Outside the I: Intersubjectivity in Habermas and Levinas Brendan O Dwyer

Transcription

1 Outside the I: Intersubjectivity in Habermas and Levinas Brendan O Dwyer Introduction Identity-formation is undoubtedly an operation that moves from the exterior to the interior; interacting with other people is a necessary and fundamental mechanism for personal human development. Intersubjectivity is a prerequisite for intrasubjectivity. Knowing oneself consists in knowing how others have constituted oneself; self-understanding requires the sustained acknowledgement of other participants in interaction, be it pre-linguistically or linguistically mediated. The task is then to account for how this process occurs; to locate the primary event, the originary experience of self-relation through relations with others. Is it perhaps through mere awareness or presence, i.e., a recognition that is prior to any speaking? Or, can true selfunderstanding only originate through participation in communicative action? We must begin with the thematic orientation that personal development requires interaction with others, be it through linguistic or pre-linguistic mediation. The role that our socio-cultural milieu plays in the construction, structure, and transmission of norms, behavioral expectations, and personal identity cannot be skirted. To begin with, I will (1) explicate a Habermasian account of identity-formation, viz., his emphasis on linguistically mediated intersubjective interactions as the catalyst for the production of an accountable person capable of engaging in communicative action; a process whereby the self comes to know itself through its interactions with others. This process, for Habermas, is the beginning of the cultivation of proper moral sentiment, i.e., ethical responsibility appears only after this linguistically mediated identity-formation has occurred. Habermas places all his emphasis on language: identity is formed through communicative action with others, i.e., not in one fell swoop, but in a cumulative, non-linear, formation. The requisite of individuality is thus acknowledgement and recognition by others, viz., acknowledgement on interaction based in language. I disagree with this conception of selfconsciousness; self-consciousness can be shown to originate prior to linguistic interaction, it can be said to be always already under way, through a primary immersion in other people. Nonetheless, self-consciousness is certainly fostered and fortified via linguistic mediation. As a way of critiquing and hopefully reconstituting the Habermasian theory I will (2) employ the Levinasian conception of the face-to-face encounter with the Other 1 as that which is the primordial ethical relation. What Habermas has done in denoting language as the locus for identity-formation and responsibility-generation is to pass over the initial, pre-linguistic exposure to the Other, who appears to us as a face, an unavoidable command. The mere face-to-face encounter for Levinas is unquestionably an ethical command; the responsibility we have to respect the life of the Other is always already upon us, prior to any deliberation or linguistic mediation. Certainly, for Levinas, language and discourse inevitably 1 Though I myself make little distinction between other and Other, Levinas does. To be philosophically respectful I will, when discussing Levinas, take up his emphasis on Other as personal Other, and other simply as otherness in general.

2 follow from the originary expression; the expression is the revelation of responsibility, language is the pronouncement, the instantiation. Nonetheless, the face of the Other is still primary, it is still the originary locus of the ethical relation. Habermas has built a strong argument for the transmission of culture, moral norms, personal identity, and behavioral expectations through linguistically mediated interactions. But, by basing it in language he may have missed integral elements of self-understanding and awareness of the Other. Where he had hoped to point out the originary experience of selfconsciousness, or as near to it as he could get, he was perhaps too quick in extolling the dynamic of language. Perhaps what is primary is not language, but the very presence of an Other, the unparalleled face of the Other; the unequivocal obligation not to harm, and the recognition of a pact of peace and concord. (1) Self-Relation in Linguistically Mediated Interactions The philosophy of consciousness, Habermas argues, is beset by the problem of circularity 2 ; the knowing subject unavoidably makes itself into an object, and is unable to access itself as the antecedent, i.e., as the absolutely subjective force (Habermas, 160) 3. A passage out of this is effected by recourse to language. Self-understanding is cultivated through discursive participation with others; in the medium of coming to an understanding with others in language and in the medium of coming to a life-historical and intrasubjective understanding with oneself the self returns to itself in a non-objectifying manner (Habermas, 153). Habermas point of departure for originary self-consciousness is the interaction of two human beings in language. Language, as it functions in accord with identity-formation and serves to create a situation of understanding between people, is used pragmatically; behavioral learning processes are transmitted through language itself, language is used precisely for the purpose of intersubjective acknowledgement and intersubjective understanding. It is then through language that the self first finds its way to itself only on a detour via a complete externalization in other things and in other humans, i.e., by sojourning in the world, by being at a distance from oneself, we receive echoes of ourselves from our sundry interactions with the world and Others (Habermas, 153). Accountability and personal identity, for Habermas, emerge via linguistic interaction with others; the ego always retains an intersubjective core because the process of individuation from which it emerges runs through the network of linguistically mediated interactions (Habermas, 170). Habermas argues that language has inherent pragmatic value, there is a primacy to world-disclosing language and it is essentially binding (Habermas, 153). Language itself is without a core and belongs to no one, but makes possible the linguistic practice among subjects who belong to a linguistic community, while at the same time it renews and maintains itself as a linguistic system through this practice (Habermas, 162 respectively). 2 Habermas writes that for a subject to assure itself of itself it unavoidably objectifies itself, thus failing to authentically account for its self-consciousness; a failure to account for the source that precedes all objectification and is absolutely subjective (Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking, 160). 3 All Habermas references are from Postmetaphysical Thinking, except a few from Between Naturalism and Religion, which will be referred to as BNR.

