Specifically in terms of instrumental or intrinsic value, how are we to view and

Transcription

1 Specifically in terms of instrumental or intrinsic value, how are we to view and subsequently enter into a moral relationship with our natural environment? Anthony Mayotte In order to build a road we destroy several thousand acres of farmland forever, all in perfect optimism, without regret, believing that we have gained much and lost nothing. In order to build a dam, which like all human things will be temporary, we destroy a virgin stream forever, believing that we have conquered nature and added significantly to our stature. In order to burn cheap coal we destroy a mountain forever, believing, in the way of lovers of progress, that what is of immediate advantage to us must be a permanent benefit to the universe. - Wendell Berry, A Secular Pilgrimage Seminar Research Essay December 10, 2015

2 Mayotte 2 Introduction Henry David Thoreau writes, "In Wildness is the preservation of the World From the forest and wilderness come the tonics and barks which brace mankind our village life would stagnate if it were not for the unexplored forests and meadows which surround it. We need the tonic of wildness." 1 Thoreau s words are intended as a wake-up call for humanity; It is a call to awareness; that only with a relationship with Wildness can we receive this necessary tonic. However, Thoreau s invitation can be received in different ways. Is he calling us to view our relationship with nature as necessary only to the extent that it prevents human stagnation? How should we view nature? We interact with nature, the environment and non-human 2 entities on a daily basis, whether it is pumping gasoline into our car, resting in the shade of a tree, using water to brush our teeth, or racing our dog in the park. There are many different opportunities to enter into a relationship with nature, and the morality of those relationships are consequently determined by how the various natural identities are valued. The chief task of this essay is to examine the different ways in which we, as humans, have valued and subsequently treated our environment; I will then propose a way in which the environment, having intrinsic value, is not something to be considered a tool or instrument as a means to the end of human progress, but rather the other partner in a symbiotic relationship. In this essay, I do not intend to propose an ethic that overlooks the needs, desires and perspectives of humanity in fact, these play perhaps the most integral part in our role and relationship in and with the environment. Environmental ethics has often established a bad name for itself. It is often accused of forsaking the needs of humanity for those of the environment the derogatory term tree-hugger stands as a testament to this. However this 1 Thoreau, Henry David. "Walking" Natural History Essays, p See Holmes Rolston III on the use of the term non-human (Environmental Ethics, p. 46) It is a shame to have to describe sentient beings for what they are not, as it is more appropriate to describe them for what they are, however the human/nonhuman boundary is a biologically identifiable one beyond which ethical concern is often thought to be exhausted, so the term is useful despite its limitations.

3 Mayotte 3 should not be, nor is it the case. If we simply look to Pope Francis second encyclical, Laudato si On Care for our Common Home, we will see that it is in humanity s best interests to acknowledge that there is already an existent relationship between humans and nature. Human beings too are creatures of this world, enjoying a right to life and happiness, and endowed with unique dignity. So we cannot fail to consider the effects on people s lives of environmental deterioration, current models of development and the throwaway culture. 3 Consequently, the International Trade Union Confederation has called for the goal of the 2015 United Nation s Climate Change Conference to be Zero Carbon, Zero Poverty again exemplifying the interrelatedness of anthropological concerns and environmental issues. I will proceed by first identifying the prevalence of anthropocentrism in both past and present societies and how it affects the way we view nature. I will then describe the varying types of value that the environment carries as well as exploring whether or not different facets of nature have the capability of attributing value. As previously mentioned, the way in which we view and value nature has a direct correlation with the way we enter into that moral relationship. I will conclude by exploring two different ways in which this relationship has been successful in light of viewing nature and all its inhabitants as having intrinsic value. Anthropocentrism The Oxford English Dictionary defines the term anthropocentric as Centering in man; regarding man as the central fact of the universe, to which all surrounding facts have reference. 4 This regard for humans as the center of the universe has wrought several objectionable conclusions, including Ptolemy s geocentric claim that humans were literally the center of the universe. 5 However, this concept of anthropocentrism was not a new idea even during the time of Ptolemy. Notions of humanity being the basis to which all 3 Francis, Pope. Laudato Si On Care for Our Common Home. 18 June Ch. 1, Sec. IV #43 4 "anthropocentric, adj.". OED Online. December Oxford University Press. 5 See Mazer, Arthur. Shifting the Earth : The Mathematical Quest to Understand the Motion of the Universe. Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley ;, 2011.

