IDEALISM WITHOUT LIMITS

IDEALISM WITHOUT LIMITS

Philosophical Studies in Contemporary Culture Volume 18 Senior Editor H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., Department of Philosophy, Rice University, and Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, Texas Editor Mark J. Cherry, Department of Philosophy, St. Edward s University, Austin, Texas Assistant Editor Lisa Rasmussen, Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina, Charlotte, North Carolina Editorial Board Stanley Hauerwas, Divinity School, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina Maureen Kelley, Department of Pediatric Bioethics, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington Terry Pinkard, Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. C. Griffin Trotter, Center for Health Care Ethics & Emergency Medicine, Saint Louis University, St. Louis, Missouri Kevin Wm. Wildes, S.J., President, Loyola University, New Orleans, Louisiana For further volumes: http://www.springer.com/series/6446

IDEALISM WITHOUT LIMITS Hegel and the Problem of Objectivity by Klaus Brinkmann Boston University, Boston, MA, USA 123

Klaus Brinkmann Boston University Dept. Philosophy Commonwealth Ave. 745 02215 Boston, Massachusetts USA brinkman@bu.edu ISSN 0928-9518 ISBN 978-90-481-3621-6 e-isbn 978-90-481-3622-3 DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-3622-3 Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg London New York Library of Congress Control Number: 2010935666 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011 No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Printed on acid-free paper Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)

To say the truth, I am wont for my own part, to regard this work as a child of time rather than of wit. (Francis Bacon)

Preface The manuscript of this book underwent a rather long metamorphosis before it finally saw the light of day. It was always to be a book about Hegel and the problem of objective knowledge, but it started originally with the problem of objectivity as it develops in the thought of the Pre-Socratic philosophers, in particular Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Zeno of Elea, and then found a preliminary resolution in Plato and Aristotle. The rationale for letting the narrative begin with the ancients was that Hegel saw himself as standing not primarily in a Kantian but in an Aristotelian tradition. As much as Hegel intended to complete Kant s Copernican revolution, and as much as he acknowledges his debt to Kant (especially in a footnote in the Introduction to the Science of Logic and, later in that work, in the general introduction to the Logic of the Concept), he also sees the critical philosophy as only one moment, albeit the crucial one, in the unfolding of the history of thinking that starts with the ancients. This larger trajectory of Hegel s argument can be seen particularly clearly in the Three Positions of Thought towards Objectivity in the Introduction to the Encyclopedia. I subsequently convinced myself that my original narrative required perhaps too long a breath to keep the reader s attention, hence the beginning with Descartes in the present version. I also found that the Cartesian legacy is still very much alive in our contemporary world and that it is in many ways responsible for our cultural and philosophical difficulties. This is the reason why I replaced the original examination of the ancients with a discussion of some contemporary attempts at preserving a viable conception of objectivity. For a further characterization of the argument of this book I may refer the reader to the Introduction. I would like to express my gratitude to the many people who accompanied the growth and permutations of this book over the years. I am indebted to my colleagues at Boston University who supported my efforts so graciously and generously, as well as to the undergraduate and graduate students who participated in my Hegel courses. It is a gratifying thought that some of the latter now teach Hegel in the classroom themselves. I would like to thank my now retired colleague Henry Allison in particular for the discussions we had about the proper way to read Kant. The more intense they were, the more enlightened I came away from them, learning to differentiate ever more sharply between the Hegelian and the Kantian Kant. I owe an vii

viii Preface immense debt of gratitude to my friend Thomas Bole III with whom I studied Hegel at the University of Tübingen under the guidance of our teacher Klaus Hartmann. Our long discussions of the true nature of Hegel s argument have helped shape my view of Hegel s project. I also thank the readers at Springer for valuable feedback on the manuscript. A special word of thanks is owed to H. Tristram Engelhardt whose unflagging encouragement helped me keep the faith. I would also like to thank the staff at Springer, especially Ms. Marion Wagenaar, for their assistance in the production and publication of this book. Finally, without my wife s willingness cheerfully to endure countless evenings with me hidden away in my study this book could not have been written. Some debts cannot be repaid. Boston, Massachusetts Klaus Brinkmann

