JONATHAN ALPHONSE BUTTACI

Transcription

1 JONATHAN ALPHONSE BUTTACI 1001 Cathedral of Learning University of Pittsburgh Pittsburgh, PA buttaci.wordpress.com (cell) EDUCATION PhD: Philosophy (Joint Program in Classics, Philosophy, and Ancient Science) University of Pittsburgh ( ; expected June 2016) MA: Classics (Ancient Greek) University of Pittsburgh ( ) BA: Honors Philosophy, Classics (Latin) summa cum laude University of Notre Dame ( ) AREA OF SPECIALIZATION Ancient Philosophy AREAS OF COMPETENCE Epistemology, Ethics, Medieval Philosophy (esp. Aquinas), Philosophy of Mind OTHER RESEARCH AND TEACHING INTERESTS Philosophy and Literature, Philosophy of Religion, Ancient Greek and Latin (languages) DISSERTATION Title: Advisors: Thinking Forms in Images: Aristotle on Intellectual Capacities, Activities, and Virtues James Lennox, John McDowell (co-chairs), Kristen Inglis, James Allen (Toronto), Sean Kelsey (Notre Dame) Aristotle s active intellect has been a subject of much interpretive controversy over the centuries. Some have said it is the divine mind, others a god-like power of the human soul. Most begin by asking what the active intellect is; instead, I first ask what it does. I argue that the active intellect plays a distinctive role in learning and discovery by making intelligible objects available for thought. To understand this role more precisely, I consider Aristotle s idea that we learn by doing: not only do we become builders by building and brave by doing brave things, but we also get knowledge of triangles by thinking about triangles. In my investigation into his account of learning I draw on the Posterior Analytics and Metaphysics. I conclude that Aristotle distinguishes two sorts of intellectual activity when students are learning about triangles: they think about specific proofs to gradually grasp them, but they can also manipulate diagrams to discover proofs not yet considered, perhaps by drawing parallel lines or bisecting angles. This latter activity, by which students search for and uncover intelligible content in perceptual particulars, is the distinctive function of the active intellect. PUBLICATIONS Aristotle s Three Intellects, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 2013 Intended and Unintended Consequences: A Natural Distinction? in Anscombe and the Catholic Intellectual Tradition, John Mizzoni, ed., Neumann University Press (forthcoming) Aristotle s Physics, extended encyclopedic analysis for Mouseion, Ltd. (forthcoming) UNDER REVIEW withheld for online version

2 BUTTACI ~ CV 2 AWARDS, FELLOWSHIPS, AND GRANTS Michael R. Bennett Prize in Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh (2015) Elizabeth Baranger Teaching Award, School of Arts and Sciences, University of Pittsburgh (2015) Mellon Fund Travel Grant, Department of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh (2014) Pre-Doctoral Fellowship, School of Arts and Sciences, University of Pittsburgh ( ) Lilly Graduate Fellowship in the Arts and Humanities ( ) Arthur R. Anderson Fellowship, University of Pittsburgh (2012) Elizabeth Baranger Teaching Award (finalist), School of Arts and Sciences, Univ. of Pittsburgh (2012) Phi Beta Kappa Honors Society, University of Notre Dame (2009) John Oesterle Award for Excellence in Philosophy, University of Notre Dame (2009) SELECT REFEREED PRESENTATIONS Cognitive Capacities and States in Posterior Analytics B th Annual Ancient Philosophy Workshop, Rice University (Feb. 2016) Cave-Dwellers and Underground Men: Freedom and Bondage in Dostoevsky and Plato Freedom Set Free, Center for Ethics and Culture Conf., Univ. of Notre Dame (Nov. 2015) Not Neglecting the Work at Hand : A Note on Socrates Debt to Asclepius Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Annual Meeting, Fordham University (Oct. 2015) Like Light : Understanding Aristotle s Active Intellect (accepted but did not give paper) Metaphors in Use, 3 rd Annual Philosophy Conference, Lehigh University (Oct. 2015) Contemplating in Order to Learn: Some Proposals for Prior Intellectual Activity Aristotle on Teleology, Annual Baker Colloquium, University of Dayton (Apr. 2015) Aristotle on Dunamis, Hexis, Energeia: Rethinking the Triple Scheme Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Annual Meeting, Fordham University (Oct. 2014) Is Aristotle Actually a Color Realist? Some Remarks on de Anima III.2 Annual Pittsburgh Area Philosophy Workshop, Washington and Jefferson College (Sept. 2014) Thinking Forms in Images: An Aristotelian Insight on the Socratic Method American Association of Philosophy Teachers Biennial Conference, St. John s Univ. (Aug. 2014) Aristotle s Conflicted Mind: The Mimetic and Poetic in Tension Impression and Object, Conference on Critical Theory, CUNY Graduate Center (Mar. 2013) What Does Active Nous Activate? Lexington Workshop in Ancient Philosophy, Univ. of Kentucky, Transylvania Univ. (Mar. 2013) Pennsylvania Circle of Ancient Philosophy Annual Conference, Villanova University (Mar. 2013) Intended and Unintended Consequences: A Natural Distinction? Anscombe and the Catholic Intellectual Tradition, Conference at Neumann Univ. (Mar. 2013) Aristotle s Three Intellects Aristotle Now and Then, American Catholic Philosophical Assoc. Annual Conf. (Nov. 2013) Theism as Morality s Foundation or Framework? A Plea for Distinctions Must Morality Be Grounded in God? Annual Philosophy Conf., Franciscan Univ. (Apr. 2013)

