1 ANALOGY, SCHEMATISM AND THE EXISTENCE OF GOD Luboš Rojka Introduction Analogy was crucial to Aquinas s philosophical theology, in that it helped the inability of human reason to understand God. Human reason is not able to understand God, but it can understand God s participation in creation by analogy in terms of the relation between human and divine knowledge and action. Kant does not deny the value of analogical reasoning. His concern is to confine its use within properly defined limits. Kant often contrasts symbolic/analogical with schematic/logical judgments. Simply put, analogy is used to gain relational knowledge but not direct, demonstrative and objective knowledge. After this distinction, analogical reasoning seems to have been confined to theology, with a consequent loose of sensitivity in philosophy. Does the schematism really have to be thought of as something essentially different or even opposite to analogy? What is the relation between analogy and schematism? In this short work, we will introduce the basic concepts of analogy and schematism as they are in Kant s works. Then, we will attempt to explore how Kant understands their relation. Finally, we will offer our own consideration of the relation between analogy and schematism in the context of the general discussion of God s existence. 1. Schematism and Analogy in Kant Schema and Schematism In the chapter on schematism in CPR, 1 Kant offers the following characteristics: Schema is the third thing, which is homogeneous with... the category and... with the appearances (CPR A 138/B 177). It is a medium between otherwise heterogeneous concepts and intuitions. Schemata play a necessary part in judgment by enabling pure concepts to be applied to appearances. In order to do so, 1 The Schematism of the Pure Concepts of Understanding.
2 they must be homogeneous with both concepts and intuitions, as much intellectual as sensible. Schemata have the property of realizing the categories and at the same time, restricting their scope to appearances. They play a pivotal role in bringing together the otherwise empty thoughts without content and blind intuitions without concepts (CPR A 51/B 75). It is through schematism that concepts, which are merely functions of the understanding, are given meaning in relation to sensibility which realizes the understanding in the very process of restricting it (CPR A 147/B 187). In this sense, it prepares the intuition for being determined by the concept, and also adapts the concept for application to intuition. But that is not all. The schematism of pure understanding is also the procedure of understanding in the schemata (My italics; CPR A 140/B 179). This means that the schematism structures the schemata of our understanding into a whole. Thus, there are two directions in the process of schematizing. On the one hand, a unification of pure concepts with intuitions and, on the other hand, structuring the schemata into a whole. We will call the former vertical and the latter horizontal direction of schematiziation. Analogy Analogy does not signify (as is commonly understood) an imperfect similarity of two things, but a perfect similarity of relations between two quite different dissimilar things (P SS 58). Analogical is used in such a way as the promotion of the welfare of children (a) is to the love of parents (b), so the welfare of the human species (c) is to that unknown in God (x), which we call love (P SS 58). In such a reasoning we do speak about the object itself, but only in a way which it might be made comprehensive to us. Because, the analogical argument holds only for us, though we have left out everything that could determine it absolutely or in itself (P SS 58). Therefore, this knowledge is called relational. 2. Schematism, the Basis of Architectonic Unity of Synthetic Understanding Relation between Schematism and Analogy From the previous exposition one might conclude the irriconcilable character of schematism and analogy. Kant himself sometimes draws a sharp distinction between them. The schemata of direct and demonstrative presentations are contrasted with the symbols of indirect, analogical presentation. In the latter, the concept is first applied to an object of sensible intuition and then its rule of reflection is applied to quite another object, of which the former is but the
3 symbol (CJ SS 59). Also in FI, the symbolic use of judgment is distinguished from the schematic as being artistic (SS V). A doubt about their irriconciliability rises from the fact that Kant describes both as hypotyposes; i.e., presentations (exhibitiones), not mere marks. 2 Similarly it is in RL where Kant makes more precise the relation between symbolic and schematic procedures of judgment, regarding both as forms of schematism. While it is permitted in the passage from the sensible to the supersensible to schematize, it is on no account permitted to infer (RL p. 65, 59). We cannot infer from the analogy that makes a concept such as God intelligible to us the conclusion that this schema must necessarily belong to the object itself as its predicate (RL p. 65, 59). Even though it is legitimate to employ analogy to speak of the supersensible, but no to use it as if it gave us objective knowledge; its use is permitted as an aid to human understanding, but not as a source of objective knowledge of God. Now, a few questions arise. If there is a common feature and at the same time a difference between the schematism and analogy, what is their relation based on? How is schematism involved in analogy? How precisely do we use schematism in the analogical discussion concerning God? Imagination A possible way might be to consider the imagination as a principle of unity from which schematism and analogy arise. Kant mentions certain rules of synthesis of the imagination (My italics; CPR A141/B180). Furthermore, the schema is in itself always a product of imagination even though (schema) has to be distinguished from the image (CPR A 140/B 179). In the next analysis, Kant specifies that the image is a product of the empirical faculty of reproductive imagination and the schema... is a product and, as it were, monogram, of pure a priori imagination... (CPR A 142/B 181). As can be seen, Kant distinguishes empirical-reproductive and pure a priori imagination. The former produces the image and the latter the schema. There is a relation between the image and the pure imagination, because this imagination is that through which and in accordance with which images themselves first become possible (CPR A 142/B 181). To sum up, the image is distinguished from schema. 3 It is a product of empirical imagination and presupposes a pure a priori imagination. The schema is a product and monogram of the pure a priori imagination. Up to now, we have not find in what the relation among analogy, schematism and imagination might consist. The situation might seem more puzzling than before speaking of the 2 Caygill also mentions WP, where direct presentation is a real schematism (transcendental) while indirect presentation is schematism by analogy (symbolic) (WP p. 332, p. 195). 3 Even though they may coincide in some cases.
