Notes and References. Thousand Oaks CA, 1995, pp 'Closure Studies'.

Transcription

1 Notes and References 1 DW Mercer, The NIEMR/ EMF Controversy: The Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge and Science Policy in the Gibbs Powerline Inquiry 1990/1991, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Wollongong, A number of valuable comments were provided on this thesis by my supervisor John Schuster and my examiners Trevor Pinch and Bryan Wynne. Thanks also to Evelleen Richards for lively debate on the political role of the SSK analyst. 2 It is important to acknowledge my awareness of the limitations of trying to provide an overview of such a large body of literature. For instance, with different analytical aims a different map could be derived. It should also be noted that some newer studies which may not yet represent a crystallized body of thought may have evaded my classification. I am also aware that classificatory exercises risk some degree of inherent philosophical circularity. These problems notwithstanding,the exercise can still be defended as an extremely valuable one for simplifying and guiding research. 3 B Barnes, TS Kuhn and Social Science, Macmillan, London, In S Jasanoff et al. (eds.), Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, Sage, Thousand Oaks CA, 1995, pp For a more detailed discussion of Engelhardt & Caplan see discussion in Section 5 'Closure Studies'. 6 Martin & Richards, op. cit., p ibid., p For a more detailed discussion of Nelkin's work see Section 3 'Technocratic Politics'. 9 e.g. in his widely quoted Alternative Technology, Fontana, London, It should be noted however that in other places Martin & Richards have argued the importance of SSK analysis having a more overt political orientation. For a discussion and critique see Section 7 'SSK'. 11 JC Petersen & GF Markle, 'Controversies in Science and Technology', in DE Chubin & EW Chu (eds.), Science off the Pedestal: Social Perspectives on Science and Technology, Wadsworth, Belmont CA, 1989, pp See also Petersen & Markle, 1979, 'Politics and Science in the Laetrile Controversy', Social Studies of Science, Vol.9, ; Petersen & Markle, 'The Laetrile Controversy', ch.8, pp in D Nelkin (ed.), Controversy: Politics of Technical Decisions, Sage, London, 1979; Petersen & Markle, 'Resolution of the Laetrile Controversy: Past Attempts and Future Prospects', in HT Engelhardt & AL Caplan (eds.), Scientific Controversies, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1987, pp In this later paper, Markle & Petersen argue for the need to investigate cognitive and political dimensions together. Nevertheless their analysis still tends towards the social movements analysis outlined in their earlier work. See also the discussion from a critical perspective of

2 social movement approaches to STC: G Bammer & B Martin, 'Repetition Strain Injury in Australia: Medical Knowledge and Social Movement', Working Paper No.19, National Centre for Epidemiology & Population Health, Australian National University, Aug ibid., p ibid., p ibid., p ibid., p ibid., p ibid., p.17. This point is also made in A Mazur, The Dynamics of Technical Controversy, Communication Press, Washington DC, See also A Rip, 'Controversies as Informal Technology Assessment', Knowledge: Diffusion Utilisation, Vol.8, pp L Levidow, 'Three Mile Island: The Ideology of Safe Level as a Material Force', Radical Science Journal, 1979, pp K Figlio, 'How Does Illness Mediate Social Relations?', in P Wright & A Treacher (eds.), The Problems of Medical Knowledge: Examining the Social Construction of Medicine, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1982, pp See also 'Medical Diagnosis, Class Dynamics, Social Stability', in L Levidow & B Young (eds.), Science, Technology and the Labour Process, Vol.2, Free Association Books, London, 1985, pp RM Young, 'Marxism and the History of Science', in RC Olby & GN Cantor (eds.), Companion to the History of Modern Science, Routledge, London, 1990, pp See also RM Young, 'Science is Social Relations', Radical Science Journal, Vol.5, 1977, pp It would also be worth noting numerous articles in journals such as Science for People which occasionally comment on scientific and technical controversies from a political vantage point. See also H Rose & S Rose, Science and Society, Pelican, Harmondsworth, 1970; H Rose & S Rose (eds.), The Political Economy Of Science, Macmillan, London 1976; M Hales, Science or Society?, Pan, London, Levidow, op. cit., p ibid., p ibid., p ibid., p.89 quoting K Marx, Grundrisse, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1973, pp , talking of labour as an example.