Introduction This book is primarily about Hegel. But the analysis I offer of Hegel s Phenomenology of Spirit and of his project in the Logic (the Science of Logic as well as the Encyclopedia Logic) is embedded in a larger context. First, there is the muchdiscussed relationship between Kant and Hegel. And second, there is the broader issue of how to secure universal standards of objectivity and normative principles of cognition and action. As I see it, Hegel came to the conclusion that Kant had pursued the Copernican revolution in philosophy only halfheartedly and had left it unfinished. On the other hand, Hegel saw no alternative to the completion of the Kantian project as he understood it. In this respect, he held on to the Kantian motive that it must be possible for concepts to determine objects a priori, if a normative basis for objective knowledge was to be preserved. Hegel based his conclusion on an immanent critique of Kant s argument in the Transcendental Deduction. The element of empirical realism that Kant needed to retain in order to avoid empirical idealism eventually undermines the position of transcendental idealism and leads to a theoretical impasse. This meant that Kant s transcendental project could only be sustained and brought to completion, if transcendental idealism was able to proceed without the element of empirical realism, i.e. without a heterogeneous material for cognition given independently of the subject of cognition. For Hegel, the task of developing such a homogeneous conception of idealism, an idealism without limits, as I call it, went under the motto of overcoming the opposition of consciousness, i.e., overcoming the epistemic hiatus between cognitive subject and object, mind and world. Although Kant s transcendental unity of apperception in principle achieved just that, the subsequent introduction of an empirical manifold of sensation invalidates the original unity by showing it to be burdened with an other or limited by it. The Phenomenology of Spirit was designed to accomplish the unfinished task of leading from subjective thinking (whose measure is correctness or the adaequatio repraesentationis et rei) to objective thought (whose measure is truth or the adaequatio conceptus et rei) and to establish the platform for a homogeneous idealism that moves exclusively within the immanence of thought. If successful, this undertaking would be proof that transcendental idealism in the form of a pure idealism remains a viable position to take. ix

x Introduction Second, there is the issue of Hegel s potential contribution to contemporary philosophical debates and, more broadly, to contemporary culture. I believe that one aspect of our current situation is what I call the crisis of subjectivity. This crisis is the result of a profound insecurity of the individual as a cognitive subject and as a subject of agency, an insecurity that has its roots in our Cartesian legacy. Descartes privileging of the individual as the ultimate arbiter of truth represents a major reason for this crisis. Even if Descartes did not inaugurate this turn towards individual subjectivity, he brought out its significance and gave it momentum and direction. Kant in fact ratified this turn while also trying to preserve the possibility of objective knowledge. In this, he had no lasting success, nor did Hegel, for that matter. Today, there is a widespread consensus that objectivity is some kind of social construct or the outcome of an interpretive activity by a particular community of agents. Every community, however, is particularized. It has its own standards of objectivity and its own norms. The problem should be obvious: Without a universal consensus about common standards of objectivity and normative commitments as agents we run the risk of a dysteleological development. On the one hand, the lack of an overarching, universal framework that permits everyone to adjudicate truth claims across different communities encourages the development of parallel universes that may become incapable of communicating with one another. On the other hand, the pressures of globalization contradict communitarian fragmentation and may thus lead to destructive antagonisms among communities. In this situation, it seems, we need to renew the effort to establish a common commitment to objectivity and normative principles across particular communities. Obviously, philosophical reflection can only do so much in this situation. Still, I believe it to be an important task to look again at the roots of the current crisis in order to understand its nature and to examine some prominent contemporary proposals of how to deal with our Cartesian legacy. In the process, I have arrived at the conclusion that past efforts to overcome cognitive and moral fragmentation based on a transcendental approach broadly conceived could serve as a valuable point of orientation. In other words, there may still be lessons to learn from Kant and Hegel that bear on our current situation. As a result, the book s argument is structured in the following way. I will first look at the nature and origin of the crisis of subjectivity (Sections 1.1 and 1.2) and briefly discuss some traditional responses to the challenges it poses (Section 1.3) in order then to turn to an examination of contemporary positions that have generally moved beyond Descartes mental immanentism to an immanence of experience in which the epistemic hiatus of mind and world is no longer an issue (Section 1.4). But because these positions have difficulty securing a non-relativistic conception of objectivity, I suggest that we look at a position that was designed to accomplish precisely that in the area of theoretical knowledge, viz. Kant s First Critique (Section 2.1). Kant s argument there defines our ontological commitments by means of the so-called restriction thesis that results from his complementarity thesis. However, internal problems with the Transcendental Deduction that Hegel first exposed in Faith and Knowledge call into question the viability of Kant s particular version of transcendental idealism (Section 2.2 and Section 2.3). I claim that Hegel s critique of Kant is an immanent critique, not a critique advanced from a standpoint alien to the Kantian project, independently of the fact that Kant

