207 John Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A Trinitas est quasi quoddam totum habens partes et perfectio praesentabilis vel appropriabilis quasi pars est et quaedam unitas illius ternarii, et secundum hoc habet rationem partis et non ducit in cognitionem alterius. [III. Ad argumentum principale] 83 Per hoc patet ad rationem in oppositum quod non sequitur: 'creatura ducit in cognitionem Dei in quantum unus, ergo non est vestigium Trinitatis, quia vestigium non ducit perfecte in cognitionem vestigiati, sed in cognitionem alicuius appropriabilis vestigiato. [Quaestio 4 Utrum memoria habeat speciem intelligibilem distinctam] 84 Utrum in parte intellectiva proprie sumpta sit memoria habens speciem intelligibilem realiter distinctam ab actu intelligendi et praeviam actui intellectus. Quod non videtur: Quia omnis species repraesentat obiectum sub ratione sub qua natum est imprimere eam; sed obiectum non est natum imprimere speciem nisi sub ratione singularis et obiectum intelligibile sive intellectus est sub ratione universalis; ergo intellectus nullam potest recipere speciem intelligibilem ab obiecto immediate. Maior est plana, quia si obiectum imprimit speciem non sub ratione qua natum est imprimere eam, tunc imprimit aliud quam speciem. Minor patet, quia actiones sunt singularium. D is t. 3, Q uest ion T hr ee 207 subsisting per se, and thus the Trinity is a certain quasi-whole having parts, and a perfection that can be presented or ascribed is a quasi-part and a certain unit of this triad, and according to this it has the character of a part and does not lead to the knowledge of another. To the initial argument 83 Through this it is evident to the argument for the opposite that it does not follow a creature leads to the knowledge of God insofar as he is one, therefore it is not a vestige of the Trinity/ because a vestige does not lead perfectly to a knowledge of that of which it is a vestige, but to the knowledge of something that can be appropriate to that of which it is a vestige. Question Four Does memory* have a distinct intelligible* species?11 84 In the intellective part taken properly is there a memory that has an intelligible species, the latter being really distinct from the act of understanding and prior to the act of the intellect? It seems there is not: For every species/form represents the object under the aspect under which the latter is suited by nature to impress the species. However, the object is not suited by nature to impress the species, except under the aspect of a singular, and the intelligible object or what is understood has the character of a universal; therefore the intellect cannot receive any intelligible species from the object directly. The major [premise] is clear, because if the object does not impress the species under the aspect under which it is suited by nature to impress it, then it impresses something other than its species. The minor is evident, because actions are all singulars. 11 Intelligible species in this case is a misnomer: it should read intelligible form, in the sense of the Greek ^op<j)ii, as is clear from the context and references to Aristotle s De anima (also see Glossary). The term has been retained since the expression has already become common in scholarly literature in its current form.
208 John Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A 85 Item, praesentia obiecti respectu potentiae est causa speciei in potentia et non e converso; ergo non per speciem ut per causam obiectum est praesens potentiae. 86 Praeterea, si esset species intelligibilis in intellectu, informaret eum sicut accidens subiectum suum; ergo intellectus patietur ab obiecto passione reali, non igitur passione intentionali, et sic sequitur quod intelligere non est motus rei ad animam. 87 Item, si potest esse una species intelligibilis in intellectu, et plures; sed quaelibet species naturaliter repraesentat suum obiectum; ergo qua ratione una species movet ad suum actum intellectionis, et omnes vel nulla; non omnes, quia tunc omnes intellectiones essent simul; ergo nulla movebit, et sic per consequens species non est ponenda in intellectu ad repraesentandum obiectum nec ad movendum intellectum, nec ut necessaria ad actum intellectionis. 88 Contra: Intellectus quandoque est in potentia essentiali ante addiscere et quandoque in potentia accidentali ante intelligere, II De anima et III,36 et VIII Physicorum;37 ergo aliter se habet quando est in potentia accidentali quam ante quando est in potentia essentiali, obiectum autem non se habet aliter sed eodem modo. Si igitur intellectus se habet aliter ut est in potentia accidentali, ergo est mutatus; sed omnis mutatio terminatur ad aliquam formam; ergo aliqua forma praecedit actum intellectionis et illam voco speciem. [I. Status quaestionis A. Opinio Gandavensis et Godefridi] 89 Hic est una opinio in qua concordant duo doctores, licet in aliis sibi saepius contradicant. Negant enim omnem speciem impressam ponendo tantum actum intelligendi imprimi ab obiecto in phantasmate, et habent auctoritates pro se et rationes. 36 Aristot., De anima II, c. 5 (417a 21-6 2); ibid. III, c. 4 (4296 5-10). 37 Aristot., Physica VIII, c. 4 (2556 1-5). D is t. 3, Q uest ion F our 208 85 Also, the presence of the object with respect to the potency is the cause of the species in the potency and not vice versa; therefore it is not through the species as a cause that the object is present in the potency. 86 Also, if the intelligible species were [already] in the intellect, it would inform it as an accident informs its subject; therefore the intellect will receive a real imprint from this object, and therefore not a conceptual one, and thus it would follow that understanding is not a movement of a real thing towards the soul. 87 Also, if one intelligible species can be in the intellect, also several can; but each species naturally represents its object; for the same reason, therefore, that one species moves [the intellect] to its act of understanding, all do or none does; not all, because then all intellections would occur together; therefore none will move, an thus as a consequence species should not be postulated in the intellect to represent the object nor to move the intellect, nor as something necessary for the act of intellection. 88 To the contrary: The intellect is at times in essential potency before acquiring knowledge and at other times in accidental* potency* before [actually] understanding, according to Bk. II and III of the De anima, and Bk. VIII of the Physics; therefore, when it is in accidental potency it is in a different state than before when it is in essential potency, but the object known is not in a different state but in the same in both cases. Therefore, if the intellect is in a different state as it is in accidental potency, it undergoes a change; but every change ends with some form; therefore some form precedes the act of intellection, and that I call a species. Status of the Question The opinion of Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines 89 Here there is one opinion in which two doctors agree, although in other matters they contradict one another. For they deny any imprinted [but not actualized] species, postulating that only the act of understanding itself is imprinted by the object in the sense imagination, and they have reasons and authoritative statements for this. The Philosopher in Bk. Ill of De anima