3 26 The degree to which scientific/technical categories can be read off the politics of class relations is a complex debate within Marxist sociology of knowledge. For our purposes the way scientific/technical categories are given meaning in practical context is sufficient. For a consistent but deeper reading see Young, 1990, op. cit., p.80, quoting Lukacs: For the Marxist as an historical dialectician both nature and the forms in which it is mastered in theory and practice are social categories; and to believe that one can detect anything supra-historical or supra-social in this context is to disqualify oneself as a Marxist. 27 Figlio, in Wright & Treacher, 1982, op. cit., p S Harding The Science Question in Feminism, Cornell University Press New York, 1986; J Wajcman, Feminism Confronts Technology, esp. ch.1 'Feminist Critiques of Science and Technology'; L Shiebinger, 'The History and Philosophy of Women in Science: A Review Essay', Signs, 12, pp See discussion in Wajcman, op cit., p.9. See also M Daly, Gyn/ecology: the Metaethics of Radical Feminism, Beacon, Boston, Harding op cit., p.26; Wajcman, op cit., p E Richards & J Schuster, 'The Feminine Method as Myth and Accounting Resource: A Challenge to Gender Studies and the Social Studies of Science', Social Studies of Science, 1989, pp ; A Dugdale, 'Keller's Degendered Science', Thesis Eleven, 21, 1988, p ; A Dugdale, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Wollongong, In this context the work of Donna Harraway should also be noted: it offers a mixture of standpoint and contextual approaches with a postmodern concern with textuality. See Simians, Cyborgs and Women: the Reinvention of Nature, Free Association Books, London, Well known scientific biographies of women include: A Sayre, Rosalind Franklin and DNA, WW Norton, New York, 1975; E Fox Keller, A Feeling for the Organism: The Life and Work of Barbara McClintock, Freeman, San Francisco, E Showalter, The Female Malady: Women, Madness and English Culture, , Virago, London, 1987; B Ehrenreich & D English, Witches, Midwives and Nurses: A History of Women Healers, Writers & Readers, London, 1976; P Chesler, Women and Madness, Doubleday Garden City NY, 1972; G Greer, The Change: Women, Ageing and the Menopause, Hamish Hamilton, London, J Wajcman, op. cit., p.5. See also E Showalter, op. cit., and for feminist discourse on hysteria, Ehrenreich & English, op. cit. 35 Wajcman, op. cit., esp. ch.3 'Reproductive Technology: Delivered into Men's Hands'; G Corea et al., Man Made Women: How New Reproductive Technologies Affect Women, Hutchinson, London, 1985; R Rowland, Living Laboratories, Sydney, Sun Books, 1992; C Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Revolution, London, Wildwood House, 1980; C Merchant, Radical

4 Ecology: In the Search for a Livable World, Routledge, New York, 1992; B Easlea, Fathering the Unthinkable, London, Pluto Press, These concerns appear in such influential work as D Bell, The Coming of Post- Industrial Society, Heinemann, London, 1974; critiques such as J Ellul, The Technological Society, Vintage, New York, 1964; numerous of the works of T Roszak, e.g. The Making of a Counter Culture, Faber & Faber, London, 1970; J Habermas, Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science and Politics, 1971, Heinemann, London; D Dickson, Alternative Technology, Fontana, London, Whilst this material is frequently left unacknowledged in the scientific / technological controversy literature, it is an important background resource for those more explicit studies on scientific controversy discussed in this section. For useful overviews looking at approaches to the issue of technocracy, see D Elliott & R Elliott, The Control of Technology, Wykeham, London, 1976, ch.3 'The Technocracy'; B Barnes, About Science, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986, ch.4 'Expertise in Society'; I Varcoe & S Yearley, 'Introduction: The Centrality of Science and Technology', in I Varcoe, M McNeil & S Yearley, Deciphering Science and Technology: The Social Relations of Expertise, Macmillan / British Sociological Association, London, 1990, pp.1-28; B Barnes & D Edge, 'Science as Expertise', in B Barnes & D Edge (eds.) Science in Context, Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1982, pp ; B Wynne, Rationality and Ritual, BSHS, Chalfont St Giles, Much of this section draws on the work of Dorothy Nelkin. See discussions in D Nelkin, 'Science, Technology and Political Conflict: Analysing the Issues', in D Nelkin (ed.), Controversy: Politics of Technical Decisions, Sage, Beverly Hills CA, 1979; D Nelkin, 'The Political Impact of Technical Expertise', Social Studies of Science, Vol.5., 1975, pp.34-54; D Nelkin, 'Controversies and the Authority of Science', in Engelhardt & Caplan (eds.), 1987, op. cit., pp See also discussion in K G Nicholls, Technology on Trial, OECD, Paris, Of special value complementing Nelkin's analysis in exploring this theme see I Cameron & D Edge, Scientific Images and their Social Uses, Butterworths, London, 1979; Y Ezrahi, 'The Authority of Science in Politics', in A Thackray & E Mendelsohn (eds.), Science and Values: Patterns of Tradition and Change, Humanities Press, New York, 1974, pp ; R Albury, The Politics of Objectivity, Deakin University Press, Geelong Vic, See Nelkin, 1987, op. cit., where she uses the phrase (p.289) 'intellectual technocracy' and points out (p.291): Disputes have broadened the scope of scientific research and created new positions in an increasing number of policy areas, providing material benefits to individuals through new consulting and advisory positions. 40 See discussion in ibid., p.292, quoting L Tribe, who talks of the application of scientific styles of reasoning to inappropriate contexts such as: '... fragile values... non-quantifiable, intangible resistant to categorisation.'