Introduction xi would never have approved of the direction in which Hegel took the Copernican revolution. If Hegel s critique is convincing, however, the question becomes what it would take to complete the transcendental project successfully. I propose that Hegel s Phenomenology of Spirit holds the answer to this question (Sections 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7). The Phenomenology, however, is only a propaedeutic in that it tries to prove the general point that thinking is capable of objective thoughts but does not itself offer a universal framework for assessing our ontological commitments. The reconstruction of such a comprehensive framework by way of a systematic critique of the concepts that determine our ontological commitments is left to the Logic. In the concluding chapter, I consider first the complicated relationship between the Phenomenology and Hegel s system (Section 4.1). Next I turn to a characterization of Hegel s intentions in the Logic based primarily on the 1831 Preface and the Introduction to the Science of Logic and the Introduction to the Encyclopedia. Much of modern and contemporary theoretical philosophy is predicated on the mind-world relationship and consequently on the referential relationship between concepts and propositions and the objects they are supposed to be about. From within such a theoretical framework, it is difficult to appreciate Hegel s very different immanentist or non-referential approach. I therefore try to highlight Hegel s concern with the intelligibility of concepts rather than their reference. The difference is one between the correctness of my representations as compared to what is the case in the world on the one hand and the adequacy or truth of a given categorial take on being or reality on the other. Hegel s concern with the intelligibility and explanatory truth value of the categorial concepts that determine our ontological commitments explains, among other things, why intuition plays no role in the explanation of objective knowledge and why Hegel s critical reconstruction of the ontological frameworks that determine our ontological commitments is able to move entirely within the immanence of thought (Section 4.2). (Section 4.3) argues for a reading of Hegel in terms of a categorial theory and in that context addresses the debate about the metaphysical vs. the non-metaphysical Hegel. I suggest that there is a metaphysical Hegel in addition to the non-metaphysical Hegel. However, the metaphysical Hegel, I submit, is not to be found so much in the esoteric Hegel of the Science of Logic and the text of the Encyclopedia as published by Hegel himself as in the exoteric Hegel of the lecture hall who is reflected in the Lectures and the Additions to the Encyclopedia. In my opinion, the core of Hegel s thought and intentions is best expressed in the 1831 Preface to the Science of Logic and in its Introduction as well as the Introduction to the Encyclopedia. That Hegel is primarily about the critical examination of the categories or concepts that explain and determine our ontological commitments. The book s final section (Section 4.4) proposes to view Hegel s Logic not only as a form of ontological monism but also as an integrative pluralism. As I point out in conclusion, however, the integrative capacity of Hegel s dialectic has its limits when viewed against the background of contemporary pluralistic societies. Page references to Hegel in the original German are as follows: The Phenomenology of Spirit is quoted in the Moldenhauer/Michel edition, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1969 1972, by volume and page number after the reference to the

xii Introduction sections of the Miller translation, e.g. PS 135/3, 109. References to the German text of Hegel s Science of Logic are to the edition by Georg Lasson in two volumes, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1967, following the page reference to the Miller translation, e.g. SL 39/WdL I 19 or SL 584 585/WdL II 221 229. References to Kant s works are to the Academy edition by volume and page number. However, as is customary, I refer to the A and B editions of the Critique of Pure Reason without adding the volume number. For abbreviations to all other works by Hegel and to works from the history of philosophy I refer the reader to the list of Primary Sources in the bibliography. References to Hegel s Encyclopedia and Philosophy of Right are by section number only, omitting page numbers (e.g. E 6, PR 100). I am grateful to Continuum International Publishing Group, London, for allowing me to reprint a slightly altered version of The Dialectic of the Inverted World and the Meaning of Aufhebung, which appeared in The Dimensions of Hegel s Dialectic, edited by Nectarios G. Limnatis (2010), as Section 3.3 Perception and Understanding: The Immanence of Thinking and the Meaning of Aufhebung. I am also grateful to Yapi Kredi Publishing, Istanbul, for permission to reprint with slight changes the article Does Hegel s System Need the Phenomenology of Spirit? that is due to be published in Cogito, a Turkish quarterly journal of philosophy and the social sciences, and which appears here as Section 4.1 entitled Interlude: Does Hegel s System Need the Phenomenology of Spirit?

Contents 1 The Problem of Objectivity as a Problem of Modernity... 1 1.1 The Objectivity Problem and the Crisis of Subjectivity... 1 1.2 Descartes and the Roots of the Crisis of Subjectivity... 7 1.3 Some Traditional Arguments in Defense of Objectivity... 14 1.4 Some Contemporary Defenses of Objectivity... 21 1.5 Conclusions... 37 2 Kant and the Problem of Objectivity... 41 2.1 Kant s Transcendental Idealism... 41 2.2 Hegel s Critique of Kant: The Transcendental Deduction... 56 2.3 Beyond the Matter-Form Distinction: Hegel as a Philosopher of Radical Immanence... 71 3 The Argument of the Phenomenology... 79 3.1 Methodological Presuppositions... 79 3.2 Sense-Certainty: The Particular and the Universal... 100 3.3 Perception and Understanding: The Immanence of Thinking and the Meaning of Aufhebung... 117 3.4 The Native Land of Truth: From Desire to Reason... 154 3.5 Methodological Interlude: Overcoming the Opposition of Consciousness... 189 3.6 The Internalization of Spirit: From Ethical Substance to the Spiritual Individual... 194 3.7 Spirit That Knows Itself as Spirit: From Religion to Absolute Knowing... 204 4 Objective Knowledge and the Logic... 221 4.1 Interlude: Does the System Need a Ladder?... 221 4.2 Hegel s Paradigm Shift: From Referentiality to Intelligibility of Thought... 233 4.3 The Metaphysical and the Non-Metaphysical Hegel... 244 4.4 Hegel s Integrative Pluralism and Its Limits... 259 Bibliography... 267 Index... 275 xiii