016, 30(2): 107 124 intellectual practice, its use lies in preparing our action. In the second place, however, we see here that for practical reasons we have the capacity (and actually the tendency) to apply the method of juxtaposing contents even to contexts of situational processes, and hence to the temporal experience itself - although, as we saw above, this latter one is originally not at all structured in a juxtaposed way. In the next section I will address this step in more detail. 6 Spatial grasping of temporal phenomena: the cinematographic mechanism Above, we encountered spatial and temporal structures as two distinct and even opposed approaches to experienced content (ignoring for a start the question if they are structures of the world itself as well). With a closer look to the context of our acting, however, we found a context within which a connection between those structures seems to be established. Indeed, in Bergson s view, in this context temporal structure appears to be translated into spatial structure; for the juxtaposing access to our temporal experience is a way of structuring it as a preparation for possible actions. Hence here spatial structure comes into play only as a secondary structure imposed by our mental capacities on our original temporal experience. Bergson s idea can be illustrated by the image of single moments that are cut out of the continuous stream of temporally structured experience and its mutually permeating contents. Certain single situations are (e.g. in memory or in anticipation) pulled out of their binding within the successive continuity of temporal experience in order to consider them as separated and standing for themselves and to juxtapose them to others. While originally we had to do with a continuous, interwoven whole of on-going processes, we can now (turning towards practical regards) grasp isolated states, which allows us in turn to conceive several of them at once - together but separate. In his later book Creative Evolution Bergson compares such an approach of cutting out single moments with the mechanism of a film camera, taking instantaneous pictures out of the continuous progression of events to be filmed. By fixing the pictures within the film reel, moments are taken out of the temporal succession of the events and transferred to the structure of a simultaneous juxtaposition. Furthermore, the inner bond of the processes is detached and the images are positioned external to one another, hence standing for themselves, instead (cf. [2, p. 330 et

Sonja Deppe: Mind-Dependence of the Relational Structure of Time 117 seqq.], [4, p. 303 et seqq.]). However, just as in the case of the film camera, it seems obvious that such a cutting out is attended by a reduction with respect to the original content experienced in the continuous form of duration. Of course, such a reduction is not necessarily a defect: In the context of acting, it is rather an advantage according to the motto less is more. 5 However, - and now I will turn back to metaphysics - what Bergson considers as problematic is a philosophical practice that takes exclusively those contents of experience as a basis for metaphysical reasoning that are gained by our spatial juxtaposing access to experience. 7 The metaphysical status of the relational structure of time As I already said, I consider the crucial task within the metaphysics of time to identify the essential structure of time. We encountered this question also within the conception of Henri Bergson, who brought into play two structural patterns gathered from observing our original spatial and temporal experience. I contrasted them as mutually external juxtapostion on the one hand and mutually permeating successivity on the other hand. Following Bergson s approach it seems obvious that the structure of juxtaposition comes off badly as a candidate for being the essential structure of time (regardless of the fact that it possibly does well for the essential structure of space): Firstly, from his view, our experience argues against it. Secondly, his reflection about the mind gives us a convincing explanation of how, within the temporal context, the structure of juxtaposition may come into play only subsequently. Bergson hence unmasks juxtaposition as secondary here. As you probably suspected, Bergson tends to expose somehow successivity and the inner connection of moments to be the essential structure of time. Before we can support or reject this claim, however, there will be many questions to be answered. 6 This is not the topic of this paper. What I take from Bergson here is the negative claim disclosing the unplausibility of juxtaposition to be the essential structure of time. Let us bring again into focus the relational B-structure, expressed by the notion of earlier/later, that the tenseless theory of time takes to be the essential characteristic of time. With Bergson s conception at the back of our mind, let us have a closer look to what is involved in thinking of time as relationally structured.

