Thomas Reid and the Evolution of the Idea of the Specious-Present 1

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1 Thomas Reid and the Evolution of the Idea of the Specious-Present 1 Abstract: This paper examines the historical contribution of Thomas Reid s Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785) to the debate over time-consciousness and in particular to the evolution of the idea of the specious-present. This objective is motivated by the fact that only parts of Reid s analysis of temporal experience are discussed nowadays. In particular, while Reid s argument concerning the instantaneous nature of perception is often cited, its metaphysical context is not fully appreciated. It is William James own reference to Reid in the course of formulating the idea of the specious-present in his Principles of Psychology (1890) which is the catalyst for this paper. James comment invites a broader perspective on Reid s analysis and brings to the fore the unique role that Reid attributed to the idea of duration in structuring our experience. It is this role and the experiential immediacy which it implies, that explain Reid s historical role in the formation of the idea of the specious-present. Key words: Thomas Reid, John Locke, William James, Time-perception, the specious-present, the Extensional-Retentional debate. 1. A comment on the need to explicate Reid s contribution This paper examines the influence of Thomas Reid s Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (hereafter EIP) on the debate over temporal consciousness and in particular the evolution of the idea of the speciouspresent. One reason for doing so is Reid s oft-quoted statement, which I will refer to as the inaccessibilityof-succession argument, which clashes with some of the current understandings of the specious-present. 2 More importantly, clarification is needed in order to emphasize some commonly overlooked aspects of Reid s analysis of temporal experience. 3 In particular, I will be relating to the unique role of the idea of duration and to the unmediated manner in which we acquire this idea. In this section, I will set the 1

2 groundwork for the discussion that follows by briefly outlining the historical roots of the idea of the specious-present and the context in which it is currently debated. The term specious-present highlights an important feature of the experienced present, i.e. its extensiveness over a short interval. Thus, the specious-present contains both earlier and later phases. This experiential feature is necessary in order to explain the immediate awareness of temporal phenomena (e.g., change and succession). As Gallagher explains the notion of the specious present involves the claim that the present or now that we experience at every moment is not a knife-edge or punctate phenomenon, but includes a brief extended interval of time (2013, 136). And Dainton argues that the specious-present has some apparent duration enough to contain the seeing of a shooting star hence its difference from the strict (durationless or mathematical) present (2014). Reid himself does not use the phrase, which first appears about a century after the publication of EIP in Edmund R. Clay s The Alternative: A Study in Psychology (1882). The thinker that is most responsible for popularizing the term is William James who borrows it from Clay and utilizes it in a section entitled The Sensible Present has Duration in his Principles of Psychology (1890). In a well-known passage, James argues: the practically cognized present is no knife-edge, but a saddle-back, with a certain breadth of its own [ ] The unit of composition of our perception of time is a duration, with a bow and a stern, as it were a rearward and a forward-looking end (1890, 610). Immediately after making this statement, James recalls the debate between Locke and Reid over temporal experience, commenting that he finds reinforcement of his own view in Reid s analysis, rather than Locke s. James reference to Reid appears in a footnote and is easily overlooked; yet, it hints at Reid s contribution to the evolution of the idea of the specious-present. James reference to Reid, which is the catalyst for this paper, appears in the oft-quoted paragraph, in which James formulates his idea of the specious-present. Thus, it invites us to reconsider Reid s contribution to the debate over time-consciousness and to correct a historical injustice. It is worth considering James comment against the background of the current debate between two perspectives on time-consciousness. 4 In Essay III of EIP, Reid states that if we speak strictly and philosophically, no kind of succession can be an object either of the senses, or of consciousness; because 2

