!.! rrhe LOGC OF TEE CONCEP'r Ob' ART
THE WGC OF THE CmWW1' OF ART By! PATRCK PAUL HCLAUGHLH. B.A. A Thess Submhed to the Sc:ho01 of Graduate Studes ~n :'1rt~al 1'"U1llmel1't 02 "tne t.equremen:;s for the Degree l1aster of Arts McHaster Unversty Hay 1971
faster OF ARTS c]9?1) (Phlosophy) NcNASTKR. UN VERSTY Hamlton Ontaro TTLE: The Log of the Concept of Art AUTHOll: Patrck Paul HcL9.ugh1nt B.A. (NcMaster Unversty) SUPERVSOR: Pro~essor J. E. Smpson :NLJJvBER OF PAGES:. 72 ACKNO\"rLEDGMENTS: ;... rsh to th:mk Evan Smpson for hs support and suggestons. and my wfe Carol for her encouragement.
U2ABLE m<' CONTENTS CRAP1ER Page 1 CHAP'l'E;:q Page 10 CHAP'l'ER [. Page 19 CHAP'ER V: Page 26 CHAP~.'EH V Page 42 CHA.PTE3 V Page 51 CRAPl'EH Vr Page 66
CHAPJ:ER Ths thes:ls s concer-ned 'v th a central problem of tradtonal aesthetcs for n t we try to say onc;) agan \'lh~t Art s. " " We approaoh the q'f-eston. hot rever wth the ad of the methodologcal nsghts tha t hav~ ccme from.;b8. t s varously called P..nglc-A.rnercan Phlosophy Ordml.ry Language 'hlosophy. Lngustc Phlosophy and Lngustc Analys~"s. t s OlU' purpose that s. to elucdate the concept of art ajd to arrve at a phlosophcal descrpton of the! logc of that con4ept. rules that" st!'1.lct-~e Hore specfcally. "e attempt to reveal the those act v tes verbal E.:lld non-verbal. by means of whch we! denote art. The frs~ tvo chapters are concerned w th some prelmxaar-y methodologcal clarfcatons. f.rst of the relatonshp of tl.s thess to the hstory of aesthetcs and seconcuy of our t$chncal use of ""the term fconcept". n the subsequent chapters. v'8 turn our attenton to the problem of dscernng just 1?-ow t s th~t we do refer to art. The trad.tonal approach to the queston. """'nat s Art?"! has been by "ray of an attempt to deyelop a defnton or theor.v of Art. Conclu::;.ons: n aesthetcs bave eyentually boled dovff to Pll:C "! portedly nformath-e and true staten:ents of the form HArt s X" "where 1X!1 has bee~ replaced by locutons of varous knds rangng from putatve forr.~ulatons of the essence of Art to statements of 1
2 what are clamed tlo be the necessary and suffcent condtons for a thng's beng or bleng recognzed as a.fork of art. n ths thess "le are not concerned to rase dffcultes for ndvdual defyl tons or groups of defntons of Art; rather. we are nterested n certall ~ssumptons ~1plc t n the defntonal approach. assu.mptons whch we do not shlare. Because they have played such a large role n the hstory of aesthetc8-~and analogous on6s n the hstory of phlosophy n genelral-- t s mportant that we make ol"ear precsely ho.! the assur.1ptons of our predecessors dffer from OlU' O'"l1. The frst ho chaptersl then lay the g:r'ou.ndl rork for conclusons df-. ferent n nature ~rom those of a tradtonal ll sthetc. One of thel assumptons of the aesthetc theorsts s that ther defntons fre nformatve and hence true or false. TLE:Y are moreover trule or false statements about the world; aesthetc theorsts attempt to defne Art not "artlt the VTord. n Englsh. Thus "'hen they say! "Art s X" they are not to be nterpreted as c tng a lngv.st!c or conceptual fact. An aesthetc defnton then. n some sensle s purported. to repdrt a fact about the world.. Novl. such a fact!s a somel rhat :str.a.nge fact n that t must be assumed by the theorst that the 'tforld could not have been other- wse. t s clearl thn.~ that the aesthetc theorst could not allovt that there ab:-e e~t~n hs defnton of ~..rt. " conceptually possble counterexamples to f t were possble to conceve of a... fork of art that dd no~ h9ve the property or propertes the aesthetc theorst r.cas claml:ld are defn t.ve of Art then he 't-tould not be able to clam tb.at he had dscovered just wr.cat t s that makes
3! a thng a vlorl.;: ofl art. To put t succnctly. the "s!! of the aesthetc defnton s the ': atemporal ls!! meanng "was n the begnnng s no~ll and ever sha~l be". n tu.:;."'ll ~t follo-.!s tl'lelt "Artll s taken by the aesthetc theorst to desefate an atemporal metsl)hyscal object--a grade of Spr t J or an ess4ntal property shared by all vtorks of art or a class or set of o~jects whch has certan necessary and suffc921t cond t'cms. Ths: assumpton s sometmes made tc? a:ppear more accept able by the cap t~lzaton of "'Artll '1'Theh suggests that the '1'lord s beng used as a ptoper name fo:r an object. Even f the theorst says that he s ndt; defnng Art but the vtord!lart" f hs app- ' - roach s by means lof a ratonal reconstructon of language then the semantcs to.'hc~ he s commtted dctate that "art" des2;nates art a class or set of lobjects and n ths knd of context '1 T th ts clams to nformatveness a class or set s just as much a meta physcal entty as s a grade of Sprt. t s because of ths shared bass that the aesthetc theores as d Ve1"Se as Croce's ntutonsm and Charles Horrs' semotc approach to aesthetcs can be grouped as la common theoretcal or defntonal approach.! 1 mplct n the defntonal approach s the dea of the mnd someho\<t beng "over aganst" realty. and essentally solated from other mnds.! The task of the phlosopher s to captu:re the nature of the pro4ecton of realty onto the "screen" of h...s mnd hether the projeoton be a block of colour (an ntuted essence) or a lattcework ~a logcal structure that can be mtated 01' "pctu:red" by a fdrmal language) and to comm1)ncate ths defnton by nsttutng nlthe mnd of the reader or lstener ether a patch of the same colour or a structure somorphc to hs o m. As 'T~.ll be seen n t~e next chapter. ve reject ths knd of assurlpton.
