A Heideggerian route through Kuhnian revolutions

Transcription

1 Louisiana State University LSU Digital Commons LSU Master's Theses Graduate School 2009 A Heideggerian route through Kuhnian revolutions Ashley Knox Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College Follow this and additional works at: Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons Recommended Citation Knox, Ashley, "A Heideggerian route through Kuhnian revolutions" (2009). LSU Master's Theses This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Master's Theses by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.

2 A HEIDEGGERIAN ROUTE THROUGH KUHNIAN REVOLUTIONS A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in The Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies by Ashley Knox B.S. Tulane University, 2006 August 2009

3 TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT...iii CHAPTER 1: THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS AND ALETHEIA Introduction The Problem: Relativism and Scientific Progress The Solution: Heidegger s Aletheia... 7 CHAPTER 2: THE KUHNIAN VIEW Introduction The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Where Kuhn Goes Wrong CHAPTER 3: THE HEIDEGGERIAN VIEW Introduction The Origin of the Work of Art Truth as Aletheia CHAPTER 4: SYNTHESIS Introduction Two Parallels Kuhn s Missing Element: Aletheia Relativism Scientific Progress Concluding Remarks...48 REFERENCES. 50 VITA 51 ii

4 ABSTRACT The aim of this thesis is to offer a defense of the philosophy derived from Thomas S. Kuhn s seminal work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. I focus on the persistent criticisms that Kuhnian science entails relativism and forbids scientific progress. My unusual line of defense appeals to Martin Heidegger s concept of truth as the Greek aletheia as explicated in his essay, The Origin of the Work of Art. More specifically, I follow the concept of aletheia as presented through Heidegger s example of Van Gogh s A Pair of Shoes (1885). The relevant parallels found between Heidegger s philosophy of art and Kuhn s philosophy of science suggest that a more Heideggerian interpretation of Kuhn is plausible, perhaps even enlightening. Kuhn s philosophy, however, lacks a crucial counterpart to Heidegger s aletheia. In the end, a Kuhnian-Heideggerian hybrid model of truth relating correspondence theory of truth to aletheic truth is presented. I propose that under this model Kuhn s most central theses regarding paradigms and the nature of scientific progress can be maintained. Moreover, the criticism of relativism and assertion that Kuhnian science does not permit scientific progress can be avoided. Thus, Kuhnian science finds a promising line of defense in Heidegger. iii

5 1.1 Introduction CHAPTER 1: THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS AND ALETHEIA It would be a safe bet to say that in 1962 no one could foresee the lasting reverberations that Thomas Kuhn s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions would have on the philosophy of science. The author himself wrote the essay as the expression of an idea that had been building in him all along, first as a physics student at Harvard, and then as a historian and sometime layphilosopher of science. In its preface, Kuhn explains that exposure to antiquated scientific theory and methods in a science course aimed at non-scientists initiated his exploration into the rift between historical approaches to science and how scientists view their field and proceed with science. The main causes for concern were the apparent dissimilarities in perspectives regarding the very subject. If the goal is to come to an understanding of science as Science, then historical accounts need match up with the brute facts of Science itself. 1 Likewise, these brute facts of Science must be cashed out in such a way that is amenable with its history. In Structure Kuhn attempts to give a new conceptualization of Science based upon a reexamination of the historical record. Kuhn focuses on the pattern in which Science is carried out, performed, done. His aim is to present a more accurate representation of how Science proceeds based upon what has occurred historically. While he concedes that the philosophical implications of his project are grand, it is not his interest to entertain such a conversation, at most mentioning those points he deems obvious or important. His seemingly neutral position creates a wriggling philosophical mess at which more than a few critics have taken stab. So great was the response to Structure that it earned the title of 1 The brute facts referring to the enterprise of Science, as opposed to the facts of science which might include such things as the Earth s being roughly spherical, light traveling at approximately 3 x 10 8 m/s, force being equal to mass times acceleration, etc. 1