3 the operations of both are confined to the present point of time, and there can be no succession in a point of time (270). Reid claims that due to the momentary nature of different modes of awareness, the relation of succession is never experienced in an immediate manner. Reid s statement is regarded as one of the initial formulations of what is now known as the Retentional model (for example, by Horel, 2013; Phillips, 2014). 5 There is no such consensus as to how to read James position. Thus, while some claim it is consistent with the Retentional model, others interpret it as supporting the Extensional model, its rival. 6 Before outlining each model, I would emphasize that my aim in what follows is not to determine which model is actually anticipated by James, nor do I challenge the understanding of Reid s inaccessibility-of-succession argument along Retentional lines. Rather, my aim is only to use the present terminology in order to gain a better grasp of James reference to Reid and to bring into focus some crucial aspects of Reid s own analysis. Both the Retentional and Extensional models face the problem of temporal experience, viz., how to explain the direct experience that we seem to have of temporal processes (e.g., change and succession), given the instantaneous nature of perception. 7 The Retentionalists hold that although succession cannot be directly perceived, it can nevertheless be represented by each momentary act of experience. Alternatively, the Extensionalists rely on the direct experiencing of change and succession as the best indication for the extended nature of perception itself. In this way, the Extensionalists absolve themselves of having to explain how successive phases (e.g., the notes of a melody) are all represented within one momentary act. This outline is sufficient to differentiate the way in which each model explains the sense in which the present is said to be specious. The Retentionalists take it to be specious since it introduces extended content within momentary acts of representation. Alternatively, the Extensionalists maintain that the present is specious since the experiential act itself is extended (thus, the spacious-present is probably more appropriate for describing what actually happens). Despite the fact that both models incorporate the specious-present, it is frequently associated with the Extensional model, so much so that the model is sometimes called the specious-present model (Cf. Grush, 2007; Kelly, 2005 b; Arstilia, 2011). 8 Therefore, if we understand James conception of the specious-present as being consistent with the Extensionalist view, then James reference to Reid (who explicitly denies that we have a direct perception of succession) requires 3

4 clarification. 9 But even if we understand James conception of the specious-present along Retentionalist lines or simply disregard the contemporary debate, an examination of his reference to Reid is still illuminating since it highlights neglected aspects of Reid s account of temporal experience, which are, as mentioned, of significance to the evolution of the idea of the specious-present. 2.1 begins with a brief sketch of Locke s analysis of the manner in which we acquire temporal notions such as succession and duration. Locke s view is certainly worth exploring in its own right but here I only consider it as part of the proper context for investigating (in 2.2 and 2.3) the two arguments that Reid raises against it. Specifically, in 2.2 I address Reid s oft-quoted argument concerning the momentary nature of perception, emphasizing that it should be understood in the context of Reid s metaphysics of personal identity and in particular in relation to the constitutive role of the idea of duration that accompanies it. In 2.3, I address this role in more detail and consider its full import for Reid s general analysis of timeconsciousness. With this synopsis in hand, I return in the concluding section ( 3) to James reference to Reid and consider its significance. I argue that James sympathy towards Reid reveals the similarity of their perspectives on the experiential immediacy of temporal relations. The immediate experience of relations and its importance for the analysis of temporal experience is commonly associated with James philosophy and is at the core of his Radical Empiricism. However, its importance to Reid s analysis of temporal experience is not fully appreciated. 2. Reid s two objections to Locke s account of how we acquire the ideas of duration and succession 2.1 A sketch of Locke s analysis 10 Locke opens chapter 14 of book II of his Essay by claiming: There is another sort of distance, or length, the idea whereof we get [ ] from the fleeting and perpetually perishing parts of succession. This we call Duration (II.xiv.1; 238). According to Locke, we must already possess the idea of succession in order to 4

5 acquire the idea of duration. The former is, in turn, directly experienced by us. This description invites two questions: a) How is a direct experience of succession possible? This question brings us back to the problem of temporal experience introduced above, viz., the problem of how to bridge the gap between the immediate experience of succession and the momentary nature of perception (notice that in the contemporary formulation of this problem there is no differentiation between duration and succession and both are equally in conflict with the momentary nature of sense perception). b) Even if we do experience succession in a direct manner, how does this experience entail the idea of duration? This question embodies the tension between succession and duration or, more specifically, between the transitory nature of the parts of the successive series and the unified flow that the idea of duration implies. The tension between succession and duration is twofold, consisting of both a structural aspect and a dynamic aspect. While duration exhibits a unified structure, succession consists of a multiplicity of parts. And while duration suggests a dynamic flow, succession can be experienced, in principle, in piecemeal form. This tension, which is in fact the tension between unity and multiplicity in temporal experience, is commonly addressed when considering the distinction between a succession of feelings and a feeling of succession (Cf. James 1890, 628). 11 The analysis in the following sections, particularly that in 2.3, is partly intended to refute the claim that Reid fails to explain the feeling of succession. 12 Locke states explicitly that an answer to (a) cannot be given in terms of sense perception. After all, as Locke goes on to explain, our sense perception has upper and lower limits, such that very slow or very fast motions are not detected by us (II, xiv, 7 8; 242). This fact clearly makes sense perception a poor basis for explaining the manner in which we acquire the idea of succession. When the succession is too quick Locke s example is the motion of a cannon shell that passes through a room (II, xiv, 10; 243) its phases are represented as simultaneous rather than successive. 13 We call this idea of a minimal and indivisible duration in which there is no succession an instant. Such a part of duration as this, wherein we perceive no succession, is that 5