209 John Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A Philosophus III De anima38 commendat antiquos qui posuerunt animam esse locum specierum, non totam, sed intellectivam tantum. Certum autem est quod Philosophus ponit species in aliis potentiis animae subiective, solum autem intellectum dicit locum specierum. Ergo non sunt in eo subiective sive impressive, sed obiective tantum et expressive et in hoc differt ab aliis potentiis. 90 Praeterea, Augustinus III De Trinitate, cap. 839 et ubicumque loquitur de ista materia, dicit productionem Verbi sive ipsum Verbum non gigni a specie, sed de scientia quae manet in anima. 91 Item, ostendit40 per rationem quod non sit species in intellectu. Cuius deductio talis est: sensus non habet sensationem obiecti, nisi propter duo: vel quia organum est eiusdem dispositionis cum medio, et sic si medium recipit speciem, et organum; vel quia species est proxima dispositio recipiendi actum. Et neutrum est hic, scilicet in intellectu. Non primum, patet, quia non habet organum; nec secundum, quia intellectus de se dispositus est nec requirit proximam dispositionem, id est medium. Unde in toto illo processu ab obiecto usque ad intellectum, agens non abstrahit speciem a specie sive a phantasmate, sed abstrahit obiectum ab obiecto. Sed quid est hoc, nisi per hoc quod est praesens phantasmati, licet alio et alio modo. 92 Alius doctor41 adducit rationem et ponit deductionem de organo. Ratio istius est talis: ad quod aliquid est primo et per se in potentia, illud et non aliud recipitur ab agente proportionali sibi; sed virtus cognitiva est in potentia per se et primo respectu propriae cognitionis; ergo ab obiecto proportionate recipit cognitionem et non speciem. 93 Confirmat hoc per Augustinum, IV De Trinitate, cap.42 ubi dicit quod forma sive species impressa visui visio est, et sic 38 Aristot., De anima III, c. 4 (429a 27-8). 39August., De Trin. XV, c. 11, n. 20 (CCSL 50A, 488; P L 42, 1072). 40 Henricus Gand., Quodl. V, q. 14 in corp. (f. 176K). 41 Godefridus de Font., Quodl. IX, q. 19 in corp. (PhB IV, 271, 273, 275). 42 Rectius: August., De Trin. XI, c. 2, n. 2 (CCSL 50, 335; PL 42, 985). D is t. 3, Q uest io n F our 209 commends the ancients who assume the soul to be the location of the species: not the entire soul, but the intellective part. It is certain, however, that the Philosopher posits the species in a subdued state (subjective) in other potencies of the soul, but only the intellect is called the location of the species. Therefore they are not in it in a subdued or imprinted state, but only as objects and expressly, and in this intellect is unlike other potencies. 90 Furthermore, Augustine in Bk. Ill of the Trinity, chapter 8, and wherever he speaks of this matter, says the production* of the word, or the word himself, is not born of a species, but of knowledge which remains in the soul. 91 Also, he [i.e. Henry] shows by rational argument that there is no species in the intellect, deducing this in the following way: the sense only has a sensation of the object because of two things: either because the organ is disposed in the same way as the medium, and so if the medium receives the species, the organ does also; or because the species is a proximate disposition towards receiving the act. Neither of these occurs here, namely, in the intellect. It is evident the first does not, because the intellect has no organ; neither does the second, because the intellect of itself is disposed [to receive its act] and requires no proximate disposition or means [that enables the intellect to receive its act]. Hence in the entire process from the object up to understanding [it], the agent abstracts no species from a species [in the senses] or from the imagination, but abstracts the object from the object [itself]. But this can only be because [that object] is present to the sense imagination, although it is there in some other way. 92 The other doctor [i.e. Godfrey of Fontaines] adduces this reason and postulates this inference about what is in the organ. He gives this sort of reason: what is received from a moving agent proportionate to something is only that, regarding which this something is primarily and per se in potency, and nothing else; but the cognitive power is in potency primarily and per se as regards its proper cognition; therefore from a proportionate object [as a mover] it receives cognition and not an [intelligible] species. 93 He confirms this by a reference to Augustine, Bk. IV of the Trinity, in the chapter where he says that the form or species
210 John Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A species non potest esse in potentia spirituali quae differat ab actu suo, licet sit in organis potentiarum sensitivarum. Sequitur ergo quod intellectus non habet speciem intelligibilem praeviam actui intellectionis. [B. Contra opiniones Henrici et Godefridi] 94 Sed non intelligo istam conclusionem et contra eam arguo quadrupliciter, supponendo quod universale possit a nobis intelligi intellectione abstractiva, quod omnes concedunt. Si autem singulare possit intelligi et esse primum obiectum intellectus, non curo modo. [II. Responsio Scoti] 95 Tunc arguo sic: intellectus potest habere obiectum actu universale perfecte sibi praesens antequam vel prius naturaliter quam intelligat: ergo habet speciem obiecti in intellectu et non solum in phantasmate priusquam intelligat. 96 Antecedens patet: quia sicut obiectum, ita per se condicio obiecti intellectus cuiusmodi est universalitas praecedit actum intellectus. 97 Consequentiam probo sic: species eadem et eiusdem rationis non est per se repraesentativa obiecti sub oppositis rationibus repraesentabilis; ratio universalis et ratio singularis sunt oppositae rationes in cognoscibili et repraesentabili; ergo nulla eadem species et unius rationis potest esse repraesentativa alicuius obiecti sub ratione universalis et singularis. Species in phantasmate repraesentat obiectum singulare sub ratione singularis; ergo non potest repraesentare sub ratione universalis idem obiectum. Maior probatur, quia species sub illa ratione qua repraesentat obiectum mensuratur ab obiecto; sed idem non potest mensurari duabus mensuris oppositis nec e converso, tunc D is t. 3, Q uest ion F our 210 impressed upon the faculty of seeing is vision, and in a spiritual potency there cannot be any species that is different from its act, although [such a different species] can be in the organ of a sensitive potency. It follows therefore that the intellect has no intelligible species prior to its act of understanding. Against the opinion of Henry and Godfrey 94 But I do not understand this conclusion and argue against it in four ways, by assuming that the universal can be known by us by abstractive* intellection, which all concede. Whether the singular could be known and be the first object of the intellect, however, I do not care at this point. Reply of Scotus 95 Then I argue in this way: the intellect can naturally have a universal object in actuality that is perfectly present to it before it may understand: therefore it has a species of the object in the intellect and not only in the sense imagination before it may understand. 96 The antecedent is evident, because just as the object [is naturally prior to the act], so also a [proper or] per se condition of the object of the intellect, such as universality, precedes the act of the intellect. 97 I prove that the implication* holds in this way: the same species whose nature remains the same cannot per se represent the object under opposite ways in which it can be represented; as a universal and as a singular are opposed ways the object can be represented or known; therefore no one and the same species having but one way can be representative of some object under the aspect of a universal and as a singular as well. The species in the sense imagination represents the object as singular; therefore, it cannot represent the same object as a universal. The major is proved, because the species, under the aspect according to which it represents the object, is measured by the object; but the same thing cannot be measured by two opposite measures, nor conversely, for then the same thing would be asserted twice,