118 KRITERION Journal of Philosophy, 2016, 30(2): 107 124 In order to establish a relation between two moments of time, understanding one of them as earlier and the other one as later, we need to grasp them on a par with each other in the first place. Two self-contained elements are considered in one go when related to each other. This means that in order to do so we need an access to time that allows us to take into account several moments together and separately. Putting moments together and separately is exactly what the B- theory does: It is a cornerstone of every B-theoretic approach to treat all B-times on a par with each other, neither of them ontologically privileged [8, p. 332]. Furthermore every such time stands for itself and can be considered independently of others. (This becomes clear if you think about the variable applicability of the earlier/later relation: any two times can be put in this relation while all remaining moments of time can be faded out.) Relating different moments of time and locating them within the earlier/later scheme of order, hence, presumes grasping them as juxtaposed to each other in Bergson s sense. So then the relational structure of time involves juxtaposition. 7 Actually, Bergson, far from being familiar with B-theory, makes this point very clear: we could not introduce order among terms without first distinguishing them and then comparing the places which they occupy; hence we must perceive them as multiple, simultaneous and distinct; in a word, we set them side by side, and if we introduce an order in what is successive, the reason is that succession is converted into simultaneity and is projected into space. [5, p. 102] (cf. [3, p. 76]) The expressions converted and projected lead us straight to our question of the metaphysical status of the B-structure: Is it really convincing to take this structure that presupposes juxtaposition to be an essential part of the structure of time, as B-theorists would have it? Or is it more plausible to conceive of it as a structuring belonging to our own access to time as Bergson implies? Let us recall Bergson s line of argument and relate it more directly to the B-theoretical approach. Firstly Bergson pointed out that our immediate experience of temporal phenomena is originally structured in a way that moments (and things belonging to those moments) are noticed/ encountered/ grasped as strictly successive (in contrast to together at once) and permeating one another (in contrast to external to one another). Hence juxtaposition is not involved. So he makes clear that a juxtaposing access to time does not arise from our original temporal experience: we do not

Sonja Deppe: Mind-Dependence of the Relational Structure of Time 119 experience different moments on a par with each other, in contrast to our experience of different places in space. Indeed, this seems to be true: we never encounter different moments of time on an equal footing with each other, but - in experience - there has one moment an exeptional position, namely the present. This connection between our experience and its present is admitted even by B- theorists, feeling therefore constrained to establish a B-theoretic explanation for it (cf. [13, p. 44]). No matter what temporal phenomenon you take: Its temporal character in experience comprises the fact that its parts are not given all at once, but - almost too trivial to mention it - successively. It is true that other moments than the present one do play a role within our experience - though this role does not seem to be on equal footing with the present moment. Rather their significance seems to lie within their connection with the present moment, i.e. their influence on it. Hence, Bergson s first argument against the thesis that juxtaposition plays the key role in temporal structure, which is based on the analysis of our temporal experience, seems to be quite applicable to the B-structure: Our experience does not exactly commend a structure of moments standing separately at a level with each other, hence B-structure. This insight, however, is by no means new but rather a standard objection of A-theorists against B-theory. It alone, of course, is uncomfortable but not necessarily an insuperable obstacle for the tenseless theory of time whose metaphysical position avowedly takes some distance from our experiential access to time. 8 Therefore, it is even more important to consider Bergson s second argument. Instead of just doubting juxtaposition to be the structure of time, he gives a consistent explanation of why one could misleadingly think so. His reflections on human intellectual practice gave us an idea of how the structure of juxtaposition (that initially had been associated with space within the immediate experience) plays furthermore an important role when it comes to the arragengement of mental contents by our mind. In this regard we encountered juxtaposition not just as a form of experience but rather as an epistemological tool, that, by the way, proves to be useful in practical contexts. What is important to see is that in those cases we encountered juxtaposition as a secondary structure imposed by our mind in order to cope with contents not necessarily spatial in nature. Does this apply as well to the relational structure of time, which already has been exposed to depend on juxtaposition? Imagine, just hy-