6 most referenced book in the Arts & Humanities Citation Index from , a list which contains the likes of Derrida, Wittgenstein, James Joyce, and other influential thinkers. 2 Additionally, it joins the group of The Hundred Most Influential Books Since the Second World War compiled by The Times Literary Supplement. 3 As of 1992, Structure had sold more than one million copies worldwide, and has been translated into 16 languages. 4 In a work that largely declines comment on the philosophical issues it raises, Kuhn opens up quite the can of worms with Structure. The overwhelming response can be attributed for a few reasons. Firstly, because Kuhn leaves the philosophical issues open ended. The implications of his account remain for the reader to fathom. As frequently noted, Structure s aim is descriptive rather than prescriptive. And secondly, I imagine, because the implications that readers tend to gather rub both philosophers and scientists alike in the wrong way. 1.2 The Problem: Relativism and Scientific Progress One unpleasant conclusion drawn from Structure is the charge of relativism. The claim stems from one of Kuhn s main theses, that scientific paradigms provide the model for how science is conceived of and carried out. Paradigms lay the foundation for the scientific problems, methods and standards that define a particular scientific tradition. A change in paradigms signals a scientific revolution: Scientific revolutions are non-cumulative episodes in which an older 2 E. Garfield, "A Different Sort of Great Books List: The 50 Twentieth-Century Works Most Cited in the Arts & Humanities Citation Index, ," Current Contents, No. 16, (20 April 1987). March 12, "The Hundred Most Influential Books Since the War." The Times Literary Supplement, (6 October 1995), p March 12, Steve Fuller, Being There with Thomas Kuhn: A Parable for Postmodern Times, History and Theory,Vol. 31, No.3, (October 1992), p March 21,

7 paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible new one. 5 Not at all without controversy has Kuhn asserted that paradigms are incommensurable, meaning that they cannot be compared to one another. The extreme view suggests that paradigms are so radically different from one another that the language used in one cannot be understood from the perspective of the other. Given that paradigms are completely incompatible, there is no conceivable way to judge if one program of science is better than another. Which paradigm solves more problems or explains the facts more clearly? Which paradigm brings us closer to the truth? No outside criteria by which to judge paradigms can be provided. The upshot is that there is no good reason the scientific community selects one paradigm over another. 6 The adoption of theories/paradigms is not a matter of comparing them against a set of clear scientific standards. Rather, the defining choice ultimately boils down to a battle of the subjective concerns of the scientists. The choice is irrational. Accordingly, theories (at least some of which are candidates for paradigm status) are weeded out by the community of scientists essentially by a vote of yay or nay. But these votes are not based upon the notion of good old-fashioned objective scientific criteria. No, Kuhn suggests that each scientist understands and evaluates theories based upon her personal and subjective reasons, which are determined by her history and social standing. Scientific values are a matter of nurture, as opposed to nature. Once historical and sociological factors come into play it is often taken as a guarantee of relativism for objectivity lies outside the realm of space, time, and human convention. 5 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p Dudley Shapere, Meaning and Scientific Change, Scientific Revolutions. Ed. Ian Hacking. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), p

8 It is no surprise, then, that critics argue that Kuhnian science is deeply embedded with relativism. The Kuhnian view is damned on two levels. First, cultural relativism can be found with respect to individual scientists. Scientists make evaluative claims about new and old theories based upon their scientific values. Kuhn identifies five: accuracy, fruitfulness, breadth of scope, simplicity, and consistency. These scientific values are not completely objective, as a scientifically minded person is prone to think, but contain a subjective aspect. Each scientist judges the relative import of each value according to her own scale, itself a product of a complex mix of social and historical factors. Thus, the judgments of scientists, and subsequently, the ordered ranking of scientific values produced, are influenced by their social and historical standing. The implication is that the evaluation of theories does not take place against a standard set of scientific values, but is relative to one s subjective values, which are relative to their culture. The choices of individual scientists combine to make up the decision of the scientific community as a whole. Scientists choose particular paradigms, and there is no standard higher [for paradigms] than the assent of the relevant community. 7 The mark of a good paradigm is not its value with respect to objective, scientific values those values typically considered to bring Science closer to the Truth. No, paradigms become good through assertive choice of a significant portion of the scientific community alone. Paradigms are not adopted because they are good; they are good because they are adopted. Since one s subjective values are shaped by her personal history and position in time and space, what counts as a good theory is actually a culturally dependent decision. 8 7 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp Note that I am still following the traditional scientific view whereby good theories are those that help us get closer and closer to the truth. Scientists or philosophers with vastly differing views may hold other ideas about what counts as good. The point here is to briefly lay out the general criticisms raised against Kuhnian science. 4