5 41 Nelkin, 1987, op. cit., pp See also D Dickson, The New Politics of Science, University of Chicago Press, 1988, ch.6 'Regulating Technology: 'Science as Legitimation' 42 Nelkin, 1987, op. cit., p.293; Nelkin, 1979, op. cit., pp Nelkin, 1987, op. cit., p.285; Nelkin, 1979, op. cit., pp.9-12; Wynne, 1982, op. cit. 44 Nelkin, 1979, op. cit., p ibid., p ibid., p ibid., pp Nelkin, 1987, op. cit., p See e.g. discussion in Wynne, 1982, op. cit. 50 Nelkin, 1987, op. cit., p e.g. Nelkin's collection, 1979, op. cit.; Barnes & Edge (eds.), op. cit. 52 See e.g. Wynne, 1982, op. cit.; Smith & Wynne, 'Introduction', pp.1-23 and B Wynne, 'Establishing the Rules of Laws: Constructing Expert Authority', pp.23-55, in R Smith & B Wynne, Expert Evidence, Routledge, London, It is worth acknowledging that Wynne's work is quite broad and also encompasses historical SSK and policy studies of science. 53 Albury, op. cit. 54 Rip, op. cit. 55 See D Nelkin, Selling Science, WH Freeman, New York, 1987, ch.4 'The Perils of Progress', pp.53-69, on the tendency for difficult questions or contextual issues to be glossed over in media treatment of controversial science. These trends have also been documented in e.g. G Jones, J Connell & A Meadows, 'The Presentation of Science by the Media', Leicester PCRC, University of Leicester, Part of these difficulties stems from the heavy reliance by those writing historico-narrative approaches on scientists for their definitions of science and scientific activity. Jones, Connell & Meadows described this reciprocity of perspective in the following terms (pp.44-45): Such work [producing science programmes] requires the joint labours of journalists and scientists. It is work which is possible week after week, because the scientists occupy the same cultural/ideological space. Those antagonisms which do break out from time to time (especially between current affairs broadcasters and scientists) are seldom of a fundamental kind, in the sense that participants hold entirely different and contradictory views of the nature and scope of scientific work. Broadcasters employed

6 in making programmes about science will normally hold essentially the same views and ideals about science as the scientists themselves. Even though not all broadcasters will articulate those views and ideals, they will be tacitly reproduced by them when they depict scientific practices as 'pure' and governed by a monolithic and unproblematic 'scientific method'. The critical approach that is sometimes adopted [in current affairs coverage] does not question the dominant views and ideals of science, but rather the uses of which pristine scientific knowledge has been put. See also D Mercer, Myth and Contemporary Popular Images of Science/The Politics of Science in the Mass Media, unpublished BA (Hons) thesis, University of NSW Department of History & Philosophy of Science, 1985, ch.9 'Sources for Popular Images of Science: the Relation of Science to the Mass Media' 56 The types of literature in mind here would be journalistic exposés such as Brodeur, Zapping of America or Currents of Death, and reviews of controversy such as those found in journals like New Scientist. 57 Mazur has written numerous articles on STCs: e.g. 'Disputes between Experts', Minerva, Vol.XI, 2 Apr 1973; 'The Rise and Fall of Public Opposition in Specific Social Movements', Social Studies of Science, Vol.10, 1980, pp ; 'Scientific Disputes over Policy', in Engelhardt & Caplan, 1987, op. cit., pp Much of Mazur's approach is synthesised in his book The Dynamics of Technical Controversy, It is also useful to note the frequent implicit adoption of such a dichotomy in many policy settings, particularly in the field of risk assessment. 58 Mazur, 1981, op. cit., pp ibid., pp Mazur has written much on the role of mass media in promoting STC: e.g. A Mazur, 'Controversial Technologies in the Mass Media', in M Kraft & N Vig (eds.), Technology and Politics, Duke University Press, Durham, 1988, pp ; A Mazur, 'Media Coverage and Public Opinion on Scientific Controversies', in 'Science: News Controversy Drama', Journal of Communication, Spring 1981, pp Mazur, 1981, op. cit., p.114. At this very general level of analysis, Mazur's work has some similarities with 'controversy as politics'. Unlike this approach, as the ensuing discussion with indicate, Mazur pays more attention to patterns of the construction of scientific claims within controversies. 62 ibid., p ibid., pp ibid., p ibid., pp ibid., p.23.