4 Mayotte 4 surrounding facts have reference can be heard in the 5 th century B.C. from Protagoras claim, man is the measure of all things. Anthropocentric ideas are also woven through many past and present theologies, seeing the end of God s creation and the purpose of Christianity as humanity. Early patristic fathers such as Origen, Justin Martyr, Philo of Alexandria and many more were surrounded by the anthropocentric philosophies of Platonism, Stoicism, and gnostic thinkers and were thus heavily influenced respectively. 6 Origen even went so far as to compare non-rational animals to that of the human afterbirth, 7 claiming, providence was created for all rational beings, and animals benefit as a subsidiary result. 8 Late medieval thinkers like Francis Bacon wrote of one of the chief ambitions of humanity being the attempt to renew and extend the power and empire of the human race itself over the universe of things. 9 He further interpreted the Prometheus myth as indicating that humanity is the center of the world that works together to serve humanity. 10 This line of thought carried into the enlightenment. John Locke writes in his essay, Nature as an Economic Resource, God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life and convenience. The earth and all that is therein is given to them for the support and comfort of their being. 11 Kant furthers the anthropocentric tradition, As the single being upon earth that possesses understanding, [man] is certainly titular lord of nature and, supposing we regard nature as a teleological system, he is born to be its ultimate end. 12 The pervasiveness of humanity as the ultimate end of nature had repercussions on the field of psychoanalytics as 6 Clough, David. On Animals. Volume I, Systematic Theology. T&T Clark, p ibid., p ibid. 9 Bacon, Francis, and John Pitcher. The Essays. Penguin Classics p Clough, David. On Animals, p Locke, John. Nature as an Economic Resource in Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions. ed. by Keller, David R. Wiley-Blackwell, p Kant, Immanuel, and James Creed. Meredith. Kant's Critique of Teleological Judgment. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 93-4

5 Mayotte 5 well. Freud writes that a way to sublimate human aggression is to direct it away from other people against the rest of the biosphere by becoming a member of the human community, and, with the help of a technique guided by science, going over to the attack against nature, and subjecting her to the human will. 13 Throughout human history, there is no lack of viewing nature anthropocentrically viewing nature as present and existent merely for the unchecked use and progress of humanity. However, perhaps a way to recognize that humans may not be the center of the universe would be to take a closer look at some of the traits that one might claim makes humans so special. We can then compare these traits with those of various non-human animals. In the 4 th century A.D., Basil of Caesarea propounded the idea of ontological homogeneity the idea that all beings have an equal status of existence. Like other creatures we are made of the dust of the earth and will return to it. Therefore, we exist in solidarity with all other creatures, sisters and brothers of a single parent. 14 The similarities between humans and other forms of life are striking. We share twenty-one percent of our genes with all other cellular life forms. 15 A fifth of genetic makeup, therefore, is common between us and bacteria, seaweed, cabbages, and oak trees. Over fifty percent of our genes are shared with those found in other eukaryotes. 16 Three-quarters of our genes are shared with all other animals, 97 percent with orangutans, 98.5 percent with gorillas and 98.9 percent with chimpanzees. 17 However, these similarities reach beyond the genetic level. It has been discovered that sheep can remember hundreds of faces. 18 Crows can fashion tools in order to solve 13 Freud, Sigmund, and Albert. Dickson. Civilization, Society and Religion : Group Psychology, Civilization and Its Discontents and Other Works. Pelican Freud Library ; v. 12. Harmondsworth: Penguin, P Clough, David. On Animals, p Ridley, Mark. Evolution. 3rd ed. Malden, MA ; Oxford: Blackwell Science, p ibid. 17 ibid., p Kendrick, K. M., et. all, Sheep Don t Forget a Face, Nature p. 414