T ': 4 The asswnbton of the metaphyscal objectvty of Art s a methodologcal as~thllpton. t s not somethng that the aesthetc theorst dscove:r-s about Art; rather. t s brought to aesthetcs Ja pror. There ls nothh1g ntrnscally tn'ong vr th a pr.9r comm t menta n aesthetds. \ole all approach aesthetcs "\<lth.certan predspos tons. Al tlhough the choce of a methodology seems to be based on somethng lke r"hat Arstotll9 calls lntut ve reasonll the grasp~ ng of ;"That t does not seem tp be obvous frst prncples..d. thout demonstraton follo~ that we can not have good reasons for pl'eferrng one methodology ovler another. lle can not ~f n. any strong sense of the ".'Ord the c~rrectness or valdty of a methodology but vlos can argue pragmatcall~ that OU1' methodologcal co!llj-utments are more adequate t han otheks n te:r.':1s of ther ablty to deal clearly and comprehensvely w~h the data "m must take nto account. 'le can challenge alternatve methodologcal commtments n two general ways. The strongest chal~enge s a demonstraton of a logcal contradcton among the key conc~pts or one that they entad when the methodology s used n a partpu.).ar area that s n the applcaton of the b:~y concepts. n the Ratter case \"e have not nece.ss81'ly dsproven the usefulness of the methodolog-.f n all areas of phlosophy» although we have sucessfully crallenged any clam ts-proponents mght make as to ts unversal frutfulness and applcablty.. Not so strong. but often qu te forceful s a challenge ()ased on a demonstraton of the lack of comprehensveness of the methoc1. lvbat 'le do s make observatons of 1-lhat actually r4-ppens n the vlorld. and see "\othch methodology h as th e mosv.t- a d equ&~e resources f' or gl'nng. an accoun t 0 f a 11 th e
5 relevant observatons. s actual then s1h.rely he s.11~ong. extend a methodoljgcal lne. leads to the cont:rradctoll ve Ths s nlt the place. f a phlos:)pher oan not "make possble ll.hat Frequently too the attempt to to t8.ke c.are of Hrecalc trant phenomena" are seekng. to go Ylto all the dffcultes an Ordnary Language Phlosopher could rase agrnst a defntonal ap- proach n aesthet~cs. Ve wll ho"ever cte one such dffculty -. ~. partly as an exat:l~le of the knd of challenge He have n mnd and partly because th~ ar{:\xffent that follows clearly ndcates an mpor- tant dstncton ~ehleen factual and conceptual problems. vlhen the JhlosoPher asks "~lhat s Art 7" he does not expect 2 the same knd of r'jesponse as does a chld \"ho asks the same queston. The chld has per11aps just come across the "vord "artll or has heard t used several tlmes and does not know "ha t t means snce he does not YJlo"\!.. hat art ls. Snce he has not the reso'urces to ansl-ler hs queston he 'romtsl nformaton. He cannot gve hm all the nformaton we have about art;; that would make hm mpatent. \olbat we tr-.r to do nstead s to ndlcate some typcal examples of al't th~t he can use as a bass for nqreasng hs o'~m understandng. '11he phloslopher. on the other hand already has such nforma-.. ton and much mo~e besdes. Hs queston s not a "dscovery!! or factual queston ~ut a concephl.al one. Ths s an mportant ds- 2 For ""hat seems to be a contrastng ve! on ths ssl"!.'? cf ~ Paul Zff "The telsk of Defnng a vlork of Art" n Aesthetcs and the Phlosophy of jcr tcsm. v. Levch ed. Random House (NeV York 1963). pp. 609-610
6 tnoton. The nadequaces of aesthotc theorsts and the quarrels ' between them.roulclj seem to ndoate tha.t the human race. or at least that part of t t~at : dea of what art s. wrtes phlosoph'cal1y about art has very lttle B'ut v:hen the aesthetc theorst pref8ces hs PE sthetc va th the! queston "Hha.t s Art7t1 he already kno\t~ vhat art Q. Othenlsd he vlould not be able to even start to nns1rer hs ovm queston. Any 8UGG;8ston on hs pnrt that he s tryng to dscover "That Art s that ;he s approachng the problem as open-mndedly as a chld vltr..out ~resuppostons preconceptons or pre-condtonng. 1 s nothng but a ~hetorca.l pretense a stylstc ruse. ""re are not! sayng that there ls no great problem facng the phlosophel' of art. There s but t ls not the factual problem of the chld. tryng to '! "/ see "hat art s. Kennck dffcul ty acc'l1..rat~ly when captures the aesthetc phlosopher's he compares h!jl. to' St. Augustne faced "th tho oues.lon!l\'lha"t s Tme?" :Both can say. lf am not asked -~... v. '" YJ10l'!j f am asked knov! not." Kennck goes on to say: there s net~er anythng mysterous nor anythng complcated about lmrks otf art whch makes the task of ans'rerng the qu8ston. f\\1bat s U''c?r' so dffcult. Lke St. Augl1stne d.th Tme ;e do knm qute;!ell what Art s; t s only '.4hen someone asks us that '\ole do no1t kno... J. The h~ouble les not n the vforks of art themselves but 1.n 'the concept 01 art. The task s not to.... "hat art s but to say "hat art s. vhle ths! observaton of Kennck's does not refute the! defntonal appro~ch n aesthetcs t does pose problems for t :3!lDoes Trach tonal Aesthetcs Rest on a Hstake?ll. Hnd hxv (1958) p. ~20.