7 [67] ibid., pp Mazur, 1987, op. cit., pp ibid., p ibid., p Mazur, 1981, op. cit., pp Casper & Wellstone, 'Science Court on Trial in Minnesota', in Barnes & Edge (eds.), op. cit., p.282; A Kantrowitz, 'Democracy and Technology', in C Starr & C Ritterbush (eds.), Science, Technology and the Human Prospect, Pergamon, New York, 1980, pp ; RD Masters & A Kantrowitz, 'Scientific Adversary Procedures: The SDI Experiments at Dartmouth', in Kraft & Vig (eds.), op. cit., pp Mazur, 1987, op. cit., p.274, proposes:... we never make a point of bringing housewives and blue-collar labourers into formal decisions about the prime interest rate or on whether or not to attack Iran, so why do it when evaluating nuclear power plants and recombinant DNA laboratories? See also Mazur, 1981, op. cit., pp Mazur, 1981, op. cit., p.34. One of the weaknesses of overviews of controversy that focus excessively on epistemological positions of the studies they are analysing is that in policy discussions it is not uncommon to see a degree of inconsistency. Distinguishing facts from values is often seen as a pragmatic rather than a strictly epistemological exercise. For an example of an approach which attempts to maintain a realist epistemology of science but also acknowledge the pragmatic difficulties of separating facts from values, see discussion of the so-called 'neo-separationist' policy option in JD Graham, L Green & M Roberts, In Search of Safety: Chemicals and Cancer Risk, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA 1988, pp 'Science and Policy Conflict', esp Engelhardt & Caplan, op. cit., preface, p.viii. 76 HT Engelhardt & AL Caplan, 'Introduction: Patterns of Controversy and Closure: The Interplay of Knowledge, Values and Political Forces', in Engelhardt & Caplan (eds.), op. cit., p Mazur, 'Scientific Disputes over Policy', in Engelhardt & Caplan (eds.), op. cit. 78 Nelkin, 'Controversies and the Authority of Science', in Engelhardt & Caplan (eds.), op. cit. 79 E Mendelsohn, 'The Political Anatomy of Controversy in the Sciences', in Engelhardt & Caplan (eds.), op. cit., pp

8 80 Engelhardt & Caplan, in Engelhardt & Caplan (eds.), op. cit., p ibid., p ibid., p ibid., p ibid., p ibid., p ibid., p ibid., pp ibid., p Other closure theorists, such as McMullen, differentiate these forms of sound argument closure thus: epistemic with strict closure equalling standard epistemic arguments; and broad sound argument closure equalling non-standard epistemic closure. E McMullen, 'Scientific Controversy and Its Termination', in Engelhardt & Caplan (eds.), op. cit., pp.49-91, esp. pp Engelhardt & Caplan, in Engelhardt & Caplan (eds.), op. cit., pp There are a number of other papers in the Engelhardt & Caplan collection which provide the basis for their schema of forms of closure. These are: McMullen, op. cit.; T Beauchamp, 'Ethical Theory and the Problem of Closure', pp.27-48; RF Rich, 'Politics, Public Policy Making, and the Process of Reaching Closure', pp ; R Macklin, 'The Forms and Norms of Closure', pp Engelhardt & Caplan, in Engelhardt & Caplan (eds.), op. cit., pp ibid., p ibid., p ibid., p ibid., p See discussion in KD Knorr-Cetina & M Mulkay, 'Introduction: Emerging Principles in Social Studies of Science', in KD Knorr-Cetina & M Mulkay (eds.), Science Observed, Sage, London, 1983, p There are numerous overviews explaining the basic implications of theory-loading and under-determination for the social and historical study of science. See M Mulkay, 1979, op. cit., esp. chs.1 & 2; A Chalmers, What is this Thing Called Science?, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1976; D Oldroyd, The Arch of Knowledge, NSW University Press, Kensington NSW, 1986.