6 Mayotte 6 problems. 19 Chimpanzees practice empathy, morality and politics. 20 Dolphins are capable of processing grammar. 21 Parrots can differentiate between objects in relation to abstract concepts such as color and shape. 22 These are only a handful of examples of non-human animals possessing traits that have, for a long time, been only attributed to humans. Perhaps the anthropocentric anti-environmentalist would say that what makes humans superior is a combination of all of these traits. I am not saying that humans are not special creatures; we possess many traits that are unique to only our species but so do wolves respectively, and peregrine falcons, to name two others. I originally thought the differing beliefs for and against anthropocentrism were the crux of the debate between environmentalists and anti-environmentalists; however, this is not necessarily the case. To prove his point on the natures of intrinsic value apart from humans (which will be discussed momentarily), G.E. Moore put forth an example: one of two worlds could be brought into existence in both worlds there are no humans present. One world is filled with beautiful trees, mountains, rivers, etc., and the other is deprived of these beautiful things it only possesses things which we would describe as unattractive; it is an ugly world. Moore states that it would be better for the beautiful world to be brought into existence because beauty must in itself, be regarded as a greater good than ugliness. 23 Beckerman and Pasek respond to this example in their article, In Defense of Anthropocentrism. They claim that if humans are nonexistent in either of these worlds, whether as actors or as spectators, then the terms ugly and beautiful themselves have no worth. They don t mean anything because they are human constructs. To assume that the use 19 Weir, A. A., et. all, "Shaping of Hooks in New Caledonian Crows." p Waal, F. B. M. De. Good Natured : The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals. Cambridge, Mass ; London: Harvard University Press, Herman, Louis M. et. all, Responses to Anomalous Gestural Sequences by a Language-Trained Dolphin: Evidence for Processing of Semantic Relations and Syntactic Information, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 122 (2): Pepperberg, Irene M. The Alex Studies: Cognitive and Communicative Abilities of Grey Parrots. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Moore, G. E. Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 84

7 Mayotte 7 of the word good would still carry meaning in a world without humans seems to neglect the role of humans in language. 24 So is it possible to be an environmentalist from an anthropocentric viewpoint? This depends on what your definition of an environmentalist is, but first as was just alluded too it must be acknowledged that in a world with humans, and we are humans, coming from an anthropocentric perspective is inevitable. It is not bad to think of oneself as special and regard one s interests as important. However, difficulties arise when those interests become too high of a priority to the extent that one begins to improperly value other living life. The difficulties that arise can be seen in the last man scenario (an often cited thought experiment in environmental ethics). If there was only one human left on the earth, and before they died, they had the opportunity to push a button that would destroy the entire natural world after they passed (for it would undoubtedly be capable of continuing on after the human had died), would it be immoral for this person to trigger the destruction? The key to answering this question lies not in a discussion of anthropocentrism, but rather in determining the value of nature. Intrinsic and Instrumental Value In his first edition of Environmental Ethics published in 1988, Holmes Rolston III identifies fourteen different kinds of value that can be found in nature and none of them include the words instrumental or intrinsic. Among others, he mentions life-support value, character-building value, religious value, recreational, scientific, and aesthetic value. 25 However, in the midst of describing these different values carried by nature, it remains ambiguous which ones are intrinsically part of natural entities, and which ones are assigned by humans as instrumental values. 24 Beckerman, Wilfred and Pasek, Joanna. In Defense of Anthropocentrism in Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions. ed. by Keller, David R. Wiley-Blackwell, p Rolston, Holmes III. Environmental Ethics: Duties and Values to the Natural World. Templeton University ch. 1