4 imagination. But let us try to proceed with an analysis of the monogram of the imagination which may perhaps help us to enter deeper into the problem. Schemata as Monogram In order to understand monogram, that which seems to be decisive is the character of the schema as illustrated in quite different context by the discussion of systematicity, in the section of CPR on the Architectonic of Pure Reason. Here Kant refers to the schema as a way of realizing the idea of a systematic unity of reason. He defines it as a constituent manifold and an order of its parts, both of which must be determined a priori from the principle defined by its end. Here what the schema features is both a manifold and an ordering of a manifold, thus participating materially and formally in producing a unified whole. A schema which unifies empirically in accordance with purposes that are contingently occasioned yields technical unity, while the schema which originates from an idea serves as the basis of architectonic unity (CPR A 833/B 861). This architectonic unity provides an anticipatory outline or monogram of the entire system. Properly this reference seems to clarify Kant s earlier description of the schema as a monogram of pure a priori imagination. The schemata which originate from an idea are the basis of architectonic unity of pure a priori imagination. If we understand the architectonic unity correctly, it should be a consequence of a procedure which we called the horizontal dimension of the schematism, namely, of the procedure of understanding in schemata. In this sense, the schematism is a way of reaching the architectonic unity of pure a priori imagination and of our understanding in schemata. To sum up, the schema are a product of pure a priori imagination and, at the same time, its monogram. The schemata, as the monogram, are in architectonic unity, which depends on an initial idea. Schematism (in the horizontal sense) is a procedure of drawing out this unity of schemata from an initial idea. Now, to put it in relation to analogy, we will explore a concrete example of an analogical argument, namely, about the existence of God. 3. Analogy and Schematism of our Understanding of God s Existence First, we will explore very briefly a basic structure of proves of God s existence, which might be in some respects different from Kant s. Then, we will explain the role of analogy and schematized synthesis in these arguments. A posteriori arguments for God s existence usually start from an analysis of experience of real events, such as, movement, intelligent structure of the world, existence of natural laws. When somebody tries to understand these different sorts of facts, he/she is attempting to grasp them intelligently asking about causes
5 and mechanisms and about their origin; in other word, he/she is synthesizing a global apprehension. He/she is building a unity of understanding from down upwards. We can say that the architectonic unity from which an affirmation idea rises is: God must really exist. If we do a comparison with the process of schematizing, described above, which starts from an idea and then builds an architectonic unity, we find a contrary procedure in the arguments for the existence of God. The final idea, God must really exist, is a consequence of an architectonic unity of our apprehension of empirical reality, where the schematism may be seen as a skeleton of the procedure. Conclusion To conclude, the a posteriori arguments for the existence of God seem to be a consequence of the schematic procedure of our understanding. 4 The final idea about God s existence is analogical, and clearly, it is a consequence of our schematized understanding. The expression God exists is analogical because we do not know the manner of this existence. But at the same time, we say something about God Himself. Simply, God must exist in a way, because the contrary of this affirmation is only absolute non-existence which cannot create anything. List of Abbreviations: CJ Critique of Judgment CPR Critique of Pure Reason FI First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment P Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics that will be able to come forward as Science RL Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone WP What Real Progress has Metaphysics made in Germany since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff? Bibliography: S. BABOLIN, Semiosi e Comunicazione. Roma: PUG 1997. H. CAYGILL, A Kant Dictionary. Oxford: Blackwell 1995. F. C. COPLESTON, Aquinas. London: Penguin Books 1955. I. KANT, Critique of Judgment. Internet. I. KANT, Critique of Pure Reason. London: MacMillan Press 1929. I. KANT, Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics. Indiana: The Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1950. W. H. WALSH, Kant s Criticism of Metaphysics. Edinburgh: University Press 1975. 4 This procedure is also the monogram of the pure a priori imagination.