3 BUTTACI ~ CV 3 INVITED PRESENTATIONS Active Thinking, Active Mind: Discovering Parallels with Aristotle s de Anima III.5 Aristotle s de Anima, Philosophy Seminar, University of Notre Dame (Nov. 2015) Aristotle s de Anima, Greek Seminar, Pacific Lutheran University (over Skype) (Nov. 2015) Aristotelian Inquiry, Universal to Particular Aristotle on Intellectual Virtue, Ancient Philosophy Workshop, Univ. of Pittsburgh (Apr. 2015) How Not to Think about Double Effect Aquinas on Freedom and Virtue, 3 rd Thomistic Workshop, Mount Saint Mary Col. (June 2013) COMMENTS AND OTHER ACADEMIC PRESENTATIONS Ontology versus Ousiology: A Comment on Humphreys Pennsylvania Circle of Ancient Philosophy Annual Conf., Pennsylvania State Univ. (Apr. 2015) (Dis)Analogies between Perception and Nous: A Comment on Vasiliou Aristotle s de Anima, Ancient Philosophy Workshop, University of Pittsburgh (Apr. 2013) Active Thinking, Active Mind: Discovering Parallels with Aristotle s de Anima III.5 (Nov. 2015) McDowell and the Myth of the Given: A Reappraisal (Nov. 2012) Guest Lecture Series, Undergraduate Philosophy Club, University of Pittsburgh Aristotle and Aquinas on Intellectual Capacities, Activities, and Virtues (Dec. 2015) Aristotle and Aquinas on the Incorruptibility of the Soul (Oct. 2015) Aristotle s de Anima and Aquinas Treatise on Human Nature: An Introduction (Sept. 2015) Undergraduate Epistemology Reading Group, Newman Student Center, Pittsburgh PA TEACHING Primary Instructor Concepts of Human Nature (Spring 2016) First Philosophy (Spring 2016, at St. Vincent s College) History of Ancient Philosophy (Summer 2015) Concepts of Human Nature (Spring 2015) TA and Recitation Instructor Introduction to Logic (Fall 2015) History of Ancient Philosophy, Writing Intensive (Fall 2014) History of Ancient Philosophy (Spring 2013) Minds and Machines (Spring 2011) Concepts of Human Nature (Fall 2010) Guest Lecturer Plato on Virtue, Civic and Psychic, for History of Ancient Philosophy (Oct. 2015) Developing Reading, Writing, and Speaking Skills Together, for Teaching Philosophy (Oct. 2015) Aristotle on Soul, for History of Ancient Philosophy (Nov and Mar. 2013) Thinking Forms in Images: Approaches to Socratic Teaching, for Teaching Philosophy (Sept. 2014) Aquinas on Love, for Philosophy of Love and Friendship (Feb. 2014) Aristotle s Intellect(s) for Aristotle (Nov. 2012) Aquinas Five Ways for Philosophy of Religion (May 2010)