8 Mayotte 8 It would seem that intrinsic value is a rather straightforward concept. However, according to John O Neill, a natural entity or non-human being can have three different types of intrinsic value. The first is simply that of non-instrumental value it has value apart from its use for any other object. Briefly stated by O Neill in his essay The Varieties of Intrinsic Value, An object has instrumental value insofar as it is a means to some other end. An object has intrinsic value if it is an end in itself. 26 The second type of intrinsic value would be that of the kind previously alluded to and often associated with G. E. Moore. The intrinsic value is present by virtue solely of a being s non-relational properties, e.g., the greenness of a leaf or the height of a mountain. Thomas Hill Jr. states Moore s position in his essay, Ideals of Human Excellence and preserving Natural Environments, Moore believed that the intrinsic goodness of a thing was an objective non-relational property of the thing, like its texture or color, but not a property perceivable by sense perception or detectable by scientific instruments. In theory, at least, a single tree thriving alone in a universe without sentient beings, and even without God, could be intrinsically valuable. 27 However, this second form of intrinsic value presented by Moore can easily be confused with the third, which is the intrinsic value a thing possesses independently of the valuation of others. This sounds eerily similar to the first two, but the difference is that this is a meta-ethical claim, rather than an ethical claim. 28 Rather than the first, where the source of value has the possibility to lie in a valuer, or the second, where intrinsic value is a specific trait that the thing possessed. An example of this can be seen in the value that ornithologist Andrew Gozler found; he recognized the uniqueness of birds specifically, and this allowed him to see the intrinsic value in life itself. He states, I came to regard birds each species as precious, uniquely evolved, irreplaceable and therefore of inestimable value, a view which has been the ground for my personal 26 O Neill, John. The Varieties of Intrinsic Value, in Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions. ed. by Keller, David R. Wiley-Blackwell, p Hill Jr., Thomas. Ideals of Human Excellence and preserving Natural Environments in LaFollette, Hugh, and Ebook Library. Ethics in Practice: An Anthology. 4th ed. Blackwell Philosophy Anthologies. West Sussex, UK: Wiley, p O Neill, John. The Varieties p. 120

9 Mayotte 9 conservation ethic ever since. Furthermore, I felt that if the value of each species arises through its being a unique evolutionary event (as indeed is each individual life), then that value is independent of my valuing of it as a human observer that is, its value is intrinsic, and not contingent. 29 The question then arises, is this the only true way a thing can be attributed with intrinsic value? Perhaps the birds had this value apart from Gozler s interaction with them, but was this value not realized until he saw them? Rolston claims that We humans carry the lamp that lights up value, although we require the fuel that nature provides. 30 This brings us to the issue of value ownership. According to John O Neill, some of the confusion in the debate about intrinsic values arises out of a failure to distinguish between the source of value, for example, human valuers, and the object of value. 31 But are humans the only creatures who are capable of being that source of value? Rolston examines several different natural entities and their ability to attribute value. He claims that animals have the ability to value intrinsically because it would be implausible to assume that there is an animal world replete with instrumental values and devoid of intrinsic values, everything valuing the resources it needs, nothing valuing itself. 32 An animal has the capability to value its own life for its own sake in that it seeks to continue living. A plant, on the other hand, does not have this capacity. A tree cannot make the choices that would lead to the continuance of its large skillset i.e., cannot choose to continue photosynthesizing or growing towards the sun. They can do many things, both at the physical and genetic level, but since they cannot feel or make decisions they do not possess the capacity to attribute value to anything apart from the plant. However, ecosystems are a different entity. Being made up of many different smaller, and seemingly more intricate entities, it often gets mistaken that the more complex beings 29 Gozler, Andrew, Surprise and the Value of Life in Berry, R. J. Real Scientists, Real Faith. Oxford: Monarch Books, p Rolston, Holmes III. Value in Nature and the Nature in Value in Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions. ed. by Keller, David R. Wiley-Blackwell, p Beckerman, Wilfred and Pasek, Joanna. In Defense of p Rolston, Holmes III. Value in Nature p