211 John Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A enim idem bis diceretur, secundum Philosophum, V Metaphysicae;43ergo eadem species non potest repraesentare duo opposita obiecta nec idem obiectum sub oppositis rationibus obiectivis. 98 Dicetur quod non est inconveniens eandem speciem representare diversa et opposita repraesentabilia in alio et alio lumine, ut patet de noctilucentibus qui in alio et alio lumine repraesentantur colorata et lucida. Sic in proposito per lumen intellectus agentis et phantasiae eadem species potest repraesentare opposita in obiecto. 99 Contra, lumen non repraesentat, sed est in quo repraesentativum repraesentat, quia lumen in medio est eiusdem rationis sive videam album sive nigrum, quia ratio distinguit essentialiter repraesentativum a repraesentativo; altera tamen est species et repraesentativum albi et nigri. Et per consequens distinctio luminis non causat distinctam rationem repraesentativi, sed manente eadem natura repraesentativi semper repraesentat idem repraesentabile et eiusdem rationis, non ergo sub diversis rationibus. 100 Confirmatur ratio, quia repraesentativum in lumine perfection non repraesentat aliud, sed repraesentat idem clarius quam in lumine imperfectiori. Patet de specie albi et nigri in lumine solis et lunae. Ergo licet species in organo phantastico in lumine intellectus agentis clarius repraesentet singulare ut intellectus possit illud intelligere, quam in lumine proprio, nunquam tamen repraesentat obiectum universale sub ratione universalis per quodcumque lumen. 101 Exemplum eorum de noctilucentibus non valet, sed concludit oppositum. Nam quaero: an eodem repraesentativo repraesententur illa diversimode de die et de nocte, an alio et alio repraesentativo. Non eodem, quia tunc illa repraesentantur de die sicut de nocte, quia repraesentativum prius est aliquid in se 43Aristot., Metaph. V (A), c. 15 (1021a 31-6 3). D is t. 3, Q uest io n F our 211 according to the Philosopher in Bk. V of the Metaphysics. Therefore, the same species cannot represent two opposite objects nor the same object under opposed aspects. 98 It must be stated that it is not incongruous that the same species may represent diverse and opposed features under one or another type of light, as is evident from fluorescent things, which under one or another type of light appear as either colored or lucid. So it is in what we propose: through the light of the agent* intellect and of the imagination the same species can represent opposed aspects in the object. 99 To the contrary, light does not represent, but is that in which what is representative, actually does represent. Indeed, light in the medium is of the same sort whether I see white or black, because it is reason that distinguishes essentially [one] representative from another representative, for the species, or what is representative of what is white is other than that which is representative of what is black. As a consequence the distinction of light does not cause the distinction of what is representative; but, the nature of what is representative remaining the same, it always represents the same thing that it is able to represent, and does so under the same aspect, not under diverse aspects. 100 This reason is confirmed, because what is representative does not represent another thing under a more perfect light, but rather represents the same thing more clearly than it does in a less perfect light. This is evidently the case with white and black in the light of the sun and in the light of the moon. Therefore, although the species in the organ of the imagination more clearly represents the singular so that the intellect could know it in the light of the agent intellect, than it does in its own proper light, nevertheless it never represents the universal object under a universal aspect under any light whatsoever. 101 The example of those fluorescent things is not valid, but rather leads to the opposite conclusion. For I ask: is it the same representative that represents those things differently by day and by night, or are they represented by two different ones? Not by the same, because then they would be represented by day in the same way as they are by night, because what is representative is something in itself prior to its representing in this or that sort of
212 John Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A quam in tali vel tali lumine repraesentet. Si alio et alio repraesentativo repraesentat44 diversa illa in noctilucentibus, habetur propositum, sive sit idem lumen sive diversum. 102 Nec exemplum est ad propositum, sed ad oppositum, tum quia vel sunt duae qualitates sensibiles in noctilucentibus, scilicet lux et color, quare altera multiplicat se sensibiliter et repraesentat rem illam in luce maiori et altera in minori, utraque tamen multiplicat se et repraesentat rem in utroque lumine, sed efficacius movens et repraesentans percipitur et minus efficaciter repraesentans non percipitur exemplum de stellis, quae ita multiplicant radios suos de die sicut de nocte, licet propter maius lumen non appareant, vel si est una qualitas sensibilis in tali corpore, ipsa virtualiter continet duo repraesentativa. Color enim quodammodo continet lucem cum sit lux in corpore terminato, et ideo in alio et alio lumine causat diversa repraesentativa: aliud in maiori lumine, scilicet de die, et aliud in minori, scilicet de nocte. Et ita semper stat quod non est idem repraesentativum obiecti sub diversa ratione repraesentabilis, quantumcumque aliud et aliud lumen concurrat. Vel si est unum formaliter, diversum tamen virtualiter, quia continet virtualiter diversa et ideo potest causare diversa repraesentativa, scilicet lucem et colorem in alio et alio lumine. 103 Secunda ratio sumitur ex parte intellectus agentis. Intellectus agens, secundum Philosophum, III De anima,45est potentia mere activa tum quia est quo est omnia facere, tum quia comparatur ad possibilem ut ars ad naturam; ergo potest habere actionem realem. Omnis actionis realis oportet aliquid dare terminum realem; iste terminus realis non recipitur in phantasmate, quia quidquid est ibi est extensum et improportionale ad movendum intellectum possibilem; nec etiam intellectus agens causat aliquid in phantasmatibus, quia non est suum passivum, secundum praedictas auctoritates, nec terminus recipitur in 44 Repraesentat: sic codd.; melius lege: repraesentantur. 45 Aristot., De anima III, c. 5 (430a 15). D is t. 3, Q uest io n F our 212 light. If it is by different representatives that diverse states are represented in fluorescent things, what we propose it granted, whether the light be the same or diverse. 102 Neither is the example given relevant to what we propose, but the opposite holds. First, because either [1] there are two sensible qualities, namely light and color, in fluorescent things, so that one of them multiplies itself sensibly and represents the thing in a greater light and the other in a lesser one, while at the same time either multiplies itself and represents the thing in either light, but the one that is moving and representing more efficaciously is perceived and the one that is representing less efficaciously is not perceived as is evident in the case of the stars, which multiply their rays during the day just as much as during the night, although because of the greater light they are not visible, or [2] if there is but one sensible quality in such a body, it virtually* contains two representatives. For color in some way contains light since it is light in a body qua term,12 and therefore in one or another light it causes diverse representations: one in the greater light, namely, during the day, and another in the lesser light, namely, during the night. And in this way it is always the case that the representative of the object under diverse aspects of what can be represented is not the same, no matter how much this and another light concur. Or, if something is one formally,* it is still diverse virtually, because it contains virtually diverse things, and therefore can cause diverse representatives, namely, light and color in one or another light. 103 The second reason is taken from the agent intellect. According to the Philosopher in Bk. Ill of De anima, the agent intellect is a purely active potency: both because it is making all things, and also because it is related to the possible* intellect as art is to nature; therefore it can have a real action. Every real action requires that something be given as its real term; this real term is not received in the sense imagination, because whatever is there has extension and is not proportioned to move the possible intellect; nor does the agent intellect cause anything in the sense images, because this is not its passive correspondent, according to the aforesaid authorities; neither is the term 12 A translation ad sensum: the Latin in corpore terminato is ambiguous.