6 which we call an instant, and is that which takes up the time of only one idea in our minds, without the succession of another; wherein, therefore, we perceive no succession at all (II, xiv, 10; 243). It is only after this inference from experience that the idea of an instant is constituted; yet it is constituted as a simple idea of the kind that composes greater durations and to which they are reduced. 14 I return to this description in 2.3 while discussing Reid s own account of what happens during the time of only one idea in our minds. Although succession cannot be discerned by the senses, Locke holds that it is still directly experienced. 15 He explains: It is evident to any one who will but observe what passes in his own mind, that there is a train of ideas which constantly succeed one another in his understanding, as long as he is awake. Reflection on these appearances of several ideas one after another in our minds, is that which furnishes us with the idea of succession (II. xiv. 3; 239). Thus, it is reflection, that notice which the mind takes of its own operations (II. i. 4; 124), that furnishes us with the idea of succession. Locke then deals with question (b) (concerning the manner in which we gain the idea of duration) in the remainder of the passage just quoted: [ ] and the distance between any parts of that succession, or between the appearance of any two ideas in our minds, is that we call duration (II. Xiv. 3; 239). Although time is needed in order to have an experience of succession (so that the flow of time is presupposed), the ideas of time and duration are derivative. From an evolutionary perspective, they are second-order ideas, inferior to the idea of succession. 16 Notice that thus far the account does not bridge the gap that was discussed in (b), viz., between the idea of succession and that of duration. Recent attempts to handle this difficulty bring together two features in Locke s analysis: the ability, provided by reflection, to represent a previous state of mind and Locke s endorsement of the cogito argument (see Weinberg, 2012; Yaffe, 2011). 17 Although these interpretations are worthy of consideration, my concern here is the manner in which Reid himself interprets Locke and in particular his complaint (discussed in 2.3) that Locke fails to bridge the gap between the ideas of succession and duration. 6

7 2.2 Reid s first argument against Locke and the inaccessibility of succession It is now possible to return to Reid s argument concerning the momentary nature of the different modes of awareness, which was partly quoted in the opening of the paper. This argument challenges Locke s answer to question (a), viz., the question of how it is possible to acquire the idea of succession through experience. Following is Reid s argument in full: It may here be observed that, if we speak strictly and philosophically, no kind of succession can be an object either of the senses or of consciousness; because the operations of both are confined to the present point of time, and there can be no succession in a point of time; and on that account the motion of a body, which is a successive change of place, could not be observed by the senses alone without the aid of memory (EIP, 270; emphasis added). This is the statement that is typically pointed to as one of the earliest formulations of the Retentionalist model. For example, Horel lists Reid as belonging to the group of philosophers who hold that we are actually in error when we say that we can see movements, or hear a melody. Rather, they claim, we know about movements and changes only through perceiving things being one way whilst remembering them being another way (2013, 14). And Phillips explains that the skeptical view, according to which we cannot perceive temporal relations between non-simultaneous events, can be traced back at least to Reid s notorious claim that no kind of succession can be an object either of the senses or of consciousness (2014, 131). These portrayals of Reid s analysis focus on his denial of the immediate experience of and in particular the perception of succession in favor of a memory-based account. My aim in what follows is not to argue against such portrayals, which underline (as part of a general historical introduction to the current dispute) a specific aspect of Reid s analysis, but rather to highlight the fact that Reid s argument concerning the instantaneous nature of perception cannot be fully appreciated while being considered in 7

8 isolation from the metaphysical background against which it was formulated. By the metaphysical background, I am ultimately referring to the unique function of the idea of duration in structuring our experience and the immediacy with which it is obtained. However, we begin the discussion of Reid s inaccessibility-of-succession argument by stressing the following two points: a) The first focuses on Reid s usage of the term present in the argument just cited. Near the end of the first chapter of EIP, Reid argues that: when we use common words, we ought to use them in the sense in which they are most commonly used [ ] when we have occasion to enlarge or restrict the meaning of a common word, or give it more precision than it has in common language, the reader ought to have warning of this (EIP, 38). Indeed, Reid gives precisely such a warning when considering the notion of the present. Thus, although one may think that Reid s usage of the term present is just common sense (since we cannot perceive what no longer exists), Reid himself does not justify it on these grounds. In fact, Reid claims that his observation that motion cannot be perceived by the senses seems to contradict the common sense and common language of mankind, when they affirm that they see a body move, and hold motion to be an object of the senses (EIP, 270; emphasis added). It is the philosophical present that is momentary. Moreover, the philosophical present is distinguished from the present of common sense and language. Grammatically speaking, Reid remarks that the present is being used to indicate something that has a beginning, a middle and an end (EIP, ). While the common sense meaning of the term present as a portion of time, which extends more or less, according to circumstances (EIP, 270) is rather vague, the philosophical concept of the present is very narrow. It is the Aristotelian present, which Reid describes as that indivisible point of time, which divides the future from the past (EIP, 270). b) Notice that the debate between Reid and Locke is actually not over our ability to perceive succession in a direct manner. As far as our sense perception is concerned, Locke also denies that succession can be among its objects (see 2.1). Thus, considered in the context of his opposition to 8