10 Mayotte 10 within the system are valued more than the ecosystems themselves. But this would be a misunderstanding of ecosystems and their own complexity and importance to those smaller organisms. Rolston claims, Organisms defend only their own selves or kinds but the system spins a bigger story. Organisms defend their continuing survival; ecosystems promote new arrivals. Species increase their kinds but ecosystems increase kinds, and increase the integration of kinds 33 The ecosystem is a fundamental unit of development and survival. They guide the changing complexities of these complex organisms. The human is able to value and behave accordingly because of the ecosystem it has found itself in. This is systemic value. Without the ecosystem, there would be no capability to value. Thus, according to Rolston, There are no intrinsic values, not instrumental ones either, without the encompassing systemic creativity. 34 They are all woven together. This process of determining which natural entities have the capability to value brings us again to the issue of value ownership. Is it actually necessary for a valuer to be present in order for a natural entity to possess intrinsic value? Initially, it would seem that Rolston is arguing that there can be no value without a valuer, Intrinsic value in the realized sense emerges relationally with the appearance of the subject-generator. 35 Therefore, it is in this relationship that value is attributed. Yet that does not mean it wasn t there. Even if a natural entity possessed an intrinsic value before a relationship, it is almost as if that value lies dormant until a human, or conscious being comes along and there is a value ignition. 36 The attributes under consideration are objectively there before humans come, but the attribution of value is thus subjective. 37 Was Protagoras right? Is man truly the measure of things? Or is man simply the measurer of things? We simply experience and encounter these values that are already 33 ibid., p ibid. 35 ibid., p ibid. 37 ibid. (italics mine)

11 Mayotte 11 present before we acknowledge them. Yet our acknowledging them is one of the most important things we can do. Rolston states, Perhaps there can be no doing science without a scientist, no religion without a believer, no tickle without somebody tickled. But there can be law without a lawgiver, history without a historian; there is biology without biologists, physics without physicists, creativity without creators, story without story-tellers, achievement without achievers and value without valuers. 38 Yet without intentionally entering into these moral relationships and recognizing these values, any hope for an environmental ethic would be futile. In his essay, A Secular Pilgrimage, Wendell Berry aptly says, man cannot live alone he cannot have values alone, religious or otherwise, any more than he can live by bread alone. 39 It is integral that we embrace our humanity as part of an ecological community. But what does entering into this community look like? Our Moral Relationship In his seminal essay, The Land Ethic, Aldo Leopold writes, The single premise of ethics is that there is an individual living amongst a community. The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants and animals, or collectively: the land. 40 Although is this communal relationship currently present between humanity and nature? Do we actually behave ethically towards our land? Leopold has his answer, Certainly not the soil, which we are sending helter-skelter downriver. Certainly not the waters, which we assume have no function except to turn turbines, float barges, and carry off sewage. Certainly not the plants, of which we exterminate whole communities without batting an eye. Certainly not the animals, of which we have already extirpated many of the largest and most beautiful species ibid., p Berry, Wendell. A Secular Pilgrimage, in A Continuous Harmony: Essays Cultural and Agricultural. A Harvest Book, HB 301. San Diego ; London: Harcourt Brace & Company, p Leopold, Aldo. The Land Ethic, in Light, Andrew, and Holmes Rolston. Environmental Ethics : An Anthology. Blackwell Philosophy Anthologies ; 19. Malden, MA ; Oxford: Blackwell, p ibid.

12 Mayotte 12 Written in 1949, Leopold s words are a cry against the anthropocentric ideologies prevalent at this time a cry against the lack of appreciation for humanity s place in and with the environment. In the last section, I spoke of nature and non-human entities possessing intrinsic value apart from that which is given to it by humans. It is often the case today that one might think they are entering into an environmentally ethical relationship in a similar manner, yet they are still viewing it as an economic resource. Leopold further claims that a system of conservation based on economic principles is lop-sided ; it assumes falsely that the economic parts of the biotic clock will function without the uneconomic parts. 42 We forsake what does not have economic value thinking that they may not be crucial to the benefit of what has economic value. Ultimately, Leopold s moral relationship with the environment can be summarized by his phrase, A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise. 43 This concept of entering into a communal relationship with an intrinsically valuable nature can be taken even further into the realm of virtue ethics. Thomas Hill Jr. proposes that rather than answering the questions put forth by destroyers of the environment such as Why is destroying the environment immoral? we should be asking, What sort of person would want to do what [the anti-environmentalists] propose? 44 Rather than an act in itself being immoral, an act appears to be wrong if it reflects something objectionable about the person doing it. Entering into a moral relationship with nature thus takes on characteristics of virtue ethics. Rather than asking the question, What right actions should I take towards the environment? one is then encouraged to ask What sort of person would I be to treat the environment in this manner? 42 ibid., p ibid. 44 Hill, Thomas Jr.. Ideals of Human Excellence p. 613

