Part III Further Aspects and Implications of Simmel s Method A postscript to Part II and an introduction to Part III Further consideration of aprioriand contingent elements in Simmel s exemplifications and interpretations Accepting Simmel s insistence that No form can provide an exhaustive taxonomy of the world and its contents, the question for further discussion following chapters 3 5 is: What do general kind(s) of account(s) forms and the exemplifications of forms involve, and how do these relate to interpretation and explanation? It can be suggested that, at their most basic, forms name and identify recurring types of social interaction. Something similar is so for cultural and disciplinary forms. In addition, all such might be seen as type generalisations (cf. Weber s ideal type of bureaucracy ). But there are barriers to any automatic acceptance of Simmel being seen in this way that must be considered. Salomon (1995) refers to Simmel s microscopic sharpness. However, Simmel s supporting examples in connection with his presentation of forms sometimes appear relatively ungrounded and it is not evident that they always meet his own recommendations on the requirements for well-grounded interpretation. For example, as Fred Davis (1992) suggests, actors self-concepts as followers of fashion are not directly explored by Simmel. Against this necessarily being seen as a problem, however, there is an argument that a randomly gathered mix of different kinds and qualities of evidence can still serve as the basis for exemplifying forms of social interaction. Whatever its insights and ingenuity, the work of Erving Goffman raises similar issues to Simmel s (see Smith, 2006: 119). The basis of Goffman s conceptual frameworks can seem to lack precise specification. With illustrations drawn from diverse sources in his analysis of everyday life, stigma, asylums or forms of talk (Goffman, 1959; 1961; 1968; 1974; 1981) and the basis and limits of the generalisations seemingly loosely or little stated it
158 Further Aspects & Implications of Simmel s Method can appear difficult to justify or nail down Goffman s approach as a method. Goffman himself at one time asserts: all sorts of naturally occurring stuff will often do as illustrations, and sometimes he also appears content to regard his work as explorative, as unverified. Simmel remarks similarly that there is no certainly effective method of wringing a formal sociological meaning from contents (see Jary and Smith, 1976). For sociologists such as Simmel and Goffman, flair and intuition (and bricolage) as well as logic or method in Simmel s case grounded in the dualities are certainly integral to the effectiveness of their analysis. Because of this their approaches cannot be readily emulated. Whilst duly acknowledging all of this, it is simply wrong to disregard the systematic aspects of both Simmel s and Goffman s approach. In the way seen in chapters 3 5, Simmel s elaboration of conceptual frameworks and the wider application of these in social analysis do appear to achieve a strong aprioribasisaswellasaninductivegrounding. John Lofland (2002: 143 4) lists eight respects in which researchers such as Goffman and Simmel working in a naturalistic analytical mode may seek answers to questions about specific areas of social life (our terminology differs in some cases from Lofland s): 1. type (i.e. what are the defining features); 2. frequency; 3. magnitude (i.e. strength and intensity); 4. structure; 5. process; 6. causes; 7. consequence; 8. agency (i.e. actors strategies in the context). Of these, we can see (1), (4), (5) and (7) as most crucial for Simmel, but each of the others can also be involved. A dubious Frank Cioffi (1971) remarks, using merely illustrative and informal comparative methods, and making claims for type generalisations, that theorists like Simmel and Goffman are faced with a situation where they must accept: I lose if you say I have lost. The fact is, however, that many readers do respond positively. We might call this method validation by recognition or acclamation. Such a procedure does seem to be a crucial source of both Simmel s and Goffman s effectiveness, supporting the contention that their approaches not ignoring but because of their exceptional analytical
Further Aspects & Implications of Simmel s Method 159 skills are capable of supporting claims for their identification of forms of interaction being seen as naming and identifying a constitutive core of forms along with their empirically varying content. The notion of constitutive concepts has been further developed by analytical philosophers such as J.L. Austin (1962) and John Searle (1971; 1995) in dealing with speech acts and associated social ontologies. Their treatment includes an analysis of promises, lies, cant and so on, which for Searle amount to institutional facts. In the light of the above, and given the mix of abstract and empirical elements operational within accounts of forms, two issues arise: i) how abstract analysis and empirical evidence fit together in the formulation of forms; and ii) where and when, and on what sort of evidence, they might also bring about revision of a form. The answer we propose is that both the definitional, more analytical, as well as the more contingent aspects can be seen as revisable. Simmel s remark