7 t s very dffdl.l t to see hoyr the aestbetc theorst can avod the! mplcaton of ths observaton that the knd of nformaton he cnn gve about art Y1Thch he formulates nto a clefn ton s to a large. extent depe ndent ~n such factor's as the tme he s wrtng hs educaton and exposure to art etc. n other vlords hs clam to be able to defne Art for al tme wll have to be nvestgated agan wth more attenton to the ~mtatons that are mpuct n such an endeavour. n what follo"78 ~e concentrate on the lmtatons mposed by the fact that art chartges.! We thus dueston the theorst's assumpton that "Art" desgnates one object. an atemporal metaphyscal object. n fact we queston that assj r 'l1pton at great length n the rest of ths thess. But t must be made clear from the begnnng "hat the bass of ths challenge s. Wh~n we clam that the denotatve logc of the concept of art (a pl'1...rase ~hose meanng s spelled out belo"vl) s best elucdated by means of an flo~en-texture" model "\'e are denyng that a defnton of art s possbld. We are not makng ths clam on the bass that we can better ~ Vlhat art s; we are sure that there are many aes- thetc theorsts.~ho have far more nsght nto axt than we do. But ve are equally sut1e that by explcatng the concept of art as an open textu-ced concept "le can far better E:.:l..hat art s--tha t s ;e can gve a clearer more comprehensve and coberent acc01h'1t of "hat ae tually happens wheb men deal "l'rth art than -muld folloh from any! defn tonal appro~ch. To make ths clam holrever s to mply that t s not necessartr that aesthetcs be defntonal or theol'etcal tr..e.t s that therb are methodologcal alternatves to nformatvely
8 defnng art. He thus treat the deo. of nformatve defnton dfferently from tlhe vlay the theorst treats t. The theorst as... "e ponted out above: s corr.nltted ~_pro;r to nformatve defntons; for hm ther cogelncy s an obvous methodologcal assumpton. For us ho'16ver nfortuat ve defn tona are just one of' a number of al- ternatve models or the explcaton of denotatve concepts. Other avalable models tdclude va:rous knds of famly resemblance models and systematcallyj equvocal models. ruled n. or out onl fl nrpll g'"'..cou.nds. of art s mpossb~e A defntonal model s not here Rather ve argue that a defn tod because thf3 theoretcal aesthetcan s barred n prnople from gvng such a defnton. and that the two thousand years of f~lure olr theoretcal aesthetcs comes from the falure "1:;0.. recog:'1ze the mnojrtance for aesthetcs of the nature of change n the concept of art. rh other words vthat underles our challenge to theory n aesthetcs s a methodologcal shft that treats as LPosteror an ssue on Vlhch for the theorst there s no debate. \ve n turn have Oul' 01ll a. Wor CbTlUll tments. contaned prmarly n the next chapter; the proof of our pv.ddng too les n the eatng of t--that s. n the use to vlhch t can be put. SUJ.ll1ary [n order to clarfy n a prelmnary 'tlay our 1.'elatonshp to the hstory of aesthetcs vle p..a.ve examned some of the methodologcal asswnptons of tradtonal aesthetc theorsts. Snce we do not share th~se assumptons ve have tred to clarfy the bass on wh ch a methodolog cal shft can be evalt1a ted. v tll spedal reference to aesthetcs. TJ:<4t bass s a pragrnatc one: a partcul~:r knd of
9 success s the crjjteron of excellence of a method.! 'Te have then contrasted our atttude to nformatve defntons dth that of the tradtonal theorjjst. The next sul)ject for prelmnary clarfcaton s our techncal lse of the term "concept". -
ella.eper 1concepttt. One of tlhe tenns that s used repeatedly n "That fo11ohs s t s:a term that has receved much currenoy lately and because t has so many phlosophcal connotatons t s extremely! mportant to be vetry clear about ho. t s beng used. n ths chapter've deal "r.lth four ssues to ndcate the.nature of onr C011- ~ cept of a concep~~ For the ~urposes of ths thess concepts are not to be thought of as menyal enttes. Rather.they are to be thought of as t]:j.e grou-as of lu1es that structu:r.e systemat)c contexts of h'jjll@ 4 n so~e of the contexts that reveal the use of concents. the actvty of only one person s nvolved and there s a temptaton to treat the conc~pt nvolved as ell mental entty~ as "hs" concept. But snce the cont!ext whch nvolves only one person s n prncple repeatable ethel~ nvolvng the same person or other persons-~ 4 see nol reason "hy a general acco1l..'tlt of concepts "Tould have to restrct the nolton to contexts of specfcally human actvty; systematc anmal behfvour also rl9veals the use of concepts although plan~ and non-organc a ct vty does not. Some knds of bum.':m concepts however are essen~ally dffer::mt from the knds of concepts shared by humans and anmus snce SOD;:: human actvtes ncludng most of what ;e vould norm~lly call tthnkngtl have propertes that shared knds of concepts ~o not r~ve. The restrcton of the noton of concept n ths thfss to hu.rnan act v ty s thus some'..rhat aro trary based on what seemf prme fac_~_ to be true that only hwnnn bengs and not anmals have a concept of art the restrcton s made for the sake of an eas~er exposton of hoyt "e "rll use "concept" n the phrase tconcept of! art". 10
11 other-wse there :orld be no possbl ty of a system of contexts and hence no concept--bental ent tf~s locutons leave a resdue of nsoluble problemsl because of the nablty of such locutons to sup- ply the resources for an adequate descrpton of n the frst case memory and n the second corrmn1..'l1ty of actvty. Fu:t'thermore such systems of context!s are a speclal case. Y.t8.ny. f not most of the sys- terns of contexts t~at embody concepts c~n be fully descrbed only "r th reference to 1uore than one person. concept of lngvs~c Of specal note here s the actvty_ The use of mental enttes locutons n the descrptonl of these latter knds of systems of contexts ould gve rse to the theoretcal dffcultes of solpssm and the dangers of an dealstc r~ductonsm. Ths threat of phlosophcal nonsense can be avoded by Jrecognzng that our startng pont s n meda res and demands the aflrrraaton of the cogen'cy of nterpersonal locutons! for the descrptor of concepts. n other vlords locutons vlhch mply that more th~n myself exst are from the beg~'l1ng assumed to need no ndependent justfcaton. Tbe acceptance of the nterpersonal nature of concepts; means that He are not Cartesans. The frst: thng to kee]) n mnd then. s that concepts are nterpersonal although ndvdual persons use thew.. The next thng.. vle need to clarfy s what vte mean by sayng that '\'Then vre descrbe a concept we are de$crbng groups of rules the. t structure systematc contexts of human actvty. The statement that such-and-ouch s a concept-rule s an emprcal generalzaton based on the observaton of h1.l..11an actvty. '-[hen '\oe say" for ex8.llple th..at the concept of a:rt has 8.n open texture ;re are sayng that an emprcal examnnton of