13 Mayotte 13 However, this environmental virtue ethic approach is faced with a paradox. This approach can quickly turn into one where the environment is simply viewed as a means or an arena in which to cultivate virtue. Nonetheless, Rolston counters a similar objection put forward by Bill Shaw, that environmental virtue ethics is more concerned with cultivating virtue rather than preserving the environment. 45 But this anthropocentric account is too one-sided. Evolution and ecology have taught us that every kind of life is what it is environmentally, in its surroundings, not autonomously. Humans too are environmental reciprocals Dialectically the character is achieved in us, but the context is relational. Nature is not sufficient to produce these virtues, but it is necessary for them. 46 This can be understood more clearly by looking at a warning from C. S. Lewis, "You can't get second things by putting them first; you can get second things only by putting first things first." 47 This essentially means that You cannot become virtuous by putting this human concern first; you get such virtue only by putting first a respect for life's intrinsic value, which preceded, envelopes, and surrounds us and of which we are a subsequent and marvelously endowed participant. 48 In order to achieve genuine virtue, one must enter into a relationship with this intrinsically valued environment recognizing the entity s value apart from oneself. An alternative yet similar approach can be seen in Martin Buber s I and Thou. Buber talks about viewing things in two different ways and attributing to them different primary words: I-it which gets its meaning from other things and being bound by others ; and the second primary word, I-Thou this is a term to define a relationship, not consisting of traits 45 ibid., p Rolston, Holmes III. Environmental Ethics, p Lewis, C. S., and Walter. Hooper. First and Second Things : Essays on Theology and Ethics. Glasgow: Collins, Rolston, Holmes III. Environmental Virtue Ethics: Half the Truth but Dangerous as a Whole in Sandler, Ronald and Cafaro, Phillip, Environmental Virtue Ethics. p. 73

14 Mayotte 14 or boundaries. As experience, the world belongs to the primary word I-It. The primary word I-Thou establishes the world of relation. 49 Buber describes the process of considering a tree. How he can experience and look upon the different limbs, the way the tree appears a green shot with the delicate blue and silver of the background. 50 He can subdue the tree s actual presence so that it only appears to be an expression of law. Or rather he can classify it by its species and know its kind and number. Yet through all these experiences the tree remains his object, still possessing its nature and constitution. However, if he so chooses, and he has both will and grace, in considering the tree he can enter into a relationship with it. The tree then ceases to be an It. He writes, To this effect, it is not necessary for me to give up any of the ways in which I consider the tree. There is nothing from which I would have to turn my eyes away in order to see and no knowledge that I would have to forget. Rather it is everything, picture and movement, species and type, law and number, indivisibly united in this event. 51 When one enters into this I-Thou relationship, they are encountering the thing or person as a whole, not as simply the sum of their parts and properties. They are encountering a living entity that is a part of nature but not defined as such. It is experienced and related to in the manner that all life deserves. Conclusion Later in his work Buber states, But this is the exalted melancholy of our fate, that every Thou in our world must become and It. 52 With this I disagree. This would mean that every relationship that maintains the intrinsic value of both entities would eventually forsake those very foundations. Through a virtue ethics lens, this is impossible. Take for instance the 49 Buber, Martin, and Ronald Gregor. Smith. I and Thou. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, p ibid., p ibid. 52 ibid., p. 16