213 Jo hn D uns Sc otus, R epor tatio I-A intellectu agente, quia nullius est receptivus. Ergo tantum recipitur in intellectu possibili. Ergo illud primo causatum non potest poni actus intelligendi, quia primus terminus actionis intellectus agentis est facere universale in actu de universali in potentia et de nullo deservit intellectus agens, quia secundum Commentatorem,46 III De anima, si essentiae rerum essent abstractae et actu universales, sicut posuit Plato, non indigeremus secundum ipsum intellectu agente; sed universale in actu praecedit actum intelligendi, quia est per se condicio obiecti quod naturaliter praecedit actum. 104 Dicetur quod terminus actionis intellectus agentis est obiectum universale sub ratione universalis lucens in phantasmate. 105 Contra: universale obiectum sub ratione universalis non habet nisi esse deminutum ut cognitum, quemadmodum Hercules in statua non habet esse nisi deminutum, quia repraesentatum in imagine; sed si aliquod esse reale habet, hoc est in quantum est in aliquo ut repraesentante ipsum sub illa ratione, ita scilicet quod intellectus agens facit aliquid repraesentativum universalis de eo quod fuit repraesentativum singularis. Ergo cum terminus actionis realis non sit obiectum habens esse deminutum, ut esse cognitum vel repraesentatum vel cognitum47 sed aliquid reale, sequitur quod realis actio intellectus agentis terminatur ad realem formam in exsistentia qua formaliter repraesentat universale ut universale, quam formam realem concomitatur terminus intentionalis ut obiectum universale secundum esse repraesentatum quod habet in specie. 106 Item, tertio sic: universalius secundum totam indifferentiam suam non potest intelligi nec repraesentari in repraesentativo minus universalis, sed species phantastica est per se et primo repraesentativa individui ut est hoc; ergo in illa non potest repraesentari universale secundum totam indifferentiam quam habet ad sua individua omnia. Maior probatur: quia nunquam cognoscitur magis universale secundum totam indifferentiam suam, nisi quando cognoscitur ut unum cognoscibile omnibus suis 4GAverroes, De anima III, com. 18 (ed. F.S. Crawford, CCAA 6.1, 440). 47 Vel cognitum: sic. codd. redundanter. D is t. 3, Q uest io n F our 213 received in the agent intellect, because [the agent intellect] is not receptive of anything. Hence it is only received in the possible intellect. Therefore, what is first caused cannot be assumed to be the act of understanding, because the first term of the agent intellect s action is to make the potential universal actual, and the agent intellect is in no respect subservient,13for according to the Commentator in Bk. Ill of De anima, if the essences of things were abstracted and actually universal, as Plato assumed, we would not need an agent intellect; but the universal in act precedes the act of understanding, because it is a per se condition of the object that naturally precedes the act. 104 It is said that the term of the action of the agent intellect is the universal object qua universal shining in the phantasm.* 105 To the contrary: the universal qua universal is only a diminished* being as something known, just as Hercules has only diminished being in a statue, because he is represented in an image. But if [something] has some real being, this is insofar as it is in something representing it under that aspect, namely, so that the agent intellect makes something representative of the universal from that which was representing it as singular. Therefore since the term of the real action is not an object that has diminished being, such as known or represented being, but has real being, it follows that the real action of the agent intellect terminates in a real existing form by virtue of which it formally represents the universal as universal. An intentional* term as a universal object according to the represented being it has in the species accompanies this real form. 106 Also, thirdly in this way: the more universal according to its complete indifference [towards individuals] cannot be understood nor represented in a representative of something less universal; but the sense imagined species is primarily and per se representative of the individual as such; therefore it cannot represent the universal in itself according to the complete indifference the latter has toward all its individuals. The major is proved, because never is the more universal known according to its complete indifference except when it is known as something 13In the sense of assisting with something that is already happening.