9 Locke, the main issue in Reid s inaccessibility-of-succession argument is not so much our inability to perceive succession but rather our inability to be conscious of it. In making this point, Reid criticizes Locke s claim that we can reflect on the succession of ideas in our own mind. Only Reid uses the term consciousness to imply the notice which the mind takes of its own operations, viz., Locke s reflection. 18 Since Reid does not explicate his narrow conception of perception on the basis of common sense, he would surely not explain his narrow conception of consciousness on the same grounds. What is then the origin of Reid s narrow conception of consciousness? According to Reid, the operations of the mind are all successive, and have no continued existence (EIP, 265). Consciousness, which gives us the immediate knowledge of these operations, is involuntary and of no continuance, changing with every thought ; its objects are never at rest; the stream of thought flows like a river, without stopping a moment; the whole train of thought passes in succession under the eye of consciousness, which is always employed about the present (EIP, 59; ). Thus, that which is past and gone cannot be among the objects of consciousness (EIP, 254; also see 22 3). And since [A] distinct notion of an object, even of sense, is never got in an instant (EIP, 418), consciousness, and not just the senses, is also not a reliable source of knowledge. 19 Yaffe expresses this by means of the following useful analogy: Consciousness is a limited tool for learning about our minds since it connects us to our own minds much as a stick one holds fast in a river connects one to the river; the stick is touching a different bit of water each instant and, similarly, to be conscious of the contents of one s mind is to be aware of a different thing each instant (2009, 179). Reid provides a rationalization of his narrow conception of consciousness in the following paragraph: Our consciousness, our memory, and every operation of the mind, are still flowing like the water of a river, or like time itself. The consciousness I have this moment, can no more be the same consciousness I had last moment, than this moment can be the last moment. Identity can only be 9

10 affirmed of things which have a continued existence. Consciousness, and every kind of thought, is transient and momentary, and has no continued existence (EIP, 278). Since the eye of consciousness is always on the present, consciousness cannot serve as the basis for identity or change. Rather, what we have is a Heraclitian flow that renders identity and change meaningless. That which exists only in the present cannot change since it is momentary; and since it becomes and perishes it cannot function as the basis for our identity. Thus, Reid s insistence on limiting consciousness to a vanishingly small present moment relates to (and should be understood in the context of) his criticism of Locke s metaphysics of personal identity. Both Locke and Reid explain identity in terms of continued and uninterrupted existence (viz., duration). Reid himself refers to this point of agreement: Identity [ ] supposes the continued existence of the being of which it is affirmed, and therefore can be applied only to things which have a continued existence [ ] to this I think Mr Locke agrees (EIP, 275; see also 263). As to the disagreement, Reid discusses it after quoting Locke s celebrated assertion (in II. xxvii. 11) that personal identity, viz., continued existence, consists in consciousness alone, and, as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person (EIP, ). 20 Attention is frequently focused on Reid s first two points of criticism which are directed against the last part of Locke s assertion: his complaint that Locke confuses consciousness with memory, and his claim (to which I return in 2.3) that Locke failed to understand the evidential functioning of memory. Reid s third point of criticism is that Locke is willing to attribute, from the outset, a continued existence to consciousness. This is a more general point of disagreement between Reid and Locke since it applies to both consciousness and memory rather than to Locke s specific understanding of them. According to Reid, the fallacy in Locke s account is that it attributes to momentary operations the strange magical power of producing its object, though that object must have existed before the memory or consciousness which produced it (EIP, 277). According to Reid, this is absurd since is it not strange that the sameness or identity of a person should consist in a thing which is continually changing? (EIP, 278). The gist of Reid s criticism is his insistence that duration is already 10