at one point that his work renders epistemology empirical might be seen as sanctioning such a view. However, the confirmation or revision of what can be seen as the constitutive definitional core of a form and its immanent aspects would be a different matter from the obviously more widely variable contingent aspects and implications of the form. This means that there are a number of ways in which Simmel s (and Goffman s) accounts of forms of social interaction can be seen and might be further deployed. The application of a form might be viewed as operating with something of the force of law-like generalisation or as general ideal types. In a related way, they can be regarded as akin to generalisations reached using the grounded theoretic approach of Howard S. Becker (1970) and Barney Glasser and Anselm Strauss (1967). However, a difference here is that Simmel and Goffman are more tacit in their search for deviant, potentially disproving, cases they do not pursue the justification for a generalisation to the point of saturation in the explicit way of Becker, and Glasser and Strauss. However, in naming and identifying forms and validation by acclamation in something like Cioffi s terms, Simmel can be regarded as far more than providing simply relatively loosely textured sensitising concepts as sometimes suggested. On this basis, the following summary can be advanced. For Simmel, sociology abstracts forms from the heterogeneity of sociation s contents and purposes. Dependent on the operation of dualities, such abstraction notably social forms can be viewed as analogous to an underlying grammar or geometry, giving shape to variable content. Thus, regarding poverty, Mizruchi notes the profound continuities but also the particularities of poverty s functions. The notion of an
160 Further Aspects & Implications of Simmel s Method analytical constitutive core (cf. Oakes, 1980) can be seen as being made up of one or more of the following: i) a priori or synthetic a priori concepts the Kantian option (cf. Jary and Smith, 1976); ii) indubitable existential statements (Rom Harré, 1972); iii) forms of life (this best fits disciplinary forms, art or science, as well as culturally integrated communities, cf. Peter Winch, 1959); and iv) clarifying depictions (Goffman) here explanation as well description is implied, with the synthetic identification of implications beyond a focus on core. The application of Simmel s conceptualisations of forms by others can also illuminate questions about the balance of abstract and universal compared with empirical and variable elements involved. Thus Ilya Parkins (2009) broadens the range of consideration of gendered ways of following fashion. Nedelmann (1984), in her consideration of poverty and what she deems Simmel s evolutionary hypothesis of an increasing openness in societies, also identifies strong counteracting tendencies. Other examples include the revisions to conceptions of urbanism since the early Simmel-inspired formulations of Louis Wirth and the Chicago School (see Mellor, 1984). Nor must it be forgotten that what Simmel s abstract forms consist of is often, in part, the unintended outcomes of the intended objectives of voluntary action. As such, these forms are often shown as performing essential social functions, even if in somewhat perverse and paradoxical ways, as for competition or conflict. This indicates how Simmel s sociological analysis can be the basis of interstitial and macroscopic. These are further ways of both exemplifying and validating forms as confirmed by i) successful application and elaboration of forms for example, by Coser or Peter Blau, within middle range theories; and ii) the embedding of forms in wider macrohistorical and comparative accounts, seen, for example, in Simmel s account of money as a historically dynamic and pervasive social form. Much of money s development, over and above and behind the backs of individuals, is seen by Simmel as immanent (see Frisby, 2004) in money as a form. The Philosophy of Money as a pivotal exemplification of Simmel s method and epistemological and ethical worldview Philosophie des Geldes is Simmel s most extended analysis of a social form. It is a sprawling 300,000-word text and a formidable one for any reader. G.H. Mead (1900/1: 619) found it often wearisome and discouragingly massive. However, it is a volume that repays effort and is a powerful exemplification of Simmel s general method and worldview. His division of the volume into analytical and synthetic sections
Further Aspects & Implications of Simmel s Method 161 relates directly to the conception of a defining core and more contingent, variable and historically relative, wider implications of a form. Informed by Howard Becker (1959), Poggi (1993) and Frisby s various commentaries, and with the contents pages of Philosophie des Geldes used as subheadings in English editions, the overview of the work we now present provides a bridge between the second and third part of the present volume, especially in relation to our consideration of absolute and relative in Chapter 6. Analytical features Money in its constitutive and evolving form works by facilitating comparisons in the value and the exchange of goods and services. Historically, money evolves from a variety of designated objects such as livestock or metals