GV958: Theory and Explanation in Political Science, Part I: Philosophy of Science (Han Dorussen) Week 3: The Science of Politics 1. Introduction 2. Philosophy of Science 3. (Political) Science 4. Theory 1. Introduction Han Dorussen (5B.312; ext: 2510; email: hdorus) will be teaching five weeks of GV958. I have my office hours from 2 4 pm on Tuesdays, but you are strongly advised to make an appointment via Claire Chell (5B.318; ext: 2741; email: clchell). Literature: You may have noticed that the reading list in Part I is limited (although not necessarily the amount of pages). The starring of required readings is less obvious though. If you haven t done so already, I suggest that you buy John Ziman: Real Science and use it as general background reading. I will also provide you with copies of the essential (and hard to get readings), like Wagner and Popper (today) and Braybrooke (later). I will try to get the other texts on Short Loan as quickly as possible. The essays of Part I: 1. Using a.o. Hegre & Sambanis (2006), describe current research on the onset of Civil War as a Lakatosian research programme? Analyze its main features and consider whether it is still progressive. If you want to argue that it cannot be described as such, why not and what would be a more appropriate framework to analyze this body of research. Hegre, Havard, and Nicholas Sambanis (2006), Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset, Journal of Conflict Resolution 50 (4), 508 535. 2. Identify the core elements of the scientific working methods of ideology and discourse analysis. To what extent can they be considered reasonable as described by John Ziman? 3. Use the possibility of flouting of social norms to analyze the (ir)relevance of the falsification principle for social scientific knowledge. 4. In what sense, and with reference to a particular area of research, does rational choice theory present a paradigmatic shift? 5. Does method matter? Length: 3,000 words; Due date: Week 9 (29/11) 1
Outline of Part I: Week 3: Q: What does science as used in philosophy of science / political science actually refer to? A: It is a particular kind of human activity (Ziman) which yields (or is supposed to yield) a particular product: theory / knowledge (Wagner: application to IR). Week 4: Q: How do scientists generate knowledge? A: By knowing when we are wrong (Popper), or by formulating new perspectives / paradigms (Kuhn), or by way of the methodology of research programmes (Lakatos). Week 5: Q: Do political scientists generate any knowledge? A: Insights from philosophy of science seem to have only limited applicability to political science. Week 6: Q: Are the social sciences fundamentally different? A: The (relative) importance of meaning (Braybrooke) and emancipation (Fay). Week 7: Q: Does philosophy of science provide a blueprint for fruitful scientific activity? A (Feyerabend): no. Practicalities: One hour lecture and one hour seminar. 2. Philosophy of Science It occurs to me that the title (philosophy of science) of part I of the module is actually somewhat misleading. I cannot (and do not want to) claim that I will be able to do justice to this particular area of philosophy. Rather the aim of part I is to make you familiar with how concepts and insights that have their origins in the philosophy of science have influenced political science, or at least on how we commonly think about political science. For whatever it is worth, my personal opinion is that even though it is occasionally wise to stand back and reflect on what one is doing, it is an activity that should come with a pretty strong health warning: science is somewhat like walking or shopping, we do it all the time and it becomes only tricky once we start reflecting upon it too much. But then again, if one keeps falling over (or returning home with useless stuff) it may be worthwhile to pause and think. Philosophy of science is an attempt to understand science and to examine whether the special claims of science are (or can be) justified (De Vries 1985, 9). Philosophy of science thus concerns itself with questions such as: What is science? What, if anything, is special about scientifically generated knowledge? Are there fundamental difference between natural and social sciences? Etc, etc. As de Vries (1985, 10) observes: a field of study, philosophy of science responds to external and internal problems. The internal problems are the issue and inconsistencies that emerge within the discipline (e.g., the debates between Popper, Kuhn, and Lakatos). As field philosophy of science has become increasingly influenced by related fields, such as mathematics, history and sociology (of science). External problems are developments in the sciences themselves. The strict distinction between philosophy and science is relatively recent (although it is also possible to trace it 2
back to Aristotle). The range of topics that are considered open to scientific inquiry has increased steadily; most relevant for us from the natural (empirical, mathematical, experimental) to the social sciences, and in particular political science. The development of scientific inquiry has defined the fundamental problem for philosophy of science. Aristotle argued that a scientific explanation relied on empirical observation: science is moving from knowing a fact to understanding why the fact occurs. (1) Induction is formulating/recognizing what is general about specific cases/observations; (2) deduction is the second step where the general principles found under (1) are used as a premise to understand why a particular fact (conclusion) holds. Once it is accepted, however, that not only direct observation (empiricism) can help us to understand nature but also experimental methods (manipulation) and thought experiments (mathematical) methods, then it is necessary to argue for the quality (possibly even superiority) of these latter methods. To put it simply: why, if one can see the sun rise and fall, accept that the earth moves around the sun if an instrument is needed to establish this fact. It is useful to remind ourselves of how young political science really is as a discipline; it is only since the behaviour revolution of the late 1950s that it became widely accepted that the study of politics could be a science ; before that time it was generally seen as dominated by ideology. Political science as a discipline was initially established as a training in civic duty (and in the European post WW II context as an antidote against political naivety of many scientists who had willingly collaborated with the Nazis); thanks to this I was able to finance my graduate studies because all Texas undergraduates had to take at least two modules in political science. 