11 there as the main feature of the enduring and substantial self. 21 It is the primacy of the enduring self over its successive operations that motivates Reid s narrow conception of consciousness and it is from this perspective that Reid s role can be appreciated. In the following section, we examine this primacy in more detail. 2.3 Reid s second argument against Locke and the idea of duration Reid s second argument (raised in chapter 5 of Essay III) deals with question (b) presented in 2.1, namely, how we acquire the very idea of duration or continued existence. Recall that, according to Locke, this is accomplished by reflecting on the distance between successive ideas. When referring to this part of Locke s analysis, Reid raises the following complaint: If it be meant that the idea of succession is prior to that of duration, either in time, or in the order of nature, this, I think, is impossible, because succession, as Dr price justly observes, presupposes duration [ ] to conceive this the more distinctly, let us call the distance between one idea and that which immediately succeeds it, one element of duration; the distance between an idea, and the second that succeeds it, two elements, and so on; If ten such elements make duration, then one must make duration, otherwise duration must be made up of parts that have no duration, which is impossible [ ] Nothing indeed is more certain than that every elementary part of duration must have duration [ ] Now it must be observed, that in these elements of duration, or single intervals of successive ideas, there is no succession of ideas; yet we must conceive them to have duration; whence we may conclude with certainty, that there is a conception of duration, where there is no succession of ideas in the mind (EIP, ; emphasis added). The dispute between Reid and Locke concerns the primacy of the idea of succession over that of duration (or vice versa). Reid holds that in order to acquire the idea of succession we must already possess the idea 11

12 of duration. He defends this claim by arguing that since a mere succession of unextended parts, even an infinite number of them, will never constitute extension, each element in the successive series must be extended. Thus, we must think of the constituents of duration as units of duration since it is impossible that the multiplication of nothing should produce something (EIP, 272). The idea of duration must therefore be conceptually prior to that of succession (an experiential priority would obviously violate Reid s narrow conception of consciousness that was discussed above). What does this conceptual priority of duration amount to? To answer this, consider once again the difference between Locke and Reid. Both Locke and Reid adopt a homoiomerous position of duration (viz., the position according to which every part is of the same nature as the whole). And both are committed to the infinite divisibility of duration entailed by such a position. For Locke, every part of duration is duration too; and every part of extension is extension, both of them are capable of addition or division in infinitum (II. xv. 9; 266). And Reid claims that duration and extension are continuous rather than discrete and as such they consist of parts perfectly similar, but divisible without end (EIP, 259). Nevertheless, Reid s line of reasoning regarding the idea of a minimal experiential duration is quite different from Locke s. According to Reid, although duration itself is infinitely divisible, its conceptual priority over succession implies that as the basis of our analysis of temporal experience we must posit experiential indivisible intervals. How else are we to understand Reid s statement that in these elements of duration [ ] there is no succession of ideas? The infinite divisibility of duration does not rule out the conceptual requirement of undivided minima of duration. These minima function as the building blocks of duration (EIP, 272). To understand the exceptionality of this analysis of the elements of duration, we can compare it to Reid s discussion of bodily extension in Essay II. In the case of bodily extension, the limit beyond which we cannot perceive any division is only perceptual. There is no such limit in thought and one must carry on the division without end. Otherwise, Reid argues, there would exist the idea of a unit of bodily extension with no parts to it and this is absurd (EIP, 220). As we just saw, there is no such conceptual restraint on continued existence (viz., duration). On the contrary, the idea of duration with no parts is consistent with Reid s metaphysics of personal identity, 12

13 viz., the indivisibility of continued existence itself. My personal identity Reid writes, implies the continued existence of that indivisible thing which I call myself (EIP, 264). 22 While Reid puts forward a conceptual analysis of the idea of duration which is consistent with the priority of continued existence over its successive operations Locke is more interested in the natural history of the production of the idea of duration as Fraser puts it (in his note to II. xiv. 4; 240). As Locke sees it, since we must think of time and space as infinitely divisible the mind is not able to frame an idea of any space without parts (II. xv. 9; 266) the idea of a minimal duration with no succession within it (which Reid defends) is conceptually incoherent. Indeed, as we saw in 2.1, Locke admits that we possess the idea of an instant or a moment. But this minimal portion of duration whereof we have clear and distinct ideas (II. xv. 9; 266) is simply inferred from experience. It is required by experience, but it is not conceptually necessary. 23 The conceptual priority of the idea of duration informs Reid s analysis of the operation of memory to which I now return. Indeed, memory implies a conception and belief of past duration (EIP, 254). But this does not mean that we acquire the idea of duration merely by linking (through memory) the current sensation with the previous one. Such a description would violate the conceptual priority of the idea of duration (and the continued existence of the self). Thus, while considering the relation between the operation of memory and the idea of duration it is important to recognize that memory does not constitute duration. Rather, it is duration that can be treated as a constitutive idea since, due to its belonging to a group of ideas which are the immediate effect of our own constitution, it precedes our experience and somehow structures it. 24 Thus, memory relates to duration in that it reveals, again, what is already there. This perspective on the relation between memory and duration is consistent with the direct access to past events implied by Reid s direct realism. 25 According to Reid s account, memory provides unmediated knowledge of past events and thus the additional act of temporal modification of representations in such a way that they are now apprehended as past (which is so crucial in the case of other thinkers such as Brentano and Husserl) is unnecessary. A closer look reveals two ways in which memory implies a conception and belief of past duration : 13