4 BUTTACI ~ CV 4 ACADEMIC SERVICE Co-Founder, Undergraduate Mentoring Program, Philosophy Dept., University of Pittsburgh (2015) Annual Conference Organizing Committee, Pennsylvania Circle of Ancient Philosophy (2015, 2016) Referee for American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly (2014), Res Philosophica (2015) Referee for Annual Pitt/CMU Joint Graduate Philosophy Conference ( ) Graduate Student Office Manager, Philosophy Department, University of Pittsburgh ( ) ACADEMIC ASSOCIATIONS American Association of Philosophy Teachers Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Pennsylvania Circle of Ancient Philosophy American Philosophical Association NON-ACADEMIC AWARDS Eagle Scout Award, Boy Scouts of America, Raleigh NC (2003) NON-ACADEMIC PRESENTATIONS Two Kinds of Life Activities: Aryeh Kosman versus Stephen Covey on Sharpening the Saw Young Professionals Mentoring Program, National Eagle Scout Assoc., Pittsburgh PA (May 2015) Learning to Lead by Leading: An Aristotelian View of How Youth Leaders Develop College of Commissioner Science, Boy Scouts of America, Farmington PA (Nov. 2012) Socrates and the Examined Life Graduation Speech, Pleasant Union Elementary School, Raleigh NC (June 2008) LANGUAGES English Ancient Greek Latin Spanish German French (native speaker) (advanced reading) (advanced reading) (intermediate reading, some speaking) (beginning reading) (beginning reading) REFERENCES James Lennox, Professor of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, jglennox@pitt.edu John McDowell, Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy, Univ. of Pittsburgh, jmcdowel@pitt.edu James Allen, Professor of Philosophy, University of Toronto, jv.allen@utoronto.ca *Kristen Inglis, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, kai21@pitt.edu Sean Kelsey, Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, skelsey@nd.edu Mae Smethurst, Professor Emerita of Classics, University of Pittsburgh, msmet@pitt.edu *also a teaching letter

5 BUTTACI ~ CV 5 PHILOSOPHY COURSES (AT PITT) (*denotes audit) Ancient Philosophy Aristotle s Posterior Analytics Allen Spring 2010 *Hellenistic Philosophy Allen Spring 2011 Understanding Aristotle s Teleology Gotthelf/Lennox Fall 2011 *Plato s Gorgias Allen Fall 2011 Aristotle s Moral Psychology Inglis Spring 2012 *Aristotle on Norms of Inquiry Lennox Fall 2013 *Plato and the Sophists Allen Fall 2013 *Aristotle s Ethical Philosophy Inglis Spring 2013 *Pre-Socratic Philosophy Hoenig Spring 2014 *Aristotle on Intellectual Virtue Whiting Spring 2015 *Aristotle s Conception of Natural Science Lennox Fall 2015 *Aristotle s Teleology Gelber Spring 2016 Modern Philosophy etc. *Hume Schafer Fall 2009 Kantian Ethics Rescher Spring 2010 *Kant Engstrom Fall 2010 Leibniz Rescher Spring 2012 *Hegel McDowell Spring 2012 Metaphysics and Epistemology Metaphysics and Epistemology Core Seminar Brandom Fall 2009 *Topics in Contemporary Phil. (Perceptual Epistemology) Gupta Fall 2009 Epistemology (Perception and Knowledge) McDowell Fall 2010 *Epistemology (Disagreement) Gallow Fall 2015 Ethics and Action Ethics Core Seminar Schafer Spring 2010 Topics in Ethics (Constitutivism) Setiya Spring 2010 *Philosophy of Action (Specifying Actions) McDowell Spring 2010 *Political Philosophy Thompson Fall 2010 *Topics in Contemporary Phil. (Metaethics/Phil. Language) Shaw/Schafer Spring 2011 *Philosophy of Action (Practical Knowledge) McDowell Spring 2014 Logic and Philosophy of Science Philosophy of Science Core Seminar Norton Fall 2009 Topics in Philosophy of Science (Causation) Earman Fall 2009 Advanced Logic Core Seminar Wilson Spring 2011 Other Classics, Philosophy, Ancient Science Greek Reading Seminar Teaching Philosophy --- Fall 2012 Prospectus Research McDowell Spring 2013