3 In communicative action each participant must recognize the other as autonomous and accountable, they must presuppose that each is someone who could orient his action with validity claims, and that each can supply approbation or criticism, to speech-act offers, as accountable persons (Habermas, 190). Insofar as language is effective in inducing a situation whereby people can, and are willing to, engage in mutual perspective-taking, then the self acquires a transformed and reflexive consciousness of time, viz., the self has a specific selfunderstanding that is anticipatory of future events, based in present situations (Habermas, 188). What we have taken as our general theme, viz., identity-formation through intersubjectivity, moves now in one particular direction. That is, identity-formation, as seen here, is composed in linguistic interaction, and precisely not through any pre-linguistic activity. The me casts off the reifying gaze, however, as soon as the subject appears not in the role of an observer but in that of a speaker and, from the social perspective of a hearer encountering him in dialogue, learns to understand himself as the alter ego of another ego (Habermas, ). In locating identity-formation in linguistically mediated intersubjectivity Habermas believes he has stepped outside of the archaic metaphysical conception of the ego as that which constitutes itself from itself. The nature of this movement is, according to Habermas, postmetaphysical: the ego does not simply return to itself as an alter ego of another ego, but as the alter ego of all others in every community- specifically, as a free will in moral self-reflection and as a fully individuated being in existential self-reflection (Habermas, 187). However, what is noteworthy here is that Habermas ethical relation(s) retain an element of the transcendental, i.e., in its return to itself the ego returns with an addition of universalizability. We approach other people with the already established reasoning that they are capable of engaging in communicative action with us; we orient ourselves toward other people presupposing that they are indeed capable of responsibly justifying their statements with valid reasons. In communicative action everyone thus recognizes in the other his own autonomy (Habermas, 190). Our thematic orientation rears its head again. Through this brand of self-relation we are necessarily drawn out of ourselves toward another person; further, we are not merely an observer watching a conversation occur, we are indeed active participants within that conversation, i.e., we are present in a symbolically mediated relationship to a partner in interaction (Habermas, 177). We thus come across ourselves most authentically, for Habermas, as we become linguistically active; we are dependent upon language to recognize ourselves nonobjectively in the other. Again, pragmatics emerges here: there is a strong current of practicality running through these interactions, viz., our behaviour is shaped and guided by engaging in perspective-taking with another person. Habermas argues that this type of relationship allows one to monitor and control one s own behavior through self-referential cognition, by way of internalized social controls that, while not composing the individual fully, are symbolically mediated and tethered to the ethical development of the acting subject (Habermas, 179). That is, as Habermas writes, the Ego takes over alter s normative, not his cognitive expectations (Habermas, 179).