9 98 See discussion in Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay, 1983, op. cit., pp See discussion in R Krohn, 'Towards the Empirical Study of Scientific Practice' in KD Knorr, R Krohn & R Whitley (eds.), The Social Process of Scientific Investigation, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1980, esp. p.xvii. It is important to note that this does not mean various of the competing approaches in SSK do not in themselves specify programmes of how to study science. See the later discussion of the Strong Programme and EPOR. 100 H Collins & S Yearley, 'Epistemological Chicken', in A Pickering, (ed.) Science as Practice and Culture, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992, pp , esp It is also useful to note that some studies working in strongly reflexive modes also transcend social realism. See the discussion later. 101 TS Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed., University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1970, 'Introduction: A Role for History' plus discussions pp.205 & 207, postscript 'Revolutions and Relativism', and pp It is useful however to note the reluctance of Kuhn fully to endorse the consequences of the relativisation of scientific progress: e.g. the interview with Kuhn in 'Profile: Reluctant Revolutionary', Scientific American, May 1991, pp See also B Barnes, Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1974, pp A Brannigan, The Social Basis of Scientific Discoveries, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981; S Woolgar, Science: The Very Idea, Tavistock, London, 1988, ch.4 'Inverting Nature: Discovery and Facts' 103 D Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1976, esp. ch.1 'The Strong Programme in Sociology of Knowledge'; T Pinch, Confronting Nature, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1986, esp. 'Explanation and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge', pp P Feyerabend, Against Method, London, New Left Books, 1976; J Schuster & R Yeo (eds.), The Politics and Rhetoric of Scientific Method, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1986, esp. 'Introduction', p.ix-xxxvii. 105 Barnes, 1974, op. cit., ch.5 'Internal and External Factors in the History of Science', pp See the widely quoted discussions in M Mulkay, 'Norms and Ideology in Science', Social Sciences Information, Vol.15, No.4-6, 1976; M Mulkay, 'Interpretation and the Use of Rules: The Case of the Norms of Science', in TF Gieryn (ed.), Science and Social Structure (A Festschrift for RK Merton), Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences, Series 2, Vol.39, 1980; Barnes & Dolby, 'The Scientific Ethos: A Deviant Viewpoint', Archives Européennes de Sociologie, Tome 11-12, , pp.3-25; Woolgar, 1988, op. cit., on the way we define science to start with, i.e. he argues for self-conscious nominalist against essentialist forms of definition of science, pp.15-29; P Bourdieu, 'The Specificity of the Scientific Field and the Social Conditions of the Progress of Reason', Social Sciences Information, Vol.14, No.6, 1975, pp

10 107 Collins & Yearley, op. cit. ; Bloor, op. cit., pp Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay, op. cit., pp.3-4. However, many studies steer very close to this. 109 Pinch, 1986, op. cit., pp For a classic statement of the Strong Programme, see Bloor, 1976, op. cit.; Barnes, 1974, op. cit. See also B Barnes & D Mackenzie, 'On the Role of Interests in Scientific Change', in R Wallis (ed.), On the Margins of Science, Sociological Review Monograph No.27, University of Keele, Keele, 1979, pp.49-66; the collection of case studies in B Barnes & S Shapin (eds.), Natural Order: Historical Studies of Scientific Culture, Sage, London, HM Collins, 'Stages in the Empirical Programme of Relativism', Social Studies of Science, Vol.11, No.1., Feb., 1981, pp.3-11, and other papers in this special issue 'Knowledge and Controversy: Studies in Modern Natural Science'; HM Collins, Changing Order, Sage, London, 1985; T Pinch, 1986, op. cit.; HM Collins, 'An Empirical Relativist Programme in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge', in Knorr- Cetina & Mulkay, 1983, op. cit., pp ; T Pinch, 'The Sociology of the Scientific Community', in Olby & Cantor (eds.), op. cit. 112 See M Mulkay, J Potter & S Yearley, 'Why an Analysis of Scientific Discourse is Needed', in Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay (eds.), 1983, op. cit.; N Gilbert & M Mulkay, Opening Pandora's Box, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984; M Mulkay, The Word and the World, Allen & Unwin, London, For a useful collection spanning milder forms of textual analysis through to new literary forms, see M Mulkay, Sociology of Science: A Sociological Pilgrimage, Open University Press, Milton Keynes, B Latour, Science in Action, Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1987; M Callon, J Law & A Rip (eds.), Mapping the Dynamics of Science and Technology, Macmillan, London, 1986; J Fujimura, 'Crafting Science: Standardised Packages, Boundary Objects and "Translation"', in Pickering (ed.), 1992, op. cit. 114 B Latour & S Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts, Sage, London, 1979; KD Knorr-Cetina, The Manufacture of Knowledge, Pergamon, Oxford, 1980; KD Knorr-Cetina, 'The Ethnographic Study of Scientific Work: Towards a Constructivist Interpretation of Science', in Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay (eds.), 1983, op. cit., pp ; M Charlesworth, L Farrall, T Stokes & D Turnbull, Life Among the Scientists, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, See discussion in Collins & Yearley, 1992, op. cit. A fruitful recent exchange on the tension between these different branches of contemporary sociology of science can be found in the collection edited by Pickering. See especially responses to Collins & Yearley's 'Epistemological Chicken': S Woolgar, 'Some Remarks about Positionism: a Reply to Collins and Yearley', p ; M Callon & B Latour, 'Don't Throw The Baby Out With the Bath School!: A Reply to Collins and Yearley', pp ; and HM Collins & S Yearley, 'Journey into Space', pp See also