9 In addition to cultural relativism, so-called truth relativism becomes apparent through Kuhn s notion of paradigms. Paradigms provide the framework for how science is carried out on a daily basis. They define the theories, methods and standards for how science can be done. Experiments and hypotheses are set up with respect to the current paradigm. Consequently, the conclusions drawn from experimental evidence are also made with respect to the current paradigm. The upshot is that the scientific truths discovered in Kuhnian science, not surprisingly, are defined by the paradigm. Kuhnian science seems to entail that science does not aim for reality as it is, but merely describes it relative to the framework in place the current paradigm. Scientific truth can no longer be considered an approximation of nature. Instead, it is a truth set out by the paradigm itself. Typically scientific progress is said to occur when new theories/paradigms are thought to better approximate what nature is really like; that is, theories/paradigms are better and should be adopted whenever they get closer to describing how nature really is. But if truth is relative to a paradigm, then science can no longer take truth for its ultimate goal. Critics argue that without truth as the ultimate goal of science, the idea of scientific progress is compromised. Thus, a second point of conflict concerns the nature of scientific progress. Given the criticism outlined above, it follows that new theories/paradigms do not bring us closer to understanding reality because all truths discovered under a particular paradigm are relative to the framework instated by the paradigm itself (as opposed to some goal set by nature in advance ). 9 Because theories are evaluated based upon subjective, rather than objective, criteria, there are no proper standards for judging whether science is getting closer to the truth. A change in paradigms does not represent a shift towards a better or more complete understanding of nature. A change in theories/paradigms is just that, mere change. The result is that there is no basis for comparing 9 Ibid., p

10 scientific regimes to one another. The standards of this society and culture cannot properly be applied to those foreign or past. From the traditional scientific view, all paradigms are considered equally good, or more commonly, equally bad. Effectively, Kuhn is challenging the traditional notion of scientific progress the idea that scientific facts are accumulating into a mass of knowledge that grows ever nearer a more accurate understanding of nature. The argument is that it is impossible to say resolutely whether science is progressing because the replacement of one paradigm by another is not cumulative, but is mere change. 10 Kuhn insists that the idea of incommensurable paradigm shifts does not bar him from believing in scientific progress. As he explains, his understanding of progression borrows from the value-neutral Darwinian concept of evolutionary progress. This position can be seen as related to his commitment to anti-realism a view that is a bit more than contrary to the typical scientist s or philosopher of science s realist view. The fervor with which realists deny anti-realism contains at least a smidge of the contention that anti-realism is damaging to the whole of the scientific project. Note, however, that while an anti-realist like Kuhn can consider science, lower case s, a project, the realist believes in Science with a capital s. For the metaphysical realist, Science aims at Truth itself, the way things really are. On the other hand, Kuhn adheres to the view that there is no comprehensive understanding of the universe which science creeps nearer still. Science continues from what has been given in the past, towards no goal in particular. 11 Scientific progress is non-linear. The proposal is akin to the evolutionary process of natural selection whereby individuals well-adapted for the current environment will have a greater chance of reproducing (thus passing 10 Ibid., p Steve Fuller, Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History for our Times. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), p.13. 6