15 Mayotte 15 "last man" scenario. Buber might claim that the man, by destroying nature, is choosing to name their relationship I-It, which, although wrong, is inevitable. Ronald Sandler, the author of Character and Environment details a different analysis to the destructive man, What the last man does is wrong because the destruction is ecologically insensitive, cruel, wanton, disaffected, and indifferent to the worth of living things. 53 We must hold on to the fact that nature, ecosystems, non-human animals, and other living beings have value in themselves. Only then can we properly enter into a moral relationship with our environment; whether that is Buber s I-Thou or a character oriented, and intrinsically acknowledged relationship. Then we will find the truth in Thoreau s words. In Wildness we will find the preservation of the World. 53 Sandler, Ronald. Character and Environment : A Virtue-oriented Approach to Environmental Ethics, New York, NY ; Chichester: Columbia University Press, p. 113

16 Mayotte 16 Bibliography "anthropocentric, adj.". OED Online. December Oxford University Press. (accessed December 09, 2015). Bacon, Francis, and John Pitcher. The Essays. Penguin Classics Beckerman, Wilfred and Pasek, Joanna. In Defense of Anthropocentrism in Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions. ed. by Keller, David R. Wiley-Blackwell, Berry, Wendell. A Secular Pilgrimage, in A Continuous Harmony: Essays Cultural and Agricultural. A Harvest Book, HB 301. San Diego ; London: Harcourt Brace & Company, Buber, Martin, and Ronald Gregor. Smith. I and Thou. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, Clough, David. On Animals. Volume I, Systematic Theology. T&T Clark, Francis, Pope. Laudato Si On Care for Our Common Home. 18 June Freud, Sigmund, and Albert. Dickson. Civilization, Society and Religion : Group Psychology, Civilization and Its Discontents and Other Works. Pelican Freud Library ; v. 12. Harmondsworth: Penguin, Herman, Louis M. Kuczaj, Stan A. and Holder, Mark D. Responses to Anomalous Gestural Sequences by a Language-Trained Dolphin: Evidence for Processing of Semantic Relations and Syntactic Information, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 122 (2): Hill Jr., Thomas. Ideals of Human Excellence and preserving Natural Environments in LaFollette, Hugh, and Ebook Library. Ethics in Practice: An Anthology. 4th ed. Blackwell Philosophy Anthologies. West Sussex, UK: Wiley, Kant, Immanuel, and James Creed. Meredith. Kant's Critique of Teleological Judgment. Oxford: Clarendon Press, Kendrick, K. M., da Costa, A. P., Hinton, M. R. Leigh, A. E. and Pierce, J. W. Sheep Don t Forget a Face, Nature Leopold, Aldo. The Land Ethic, in Light, Andrew, and Holmes Rolston. Environmental Ethics : An Anthology. Blackwell Philosophy Anthologies ; 19. Malden, MA ; Oxford: Blackwell, Lewis, C. S., and Walter. Hooper. First and Second Things : Essays on Theology and Ethics. Glasgow: Collins, Locke, John. Nature as an Economic Resource in Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions. ed. by Keller, David R. Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.

17 Mayotte 17 Moore, G. E. Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903 O Neill, John. The Varieties of Intrinsic Value, in Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions. ed. by Keller, David R. Wiley-Blackwell, Pepperberg, Irene M. The Alex Studies: Cognitive and Communicative Abilities of Grey Parrots. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Rolston, Holmes III. Environmental Virtue Ethics: Half the Truth but Dangerous as a Whole in Sandler, Ronald and Cafaro, Phillip, Environmental Virtue Ethics, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Value in Nature and the Nature in Value in Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions. ed. by Keller, David R. Wiley-Blackwell, Environmental Ethics: Duties and Values to the Natural World. Templeton University Sandler, Ronald. Character and Environment : A Virtue-oriented Approach to Environmental Ethics, New York, NY ; Chichester: Columbia University Press, Thoreau, Henry David. "Walking" Natural History Essays, Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith, 1980 Waal, F. B. M. De. Good Natured : The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals. Cambridge, Mass ; London: Harvard University Press, Weir, AA, Chappell, J, and Kacelnik, A. "Shaping of Hooks in New Caledonian Crows." 2002.