11 discussion in A Pickering, 'From Science as Knowledge to Science as Practice', pp.1-26; Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay, 1983, op. cit., pp ibid., pp The two most widely celebrated and criticised Strong Programme studies attempting to move from social interests to macro-social structures, are S Shapin, 'The Politics of Observation: Cerebral Anatomy and Social Interests in the Edinburgh Phrenology Disputes', in Wallis (ed.), 1979, op. cit., pp , and D Mackenzie, 'Statistical Theory and Social Interests: A Case Study', Social Studies of Science, Vol.8, 1978, pp For some critiques of these attempts, see S Yearley, Science, Technology and Social Change, Allen & Unwin, London, 1988, pp.38-41; and from a philosophical perspective, A Chalmers, Science and Its Fabrication, Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1990, pp Collins, 1981, op. cit. 119 Pinch, 1985, op. cit., pp It is important for the sociology of scientific knowledge that external factors can be brought into the analysis. This would complete the third stage of EPOR... Although this is the explanatory goal of the programme most studies, including the present work, focus more upon the social processes to be found within the scientific community. 120 CE Rosenberg, 'Nature De-coded', Isis, Vol.71, 1980, p.291. See also discussion by Shapin in Natural Order, op. cit., p Bloor, 1976, op. cit., p Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay, 1983, op. cit., p Bloor, 1976, op. cit., p ibid., p Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay, 1983, op. cit., p ibid., p Barnes & Mackenzie, in Wallis (ed.), 1979, op. cit. For a recent overview of some of the complex issues involved, see S Russell, 'Interests and the Shaping of Technology: An Unresolved Debate Reappears', STA Working Paper No.4., University of Wollongong, For an important critique of the idea of social interests, see in particular S Woolgar, 'Interests and Explanation in the Social Study of Science', Social Studies of Science, Vol.11, 1981, pp D Mackenzie, 'Interests, Positivism and History', Social Studies of Science, Vol.11, 1981, p.499.

12 129 B Barnes, 'On the 'How's' and 'Why's' of Cultural Change (Response to Woolgar)', Social Studies of Science, No.11, 1981, esp. pp ibid., pp ibid., pp.485. 'All that has gone before stands formally as a resource from which what is to come is developed.' 132 Barnes & Shapin, 'The Social Basis of Scientific Controversy', in Barnes & Shapin (eds.), op. cit., pp Pinch, 1986, op. cit., pp As Mulkay points out in 'Knowledge and Utility', Social Studies of Science, Vol.9, 1979, p.69, the failure or efficacy of knowledge claims in practical contexts should not be used to undermine epistemological symmetry, that is, under-determination implies epistemologically incompatible theories may well be capable of supporting equivalent practical outcomes. 135 Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay, 1983, op. cit., point out the need to distinguish between epistemic and judgemental relativism, pp Of course, such evaluative processes face the problem of steering between achieving sufficient native competence to understand the nature of debate and simultaneously maintaining a degree of anthropological strangeness. See discussion in Collins, in Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay (eds.), 1983, op. cit., pp.91-93; T Pinch & HM Collins, Frames of Meaning, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1982, pp Pinch, 1985, op. cit., p ibid. 139 ibid. 140 HM Collins, 'Son of Seven Sexes: The Social Destruction of a Physical Phenomenon', Social Studies of Science, Vol.11, 1981, p HM Collins, 'The Place of the "Core Set" in Modern Science: Social Contingency with Methodological Propriety in Science', History of Science, No.19, pp Pinch, in Olby & Cantor (eds.), op. cit., p Mulkay & Knorr-Cetina, 1983, op. cit. 144 M Mulkay, 'Action and Belief or Scientific Discourse?', (1981), in Mulkay, 1991, op. cit., pp Collins & Yearley, 1992, op. cit. 146 Mulkay, 1985, op. cit., p.43.