6 BUTTACI ~ CV 6 CLASSICS COURSES (AT PITT) Greek Philosophers (Marcus Aurelius Meditations) Avery Fall 2010 Greek Philosophers (Aristotle s Poetics) Smethurst Fall 2011 Latin Epic (Virgil s Aeneid) Stahl Fall 2011 Greek Prose Authors (Plato s Republic) Avery Fall 2011 Greek Verse Authors (Sophocles Antigone and Oedipus Tyr.) Floyd Spring 2012 Greek Directed Study (Homer s Iliad) Avery Spring 2012 Greek Tragedy (Aeschylus Oresteia, complete) Smethurst Fall 2012 Greek Philosophers (Plato s Phaedo) Stahl Fall 2012 GREEK TEXTS READ IN ORIGINAL (SINCE 2007) Homer s Iliad (bks. I, VI, IX) Aeschylus Oresteia (complete) Sophocles Antigone, Oedipus Tyrannus Aristophanes Clouds Lysias On the Murder of Eratosthenes Xenophon s Apology of Socrates Plato s Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates, Crito, Phaedo, Philebus, Cleitophon, Republic (bk. I) Aristotle s Posterior Analytics, Poetics (1-16), Physics (bk. VII), de Anima, Metaphysics (bks. A, E, Θ, Λ), Nicomachean Ethics (bk. VI) Marcus Aurelius Meditations (bks. I-III) Theodorus Prodramos Katomyomachia LATIN TEXTS READ IN ORIGINAL (SINCE 2007) Lucretius De Rerum Natura (bks. I, III) Cicero s Pro Archia, In Verrem (1 st ), In Catalinam (1 st ), de Finibus (bks. I-II) Virgil s Aeneid (bks. I-II, IV) Horace s Odes (bk. I) Ovid s Metamorphoses (bks. I-III) Livy s Ab Urbe Condita (bk. I) Seneca s Moral Epistles (selections), de Ira, de Providentia Augustine s Confessions (bks. I-II) Clementine Vulgate Psalms CONFERENCES, SEMINARS AND WORKSHOPS (AS PARTICIPANT) Allan Gotthelf Memorial Workshop on Aristotle, University of Pittsburgh (Oct. 2015) Ancient Philosophy Workshop, University of Notre Dame (May 2015) Lilly Fellows Program National Conference, Scranton University (Oct. 2013) Aquinas and Mind/Body Problem, 2 nd Thomistic Workshop, Mount Saint Mary College (June 2012) Aristotle on Discovery and Justification, Pitt/UNC Philosophy Workshop, Pittsburgh (Mar. 2012) Aquinas and Geach, 6 th Thomistic Seminar, Witherspoon Institute, Princeton Univ. (Aug. 2011) Aquinas and Contemporary Philosophy, 1 st Thomistic Workshop, Mount Saint Mary C. (June 2011) Anscombe Workshop, Philosophy Department, University of Chicago (Apr. 2011) Arts and Humanities Seminar, Erasmus Institute, University of Notre Dame (June 2009)