11 on their genes through their progeny) than those too ill-fit to live long enough to reproduce or win proper-enough mates to reproduce well. Similarly, in Kuhn s eyes scientific theories play a game of survival of the fittest, with the scientific community acting as the selector. 12 Since the community s assent or dissent to particular theories is based upon subjective values, Kuhn s version of progress is a bullet that not all scientists or philosophers are willing to bite. But not all hope is lost. In the Postscript addendum to the third edition of Structure, Kuhn presents a relatively brief defense that attempts to clear up all the confusions and expound upon ideas which were left too inchoate in the original work. The problem is that too little space is devoted for offering a full reply to each point of conflict. Not much is settled there and the same criticisms regarding relativism and progress have persisted. What might help clear the air, however, will not be obvious at first. 1.3 The Solution: Heidegger s Aletheia The solution I am proposing draws upon the work of Martin Heidegger, a name that perhaps renders a small shock. Heidegger s own deprecating views 13 of science notwithstanding, there are several, pertinent parallels to be found between his and Kuhn s thinking. Regarding 12 This has come to be known as the Planck Effect, after Max Planck, who Kuhn quotes as saying, a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because the opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p.151, via Steve Fuller, Being There, p To say Heidegger s view on science are deprecating is an understatement. Heidegger sees science as a disclosure of Dasein which renders everything in terms of objects. Rather than opening up the question of being, science forgets the question all together. Heidegger asserts that the particular ways in which science and technology proceed obscure the fact that they are particular ways of disclosing Being, amongst many others. Therein lays the problem. I take a less value-laden stance, based upon the position (the degree to which Heidegger would go along with is arguable) that science is fine and dandy as long as we recognize it for what it is, a particular mode of disclosure. One can take science as just another step, perhaps even a necessary one, in the question of Being. Perhaps it is our destiny to fulfill and complete this role. Likewise, one can view the error that philosophers had been thinking since the time of Plato as an era required in order for Heidegger to reach his revolutionary conclusion, namely that it is an error to think of beings rather than Being. 7

12 ontology, Heidegger noticed that the way the whole history of philosophy had preceded theretofore was based upon an error. Since the time of Plato, says Heidegger, philosophers had been perpetuating the mistake of thinking of being in terms of entities found in the world rather than how Being is disclosed in the first place. Similar to Kuhn s approach, Heidegger s revolutionary work relied upon a reexamination and reconstruction of the history. Secondly, as I shall draw out in greater detail, Heidegger s descriptive account of the work of art sounds remarkably in line with Kuhn s description of the manner in which Science proceeds. The similarities between Kuhnian science and Heideggerian art are what initially attracted me to this project and stand for its justification. I know of no work that employs a systematic comparison of the relevant parts; one goal will be to rectify this. 14 By taking a Heideggerian route through Kuhn s (scientific) revolutions, a viable path uniting science, philosophy, and truth will be blazed. 15 The assumption is that the intuitions of scientists, philosophers of science, and realists alike pose a very real concern that needs to be addressed. They will want to know why it is they should take Kuhn, an anti-realist naysayer, seriously at all. A few of my own intuitions for a Kuhnian defense appear in the Postscript to Structure, in nearly identical form to those I had formulated on my own prior to reading it. Given my background in Heideggerian philosophy, it is fair to surmise that Kuhn s thinking is a lot more in line with a Heideggerian interpretation than initially given at first glance. Despite his ignorance of Heidegger s work, it is possible that Kuhn s Structure is implicitly Heideggerian. 16 I recognize 14 Barring Joseph Rouse s Knowledge and Power, whose attempt at bringing Heidegger and Kuhn together is of another sort. Rouse is concerned with hashing out the political effects that science has a political philosophy of science. Joseph Rouse, Knowledge and Power, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), p.xiv. 15 Ambitious? Yes, indeed. 16 I am no expert on Kuhn s life, but nothing I have encountered heretofore has suggested that Kuhn was at all familiar with Heidegger. This is especially plausible given his proper training in science and history rather than philosophy. 8