4 In this acquisition of expectations we can situate the expression of freedom; but, rather than having the goal be knowing oneself, reflection acquires a motivation to generate reasons supporting our actions, in short, we make a move toward language as the vehicle that can convey our supporting reasons to those who inquire. The practical-relation-to-self is made possible by a me that places limits, from the intersubjective perspective of a social we, on the impulsiveness and the creativity of the resistant and productive I (Habermas, 180). Despite our freedom being both effectuated and limited by the presence of another person, the self still receives itself back to itself, perhaps suggesting that in a counterfactually supposed universe of discourse the sense of freedom may be greater than any limitation placed on it (Habermas, 187). And perhaps it is precisely the limitation which may at times make our sense of freedom seem even greater; a denial of freedom creates a situation where one is never truly sure of any direction, but always subject to some external whim. In the practical relationto-self... the acting subject does not want to recognize (erkennen) itself; rather, it wants to reassure (vergewissern) itself about itself as the initiator of an action that is attributable solely to it- in short, to become sure of itself as a free will (Habermas, 181). To return again to our general theme (identity-formation in intersubjectivity) and to give Habermas due credit, we can find a pre-linguistic thread in his essay Freedom and Determinism ; he notes that pre-linguistically we are already capable of coordinating our actions to those of an other. We must take special care to keep in mind that it is precisely in language we find the concretionary force of making our intersubjective relations into binding ones; we become bound through discourse with other people, we take up relations with them, allowing ourselves to become absorbed, to varying degrees, in their lives. Language facilitates the further development of self-consciousness through symbolically mediated interaction[s], and directs itself like converging rays toward the common goal of reaching universal understanding (Habermas, BNR, 179 and 163, respectively). But, as children without the linguistic tools necessary for discursive participation, we already learn to direct [our] attention together with [our] caregiver to the same object (Habermas, BNR, 171). Prior to any linguistic mediation we are already aware of ourselves as actors, we can engage others on a common level, already entering into co-operative action, adopting a shared perspective... [that] already emerges at this [pre-linguistic] stage from the incipient relationship of a first to a second person, [and] is constitutive for the objectivating, distancing take on the world and on oneself (Habermas, BNR, 171). Habermas admits ground in our favour, conceding that our capability to manage our environment is wholly dependent on cognitive interaction with one another, i.e., the perspectival combination of observer and participant, prior to language use, socializes the cognition of the developing child with her fellow humans such that the child learns expectant behavioral patterns from mere observation (Habermas, BNR, 171). In the course of acquiring language the developing child s processes of learning become accelerated, and the child becomes capable of articulating itself as an accountable individual. Accountable in the sense of

5 linguistically justifying themselves and their actions, thus gaining access to a higher echelon of social participation, viz., argumentative discourse. (2) Pre-Linguistic Exposure to the Self and Other Though Levinas does not investigate self-consciousness as comprehensively as Habermas, he still finds an ethical dimension in the face-to-face encounter with the Other, an ethical relation that appears before linguistic mediation. Discourse for Habermas is that which can potentially bind people together, forming a concrete social order, and further, motivating the instantiation of agreed upon moral norms. Ethical self-understanding achieved by discourse with others is articulated not as the self-relation of a knowing subject but as the ethical self-reassurance (Selbstvergewisserung) of an accountable person (Habermas, 168). This accountability and ethical self-awareness is achieved through participation in discourse, by responding to the demands of other people, because others attribute accountability to me, I gradually make myself into the one who I have become in living together with others (Habermas, 170). In Levinas the subject is first encountered in a situation of strain: the fact of existence is a burden, and the I is not initially an existent but a mode of existing itself, that properly speaking it does not exist (Levinas, Time and the Other, 53) 4. This ought not to be taken in any literal sense, that the subject is non-existent, but that the self-understanding of the subject has not been fully constituted. For Levinas the experience of self-awareness emerges with an opposition to alterity; by reaching a crispation through suffering and a relation to death, the solitary being is constituted on a ground where intersubjective relations become possible (Levinas, TO, 75). The Other then comes upon us as that which imputes existence, the relationship with absolute alterity- with death and with the Other- brings about temporalization, for the consciousness of time is accomplished in the face-to-face encounter with the Other... the encroachment of the present on the future is not the feat of the subject alone, but the intersubjective relationship (Levinas, TO, 79). Our thematic thread appears: self-consciousness is entirely a product of intersubjectivity, i.e., the awareness of temporality, of finitude, and obligation all emerge in contact with others. The face of the Other is the primary revelatory experience of the obligation the ego has to the Other, i.e., the face of the Other obligates the ego prior to any deliberation, viz., prior to any linguistic mediation (Levinas, Diachrony and Representation, 105) 5. This encounter is the first instantiation of obedience and obligation to the Other; prior to any communicative action the ego is obligated to respond to the Other s demand for justice, and thus becomes accountable and autonomous, for the order of responsibility, where the gravity of ineluctable being freezes all laughter, is also the order where freedom is ineluctably invoked (Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 200) 6. 4 Time and the Other will be henceforth referred to as TO. 5 Diachrony and Representation will be henceforth referred to as DR. 6 Totality and Infinity will be henceforth referred to as TI.