12 the contexts n 'll1.ch vte denote art has revealed that ths actvty has certan logcal or formal features ;hch we call ts "open tex ture" a phrase 'Trose meanng s explaned below. n other "Tords the use of "rule" :n ths context s smlar to the use of "18{1l n the phrase "sdentfc 18v" and not to the use of "la" as a rough synonym for ;"statute" (c:(~!lby-lb.""). There are three reasons. hovrever. for not ~ayng that concepts are groups of scentfc 18.11's.. n the f:lpt place. scentfc laws fol'tl sets that gve. necessary and suf1cent condtons for the occurence of such and such phenomena. }~ot all of the groups of rules td..at make up concepts ho-lever a~e examne v7e fnd obly necessary or ~nly sets. n some of. the systems of contexts "re suffcent col'ld tons for the act v- tes ve ~escrbe. n stll others "vb fnd actvtes that "rhle rule gove'"fl.eld are not condton-governed n the above sense at all. That s tp say some systems of contexts reveal knds of regulartes that defn tonal--.e. necessary and suffcent cond tons-~locutonsl do not have the res01.;crces adequately to descrbe. Thus groups of sc~entfc lavs do not have the degree of logcal flexblty that groups of rules have. Secondly the only knd of context n "lh.ch scentfc lays! are found s a desorptve context. Objects pay no attenton to the lal of gravty; they just fall. But we not only descrbe concepts! ve also Jd. J2. thel'l; systematc -lays.!-t.. lj..v does not just happen that ;"e behave n certan fut the use of a concept by a person does not necessarly mean t~lat there Has a conscous avrarene:ss on hs part of e ther the concept of of hs use; most frequen ly "'le employ rules
5 aut.omatcally hal t.uall;t or to use lttgensten's wro blndly. \-!e use a partculalr... rord or perform a partcular act because t s obvously and unrelflect. vely the corj..'ect thng to do there and then. 1J Ho'wever. and ths :s crucal. '\ole could be... 'rong. ve could be mstaken n our attempt. to luse the rules whle a stone can never be wrong n fallng. Rules can be broken. but scentfc laws f they are correct.ly gven ~an not. The thrdj re880n for refusng t.o call c<;mcepts groups of scentfc lm'rs dlosely related to the second s that scentfc laws should never :be treated as f they have any prescrptve or teleologcal forc~ whereas concept-rul?s are so treated hen we are attemptng to teach the rules of a concept or to correct a mstaken use. ve say that the rtj.les tell us or make us do th:.s rather than tl<...at to use "pc~ure't "rhen referl'ng to some pantngs and never when referrng to books (ve17 roughly). bne goal of teachng and. learnng the rules vlhch s the bass of the prescrptve force we g ve them. s corllect speech 'l>rhch means speech by means of "'hch we can ComD'lUlcate dth others. For these three reasons then. that the groups of rules that make up conc~pts are not all sets that concept-rules are used and pan be used m~stakenly and that concept-rules can be tad~ht. we dstngush betve!$n the genera l za -eons tha t are the result of the observaton of cortce'otual actvty and those that result frore the 5 Ph19so~hcal n~estgatons. 219..
14 the observaton ofl non-conceptual actvty. A thrd ppnt about our use of "concept" s that t would be msleadng to say ~hat c0l1cept8 are. :.llj.ed to obects. To say that s to suggest agap. t.hat concepts are mental enttes. and that the mnd s flover aganst" realty. Rather. concepts are used to deal wth :rea1ty n varous' ways and the part of realty a concept s used to deal ". th s ts hbject matter or data. Denotatve concepts (eg. colour concepts) and the denotatve parts of more complex concepts reveal const tut V? nteractons bebeen e thor ndvdual mnds or groups of mnds an~ a pluralstc unverse that lends tself to llany d.fferent knds of'departmental organzaton. What have n mnd s. somethng lke ths. We can consttute or organze realty nto many dfferent kndls of objects" There are of course. ordnary objects lke tables and ch~rs and pens and balls of w~x. But we can also see the world n t~rms of matter n measu~able of physcal objects (forces and stresses bts moton etc.) chemcal objects (molecules co-valent bonds. etc.) economc: objects (demands. up\{ard pressures on prcesetc.) ~ocologcal objects (classes. etc.) poltcal objects (partes mandates etc.). psychologcal objects (condtoned responses. neurose~ ~tc.). phlosophcal objects (voltons percepts work of art. aesthjtc experence etc'.) and n terms of many other knds of objects. 'Some ways of seeng thngs are more successful than others. depenqng on our nterests. The materal out of whch we consttute an aqcount of realty n terms of a conceptual scheme does not come out qf nothng (solpssm); nor does t all come out of the same thng (!reductonsm). t comes out of other relat ve1y
15 unconsttuted materal whch s -Lhe relatve data. The subject matter 6 for any concept s ahays only relat vely tl1l.consttuted. Now. ve dleal \1 th realty by means of habtual responses to relevantly smlarj stuatons. Habts are establshed n vrtue of the wants and needs of a person or group of persons lvng n a complex envronment. ve have many such condtoned nterests--\ rants and needs teleologcally rel!ated to objects.. -\ hch "Te seek to satsfy. The nterest n survval s almost unversal n man; the nterest n enjoyng Pcasso s far les~ \-de spread. The contnued and unquestoned use of a concept s ~me face!.. evdence that the habtual act v ty t s based on s effcacous for dea1ng \d th real y to the satsfacton of certan nterests. For ths reason word usage for example does not need a phlosophcal justfcaton n terms of a pror theory of lanl ;uagej the fact: tb..at a \-lord s used--not just once by one person of course--s sufftcent justfcaton for ts correctness ~Lf t s used rratol1allx. nconsstent usage s bad usage from a certan pont of vew~ but s not necessarly ncorrect usage. Over tme the nconvenence of llogcal usage n ratonal contexts-- ts 6 Al tbough ths all sounds very Kantan h/o major dfferences betvreen ths and Kant S conceptue.lsm are: here there are no sem:e mpressons nor a:re there any analogues of sense mpressons n some knd of absolutely:smple gven data; secondly there are no analogues for the Kantan Ca-ttegores. that s there are no metaphyscally prvleged concepts. t mght be argued that our poston on concepts ~~1)les a phenomenon-noumenon dstncton; that may be so but f t l!~t s based on tte contngent fact that so far~ the human race has only used a small porton of the possble modes of organzaton of real ty. A thrd dfferenc:e s that Kant's conceptualsm s good only for knowledge by aoquantance that s. for kno"\.rledge of objects whereas for us dendtatve concepts are only one knd of concept.