13 that this conjecture may serve merely to highlight the extent to which my own Heideggerian hat is being laid over Kuhn s. But if the two accounts are amenable, and what s more, Kuhn s theory becomes strengthened by such an interpretation, it does not seem at all unreasonable to do so. In fact, it may prove enlightening. The key components of Kuhn s description of science will find an equal counterpart in Heidegger s description of art. Heidegger s philosophy on art, however, contains one critical element that Kuhnian science lacks, namely the notion of Truth as aletheia. For Heidegger, there are two levels of truth. The theory typically held by scientists is the correspondence theory, whereby truth is the accurate matching up of world and statements. Heidegger thinks that this type of truth is grounded by a separate notion of truth, the Greek aletheia. Aletheia is a type of truth which comes prior to and provides the ground for correspondence theory of truth. It is the truth of beings as they are, unconcealed and revealed as they stand before us. Truth as aletheia will prove helpful in understanding Kuhn s position. The defenses offered against charges of relativism and a questionable notion of progress in Structure s Postscript will become more sensible and seem less antithetical to science if they are placed within a Heideggerian context. I hope to make it clear that it is a mistake to think of Kuhn s work solely from the perspective of correspondence theory the criticisms discussed here stem from this error. Whether Kuhn recognizes it or not, aletheia provides a unifying theme for The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. I will begin in Chapter 2 by taking a look at what it is that Kuhn has to say about the inner workings of science in Structure and why it is that so many cry Relativist! Progress? In Chapter 3 I will focus on Heidegger and The Origin of the Work of Art so that in Chapter 4, a synthesis applying Heidegger s concept of aletheia to Kuhnian revolutions can be presented. The parallels 9

14 found between The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and The Origin of the Work of Art will serve as a justification of sorts. Through the concept of aletheia, the defense offered in Kuhn s Postscript to Structure will become much clearer, its force more powerful. Aletheia, as it turns out, will be Kuhn s saving grace. 10

15 CHAPTER 2: THE KUHNIAN VIEW 2.1 Introduction With the arrival of Structure came the introduction of a new vocabulary with which scientific and philosophical communities talk about science. Kuhn draws a distinction between normal science and revolutionary science. Normal science refers to puzzle-solving science that scientists carry out on a daily basis. Revolutionary science, as the name implies, consists of those much rarer occasions when a significant shift is made in scientific thinking. Essentially scientific revolutions mark the acceptance of a new paradigm in lieu of the old theories. This is perhaps most plainly illustrated by the Copernican revolution whereby the Ptolemaic view of an earthcentered universe was replaced by Copernicus heliocentric theory. 17 Scientific revolutions are characterized by the controversial rejection of the old theory, effectively rendered incompatible with the new theory, and the proliferation of a new set of scientific problems for scientists to mull over. Revolutionary science does not just spring from nowhere or out of the unprecedented brilliance of one or a few scientists. It is the result of a continual process of anomaly accumulation, novelty recognition, and crisis. The purpose of Kuhn s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is to describe the scientific cycle of normal science and revolutionary science through these terms. 2.2 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions The phrase normal science refers to the sort of routine science that is practiced everyday. It is defined by the so-called overarching paradigm which directs current scientific research. Paradigms provide the foundation for further scientific inquiry. They are the framework under 17 Ibid., p. 6. Kuhn also includes the work of Newton, Lavoisier, and Einstein as examples of scientific revolutions. 11

16 which normal puzzle-solving science proceeds and particular traditions of science are born. In other words, the paradigm sets up a structure for science in which there are not only specific problems available for solving, but also the means and information required to solve them. Kuhn explains, Paradigms provide scientists not only with a map but also with some of the directions essential for map-making. In learning a paradigm the scientist acquires theory, methods, and standards together, usually in an inextricable mixture. 18 The paradigm itself determines how science is and can be done. Once a paradigm is in place, normal science sets out to solve all the puzzles the paradigm has constructed. Effectively, normal science attempts to tie up all the loose ends created by the paradigm. From the scientist s perspective, these puzzles are solvable under the paradigm so long as enough time, effort and resources are exhausted. This type of research comprises the everyday routine science that scientists carry out with the hopes of solving puzzles, or solving them more completely than anyone before them. 19 Herein lays the scientists motivation. But if science is to progress (at least in the way that it has already done so), there must be a way for paradigms to change in order that inferior models be replaced. As the process of normal science advances, says Kuhn, a mass of anomalies accumulates. Through the course of everyday science, scientists happen upon data notably dissimilar from the prediction made in the hypothesis. These data are inexplicable under the current paradigm; they are anomalous. Thus, anomalies are phenomena which resist explanation under the paradigm in place. They come in a variety of forms, from experimental results to fortunate accidents. A collection of these anomalies prepares the way for the perception of novelty. Novelties often call forth new theories to help explain, for lack of a better word, their novelty. Novelty does 18 Ibid., p Ibid., pp