13 147 See discussion in Mulkay, 1976, op. cit. 148 ibid.; Schuster & Yeo (eds.), 1986, op. cit. See also GJL Travis, 'Replicating Replication? Aspects of the Social Construction of Learning in Planarian Worms', Social Studies of Science, Vol.11, No.1., 1981, esp. pp.22-27; M Mulkay & N Gilbert, 'Putting Philosophy to Work', (1981), in M Mulkay, 1991, op. cit., pp Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984, op. cit., pp See also Collins & Pinch, 'Construction of the Para-normal: Nothing Unscientific is Happening', in Wallis (ed.), 1978, op. cit., pp , esp. pp ; Mulkay, 1979, op. cit., p.83; B Wynne, 'GG Barkla and the J-Phenomenon: a Case Study of the Treatment of Deviance in Physics', Social Studies of Science, Vol.6, 1976, pp See Collins, 1986, op. cit., pp ; Latour & Woolgar, 1979, op. cit., for discussion of Bachelard's idea of 'phenomenotechnique'. 151 See B Barnes, TS Kuhn and Social Science, Macmillan, London, A good example of a study of scientific controversy emphasising the above would be D Robbins & R Johnston, 'The Role of Cognitive and Occupational Differentiation in Scientific Controversies', Social Studies of Science, 1976, Vol.6., pp Woodhouse reviews a number of recent studies attempting to branch out from the insights of the micro-construction of science to broader politics: E Woodhouse, 'The Turn Toward Society? Social Reconstruction of Science', Science, Technology and Human Values, Vol.16, No.3, Summer 1991, pp The tension between the heterogeneity of science as practice versus the homogeneity of forms of scientific representation appears in a number of case studies linking in situ deconstruction of specific scientific knowledge claims with broader claims of deconstructing the authority of science in more general terms. 154 This problem is acknowledged in part by Pinch, in Olby & Cantor (eds.), op. cit. 155 For the purposes of this paper, the philosophical issue of 'infinite regress', that is, the implication that the analyst accepts his/her account can be explained by the same tools it uses to explain other accounts, can be taken as being adequately addressed in the existing literature. B Barnes & D Bloor, 'Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge', in M Hollis & S Lukes (eds.), Rationality and Relativism, Blackwell, Oxford, 1982, pp.21-47; B Barnes, 'Sociological Theories of Scientific Knowledge', in Olby & Cantor (eds.), op. cit., pp S Woolgar, 'Irony in the Social Studies of Science', in Mulkay & Knorr-Cetina (eds.), op. cit., pp See also S Woolgar, 'Some Remarks...', 1992, op. cit, pp ; Mulkay, 1985, op. cit. See also footnote See discussions of the so-called 'ideology of science' in Albury, 1983, op. cit.; Mulkay 1976, op. cit.; plus Ezrahi, op. cit. 158 See references in footnote 159, and discussion of historical examples of the 'ideology of science' in R Toby, The American Ideology of National Science, 1919-