14 a) First, the duration of events which we remember leads us necessarily to the conception and belief of a duration (EIP, 260). These are events that we remember. 26 b) Second, the memory of a past event is always accompanied by the interval between that event and the present moment. Reid writes that it is impossible that a man should remember a thing distinctly, without believing some interval of duration, more or less, to have passed between the time it happened, and the present moment (EIP, 254). Reid s more general view of the two ways in which we acquire the notion of relations clarifies this point. The first involves comparing the related objects so that we perceive the relation, either immediately, or by a process of reasoning (EIP, 422). The other, which seems not to have occurred to Mr Locke [ ] is, when, by attention to one of the related objects, we perceive or judge, that it must, from its nature, have a certain relation to something else [ ] and thus our attention to one of the related objects produces the notion of a correlate, and of certain relation between them (EIP, 422). Reid s clarifies his criticism of Locke as follows: by attending to the operations of thinking, memory, reasoning, we perceive or judge, that there must be something that thinks, remembers, and reasons which we call the mind (EIP, 422). Thus, I must attend to the operations of the mind as mine, viz., as related to the underlying self. Already in Essay I, Reid explains that there are some things which cannot exist by themselves, but must be in something else to which they belong, as qualities or attributes [ ] In like manner, the things I am conscious of, such as thought, reasoning, desire, necessarily suppose something that thinks, that reasons, that desires (EIP, 43). As we have just seen, this reasoning, which relates to the synchronic unity of the self, is also applicable in the case of diachronic unity, i.e., the continued existence of the self over time. At this point, the importance of the unmediated experiencing of duration is fully exposed. Although the experience of succession, which becomes possible through the operation of memory, is necessary for us to have temporal experience, this experience (and the operation of memory) is not the source of our idea of 14

15 duration. 27 The idea of duration is original since it is not entailed by experience; rather it is purely the effect of our constitution, and given us by some original power of the mind (EIP, 273). This idea (again, like the operation of memory itself) is also simple. Reid thus bypasses the difficulty with Locke s analysis, that of explaining the sense in which time is simple yet composed of more fundamental ideas. Reid further insists in the first chapter of his Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind that: We cannot give a logical definition of thought, of duration, of number, or of motion (1983, ). If we try to define such notions, their definition will always be obscure or false, as shown by the Aristotelian attempt to do so (EIP, 19). 28 Having explained the role of the idea of duration, we now return to James reference to Reid in the Principles. 3. Back to James reference to Reid I earlier made the claim that James comment reveals Reid s unique influence on the evolution of the idea of the specious-present, on which I will now elaborate. On the face of it, James objective in chapter 15 of his Principles is consistent with Locke s analysis of temporal experience, rather than Reid s. According to James, awareness of change is thus the condition on which our perception of time s flow depends [...] the change must be of some concrete sort an outward or inward sensible series, or a process of attention or volition (1890, 620). In other words, both Locke and James explain temporal consciousness in terms of the immediate experience of change. More precisely, it is the immediate experience of succession to which they relate. While James and Locke tend to agree on this issue, James and Reid diverge. James claim that the sensible present has duration or that the units of composition of our perception of time is a duration or that we can no more intuit a duration than we can intuit an extension, devoid of all sensible content (1890, 620) is in conflict with Reid s argument (discussed in 2.2) concerning the instantaneous nature of sense perception. However, immediately after making these claims James comments as follows: Locke, in his dim way, derived the sense of duration from reflection on the succession of our ideas. Reid justly remarks that if ten successive elements are to make duration, then one must make 15