-.LO nablty to fost~r clear comrnu?1 cu ton--tends to break t do'o-tn. n the meantme a11... 1e can do s pont out the nadequaces of certan usages and recornmdnd clearer ones.. There s 'one condtoned nterest n man that gets us out of the determnsm tbat seems :to follow from the above paragraph. Sometmes our rulels are nadequate for dealng "d. th vthat.;e have an nterect. n dealng w th; t s not obvo.j.8 Hhat s the correct thng to do or say; OUT!hab tool patt1ern.s of act v ty fal to supply the expected satsfact;on. n such cases th.;.; human demand for under~ standng--a combnaton of curosty and frustraton--s actvated. The rules \<e know lo not work. so 'e look for ne<7 ones to replace them. The search for Q~derstandng s thus radcally destructve of selected habts' As ndvduals and n groups l."e break do\v11 ou.r cond tonng and re-cond ton ourselves or a 110... 7 ourselves to be recondtoned to have new habts. ner rules. that s ne. concepts. Personal condton~ng. can break down b1 no tme at 8.11. a1 thou<?:h ~ vle can be lpg-heaaed"; group condtonng crumbles more SlO>lly; lngus:;ccondtlbnng has great nerta. Certan knds of cultural condtonng survye for mllena; wtness the contnued appeal of the Honlerc poems; butf our cultural nterests changed there s no reason to suppose that they mus~ contnue to appeal. Fourthly : there mght be some queston about what consttutes a system of contexts of human ac:tvty. By "hat crteron t may be asked. do we pck cdut ths group of regulartes and not that as a bass for a descrwton of a COCe})t. Wth specfc reference to what fo11o".;s n ths thess t!flght be asked by vthat crteron '7e
17 dstngush bet relen what \.;e call the "aesthetc form of lfe ll a group' of actv t:es rule-governed by the concept of art and related 7 concepts and sub-concepts and other forms of lfe. n reply to ths queston. t must frst be ponted out that the clear statement of such a crteron would by the :1'e8111 t of our and Dany other smlar researches nto hlow n fact aesthetc concepts are used and not a startng pont forr these researches. Snce \-le are concerned only '- th a small part of o~e aesthetc concept--that s. wth the denotatve part of the concept of art-- t s not \>; thn the scope of ths thess to arrve at a cl~ar statement of' ~uch a crteron. Short of that and n the meantme our procedure s justfed on the follo-rng grounds. ve noted above that the use of a concept does not necessarly mply a conscous: a rareness by the user ether of the concept. (the rules he s usng) or olf hs use of the rules. A pont closely related to ths s that an a'j:llty to use a conc~pt does not mply the ablty to d.escrbe the concept at all clearly. To be able to do the latter requres study of! ho. the as yet Undescrbed concept s n fact used. No"" know hovr to use the coneept of art n a great many contexts "'hch.s not clalned to be any great ache vement. Learnng ho"t to speak Englsh was. one' of the many vrays by "Thch came to accomplsh ths. knovl that use the concept correctly because "Then nteract ;or th art n the ptesence of others do not get quzzcal looks and 7 cr. 1d.B~ Gal1e "Art as an Essentally Contested Concept" The Phlosophcal Quarterl:y: V 1956 p. 101; note that Galle se8ms to mean "defn t~n".. There he tl.ses 1conceptl1.
. 18 objectons to my act v. tes do not get rrelevant and ncomprehensble. ans\'18rs to my quest ons; n other words. my act v tes are understood and acceptable. thus already knoo[ Ylhat the crteron s even though an npt able to ll[ 'VlM t t s. can not state t not because t s 1111st8table but because have not yet clearly dscerned vhat t s and others are dong n the aesthetc form of lfe. Thus the demand for a crteron clearly stated at ths pont s based ona msunderstandng of the emprcal nature of these nvestgatons. Summar:: :m. summary. then fow: man ponts have been nvestgated n order to clarfy hov1 the term "concept" s used n ths thess. Frst col!lcepts are not to be thought of as mental enttes; the1 are' nterpersonal groups of rules th&t structure systematc contexts of hutl1an 6\.ctvty. Secondly. the observaton"and descrpton of concepts has some smlartes to the search for scentfc lavs; there are. hovreverl certan crucal dfferences betvleen concept-rules and scentfc la';vs the examnaton of whch gave us a crteron for dstngv.shng condeptual fron non-conceptual contexts. n the thrd place conceptual actvty s for the most part condtoned or habtual nteracton vr th realty the man excepton to ths last beng those act v tes ".e call :the search for understandng. Fnally. 1.;e ponted out that Hhen we can correctly use a concept. we sometmes cannot say what correct usage s. and that aesthetc crtera and absolutely general aesthetc dstnctons are properly conclusons and not the startng pont of phlosophcal nvestgaton of art.
CRAnER As we have ndcated above we do not ntend to gve a complete explcaton of the concept of art n ths thess. To do that "Tould nvol ve an explca'ton of all those systems of contexts n hch e deal wth art a Vlery large task ndeed. Here vte are concerned vtth one small but mportant part of the concept of art that s th the denotat Te part of! the concept. Hare concretely ve wll try to elucdate the 10g:Lc of those syste:1s of contexts n ;hch vte refer to a vtork of art n general n hch ';Te rldcate or denote vlorks of art or art n general" n whch "re make t. clear tr..at we consder an object to be a wo:ck of art. Ths s ho'7 the tradtonal queston "vlhat s Art?" becomes renterpreted wth our methodologcal col11..llltments. Ths chapter s ntended to lay some of the ground\'lork for our later examnaton of th8jt queston. The frst thng ';e no1e about hoyt vre d~'1ote art s the 'le very seldom say of an object "X s a vlork of art" flt s a 'Tork of U1 T' J J ~ t.?tll.d.\.!.lo.j..lj' y"u.~.oton. Only when He have a rather specal set of crcumstances n \'Thch t s understood that 1vl}!..at s t?" means "s s a \wrk of art or of handcraft?l 11 or of propaganda?l1 " or of hstoj.oy?" " or a forgery?" ' or garbe.ge?l or some such alter-daton ':Tould V.'e say llt s a vtorl1 of art". ::Sut even though ths partcular locuton s seldom used v78 do have a host of \'rays of ndcatng that we are dealng r th real:lt;y n aesthetc terms--tha t s tba t He are usng 19
20 the concept of ar~ to deal v th an object or group of objects. vlhen 8 "Te treat somethng as a rork of art. "He are! sayng" that t s art even though ;e ma;w not say t out loud or even verbally. Hence there are many actvtes that must be taken nto account n 2n explcaton of the logc of the denotatve part of the concept.of art some of whch are aesthetc denotatons and r~ others of "hch such a denotaton s mpld t. For ease of explcaton 'de can dstnb"ush beb-reell verbal andl non-verbe.l aesthetc denotatons. 9 To begn vl th the 12 tter. consder the case of a stone that has e. pecular cr;stal forrr.aton such that '.>Then cut n a certan way and polshed the fgure of a brd n flght s clearly vsble. NOH f ths polshed srt;one s placed n a scence museulll then t s beng treated as a specmen and the comments on and explanel-r.ons of the brd form wll be scentfc n nature--geologcal or chemcal. f on the other b..and the sat!le polshed stone s placed on-a pedestal n an art gallery we wll treat t dffej?entl:{. and our conunents on t 2nd reactons to t wn.be n terms of ts beauty and mysterousness and. perhaps cosm.c meanng. n other 'words vrhen we put t n an art gallery -e a.re "sayng" and are understood to be "sayng" "Ths.l 8 W.s.en \"e treat somethng... a work of art we are not treatng t as f t "rere or lke a work of art when t s not one. As an example of trn.e latter knd of usage consder the sentence. "He treats hs Volkswagon as f t 'rere (lke) a Cadllac". When "re treat somethng as' a 'dork of art as far 2S 'ole are concerned. t s art. But there arj lmts on what we can correctly treat as art. 9 An actual case; also cf~ Paul Zff op.~ c t~ pp. 615-616.