14 1930, University of Pittsburgh Press, See also SD Fries, 'The Ideology of Science during the Nixon Years ', Social Studies of Science, Vol.14, See discussion in e.g. B. Martin, The Bias of Science, Society for Social Responsibility in Science, Canberra, D Turnbull, 'Relativism, Reflexivity and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge' Metascience, Vol.1-2, 1984; DE Chubin & S Restivo, 'The Mooting of Science Studies: Research Programmes and Science Policy', in Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay (eds.), 1983, op. cit., pp.53-84; DE Chubin, 'Values, Controversy, and the Sociology of Science', Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society, Vol.1, 1981, pp ; S Restivo, 'Science Studies: What is to be Done?', Science, Technology and Human Values, Spring, 1987, pp.13-18; response to Chubin and S Restivo, P Shepard & C Hamlin, 'How Not to Presume: Toward a Descriptive Theory of Ideology in Science and Technology Controversy', Science, Technology and Human Values, Spring 1987, pp For such polemical statements, see Scott, Martin & Richards, 'Captives of Controversy', Science, Technology & Human Values, pp , Vol.15, No.4, Autumn See also HM Collins, 'Captives and Victims: Comment on Scott, Richards & Martin', Science, Technology and Human Values, Vol.2, Spring 1991, pp ; Martin, Richards & Scott, 'Who's a Captive? Who's a Victim: Response to Collins' Method Talk', pp SE Cozzens and TF Gieryn, 'Introduction: Putting Science Back into Society', in SE Cozzens & TF Gieryn (eds.), Theories of Science in Society, Indiana University Press, USA, 1990, pp ibid. 164 TF Gieryn & AE Fiegert, 'Ingredients for the Theory of Science in Society', in Cozzens & Gieryn, op. cit., pp See e.g. Latour, 1987, op. cit.; Callon, Law & Rip, op. cit.; Latour, 'Give Me a Laboratory and I Will Raise the World', in Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay (eds.), 1983, op. cit., pp ; M Callon & B Latour, 'Unscrewing the Big Leviathan: How Actors Macro-Structure Reality and How Sociologists Help Them to do So', in K Knorr- Cetina & AV Cicourel (eds.), Advances in Social Theory and Methodology, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1981, pp ; Callon & Latour, in Pickering, 1992, op. cit.; H Radder, 'Experiment, Technology and the Intrinsic Connection between Knowledge and Power', Social Studies of Science, 16-4, 1986, pp ; D Mackenzie & G Spinardi, 'The Shaping of Nuclear Weapon System Technology', Social Studies of Science, Vol.18, 1988, pp ; D Mackenzie, 'Micro versus Macro Sociologies of Science and Technology', Edinburgh PICT Working Paper Series No.2, Research Centre for Social Sciences, University of Edinburgh, In some important respects these observations of the need to locate scientific facts in terms of their stabilisation and extension across a variety of contexts were anticipated in the work of JR Ravetz: e.g. 'Facts and their Evolution', in Scientific Knowledge and its Social Problems, Penguin, Oxford, 1973, pp

15 166 See Latour in Mulkay & Knorr-Cetina (eds.), 1983, op. cit. 167 Mackenzie, 1988, op. cit.; Radder, 1986, op. cit. 168 Callon & Latour, 1981, op. cit., p Mackenzie, 1988, op. cit. 170 T Shinn & R Whitley (eds.), Expository Science: Forms and Functions of Popularisation, Sociology of the Sciences Yearbook, Vol.IX, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1985; S Hilgartner, 'The Dominant View of Popularisation: Conceptual Problems, Political Uses', Social Studies of Science, Vol.20, 1990, pp ; S Hilgartner, 'Telescoping Policy Relevant Science: Summaries of the Evidence on Dietary Fibre and Colon Cancer', paper presented to 1986 Annual Meeting Society for Social Studies of Science; B Wynne, 'Knowledges in Context', Science, Technology and Human Values, Vol.16, No.1, Winter 1991, pp ; B Wynne, 'Public Understanding of Science Research: New Horizons or Hall of Mirrors?', Public Understanding Science, Vol.1, No.1, Jan 1992, pp T Shinn & R Whitley, Editorial Preface, in Shinn & Whitley (eds.), op. cit., p.vii 172 ibid., p.viii. 173 R Whitley, 'Knowledge Producers and Knowledge Acquirers', in Shinn & Whitley (eds.), op. cit., p ibid., p Hilgartner, 1990, op. cit., p ibid. 177 ibid. 178 Collins & Yearley, 1992, op. cit. 179 Latour, 1987, op. cit. 180 This can be shown clearly in public discourse in the so-called 'Two Cultures Debate' from the time of CP Snow's influential essay of the 1950s. Snow assumes the epistemological authority of science but largely argues for the superiority of science on its strategic economic instrumental value. 181 See discussion in Douglas & Wildavsky, op. cit. Douglas & Wildavsky's views have been criticised in a number of places, e.g. L Winner, 'On Not Hitting the Tar- Baby', in The Whale and the Reactor, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, See discussion in Y Ezrahi, op. cit. and Edge & Cameron, op. cit. This argument is basically a variety of the so-called 'naturalistic fallacy' or the so-called 'is/ought' debate. For brief discussion of this debate see A Bullock & O Stallybrass (eds.),

16 Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought, 5th impression, Fontana, London, 1982, p Collins, 1991, op. cit.