6 Levinas, interestingly, argues that the initial face-to-face encounter reveals a primordial sense of justice, however, justice, in its juridical instantiation as law, i.e., justice encoded, in fact obscures the alterity of the face that originally signifies, or commands, outside the context of the world (Levinas, DR, 106). Law, also, can be seen as what relieves the subject of having to constantly enact the face-to-face encounter, but for Levinas it inevitably cheapens the original relation to the Other. Perspective-taking, in Habermas, ultimately results in role-taking, whereby a participating subject accepts the role of the alter ego; ethical self-understanding appears by moving from an epistemic self-understanding to a practical one, prompting an agency of selfcontrol (Habermas, 179). For Habermas socialization causes the subject to take on concrete forms of life and institutions of a particular collective (Habermas, 183). What this societal differentiation results in is a distancing of the moral and the ethical dimensions active in the individual (Habermas, 183). Constitutive of this distance is a taking on of the obligations and requirements demanded of us for group-living; we seek less to make moral decisions alone, and more to make them within the context of a group. Though it appears as if it is in some form a limitation, what occurs here is the subject gravitating toward a dimension of increased autonomy. The active willingness to open oneself for the internalization of moral norms, the added weight of responsibility for decision-making being delegated entirely to the subject, and active perspective-taking demonstrate this increased autonomy. The subject moves into terrain where he must make moral decisions on his own, that is, he has acquired the necessary behavioral expectations, adapting himself to social controls, and is now fully capable of accountability and autonomy to stabilize itself in the anticipation of symmetrical relations of unforced reciprocal recognition (Habermas, 188). The individual projects himself in the direction of a larger society, i.e., the subject reaches the conventional moral understanding and now begins a new trajectory where he makes new decisions beyond a conventional moral consciousness, decisions that are to be made under the conditions of a universal discourse (Habermas, 183 and 184 respectively). The face-to-face encounter we come across in Levinas develops similarly. The encounter reveals the the very mortality of the other person, i.e., the face discloses our greatest responsibility toward other people, a responsibility of a non-in-difference to the Other, where love breaks the equilibrium of the equanimous soul (Levinas, DR, 107 and 108 respectively). The face discloses the responsibility we have not to harm the Other, we are commanded to attend to the Other, to answer for the life of the other person by understanding in its rectitude a voice that commands before all mimicry and verbal expression (Levinas, 109). Responsibility before the Other is then prior to any deliberation, that is, any linguistic mediation, be it intersubjective or intrasubjective, for deliberation would already be the reduction of the face of the Other to a representation, to objectivity of the visible (Levinas, DR, 111). Deliberation implies a reasoned cognition, something that can only emerge in a linguistic context, that is, a context that is a consequent of the original relation of responsibility. Yet, within this exposure to the face of the Other is the expectation of a language, i.e., we must answer

7 for ourselves to those who address us. The facing position, opposition par excellence, can be only as a moral summons, because it is ultimately not a question of receiving an order from the face of the Other, and deliberating about that command, for in the nearness of the face the subjection precedes the reasoned decision to assume the order that it bears (Levinas, 196 and 112 respectively) 7. When facing another person, prior to dialogue, we are commanded to obey the primordial relation we can perhaps take to be one we share with others, viz., the intersubjective responsibility of equal regard. This is close to Habermas idea of a larger society, whereby the subject must presuppose, prior to participation, a community of accountable subjects as a context of interaction and as a communication community in which everyone is capable of taking up the perspective of everyone else and is willing to do so (Habermas, 185). What we see in the face of the Other, the Other recognizes in us; a mutual exchange of liability is triggered, and the being that imposes itself does not limit but promotes [our] freedom, by arousing [our] goodness (Levinas, TI, 200). From the face of the Other comes freedom, comes the origin of accountability, for this infinity stronger than murder, already resists us in his face, is his face, is the primordial expression, is the first word: you shall not commit murder (Levinas, TI, 199). The alterity of the Other, revealed in the face, discloses infinity to us; the temptation to harm, and the ethical impossibility of this temptation (Levinas, TI, 199). The recognition of a universal obligation to a larger society is echoed in Levinas; for him the presence of the face, the infinity of the Other, is a destituteness, a presence of the third party (that is, of the whole of humanity which looks at us), and a command that commands commanding (Levinas, TI, 213). It is the singular Other whose face demands responsibility and obligation which is the first instance of awareness of community, i.e., that constitutes the original fact of fraternity (Levinas, TI, 214). In the facing position with a single Other we consecrate the conscious awareness of the responsibility to humanity in general, and thus, to quote Habermas, the idealizing supposition of a universalistic form of life, in which everyone can take up the perspective of everyone else and can count on reciprocal recognition by everybody, makes it possible for the individuated beings to exist within a community- individualism as the flip side of universalism (Habermas, 186). The Other is the original revelation of the universal ethical obligation in general, it is the first process of ethical education, because the Other comes to us before a language: the face is the evidence that makes evidence possible- like the divine veracity that sustains Cartesian rationalism (Levinas, TI, 204). This making evidence possible can be construed as the development of a language that is grounded in the initial ethical exposure to the face; thus, the face always contains in itself the potential to speak, and because of this there is contained in us the possibility to answer, viz., an implicit exposure to linguistic mediation. Notwithstanding the surety of each ethical relation in Habermas and Levinas, it is only 7 Quotation from p. 196 is from TI, p. 112 is DR.