7 BUTTACI ~ CV 7 DISSERTATION ABSTRACT Aristotle understands intellect by an analogy with perception: in both cases some receptive power is informed by some object in the world. Perceptual acts result when perceptual capacities are suitably acted upon by perceptible objects; intellectual acts result when intellectual capacities are suitably acted upon by intelligible objects. After discussing the receptive intellect, however, Aristotle introduces another intellect the active intellect which is not receptive like perceptual capacities but is instead like light. This light-like intellect has been vigorously debated over the centuries. Outside of an infamously difficult and compressed chapter, On the Soul III.5, Aristotle does not mention it. Agreement is scarce while perplexity abounds, leaving even Theophrastus, Aristotle s immediate successor, with questions about what this active intellect might be. But instead of asking what the active intellect is, I begin by asking what it does. This function first approach helps avoid a common interpretive impasse regarding the active intellect s identity. Furthermore, this approach promises to shed light on important epistemological questions about how perception and imagination inform and constrain intellectual activity. On my view of the light analogy, the active intellect s function is to activate potentially intelligible objects, just as light activates potentially visible objects, which Aristotle says in a way makes colors existing potentially to be colors in activity. Now, others interpret this analogy differently. Since they begin by asking what the active intellect is, they have the advantage of pointing to concrete instances in Aristotle s thought where something fills the role they go on to attribute to the active intellect. Some say that it is the divine intellect, causing the general intelligibility of the world. In support, they cite passages on god, for example from Metaphysics XII, that fit well with Aristotle s abstract descriptions of the active intellect. Others say it is human knowledge or a sort of intellectual will, initiating particular episodes of thinking. They cite passages from On the Soul where Aristotle clearly indicates that those who possess geometrical knowledge can think about geometrical truths (e.g.) about triangles whenever they wish. While these rival interpretations can cite concrete instances of something filling the role they assign to the active intellect, neither gives a strict reading of the light analogy. On the divine-mind reading, the active intellect makes the world intelligible in general, but this is analogous to giving the world color, not illuminating a world that is already colored in itself. On the intellectual-will reading, the active intellect triggers particular episodes of thinking, but this is analogous to the activation of particular acts of vision, not potential colors. Further, Aristotle does not even mention the visual capacity in the light analogy: there, light activates unlit colors. And while many take Aristotle s remark in a way to invite a looser comparison, on my view it flags that this description of light is not his settled, scientific view things. So, I take the comparison very strictly, since this somewhat stretched description of light s activity is illuminating of the active intellect s distinctive function: it activates potentially intelligible objects just as light (in a way) activates potentially visible objects. My interpretation faces a significant hurdle, however, and one that the rivals can avoid: what activity could activating potentially intelligible objects describe? Where in Aristotle do we find a concrete case of something playing this role? Because of this hitherto unanswered question, an otherwise inviting interpretation seems to be blocked, leaving many to settle for looser readings of the light analogy that connect more clearly with passages outside of this brief and difficult chapter. My dissertation goes on to develop a concrete answer to the question, What is the active intellect s function? I begin with a hypothesis that activating potentially intelligible objects plays some role in learning and discovery. Accordingly, I consider Aristotle s general account of learning, beginning with his thought that we learn to φ by φ-ing. This strikes many as difficult, since we obviously cannot exercise a capacity we do not yet have. But Aristotle nevertheless insists on the similarity between the student s unrefined prior activity and the expert s perfected activity: both the student and the expert do geometrical things, but only the expert does them geometrically, that is, in accord with his own geometrical knowledge. I develop a new interpretation of this distinction, drawing on another of Aristotle s distinctions between grades of capacity. On my view, a student s capacity to learn is the very same capacity exercised beforehand when engaged in learning. And since students themselves must be actively engaged in their own learning, they must

8 BUTTACI ~ CV 8 already have a capacity to act and not merely to be acted upon by a teacher. What is acquired through learning, such as knowledge or virtue, is not so much a new capacity, but rather a developed state of a capacity that the student already had. First potentiality, as it has come to be called, is a capacity not only to learn but also to engage in the relevant prior activity. For Aristotle, then, geometrical knowledge is not passively absorbed from a teacher, like sight put into blind eyes (to borrow a line from Plato s Republic), but rather students themselves must engage in geometrical activity, albeit in an unrefined way. But a teacher still seems to be necessary here: unrefined prior activity alone cannot explain successful learning that results in a correct grasp of things. Something must guide students prior activity so that it is gradually refined in the right way. I have found that Aristotle draws a distinction between two very different kinds of activity involved in learning and discovery. On the one hand, geometry students must consider particular proofs and features of triangles in an unrefined way as geometrical knowledge gradually settles in. On the other hand, some students also learn and deploy general strategies for solving problems they do not yet know how to solve, perhaps by drawing parallel lines or bisecting angles. While in many cases this is facilitated by a teacher, in some cases students themselves make these discoveries. So, this second sort of activity uncovers features of geometrical diagrams that were only implicitly present to students before, thereby making some geometrical feature available for thinking and learning. While the first sort of activity is receptive of some intelligible object, Aristotle describes this second activity as active and productive. This latter activity, I conclude, is the distinctive function of the active intellect. It is productive in a way analogous to light, which does not create the color of things but rather reveals colored things as they already are. So too, the active intellect activates potentially intelligible objects by uncovering and making them actually available for thinking and learning. Furthermore, returning to an important epistemological concern, for Aristotle all thinking requires an image, since intellectual activity is considering some intelligible form in an image. On my view, then, the active intellect works principally on images, making them suitable material for correct thinking. Images, insofar as they represent perceptual particulars, are the potentially intelligible objects that are activated for learning and discovery, as when a student draws a parallel line to discover the solution to a geometrical proof. The active intellect therefore directs our perceptual engagement in learning, so that we may hunt down, discover, and intellectual consider the correct intelligible forms in the images.