120 KRITERION Journal of Philosophy, 2016, 30(2): 107 124 pothetically, that the beforehand described original experience of time of successivity and permeation of moments would be our only access to temporal phenomena. This would indeed not be very useful in practical respects: On the one hand, by virtue of the moment s successivity, we would strictly have to do with the single moment just experienced and hence be unable to refer to any other moment. Reflecting on past experiences or directing our actions towards future targets would be hardly possible. On the other hand, even if we had to do with a single moment here, this one would be embroiled and permeated with other, now vanished, moments, since it would be qualitatively stamped by its continuous emergence from other moments as we saw it in the case of the melody. What would be missing here is the capacity of conceiving a moment as a bare state that is comparable to others and possibly reproducable. This, however, seems to suspend the possibility to evaluate a moment as the result of certain actions or to use it as starting points for calculated actions, as has been developed in Section 5. Sure enough, in this hypothetical situation a mental approach of isolating moments as states, confronting them with others and arranging the ensemble within an ordering scheme would do a great deal: We will be able to repeat successful actions or avoid unsuccessful ones if we have the possibility to isolate once experienced moments as standing for themselves, to confront them with the present experience and to conceive of the interaction between them as an ensemble of earlier and later states. We will be able to direct our acting in an advantageous way, if we put ourselves in the position to conceive of a desirable state while experiencing another one, to reflect their differences and to grasp both as (possibly) related as one earlier than the other. Establishing this approach of taking into account situations as external to each other would obviously go along with juxtaposition, since moments have to be conceived of as separated and together, as already pointed out. This setting may give an idea of how the juxtaposing structure of an earlier/later ordering of moments in fact facilitates our handling of time within our everyday acting. Within this exposure, however, the relational structure appeared to be merely secondary, applied by us to our original experience. Following up on the above example of a melody, a quite good illustration for this procedure would be the compilation of a sheet of music: On the one hand, every single tone is reduced here to an isolated state that is perfectly reproducable detatched from its being bound within the succession with the others. On the other hand, the succession of tones

Sonja Deppe: Mind-Dependence of the Relational Structure of Time 121 is being fixed, too, although not within the original temporal (successive and permeating) form any more, but rather within a juxtaposititon of an ensemble of elements on a par with each other. As follows from the illustration, successivity and inner connection as experienced in temporal phenomena can be brought to a juxtaposition form which turns out to be useful in many respects. But writing down the tones of a melody on a sheet obviously is a matter of conceptualising the melody mentally, which in itself can only be revived by playing its notes successively and allowing the tunes to permeate each other within temporal continuity. The view elaborated here results in a very plausible alternative for the status of the B-structure within the field of time: As I see it, B- theory converts experienced successivity and continuous emergence of moments into ordered and easily accessible juxtaposition in a similar way than a sheet of music does with a melody. In this light, the B- structure seems to be part of our own grasping of time rather than of time itself (even if we may not know the latter one s positive structure yet). Hence, in line of this reasoning, the relational structure of time, the objectivity of which is the cornerstone of the metaphysical position of tenseless theorists, appears to be mind-dependent. In this paper I wanted to render plausible a view that conceives the relational B-structure as a feature belonging to our own structuring access to the world. In doing so the metaphysical relevance of the B- structure has been challenged, which may be a step in the search of the essential structure of time. Since my focus lied on the B-structure I did not provide any direct argument to support the metaphysical relevance of the A-structure. Confronting its approach with Bergson s reflections on temporal structure in a similar manner seems to be a further interesting issue - that will be left for another time. 8 Conclusion I have consulted the reflections of Henri Bergson about our original temporal experience on the one hand and about the tendency of our intellectual practice to apply spatial and juxtaposing structures on the other hand. With regard to these considerations, we arrive at the following conclusions: Firstly, a juxtaposing and hence spatial structuring of time seems to be secondary with respect to our original experience of time. Secondly, the alleged relational structure of time - presupposing juxtaposition - seems to be more closely connected to the nature of