21 stone s a... rork of arth perhaps even more clearly than... 'ould be the case ~ "re used the "l-lords. f He used the words \<T8 mght be asked. "\<That do you mean?" whereas "hen re put t n the gallery t s clear "That ;e mean. 'l'hus to place all object on dsplay n an art gallery s to denote t as art s to say llt s art. And of course ths s the vlay w~ denote a great deal of art. Pantngs sculptures. mobles. tapestrej')s Afrcan masks a~ ;aso on at great length are dsplayed n art galleres. and also n parks. n unversty and cty hall open spaces 'n our homes. Furthermore \1e.clean these knds of objects and try to preserve the!m;... e bmy aud sell them. and gve them as gfts ~ l.re do not demand as much utltaran value from them as 1<Te do for example from an ordnary dnner fork (although t s to be noted that "Art for art ls sake" s a very recent slogan. and that for most. of hstory art has been expected to have SODe functon. ;.hether socal and poltcal (Plato U. s. S. R.) psychologcal-ther8.peutc (Arstotle' on tragedy). relgous (medeval art). ddactc (Neoclasscal perod) or even decoratve (Egyptan bural art).) t "lould clearly be napproprate to dsplay an unprotected Cezanne pantng ~ a park just as a large Henry Moore SCUlpture has no place n a hamel. We treat dfferent knds of vlorks of art n the 10 ways that are apprbprate to them. Treatment n some "rays s approprate for some knds of art but napproprate for others. Ths noton of approprateness s even more clearly applcable yrhen we shft our 10 Cf. Zfr ad. Pt. pp. 611-6lJ for an admrable lst of characterstc and approprate thngs \'re do to and say about just.q1le. pantng Poussn s "The Rape of the Sabne Homen."
22 attenton from plastc to other art forms. He do not for exarr:ple dsplay \wrks of lterature; ruther.;9 read and reread them vre publsh them and :reprnt them we place them on readng lsts of 1.mversty lterature courses \e make them nto fl ms and so on. v We then sho'; the flms to audences. Presentaton to an audence s an approprate "ray of denotng several other art forms~-llu8c: ballet opera dr1ma.. and poetry (n readngs). Th~s agan does not exhaust the ways vre denote these art for'lls "re record and replay musc re treat drama and PdJetry as lter-cltu..l'e ve flm ballet and opera for theatres and. televson etc. t s to be rlotced that attendance at a per-forme-mee or $'allery s just as much an aesthetcally denotaty8 act v ty as amoret! nstru.l1ental fu..'1ctbn n the presentaton. t s also nterestng to note that He talk about the producton of a performance but the reproducton of a. pece of plastc al~t and the reprntng of a ':lork of lterature (.hch s not the same as a reproducton whch attempts to preserve the vs1:!.8.l appear'ance of the object; a reprnt need preserve only the order not the typographcal sb..ape of the words.) Here agan the noton of approprateness s functonng. We can no~ here go nto the truly mmense number of ways of non=verbal aesthetc denotaton. As :phlstne as t sounds even the prces ve are '"rllng to pay hgh ones for art and low ones for decoraton or entertan..tc1ent mark an mportant gl~oup of contexts l "hch we denote ant. The pont that s mportant at ths stage s that n our subsequent elucdaton of the logc of the concept of art we wll frequently U818 non-verbal act v.tes as a source of date. and examples. Becausel of the vagu6ness n langu age and because lngustc
23 act v ty s just <Dne of the many ldnds of act v t;y rule-governed by concepts t dll sometmes' g ve a clearer pcture to appeal to the use we make of art rathel' than lartl!.. The dstrllcton ve have made bet"een verbal and non-verbal denotatons of art s artfcal made for the convenence of exposton. Just as there are many non- ver bal vrays of denotng art the:re are many verbal 'lays w'hch are ntmately \'Oven nto the latter. Bere agan. the noton of approprateness s applcable although some verbal act v tes are vej.'y wdely approll'ate. For example we crtcze all \orks of art ~and other thngs.bs vlell. such as automobles brdges and ranbovts) but we crtcze n many dfferent regonally approprate \vays. ve can talk about the formal qualtes or the magnatyeness or tbe orgnal ty or the banalty or the 8;''111001c meanng or the style or the perod or the expresson of emoton or the technque or the medum or the artst S 1l.tentons or the place n tradton or art hstoyf of a work of art and so on at great length. Some knds of crtcal actvtes are apwroprate to some knds of art others to others; some knds of actvtes are 3;tpproprate to some nterests. others to others. n all t~ese actvtes there s f not an explct at least an mplct denot8ton of. art. To talk a"bout the meanng of a flm s to treat t as art; to say that t has no meanng Vlorth speekng about (\b.ch s dfferent from sayng that t s meanngful because t has no meannf;) but 'as just enjoyable s to treat t as mere entertanment. One of the more mportant aesthetc verbal actvtes s cla8sfcaton. 0n an atomstc level each ;ark of art r.!3s an
24 ndvdual name a!lthough the ontologc8.l status of the ndvdual the Tl..a:ne names var es 'from one art' form to another. For example lthe l1an n the Golden Helmet" refers to the' orgnal Rembrand.tpsntng n the louvre although t:he same name s also used to refer to r~prnts and copes of the orgnal. t s problematc to specfy to [hat "Kng Learn or "Le S:3.cre du Prntemps refers but these are not the problems that He vlsh to ge1t nvolved n; suffce t to say -'chat \ re do usually knovr hoh to use thle names of Horks of art. The most general aesthetc classfcaton of' course s art or work of art. ]3ebreen the level of the ndvdual name and the most general classfcaton there are a great many dffetrent... rays works of.art can be classfed dependng on ther characterstcs and 01.1:r' nterests. and each work of art can be treated as an example of many dfferent knds of art. \ve have a very general matertlal classfcaton nto pla'stc performat V9 and l terary art forms vr thn whch there are many subdvsons. \'le have geographcal ~nd temporal classfcatons agan "lth many nternal subdvsons. Technque ' style. artst perod movement and many other characterstc~ an9. nterests can form the bass for arrangng works of art nto varous relatonshps. t s to be noted that to classfy an object as say Romantc s 1)SO facto to classfy the ob ject as art. n other 'ords the act v ty of classfcaton ve are consderng s an mplct act v ty of aesthetc denot&ton. Secondly t s mportant to notce that tbe condtons ef1b~ded n varous modes of classfcaton vary. Some classfcatons have necessary and suffoent condtons; to be a Pcasso pantng t s ne~essary and suffcent that the object be