214 J ohn D uns S cotus, R epor tatio I-A inferioribus, sed impossibile est quod ut habet esse in uno singulari quod48 cognoscatur ut idem omnibus aliis singularibus inferioribus, sed praecise illi singulari in quo est. Ergo in repraesentativo unius singularis non cognoscitur universale secundum totam indifferentiam suam. Potest autem intellectus sic intelligere universale secundum totam indifferentiam suam; aliter enim non essent praedicata universalia nec definitiones nec species nec genera nec aliquid huiusmodi praecise. Ergo non concipitur universale in phantasmate; phantasma enim non est nisi ipsius singularis proprie, et hoc est in quantum singulare speciei specialissimae, maxime si phantasma sit impressum ab aliquod debite approximato. 107 Item, quarto sic: aut intellectus prout distinguitur contra partem sensitivam potest habere obiectum sibi praesens propria praesentialitate, aut non. Si sic, habeo propositum, quia obiectum non est sibi praesens in cognitione abstractiva ante actum elicitum, nisi per aliquod repraesentativum quod voco speciem. Si non, ergo non potest habere aliquam operationem sibi propriam sine parte sensitiva et per consequens nec esse sine ea, secundum argumentum Philosophi III De anima: si intellectus non potest habere operationem sibi propriam, non potest separari, unde non concederet intellectum separari a corpore sicut perpetuum a corruptibili, nisi posset habere operationem sibi propriam in qua non dependeret a parte sensitiva. 108 Dico igitur ad quaestionem quod oportet ponere in intellectu ut habeat rationem memoriae: speciem intelligibilem repraesentantem universale ut universale, priorem naturaliter actu intelligendi. Et huiusmodi necessitas est duplex: una ex condicione per se obiecti quae est universalitas et quae, ut per se ratio obiecti, semper praecedit actum, quod non esset nisi species esset impressa in intellectu sicut concludunt tres primae rationes. Alia est condicio et dignitas potentiae superioris ne ipsa D is t. 3, Q uest ion F our 214 knowable that is common to all its inferiors,14but it is impossible that, as it has being in one singular, it be known as identical with all other singulars below it, except precisely with that singular in which it is. Therefore in the representative of one singular the universal is not known according to its total indifference. However, the intellect can understand the universal in this fashion according to its complete indifference, for otherwise there would be no universal predicates, nor would there be definitions, species, or genera, nor something precisely of this sort. Therefore the universal is not cognized in the sense imagination, for this is properly [knowledge] of the singular itself and this insofar as it is a singular of the most particular species, most of all if the sense imagination is impressed by something that suits it properly. 107 Also fourthly in this way: either the intellect as distinguished from the sensitive part [of the soul] can have an object present before it independently, or it cannot have such. If it can, I have what I propose, because the object is not present to it in abstractive cognition before the act is elicited, except through some representative that I call a species. Therefore if it cannot have such, then it can have no operation proper to itself without the sensitive part and as a consequence neither can it exist without that [part], according to the argument of the Philosopher in Bk. Ill of De anima: if the intellect cannot have an operation proper to itself, then it cannot be separated, hence he would not concede that the intellect could be separated from the body, as the perpetual from the corruptible, unless it could have an operation proper to itself for which it would not be dependent upon the sensitive part. 108 I say therefore to the question that one must postulate the intellect as possessing a memory: [i.e.,] intelligible species representing the universal as universal, that is naturally prior to the act of understanding. And the need for such is twofold: one from the condition of the object per se which is universality and which, as a per se feature of the object, always precedes the act, which can only be if the species were impressed in the intellect as the first three reasons imply. The other is the condition and 48Quod: superflue dictum. 14 Inferiors = all things less extensive such as are the individuals falling under a species.
215 Jo hn D uns Sc otus, R epor tatio I-A vilificetur nimium, nisi manifeste appareat aliquid repugnans; maxime autem vilificaretur si non posset habere suum obiectum sibi praesens, nisi praesentia mendicata a potentiis inferioribus, quibus est ex ratione potentiae coniuncta accidentaliter, et tamen quod aliae potentiae inferiores possent habere sua obiecta propria praesentialitate non mendicata; et hoc concludit quarta ratio. 109 Memoria autem potest accipi tripliciter vel intellectus sub ratione memoriae: uno modo ut est conservativa specierum praeteritarum ut praeterita sunt, et isto modo loquitur Philosophus in De memoria et reminiscentia,49 et de ista etiam aliquid tangetur inferius. Alio modo ut est conservativa specierum repraesentantium obiecta in se, sive sint realiter sive non; et hoc modo loquimur hic de memoria; et dico quod sic, tum propter universalitatem, tum propter dignitatem potentiae. Tertio modo prout habet aliquod principium eliciendi notitiam actualem, quod tamen non manet sine actu secundo, quomodo ponit Avicenna50 speciem in intellectu nostro, et de ista dicetur in quaestione sequenti. 110 Haec quae supra probavi videtur esse expressa intentio Philosophi, III De anima,51ubi dicit quod anima est quodammodo omnia intelligibilia per intellectum, sicut sensibilia per sensum; quod non potest intelligi per habitum, quia habitus non est similitudo repraesentativa obiecti, quia sequitur actum aliquis habitus. 111 Et confirmatur hoc, quia habitus scientiae per quem reducitur intellectus de potentia essentiali ad potentiam accidentalem respectu actuum de quibus loquitur Philosophus II De anima52 et VIII Physicorum,53 necessario praecedit actum intelligendi. Scientia autem quae habitus est sequitur actum, quia generatur ex actibus. Unde ista scientia quae reducit intellectum de potentia essentiali ad potentiam accidentalem est species, quae species vere est habitus, quia nata radicari et firmari in intellectu; sed tamen non omnis habitus est species, quia habitus accidentaliter radicatus et firmatus non est species 49 Aristot., De memoria et reminiscentia, c. 1 (4496 24-5). 50 Avicenna, De anima pars 5, c. 6 (AviL, 143-6). 51 Aristot., De anima III, c. 8 (4316 22). 52 Aristot., De anima II, c. 5 (417a 21-6 2). 53 Aristot., Physica VIII, c. 4 (2556 1-5). D is t. 3, Q uest io n F our 215 dignity of the superior potency lest it be too vilified, unless something appeared clearly to be repugnant to it; but it would be vilified in the highest degree if it could not have its own object present to it, unless it were acquired by begging from inferior potencies, to which it is accidentally joined as a potency, while at the same time the other inferior potencies could have their own objects present without begging, and this the fourth reason proves. 109 But memory, or the intellect functioning as memory, can be taken in three ways: in one way as conserving the species of the past things as past, and the Philosopher speaks of this in De memoria et reminiscentia, and something will be said about this later. In another way as conserving the species representing the objects in themselves, whether they really exist or not; and in this way we speak of memory here, and I say that this is so, both because of their universality and because of the dignity of the potency. A third way is insofar as [the memory] has some principle whereby it elicits actual knowledge, which, however, does not stay there without a second act.* Avicenna posits how [such a] species is in our intellect, and this will be discussed in the following question. 110 That which I have proved above seems to be the express intent of the Philosopher in Bk. Ill of De anima, where he says that the soul is in some measure all that are intelligible through the intellect, as the sense is all that can be known through sense perception; which cannot be understood through a habit, because a habit is not a likeness representative of the object, for a habit follows some act. 111 And this is confirmed because the habit of knowledge through which the intellect is reduced from essential potency to accidental potency with respect to the acts, about which the Philosopher speaks in Bk. II of the De anima and Bk. V III of the Physics, necessarily precedes the act of understanding. Knowledge, however, which is a habit, follows the act, because it is generated from acts. Hence this science which reduces the intellect from essential to accidental potency is a species, which species truly is habit, because it is suited to be rooted and made firm in the intellect; but nevertheless not every habit is a species,