8 in Levinas that we get a hold of the primordial ethical relationship from the face of the Other, a face that can speak. Language can only be the conditioning force which gives significance to our expressions, which proclaims what we originally saw in the face of the Other, viz., this presentation [as] preeminently nonviolence, for instead of offending my freedom it calls it to responsibility and founds it (Levinas, TI, 203). Still, language is not purely mechanistic, for it is also in the face; language always comes from a face, it gives it a commencement in being, a primary identity of signification in the face of him who speaks (Levinas, TI, 204). Conclusion Habermas argued that the identity of socialized individuals forms itself simultaneously in the medium of coming to an understanding with others in language and by an authentic appropriation of individual life-history, thereby coming to an understanding with oneself. We found that this is not always the case, that while language further develops this process, it does not constitute it in full (Habermas, 153). Intersubjectivity that is prior to linguistic mediation had been briefly indicated by Habermas as the infantile experience of coming to an understanding with oneself, and with Others through rudimentary perspective-taking. In criticizing Habermas I had hoped to show that by passing over this important aspect of pre-linguistic identity-formation he perhaps had started his philosophical investigation too soon. With Levinas we found that there is a pre-linguistic contact with oneself, and with an Other; the shocking exposure to the vulnerability of the Other catapults us into positions of responsibility and freedom, ethical positions par excellence. The face of the Other cannot be ignored, the look compels us into acknowledgement, we cannot evade by silence the discourse which the epiphany that occurs as a face opens... The face opens the primordial discourse whose first word is obligation (Levinas, TI, 201). The face pulls us into discourse, i.e., language presupposes the initial encounter with the face of the Other, for to seek a truth between us one must already establish a relationship with a face, a face which can guarantee itself, whose epiphany itself is somehow a word of honor (Levinas, TI, 202). All language is then the signification of this word in the epiphany of the face; the ethical exigency is enacted in the face, and promulgated within discourse (Levinas, TI, 207). Before any utterance the face grips us and commands us into caring, for in the Other we see a coruscation of humanity in general; by seeing the Other we come to see everyone in the Other, everyone who is equally deserving of recognition and respect. Starting from this we can see the inherent use of language since with the vocal gesture, which both organisms perceive simultaneously, the actor affects himself at the same time and in the way as he affects his opposite number (Habermas, 176). This simultaneity motivates us to perceive ourselves as we are perceived from the perspective of others, and further, to learn to project the context of interaction that first makes the reconstruction of a shattered conventional identity possible (Habermas, 176 and 187 respectively). Language use serves the additive function of expanding upon what was originally encountered in the face of the Other; language ushers in the post-conventional ego-

9 identity that has developed into a fully autonomous and accountable person willing to engage in unforced reciprocal recognition with others. The original ethical obligation found in the Other becomes augmented through linguistic networks, it becomes systematized and reified from its transformation in language. As bearers and respondents to this original obligation we develop a societal structure that is primordially centred in this obligation, and it is only in language that we can become fully aware of the meaning of the originary experience of the exposure to the Other, and articulate the impact it has had on shaping who we are. Personal development and the mechanisms necessary to bring about processes of accountable decision-making we now see is not wholly dependent upon language. The silent Other who, in passing judgement upon us, also erects the scaffolding of freedom and responsibility around us only. Language heightens this relationship into a more communicatively integrated one. It is arguable that a social order could not develop without linguistically mediated intersubjective interactions, that the development of humanity in general has actually been dependent upon language for its vertical trajectory. Language facilitates thought and deliberation, which further makes reasoning possible, that is, language takes what we initially found in the attendance to the Other and translates it into its manifold variations. Language is the great method of circulation, the circulation of selfunderstanding, accountability and freedom. It lives in the Other and in us, in the face and body of the Other. Only in shared interaction can it manifest itself in and through us both.

10 Works Cited Habermas, Jürgen. Freedom and Determinism. Between Naturalism and Religion. Trans. Ciaran Cronin. Cambridge: Polity Press, Individuation through Socialization: On George Herbert Mead s Theory of Subjectivity. Postmetaphysical Thinking. Trans. William Mark Hohengarten. Cambridge: MIT Press, Levinas, Emmanuel. Time and the Other and Other Essays. Trans. Richard A. Cohen. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, Diachrony and Representation. Time and the Other and Other Essays. Trans. Richard A. Cohen. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. Trans. Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969.