25 a pantng done by Pcasso. Others have only necessary condtons; for example musc must be ordered sol...1!1d lterature must be ordered words sculpture must be three-dmensdnal. Stll others have nether necessary nor slj.fflcent condtons; the classfcatons ~omantc sentmental trag:jc delcate as \'Te11 as many other's can not be spelled out n suqh terms but are better treated n terms of strands of sm:.lar tes. The mportance of the exstence of so many- aesthetc classfcatonal actvtes s Jehat t ShO'lS us agan that denotng art s not a smple aot v ty of sayng nxs a work of art!!. "!hen asked to g ve an example of a work of art '"le are just as lable to say ".. pantng" or A muscal composton" or "A poem" as \1e are to reply' by namng a specfc vjork of art. An elucdaton of' the logc of the denotat ve part o : the concept of art "ll have to take ths knd of fact nto account. Surnmal--:'Y Tlhe man purpose of ths chapter has been to sho vl that the denotaton of art takes place n many v.lays. lye have also tred to show the eomplexty and varety of the knds of context structured by the denotatve rules of the concept of art. The prelmnary clarfcaton (perhaps "complcaton" would be a better "lord) sets the stage for us to return to the queston "What s Art?"
CHll.P'l~ ::R V f anythng s clear from the last chapter \ lb..at the denotatve logc of the concll':pt of art s; s not. '1'he rules by -lhch we explctly and r.1plctly denote art Cl'';:: many and vared. an(l t s not clear from the cursory qnalyss they have been gven f there s any logc to ther use much less vhat t s. The problem v th -lhch V'e are faced s ths: to help us to cut through the complexty. \ re must try to ftnd a conceptual model or framevlork whoh 'nll so smplf;y. condense and clarfy the cjlassfcaton of the contexts n whch V'e :cefcr to art that ve are aale to gve a phlosophcal descrpton of the denotatve logc qf the concept. Our model should be such that t has the resoul"ces 'rch enough that \ re can deal comprehensvely and consstently th the whole range of our observatons of the use of aesthetcally denotng rules. The model that has been tradtonally assumed to be the obvous one to use has been one that employs theoretcal or defntonal locutons. that s that employs the lan- To be adequate a defn ton '\~'OlJ.ld have to be such that the descrpton of anythng that alctually s a legtmate -ray of denotng or referrng to art explctly or mplctly could not conflct mth the defnton or any statement the defnton entals. Ths project. however. has re.sul ted n tyro thpupand years of falure of aesthetcs to provde an adequate defnton of art The "true defnton" or even a close
27 approxmaton of "jjt has never been found; all the defntons have eventv.ally ru.."1 aground on the shoals of' a contradcton wth the frets of our experence n the aesthetc form of lfe. f vle can see ho-7 ths happens--and even better how t must_ happen--then p~rhaps we.vll have a clue that rll.8j:1..a ble us to choose bette'r sorts of 11 locutons for dealng -th art. 'The aesthetc theorst clams to present an nformatve. defnton of Art. To see wbat he can n fact clam let us suppose that t were possble for someone to examne all of the thngs referred to as art. that s" all contemporary aesthetcally denotatve contexts. Further let us suppose that he dscovers that there s a property X (smple or complex) shared by all l;tqrks of art. The property n queston does not have to be a natural one; all that s requred s that a person " th normal sensory- and mental facltes (ncludng some degree of "taste") s after some educaton readly able to dentfy the presence or absence of the property by the nspecton of putatve works of art. vou!ld the researcher then be able to clam that Art s X? The ans"ler depends on ho' \-le nterpret the "s l1 of hs statement. f he means by!!s~!. "s nol" consdered to be" and f ex hydothes hs research s colb.pletely adeq:uate then hs statement s true. n 11 Ve began of course to establsh 8. eoncept'ual schetlo n Chapter. The c~:mceptualsm outlned there s n a very loose sense a sort of axom systew or better a sort of group of hypothetcal postulates or assumptons for ths thess. embraced because the succes$ smlar conceptualsm h28 had n other areas ptomses that t may be fru tfd]. here.
28 fact. he ;ll have' stated an em})rcal dentty statement of the form. "\vorks of art are (consdered to be) dentcal v th those objects that have the property X". Now. hovever nterestng ths statement may be. t would not be at all useful for sayng what '"lorks of art really are (whatever that means). snce n order to make the statement. he would already have to knq:)'w what objects are '!orks of art. t "Tould perd..aps have the hevtstc value of adng n tr~e re-dentfcaton of Vlorks of art. but a lst "ould accomplsh the sane thng better. And he certanly "lould not be able to clam that t s n vrtue of X that \.re 1:no'l" jhat s a 'Tork of art snce the property or propertes n queston "rere dscqvered as a result of the research. '<'hch means that the researcher hmself already kn8y' what thngs "rere works of art '!hen he dscovered the property or propertes by an nspecton of vlorks of art and not by an nspecton of hs. Om 'mnd. n order to make the clam that t s n vrtue of X that we kno- what s a ''lark of art. he "TUuld l>..ave to show not only that all.;arks of art have the property but also that there s a causal relatonshp betv!een the recogd ton of ths property and dut callng these objects "arttl. To show that. he would }:.ave to get nto psychology. and perhaps socology and lngustcs "hch agan "'TOud olnly gve hm emprcal facts to the effect tr.cat we do n fact refer to art n such and such a "lay and not to the effect that \'18 ~ refer to art n that '<lay. f...hat he s lookng for s the evdence for salyng that n some logcal sense t s n vrtue of X that re kno.! "hat art s. he can not fnd t. f n saynls rtart s X" our researcher takes on the mantle of the aesthetc theorlst then he '\oll clam to be g -ns an nformatve
29 defnton of Art and not an emprcal u..'1versal generalzaton about art. _ n other VTO'ds he means the ls" of the statement to be nterpreted as meanng "vas n the begnnng. s noh and ever shall be". Hs statement s most probably false. t vould seet.:1 to be as sound an nductve generalzaton as car.. be made: that as long as man contnues to have artstc nterests J art wll contnue to develop and cr.c'1.nge n u '1predctab18... 'lays. 'l'he thngs.men call "art" and othen-rse denote as art at one pont n tme are not treated as art at another tme; moreover the 1-lays they denote art change too. Trvally of course... rorks of art are created at dfferent ponts' n tme so that for example da Vnc could not say that vle call "artl! such thngs as lthe Man n the Golden Helmet" and tlgl ly.rnca" becau.se they had not yet been panted. :Sut more mportant than ths there are not only new "orks of art.. but also nev! knds of... mrks of a:rt that unpredctably revolutonze. 12 the group of propertes that 1-le must n our research 'ascrbe to art'. Cubsm for example was a style of pantng that subverted the to that pont almost completely u..'1versal representatonal property of pantng. t could not be foreseen that Cubst pantng would develop as t dd; how'ever that some new style of pantng should become establshed vtas nev table--or at least almost nevtable. There -ras always the possblty not actualzed and there contnues to be the possblty tr..at all new "-lorks of art be clear-cut paradgm cases of "arks of art. But there s no reason for supposng that such 12 vlhat vro1.lj.ld c1a Vnc say f he were shokl1 GE\yrnca? -That.mula. he say after some ~oachng? Ho;- lke the 'lona Lsa s!geu.:rnca l!?