3. (Political) Science So what is science? Wagner (2007, 5; paraphrasing Ziman) describes it as an enterprise in which scholars compete with each other in constructing nonobvious explanations of the phenomena they study that can withstand concerted attempts to discredit them. In other words, an activity or field of study becomes scientific if (a*) people are encouraged/rewarded for showing that existing explanations fall short of standards for justifying claims, (b) people reap rewards for constructing nonobvious explanations that survive attempts to discredit them as under (*), and (c) scholars should make their reasoning transparent and thus allow for (*). Essential to this particular understanding of science is: that science is a collective endeavour or a particular social institution, that it generates knowledge that cannot be demarcated from the act of knowing and the scientific enterprise, what Ziman (2000, 6) calls the social stability of scientific knowledge. that ultimately we know what science is by observing the academic ethos (Ziman 2000, 56 7) The obvious follow up question (which I will try to address in week 5) is whether political science adheres to this academic ethos? 3
4. Theory In the discussion so far, the aim of science is still to generate knowledge. In particular, science is about explaining rather than identifying regularities (although I think that Wagner is drawing the distinction too sharp; a lot of scientific work is actually engaged in identifying regularities where the distinguishing feature only seems to be the underlying (explanatory) motivation: e.g., the CERN project). Scientific knowledge is generally packaged as theory, so what is a theory? Ziman (2000, 118) refers back to what he said above: theories are social institutions. They must conform to the standards of the society in which they are established. In principle, the scientific community is total meritocratic and multicultural. For Wagner (2007, 7 8), a theory is a valid argument that can serve as an explanation of observed facts. What is wanted is not just anything that might be called a theory, but an explanation from which the facts in question can actually be derived. Validity demands that conclusions follow from acceptable/reasonable premises. For example: Premise 1: Labrador retrievers are friendly and good with children (Theory) Premise 2: This dog is a Labrador retriever (Initial Conditions) Conclusion: This dog will be friendly and good with children (Event). Mearsheimer (according to Wagner): Premise 1: There is no world government (IC) Premise 2: All states are capable of using force against other states (T?) Premise 3: No state can ever be certain that another state will not use force against it (T?) Premise 4: All states seek to maintain their territorial integrity and domestic autonomy (T?) Premise 5: States are rational actors (T?) Conclusion: Two states may go to war with each other though they both want only to survive. Wagner s point is that the conclusion does not follow from the premises. Even a weaker conclusion: namely that states want to acquire military superiority does not follow. In fact, it is not even obvious that Mearsheimer s theory is similar to the Labrador theory. The point that the conclusion does not follow from the premises is however well taken. In criticizing Waltz (Mearsheimer), Wagner seems to ask for a theory that is complete and consistent. A complete theory specifies all conclusions that follow from the premises and a consistent theory is that it no two conclusions are contradictory. It is possible to demonstrate mathematically that apart from the most simple/obvious theories, completeness and consistency cannot be demonstrated. In this sense, Wagner s claim that a theory should be valid may not be so modest after all. However, it is still more 4
modest than claims that (social) scientific theories should be imbued with meaning and/or emancipatory. Jonathan Culler (writing on theory in literature studies): A theory must be more than a hypothesis; it can t be obvious; it involves complex relations of a systematic kind among a number of factors; and it is not easily confirmed or disproved. Good starting point: 1) a theory should help us to understand something that we (or at least the theorist) find puzzling; 2) it should be informative (tell us something new); 3) a theory should have at least some general value (here the disagreement starts D1); 4) a theory should have some bearing on our understanding of reality (D2); and 5) a theory should have some practical value (D3). D1: Explanatory theories: universal versus descriptive (historical) theories. highly abstract to highly complex theory. parsimony versus descriptive richness. D2: Interpretative theories: rationality versus understanding. D3: Normative theories: objectivity (claim to true understanding) versus emancipation (multiple truths). Seminar Read the first chapter of Wagner. Discussion: Is Wagner s critique fair? Why (not)? Does Wagner s critique apply to other areas of study of politics? Do you know of a counterexample: that is a theory with conclusions that seem to follow from its premises? Do we need to know what ontology and methodology, and epistomology are all about? What is the academic ethos of political science? To what extent, does it conform to the principles outlines by Ziman? Is method an important element of the academic ethos in political science? What to make of any special status of the social sciences? What about the humanities (and areas of political science most influenced by the study of history/culture)? 5