16 duration, otherwise duration must be made up of parts that have no duration, which is impossible [ ] we may conclude with certainty that there is a conception of duration where there is no succession of ideas in the mind [ ] No point in seeking, says Royer Collard in the fragments added to Jouffroy s translation of Reid, duration in succession; we will never find it there; duration preceded succession; the concept of duration preceded the concept of succession. It is, therefore, completely independent? Yes, it is completely independent (1890, ). 29 James finds Reid s argument concerning the priority of duration over succession so appealing that he completely ignores Reid s inaccessibility-of-succession argument. How can this be explained? One way is to argue that James does not really think of perception as extended, viz., to understand James analysis along Retentionalist lines. However, since it is evident that James makes arguments in favor of both models, it is more rewarding to clarify the point that he is trying to make with this comment outside the scope of this debate. Evidently, James recognizes that it is Reid, rather than Locke, who captures the focal feature of the specious-present, i.e., its straightforward unity. James describes this feature by claiming that it is only as parts of this duration-block that the relation of succession of one end to the other is perceived. We do not first feel one end and then feel the other after it, and from the perception of succession infer an interval of time between, but we seem to feel the interval of time as a whole, with its two ends embedded in it [ ] the original experience of space and time is always of something already given as a unit (1890, ). Thus, succession is immersed within each minimal unit of experience and does not in itself constitute duration. Indeed, this is exactly the point that Reid is making. For both James and Reid, the idea of succession is an abstraction from an aboriginal unity which is essential to the idea of duration. Moreover, both Reid and James explain this unity of minimal experiential units in terms of a direct experience of relation. Reid s account of relations as the necessary and essential background of every act is strongly connected to the role that the idea of duration plays within his overall scheme and the experiential immediacy which it involves. A temporal relation is immediately experienced, due to its embodiment in each and every present experience. And the embodiment of this relation provides 16

17 a contextual mesh for the current experience, an idea that is one of the cornerstones of James thought. To be sure, Reid denies that we are directly aware of a temporal relation (via perception or consciousness), but he insists that the idea of duration is experienced in an unmediated manner just the same. Can this embodiment of duration be thought of as providing something over and above the succession of feelings, viz., the dynamic feeling of succession itself? Although Reid s explanation is not detailed enough to answer this question, he undoubtedly made a serious contribution to the later attempts to do so. NOTES 1 I would like to thank the participants of the early modern philosophy reading group: Noa Shein, Ori Belkind, Yakir Levin, Assaf Rotbard, and Julia Klintsevich for a fruitful discussion. I would also like to thank Hagit Benbaji, Benjamin Aisner and Daniel Mishori for their help. Finally, I want to thank the anonymous referees for their stimulating suggestions. 2 Cf. Arstilia 2011, Kelly 2005 b. Also see note 8. 3 An exception is the paper by Andersen and Grush 2009, which strongly emphasize Reid s contribution to the debate. 4 For an outline of the debate, see Dainton 2008; 2013; Horel s and Phillips references to Reid are cited in more detail in Dainton 2014, and Gallagher 2013, 137 interpret James specious-present along Retentionalist lines while Kelly 2005 a understands it as following the Extensionalist model. Also see Le Poidevin 2007, Kelly formulates the problem as follows: How is it possible for us to have experiences as of continuous, dynamic, temporally structured, unified events given that we start with (what at least seems to be) a sequence of independent and static snapshots of the world at a time? (2005 a, 210). And Falkenstein explains the specific significance of this problem in the framework of the commitment of early modern empiricism to the presentist view: for a presentist, there are effectively no temporally extended sense organs. Presentism poses a particular problem for the empiricist view that the idea of time arises from our experience of the succession of our ideas. The empiricist must not only address the standard Augustinian problem of how time could exist if only the vanishingly small present moment exists, but the further problem of how there could be any such thing as an experience of succession if only the present mental state exists (2013, 103). 8 According to Arstilia: Two different views have been proposed to resolve this paradox [see fn.7]. The first one is the Extensionalist view that is often related to James s theory. According to this alternative, it is the episodes of experiencing that are temporally extended (2011, 4). Arstilia then contrasts this Extensionalist/specious-present approach with Reid s, writing that those who disagree with Reid and endorse some notion of specious present maintain that our experiences can really have succession as their content (ibid). And Kelly comments: One of the central issues between Retention theorists and defenders of the Specious Present turns on this point [...] defenders of the Specious Present claim that we do have a direct perception of duration, that we experience the world, in other words, in temporally extended units that are taken in as a whole (2005 b, 225). 9 For example, in Arstilia s unsympathetic reading of Reid, Reid denies that we really experience temporal properties [ ] our consciousness, and the things we can be conscious of, are confined to momentary points in time [ ]Accordingly, Reid claims that we do not really experience succession, change, persistence, melody, or any other temporally extended phenomena [ ] Although Reid s view of consciousness provides us with the succession of experiences [ ] it does not provide us with experiences of succession [ ] Hence, those philosophers who draw their intuitions from such phenomenology (which includes almost everyone) have disagreed with Reid s view (2011, 3 4). 10 For a detailed analysis, see Yaffe For a contemporary analysis of this phrase, see Hoerl This is Arstilia s main accusation against Reid (see note 9). 17