216 John Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A quae praecedit actum nata firmari, quia ista postea firmantur per actum. 112 Item, secundum istos,54 non videretur aliquis habitus esse ponendus in intellectu nostro, sed tantum in virtute phantastica, quia secundum quemcumque modum essendi est obiectum in aliqua potentia, secundum eundem modum essendi sunt omnia quae continentur virtualiter in illo obiecto. Ergo si obiectum universale non esset per suum repraesentativum in intellectu, sed in virtute phantastica, omnia explicanda et explicabilia de isto obiecto essent ibidem, et ita non esset nisi habitus phantasticus, praecipue si phantastica ordinate concurrerent, explicans omnes veritates scibiles de illo obiecto, et omnis scientia esset in phantasia et perfectio eius et non esset perfectio intellectus, quod est contra Philosophum; et sic cum species illa in phantasia contineat virtute actum intellectus, ergo actus ille erit in phantasia. 113 Item, Augustinus XIII De Trinitate, cap. 4, 6 et 15,55 investigat Trinitatem ubi dicit quod impossibile est accipere imaginem Trinitatis ex anima nostra vel in mente, nisi per hoc quod aliquid est in memoria ex quo imprimitur aliud. 114 Tunc arguo sic: si in mente est aliquid parens Verbi, oportet quod hoc sit per aliquid intrinsecum sive exsistens in memoria; sed non est parens Verbi nisi memoria habeat obiectum menti intra se praesens; alias non esset parens. Ergo cum obiectum non sit in memoria quantitative et realiter, nec phantasma, necessario erit parens per speciem intelligibilem. 115 Sed dices quod propter lumen intellectus agentis in phantasmate possunt omnia fieri in intellectu et memoria quae fiunt per speciem intelligibilem quam tu ponis et salvatur praesentia obiecti in quantum actum intelligo universale; nulla igitur est necessitas ponendi speciem. r>4scilicet, Henricus Gand., Quodl. V, q. 25 in corp. (f. 204K). s» Cf. August., De Trin. XII, c. 2, n. 2 (CCSL 50, 356-7; P L 42, 999); ibid., XIV, c. 3, n. 5 (CCSL 50A, 426; P L 42, 1039); ibid., c. 6, n. 8 (CCSL 50A, 432; P L 42, 1042). D is t. 3, Q uest ion F our 216 because a habit accidentally rooted and made firm is not the species that precedes the act and is suited by nature to be made firm, for those are made firm through an act afterwards. 112 Also according to those, it does not seem that some habit must be postulated in our intellect, but only in the imaginative power, because all things that are contained virtually in an object [that is] in some potency have the same mode of being as that object has [in that potency]. Therefore if the universal object were not in the intellect through what is representative of it, but in the imaginative power, all that must be explained and can be explained about this object would [also] be there, and thus it would only be an imaginative habit especially if imaginative things concurred in a well ordered way explaining all truths that can be known about this object, and all knowledge would be in the sense imagination, as well as its perfection, and it would not be a perfection of the intellect, which is against what the Philosopher says; and thus, since that species in the sense imagination would contain virtually the act of the intellect, therefore that act will be in the sense imagination. 113 Also, Augustine in Bk. XIII of the Trinity, chapters 4, 6 and 15, investigates the Trinity where he says that it is impossible to accept the image of the Trinity from our soul or in the mind, except through [an assumption] that something is in the memory from which another is impressed. 114 Then I argue in this way: if in the mind something is a parent of the Word,* it is necessary that this be through something intrinsic or existing in the memory; but unless the memory would have an object of the mind within itself it would not be a parent. Therefore, since the object is not in the memory quantitatively or really, nor [is there] a sensible image, it will necessarily be a parent through an intelligible species. 115 But you may say that because of the light of the agent intellect in the sense imagination, all things can come to be in the intellect and memory which come to be through an intelligible species, which you posit, and the presence of the object is saved insofar as I understand the act as a universal; therefore there is no necessity to posit a species.
217 John Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A 116 Respondeo quod non sunt ponenda plura ubi sufficit unum; necessitas autem ponendi speciem intelligibilem est duplex: prima est propter intellectum universalis ut universale est, quia si non est species, non plus relucet obiectum universale in phantasmate quam in pede, nec plus intelligit intellectus in phantasia quam in alia parte, quia ibi non est magis repraesentativum obiecti universalis quam alibi. Alia necessitas ponendi speciem intelligibilem est propter praesentiam obiecti in intellectu, quam habet ex nobilitate potentiae et naturae suae; natura enim superior vel potentia non dependet ab inferiori, et ideo oportet quod habeat praesentiam sui obiecti, sive suum obiectum intrinsece, quod non potest esse nisi per speciem. [III. Ad argumenta principalia] 117 Ad primum argumentum56 dico quod concluderet si Deus imprimeret, et concludit contra omnem opinionem. Respondeo ergo quod species repraesentat obiectum sub ratione formali sub qua obiectum imprimit, etiam si ab alio imprimeretur, et hoc est sub ratione quiditatis, quae est ratio agendi; singularitas autem non est ratio agendi, sed agentis sive modi agendi. Ulterius dico quod quando species imprimitur ab aliquo sicut a causa totali, illud quod est ratio imprimendi est etiam ratio repraesentantis; quando autem non imprimitur nisi a particulari causa, tunc potest repraesentare condicionem agentis sub opposito modo. Sic D is t. 3, Q uest ion F our 217 116 I reply that several things must not be postulated where one suffices; but the necessity of assuming an intelligible species is twofold: the first is on account of understanding the universal as universal, for if no species exists, the universal object will shine forth in the sense imagination no more than it will in the foot, nor will the intellect understand in the sense imagination any more than in another part, because no more is there a representative of the universal object there than elsewhere. The other necessity for postulating the intelligible species is because of the presence of the object in the intellect, which it has because of the nobility of the potency and its [own] nature. For the superior nature or potency does not depend upon the inferior one, and therefore it is necessary that it have the presence of its object or have it internally, which it can only have through a species. To the Initial Arguments 117 To the first argument [n. 84] I say that it would have held good [even] if God were to make the impression, and it is againt any [existing] opinion. I reply therefore that the species represents the object under its formal* aspect under which the object impresses, even if it were impressed by another [individual], and this formal aspect is its quiddity [or essence], which is its basis for acting. Singularity however, is not the source of its acting; rather it is [a condition] of the agent or its manner of acting. Furthermore, I say that when the species is impressed by something as a total cause, that which is the [causal]15 aspect under which it was impressed is also the [conditional] aspect of the one making the representation. However, when it is impressed only by what is a partial cause,16 then it can represent the condition of the agent17 under an opposite mode. Such is the case here, because the intelligible 5GCf. supra n. 84. 15As the text of the Ordinatio makes clear, the distinction Scotus is making here is between a cause, and what is only a sine qua non condition. The nature or quiddity of the individual, not its individuality, is the cause or basis of its acting in the specific way it does. 16 The object is only a partial cause; to act it requires the co-causality of the intellect. 17Namely, its singularity, rather than its quiddity or nature.