that stand as more general measures of value. The less concrete forms, such as paper money and cheques culminating today in electronic payments and instantaneous money and credit transfers enhance the general form of money which is described by Simmel as a pure means, its universal or abstract exchangeability. The evolution of money is crucial in allowing moveable and alienable private property, for example, freeing lord and peasant alike from the fixities of feudal commitments. Just as in Simmel s epistemology, all objects are seen as acquiring their meaning in relation to other objects, so also does the economic value of any object arising from comparison with its relativity in relation to other objects. With money in any of its historical and evolving forms, the price attached to a commodity expresses merely a relative value. All of this is an aspect of Simmel s overall relationism, as we explore further in Chapter 6. This however, does not prevent a relative objectivisation of social relations from the outcomes that money brings. Poggi (1993) identifies four interrelated clusters of properties of money that, in Simmel s formulation, capture money s overall effectiveness. Instrumentality: Simmel refers to money as the purest form of tool, with the flexibility of its later forms enhancing its portability and concealability. Stated in terms of the means ends duality, money is not primarily an end in itself (though it can become so) but is a universal means to ends, in which money becomes nothing but money. Impersonality: Money s acceptability as payment for all goods and services also gives rise to the detachment often associated with money
162 Further Aspects & Implications of Simmel s Method transactions; in fact, it works best when affective involvement is absent. The latter, Simmel suggests, explains why it is good advice to not get involved in financial transactions with either friends or enemies. Impersonality is also involved in what can be described as levelling effects of money its universalism compared with particularism. Paradoxically, being able to disregard the personality or social situation of the parties to a transaction provides heightened opportunity for the expression of individuality. The impersonality of money also extends the number of persons who are potential interactors and the purposes that might be pursued. Importantly, this latter includes the increase in specialised groups and associations. Abstract exchangeability: This refers to money being an abstraction from all the specific features of things. Expressed as a duality, this positive feature of money arises from its negative lack of quality. The quantitative rather than qualitative expression of economic value of money its calculability and divisibility, encouraging a cognitive rather than a normative orientation a pervasive aspect of modern society that has many implications. Potentiality: This arises in this case from the duality of actual and possible that is, the use of money is not restricted to any particular use; rather, its possible uses are open-ended, creating empowerment and an enlargement of choice. This occurs disproportionately, especially for the rich, in stark contrast with the more limited horizons possible for the poor. It is because of its potentiality, Simmel suggests, that money is central to the absolute dynamic character of the world. The institutional requirements for money and its growth in use and effects within functioning money economies are further elements in Simmel s account. These requirements include a degree of trust and stability in expectations, including functioning states, with their legal systems and bureaucracies. Synthetic implications The synthetic elements in Simmel s analysis involve discussion of the wider implications and outcomes of money economies for social institutions and for culture, and, what Simmel refers to as the inner lives and the life styles of individuals. Since he makes money utterly central to modernity, the ramifications here are wide-ranging. These, including the increasing pace of change with money as a perpetual motion
Further Aspects & Implications of Simmel s Method 163 machine and the Simmelian slant on money and estrangement compared with Marx. The ramifications also include the metropolis being a context in which the intellectual and emotional sides of each individual combine in a search for meaning thus making the individual a bricoleur. And as a bricoleur is how Simmel himself can also be characterised (cf. Deena Weinstein and Michael Weinstein, 1993: 69). The more specifically philosophical argument of the Philosophy of Money Although the primary focus is money, Philosophie des Geldes contains a great deal more of relevance to understanding Simmel s method, including an explicit working-through of his conceptions of epistemology and ethics, and knowing and valuing generally alongside a consideration of absolute and relative, and subjective and objective value in relation to money. What Simmel aims to achieve is the incorporation of value in his own conception of a relativistic world view (p. 103). Money is presented as the historical symbol of the relative character of existence (Simmel, 1900: 510). These aspects are discussed further in our consideration of absolute and relative that follows in Chapter 6.