30 a thng ll happen; the 1:l8SS of nductve e'vdence s that t rll not. The ntroducton of the flm subverted the e.esthetc nformaton pool even more than the ntroducton o f C'ubst pantngs because ts dssmld.r"tes to prevously establshed art forms 1-lere ~yen greater. than those of Cubst pantngs. Furthermore there are objects and knds of objects that ""ere once consdered works of art and art fotls but are no longer. The eclecte and expansve perod n h cl1 '.-l"(? lve has obscured the fact that we have for example completely stopped consderng landscape gardenng to be an art form whle t was so consdered n the Bghteenth Century'. Ths s not to say that "'("9 have stopped oreatng al'tst c landscape gardens as \v8 have stopped oreatng Gothc cathedrals; more than ths...e 1'.:.8Ve stopped oonsderng any landscape garden t() be a vtork of art. Thus any attempt to defne art nformatvely would have to be based on nformatcjn ganed from an examnaton of the objeots that have been consder~d art to date. But there s no gu.arantee that art \-lll retan ally of the features that t has had. Bven the most general 13 feature of' art has no gu.aranteed future. A radcal revoluton n the conoept of art of course does not happen n a day. Contnu ty 13 t has been ponted out to metd..at.orks of art must at least be \vorks. f 'That s mecmt by th~t s that they must be artfacts. then t s not true. There s already an establshed tradton of treatng natural objects (peces of drfhrood J stones even sunsets) as natc1.ral "orks of art. }lor.'ov"er~ there s no reason 'Thy such a trend could not bedome paradgmatc that s central to the concept of art. f on the other hand hat s meant s that "Horks of art must be real (of. the French "objet d'art") then of course the statement s true; but everythng else s real too.
------.. ------ -_.... -..-.-._--._... -.--. 31 s mantaned by the persstence of certan clv.sters of propertes or to use the current catch-phrase "strands Ol smlartes" that overlap and ntertj.-rne for varous lengths of tme lnkng the present to the past and the near past to the remote past n varous ways and wth varuus geographcal etnpb.ases. An elucdaton of the logc of the concept of art must make reference to the tme at whch the de.ta for the elucdaton has been gathered and assu.!te t!;.at there s nothng 14 fnal about the use of the COnCE!pt at that partcular tme. From 13. more general. temporal vantage-pont (.~!.. takng the eyes of God on the concept of art)$ we can see that the elucdaton of the concept of art must be dependent on a te~mporal axs. t s ths knd of temporal dependence that makes the denotatve logc of the concept of art "open-textured". Art s not a unque concept n ths respect..a..'1other example of an open concept s the concept of scence. The concept of scence s determned n part at least by vhat scentsts do and scentsts do dfferent thng~ at dfferent tmes; nor can we predct what the scentst "rll do next only tr...at he "rll do somethng dfferent from ton '\>l2s just as legtmately scentfc as the gaseous theory that replaced t; Ne'l rton' s laws of dynamcs Here.just as legtmately 14 The need! to specfy spatal co-ordnates for an elucdaton of the concept of altt s be.sed on the practcal mpossblty of dscov'2rng all the uses of the concept at anyone tme; ths s not an mposs.bl ty n prncple the y!2y tryng to dscover the uses of the concept for all tme at anyone place would be.
32 scentf c as the }<~nstenan ongs that replaced them; ntrospecton was just as legtmately a scentfc approach as s be}1..avoursm. Agan consder the pre-emnantly phlosophcal queston "vlhat s Phlosophy?" rrhe problem of dscernng hat a f~rk of art s has a great many smlartes to the problem of dscernng 'That a.. rork of phlosophy s. 'men 8 ex8.p.1ne the hstory of phlosophy vrg dscover.many dfferent methods and many dfferent areas of concern beng called phlosophcal. Attempts to gve a defnton of phlosophy do not do justce ~to the "de dversty of act v tes practces atttudes 'Horks deas etc.) that vle consder and have consdered phlosophcal.' lm.dl the future s open. Although re may prefer to do phlosophy n one llay rather than another on the grounds of frutfulness or clarty our reasons for such preferences are pragmatc ones. Eo one can gve a set of proven vald prncples for correctly phlosophzng for all tme and clam that phlosophy can be done n no othel~ "ray. J...nyone who pretends to do so s justfabl:v- crtczed as dogmatc. Ths suggests that as phlosophers "e should observe a prnc.ple of toler~nce "hch allows that others may have valu.able f vaguely expressed nsghts usng: methods that.re ourselves do not choose to use. ':!.1h:ls s not to say: of course that a phlosopher can say anythng he wshes; ve have canons of ratonalty such as coherence consstency clarty comprehensveness and accuracy of observaton and reportng. and the valdty of presented and mpled ar ;u.mentatj.on that govern all phlosophcal enterprses and other ratonal undertakngs as e1l. Phlosophcal tolerance does not ental phlosophcal anarchy.