218 Jo hn D uns Sc otus, R epor tatio I-A est hie, quia species intelligibilis repraesentabit quiditatem obiecti sub ratione istius singularis et illius, et non erit ratio agendi, quia non est species repraesentans quiditatem obiecti universalis. 118 Ad aliud57 dicendum quod aequivocatio est de praesentialitate; quaedam enim est praesentialitas realis obiecti et potentiae, sive activi ad passivum; et alia est praesentialitas obiecti cognoscibilis, et haec non requirit praesentiam obiecti realem, sed bene requirit aliquid in quo obiectum relucet. Dico ergo quod praesentia obiecti realis est causa realis speciei et in ilia est obiectum praesens. Unde in prima praesentia obiectum est causa efficiens, sed in secunda praesentia est speciei praesentia formalis. Species enim est talis naturae quod in ea est praesens obiectum cognoscibiliter, non effective vel realiter, sed per modum relucentis. 119 Ad tertium,58 quando dicitur quod intellectus patietur passione reali, dico quod intellectus patitur duplici passione, sicut potentia organica vel sensus organicus. Primo realiter recipiendo speciem, licet non sit realis sicut passio materiae, et hac praemissa, sequitur passio cognoscibilis sive intentionalis qua patitur ab obiecto in specie intentionaliter, et ideo intelligere est motus ad animam, quia ab obiecto ut in specie. Prima ergo passio est in intellectu per speciem praesentem receptam in intellectu, secunda est ab obiecto ut in specie relucente. 120 Ad quartum,59 quando dicitur quod si sunt plures species intelligibiles, quaelibet movebit ad propriam intellectionem, dico quod concludit contra omnem opinionem. Dicit enim Augustinus XIV De Trinitate, cap. 6,60 quod multa novit memoria de quibus non cogitat homo. Unde hoc dictum non quaerit nisi difficultatem antiquam, scilicet quare hoc primo intelligitur et non illud. Quando dicitur quod omnes species movebunt simul vel nulla, 57 Cf. supra n. 85. 58 Cf. supra n. 86. 59 Cf. supra n. 87. fi0 August., De Trin. XIV, c. 6, n. 8 (CCSL 50A, 432; PL 42, 1042). D is t. 3, Q uest io n F our 218 species would represent the quiddity of the object under the aspect of this or that singular, and will not be the causal basis of acting, since it is not the species representing the quiddity of the universal object. 118 To the other [n. 85] it must be said that being present is equivocal; for there is a being present of the real object and potency, or when something active [is present] in respect to what is passive; and there is another being present of the object that can be known, and this does not require any real presence of the object, but it does indeed require something in which the object shines forth. I say, therefore, that the presence of a real object is the real cause of a species and in that species the object is present. Hence in the first [type of] presence it is the object that is the efficient cause, but in the second [type of] presence, it is the species that is formally present. For the species is of such a nature that in it the object is present as something able to be known, not as something real or effective, but in a way that it shines forth. 119 To the third [n. 86], when it is said that the intellect would receive a real impression, I say that the intellect, just as an organic potency, or as a sense organ, is the recipient of a twofold impression. In the first way it really receives a species, although it is not real in the sense of a material imprint; and when this is given, there follows an intentional imprint of what can be known, when [the intellect] reacts to the object in the species in an intentional way, and therefore, to understand is a movement to the soul, because it is from the object as it exists in the species. Therefore the first impression occurs in the intellect through the presence of the species it has received; the second is from the object as its shines forth in the species. 120 To the fourth, [n. 87] when it is said that if there are several intelligible species, each will move to an intellection proper to itself, I say that that implies something that militates against any opinion. For Augustine says in Bk. XIV of the Trinity, chapter 6, that man has many memories he is not actually thinking about. This statement, therefore, only raises the old question, namely, why does this memory, and not that, first come to mind. When it is claimed that either all species together or no species will move,
219 John Duns Scotus, Reportatio I-A respondeo ergo quod in principio sensibilia occurrunt sensui diversa diversis vel diversa uni inter quae semper est iste ordo, quod unum illorum movet efficacissime et movet efficacissime illam potentiam quam movet, et efficacius illam quam aliam; motus autem efficacissimus est phantasiae. Receptis igitur multis phantasmatibus, tunc post dormitionem esset iste ordo, si intellectus non habeat habitum, quod phantasma efficacissimum primum movet nec est in potestate nostra sive in potestate recipientis illud phantasma; huic autem phantasiae efficaciter motae per phantasma obiecti efficacissimi coagit intellectus agens et immutat intellectum possibilem ad usum speciei correspondents, abstrahendo speciem intelligibilem, et sic sequitur necessario prima intellectio sive unus actus necessitatis et, illo habito, potest voluntas61 servare illam speciem vel non uti ea, vel potest converti ad alia et si voluntas non esset semper efficacissima, prius moveret. 121 Ad probationem, quando dicitur vel omnes movebunt simul vel nulla, dico quod quaelibet movet aequaliter et proportionaliter, id est aequalitate proportionali, non tamen aequaliter quaelibet movet simpliciter, et dico proportionaliter, quia sicut parvus calor ad parvam calefactionem, ita magnus proportionaliter ad magnam calefactionem; sed calor licet sit aequalis proportionaliter et calefactio, non tamen aequalis in perfectione. Et sic est in proposito, quia unicum tantum simpliciter et perfecte movet, licet alia moveant ex natura sua proportionaliter. 122 Ad argumentum de loco,62 scilicet quod intellectus est locus specierum, dico quod loci est conservare, et aliter intellectus salvat species quam sensus. Illa ergo potentia debet dici locus proprie cuius est salvare speciem, sed nulla potentia organica est conservativa specierum nec salvans, quia species possunt corrumpi vel ex indispositione organi vel ex actione contrarii. 61 Add. vel non omnes codd., sed expunctum in uno, quod ad sensum melius videtur. 