122 KRITERION Journal of Philosophy, 2016, 30(2): 107 124 our intellect than to the nature of time itself (whatever that is). Thus my considerations suggested understanding the relational B-structure of time primarily in the context of our structuring access to and handling of temporal reality. Hence, with respect to tenseless theorists - whose aim is to discredit the metaphysical importance of the A-structure of time for the reason of being merely mind-dependent - we find an interesting result: from Bergson s perspective, their own starting point of metaphysical reflection, namely the relational structure of time, seems itself to depend on the human mind. Notes 1 I will use A-structure as abbreviation for structure that can be described by A-notions and B-structure as abbreviation for structure that can be described by B-notions. 2 It is true that Oaklander broaches the issue of an ontological ground of temporal relations [14, p. 74]. This is, however, in order to refute the presentist premise and hence part of the debate on the metaphysical status of the A-structure as well. 3 For reasons of simplification I will not discuss here the proper notion of duration that Bergson introduces in order to distinguish his own conception from a conventional use of the notion time. For him, the latter one is usually understood with a close connection to space which Bergson wants to avoid. 4 For instance, Rudolf Carnap even tries to trace back the practice of counting to successive experience in principle (cf. [6, p. 15]). For Carnap s approach to time and measurement see also [9] (this volume). 5 By the way, Bergson counts even scientific reasoning as a form of praxis, since the target of its analytical activity is to structure experienced contents for practical action. Furthermore, its methods and systems of concepts are structured in a spatial way in Bergson s sense (cf. [2, p. 357 et seq.], [4, 328 et seq.]). 6 For instance there is obviously a requirement of a more precise characterisation of this structure. Furthermore it has to be asked how a metaphysical dimension of the mutual permeation of moments - beyond a mere subjectivly experienced quality - is justified etc. 7 A possible objection here might be that the term juxtaposed, meaning next to each other indicates a spatial relation in the first place and that its use in the temporal context should be taken as a mere figurative sense. The opponent might point out that the relation of earlier/later is intended to describe a temporal connection after all and hence - even if moments are considered together at once - they are never put next to each other in last consequence but past each other which still allows for their successivity. Remember, however, that we worked out from Bergson s conception how in order to conceive entities together but separated the spatial dimension is already involved (Section 4). Successivity may be the starting point of applying the B- theoretic order relation - however, just by taking successivity to be a mere order

Sonja Deppe: Mind-Dependence of the Relational Structure of Time 123 relation (of a whole entirely given succession ), it is reduced severely and actually deprived of the temporal character as we are acquainted with from our experience. 8 The validity and/or plausibility of the reasons for this distance are actually part of the debate between A- and B-theorists. They are, however, not the main focus of this article. Sonja Deppe Universität Koblenz-Landau Institut für Philosophie Bürgerstr. 23 76829 Landau (Pfalz) <sonja.deppe@gmx.net> References [1] Lynn Rudder Baker. On the Mind-Dependence of Temporal Becoming. In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 39.3 (1979), pp. 341 357. [2] Henri Bergson. Creative Evolution. New York: Random House, 1944. [3] Henri Bergson. Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1946. [4] Henri Bergson. L évolution créatrice. 8th ed. Vol. 8. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1998. [5] Henri Bergson. Time and free will: An essay on the immediate data of consciousness. Mineola and N.Y: Dover Publications, 2001. [6] Rudolf Carnap. Physikalische Begriffsbildung. Vol. 39. Wissen und Wirken. Einzelschriften zu den Grundfragen des Erkennens und Schaffens. Karlsruhe: G. Braun, 1926. [7] William Lane Craig. The Tensed Theory of Time: A Critical Examination. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000.

124 KRITERION Journal of Philosophy, 2016, 30(2): 107 124 [8] Heather Dyke. Time and Tense. In: A Companion to the Philosophy of Time. Ed. by Heather Dyke and Adrian Bardon. Vol. 52. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013, pp. 328 344. [9] Florian Fischer. Carnap s Logic of Science and Reference to the Present Moment. In: Kriterion 30.2 (2016). [10] Cord Friebe. Zeit - Wirklichkeit - Persistenz: Eine präsentistische Deutung der Raumzeit. Paderborn: mentis, 2012. [11] Robin Le Poidevin. Change, cause and contradiction: A defence of the tenseless theory of time. Basingstoke: Macmillan in association with the Scots Philosophical Club, 1991. [12] J. Ellis McTaggart. The Unreality of Time. In: Mind XVII.4 (1908), pp. 457 474. [13] D. H. Mellor. Real time II. London and New York: Routledge, 1998. [14] L. Nathan Oaklander. Presentism, Ontology and Temporal Experience. In: Time, Reality & Experience. Ed. by Craig Callender. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 73 90.