18 13 Yaffe refers to this aspect of Locke s analysis as the Halting Sensation View according to which the sense organs are like an information hopper: they hold information until it can be transferred as a single batch into ideas (2011, 394). 14 However, notice that at the beginning of this section Locke argues that duration itself, and not just its least thinkable portion, is a simple idea, yet not without all manner of composition (II. xv. 9; 264). 15 This is how Dainton interprets Locke: If reflection simply means introspection [ ] then for Locke succession is something of which we are directly aware (2014). 16 Fraser comments as follows on this section: Succession, in which the idea of duration is necessarily contained, is, according to Locke, an idea which accompanies every other idea [ ] Duration is therefore presupposed, as the condition of our apprehension of phenomena presented in experience (239). See also Locke s own summary of the process by which we acquire our temporal notions (II, xiv. 311; ). 17 According to Weinberg, Locke utilizes the cogito argument to explain the synchronic, momentary unity of the self. Later, this unified experience joins other experiences to create the experience of continuing self. Weinberg emphasizes that this does not mean that consciousness is simply constructed from successive states. Rather, we have an experience of continuity in successive states of consciousness: we experience our conscious states of ourselves as linked in a continuing stream of consciousness (2012, 400). See also Yaffe s complex analysis of reflection in his Locke on Consciousness, Personal Identity and the Idea of Duration : if reflection is both smooth [viz., providing us with ideas of the states of our minds that represent only one state at a time] and halting [viz., providing us with the representation of successive states as simultaneous; cf. note 13] then, given the Cartesian point, it seems possible to acquire the idea of your own continuous existence, your own duration, from reflection on the succession of your ideas (2011, 403). 18 Reid writes: Mr. Locke says, that, by reflection, he would be understood to mean the notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them. This, I think, we commonly call consciousness (EIP, 268; also see ). For a critical analysis of Reid s attempt to distinguish consciousness from reflection, see Mishori What makes knowledge possible is reflection which Reid distinguishes from consciousness in EIP, 58. Also see Yaffe Also see Locke II. xxvii. 25; While Reid s perspective on the relation between memory and personal identity is frequently addressed, this more subtle line of disagreement between Reid and Locke, as Copenhaver refers to it (2009), is less discussed. 22 See also the characterization of the self in terms of Leibniz s indivisible monad in EIP 264; further see EIP See Falkenstein 2013, Reid holds that certain powers appear already from infancy, before the reasoning power appears (EIP, 238). Perception, memory and consciousness for example are all original and simple powers of the mind, and parts of its constitution ; thus, we cannot suggest a theory for them (EIP, 193). The unaccountability of such powers is emphasized throughout the Essay. Following are a few examples: If the power of perceiving external objects [ ] be a part of the original constitution of the human mind, all attempts to account for it will be vain: No other account can be given of the constitution of things, but the will of him that made them (EIP, 101). This reoccurs with regard to conceptions: We know that such is our constitution [ ] but how they are produced, we know no more than how we ourselves were produced (EIP, 226). The same is argued with regard to memory (EIP, 255), our belief in personal identity (EIP, 262) and other principles and conceptions which are grounded in the constitution of the mind. I want to thank the anonymous referee for highlighting this positive characterization of the idea of duration. 25 This evidential role of memory is clarified in Hamilton 2003, Van Woudenberg 2004, Copenhaver As Falkenstein explains, this role is well suited to the extraordinary ability of memory to look into the past and directly perceive the past object at the point where it exists in the past (2013, 116). 26 Copenhaver considers the fact that our conception of and belief in duration is supplied by memory as a good reason to interpret Reid as holding that the objects of memory are primarily events. Things that happen or have a duration and only secondarily concrete objects or properties that figure in events (2006, 179). 27 This is clarified in an editorial note added to the Bartlett s third edition of Reid s EIP (1852) by means of Cousin s distinction between two types of order: chronological and logical. Logically, the idea of duration is prior to that of succession and there could not be any succession but upon condition of a continuous duration, to the different points of which the several members of the succession may be attached (Cousin 1875, 145). But in the chronological order, which is the order of the acquisition of our ideas, it is the idea of a succession of events, which precedes the idea of time that including them (ibid). 28 See note The last two sentences of this quote are originally in French; the translation is mine. 18

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