62 Cf. supra n. 89. D is t. 3, Q uest ion F our 219 I respond, therefore, that in the beginning diverse perceptible things occur to diverse senses or to one sense, among which there is always this order, that one of them moves more efficaciously and moves most effectively that potency which it moves, and more effectively this than another. However, the movement that is most efficacious is that of the sense imagination. Therefore, after many sense images are received, this order would remain after sleeping if the intellect does not have a [contrary] habit that the most efficacious sense image would move first, nor is the sense image in our power or in the power of the one receiving it. But the agent intellect acts together with this sense imagination moved efficaciously by the image of the most efficacious object, and prepares the possible intellect to use the corresponding species by abstracting the intelligible species, and so the first act of understanding follows necessarily, i.e., there is one necessary act, and subsequently the will* can either make use of it or not, or it can be turned to another and if the will would not always be most efficacious, [that species] would move first. 121 As for the proof [n. 87], when it is said that either all will move together or none will, I say that each will move equally and proportionately, that is, with proportional equality; each, however, will not move equally in an unqualified sense. And I say that it will move in proportion [to its own capacity], in the sense that just as a little heat will heat a little, so proportionately a great heat will heat greatly. But [these two instances of] heat and heating, although [in both cases they have an] equal [opportunity to act] in proportion [to their capacity], are not equal in perfection. And so it is in what we propose, because only one moves simply and perfectly, although others may move in proportion to their nature. 122 To the argument about the location, namely that the intellect is the location of the species, [n. 89] I say that [the role] of the place* is to conserve the species and the intellect does this otherwise than the sense. Therefore, that potency must be called the location properly, whose task it is to save the species, but no organic potency is saving or conserving the species, because the species can be corrupted, either because the organ is indisposed or because of some contrary influence. Hence the Philosopher in
220 Jo hn D uns Sc otus, R epor tatio I-A Unde Philosophus, libro De memoria et reminiscentia,63dicit quod senex et pueri sunt male reminiscitivi, quia organum in eis est indispositum, in intellectu autem neutrum est. 123 Ad illud64 quod dicit de Augustino65 quod verbum gignitur non de specie, sed de scientia, dicendum quod in multis locis accipit scientiam pro specie intelligibili, vel pro scientia ut includit speciem; unde exponit illud formata cogitatio a scientia,66 id est a re quam scimus, et sic formatur ab illo in quo obiectum scitum est praesens in memoria; hoc autem est species; ergo formatur species in intellectu. Item, XIII De Trinitate in fine,67verbum est simillimum rei notae de qua gignitur. 124 Ad deductionem de organo,68 scilicet quod species non est in sensu nisi quia organum est eiusdem dispositionis cum medio etc., dico quod propter neutram rationem praecise species est in sensu; non propter primam, quia (Philosophus, I De anima)69 forma non est propter materiam sed e converso. Dispositio igitur organi non est nisi propter dispositionem istius formae quae est in organo. Nec propter secundam rationem, scilicet ratione operationis perfectae, quia illa quae sunt sparsim in sensu propter suam imperfectionem, possunt esse in intellectu et modo perfectiori et sine organo. Natura ergo dedit organum sensui ut posset operari circa obiecta corporalia quod potest intellectus sine omni organo. 125 Ad rationem alterius magistri,70 dicendum quod aliquid potest esse in potentia et in ordine primo ad duas formas, tamen secundum diversas primitates. Quaedam enim est primitas perfectionis, et quaedam originis sive generationis. Potentia ergo intellectiva respectu obiecti est in potentia primo ad cognitionem primitate perfectionis et est in potentia primo ad speciem primitate originis vel generationis. 63 Aristot., De memoria et reminiscentia, c. 2 (4536 4-7). 64 Cf. supra n. 90. G5August., De Trin. XV, c. 10, n. 19 (CCSL 50A, 486; PL 42, 1071). GGIbid. G7Ibid., c. 12, n. 22 (CCSL 50A, 493; PL 42, 1075). 08 Cf. supra n. 91. G9Cf. Aristot., De anima I, c. 5 (4106 10-5; 4116 5-10). 70 Cf. supra n. 92. D is t. 3, Q uest ion F our 220 the book De memoria et reminiscentia, says that the very old and infants recall badly, because their organs are indisposed; in the intellect, however, there is neither.18 123 As for what is said of Augustine that the word is born not of the species, but of the knowledge itself, [n. 90] it must be said that in many places he takes knowledge in the sense of the intelligible species, or for knowledge as including the species. Hence he explains that thinking is formed from knowledge, that is, from something we know, and thus it is formed from that, in which the object known is present as memorized. But this is the species; therefore species is formed in the intellect. The same is found in Bk. XIII of The Trinity, at the end, that the word is most like the thing known from which it is begotten. 124 As for what is deduced about the organ [n. 91], namely that the species is only in the senses, because the organ is disposed in the same way as the medium, etc., I say that it is because of neither reason that the species is in the senses. Not because of the first, since the Philosopher in Bk. I of De anima, says the form exists not because of the matter, but vice versa. Therefore the disposition of the organ exists only because of the disposition of this form, which is in the organ. Neither is it because of the second reason, namely, by reason of the perfect operation, because those things that are scattered in the sense because of its imperfection, could be in the intellect in a more perfect manner and without an organ. Therefore nature gives an organ to the sense so that it could operate in regard to corporeal objects, which the intellect could without an organ. 125 To the reason of the other master [n. 92], it must be said that something could be primarily in potency as regards two forms, nevertheless according to different primacies. One is a primacy of perfection, and another of origin or generation.* Therefore, the intellective potency with respect to the object is primarily in potency as regards cognition by a primacy of perfection, and it is primarily in potency as regards the species by a primacy of origin* and generation. 18Namely, neither corruption nor indisposition.