17 not arise without resistance and difficulty, however. It is manifested against a background of expectation provided by the paradigm in place. Moreover, anomaly and novelty are often overlooked because of the influence of the anticipated results. Despite the difficulties, one or a few scientists (often coincidentally) will take notice of the novelties, perhaps recognizing a pattern in them which the current paradigm fails to explain. They begin to question the adequacy of current theories and even going so far as to formulate new theories in their place. Often new theories manifest themselves only implicitly at first, as a hunch. A scientist s intuition about anomalies can slightly alter his course of experimentation or interpretation of results. Kuhn explains that the mere awareness of anomaly opens up a period in which conceptual categories are tweaked until what initially appeared as anomalous eventually becomes appropriated as the norm. 20 The novelty of anomalies does not transform into the expected all on its own. No, anomalies earn acceptance through the proliferation of possible explanatory theories put forth by sympathetic scientists. But not all new theories will progress to paradigm level, warns Kuhn. He explains: Both during pre-paradigm periods and during the crises that lead to large-scale changes of paradigm, scientists usually develop many speculative and unarticulated theories that can themselves point to the way of discovery. Often, however, that discovery is not quite the one anticipated by the speculative and tentative hypothesis. Only as experiment and tentative theory are together articulated to a match does the discovery emerge and the theory become a paradigm. 21 As data begin to corroborate with a tentative theory, a discovery occurs. At that point scientists have the option of choosing between competing theories, including the old one. Ultimately the approval of a significant portion of the scientific community marks the inauguration of a new paradigm. 20 Ibid., p Ibid., p

18 The time between the recognition of anomalies and the adoption of an entirely new paradigm is marked by insecurity, debate and controversy within the scientific community. Kuhn notes that scientific revolutions are inaugurated by a growing sense, again often restricted to a narrow subdivision of the scientific community, that an existing paradigm has ceased to function adequately in the exploration of an aspect of nature which that paradigm itself had previously led the way. 22 Scientists begin to have the uneasy feeling that some of the most fundamental suppositions guiding their work may actually be flawed. In Kuhn s word, crisis has set in. During the crisis stage, the boundaries of the old, still reigning paradigm become increasingly blurred. The rules of everyday science s puzzle-solving become looser, ultimately permit[ting] a new paradigm to emerge. 23 The scientific society divides itself into two parties, those traditionalists holding on to the old ways, and those revolutionaries seeking to institute a new view, a new paradigm. The two camps represent competing paradigms with incompatible modes of scientific life. Each camp, however, can argue for the supremacy of its paradigm only from within the paradigm itself. A particular scientist s hunch and subjective concerns will be lost on others. As in political revolution, change must be instated through mass persuasion rather than logic or probability. Because the scientific community decides the fate of scientific theories, the progress of science depends part and parcel upon the society in which it is instituted and the accompanying values. In terms of rivaling paradigms, the scientists become divided based upon their subjective 22 Ibid., p Ibid., pp. 80,

19 opinions. Once a majority has been swayed, it is safe to say that the new paradigm rules and the old holdouts will eventually be left behind. 24 Kuhn thinks the initiation of a new paradigm signifies a bona fide revolution. Since the paradigm itself determines the structure of how science is thought about and done, that is, it defines the theory, methods and standards available, a change in paradigms causes significant alterations in the scientific program. The criteria determining the problems and solutions to be worked on in normal science and anticipated under the new paradigm must also change in light of the new model. Once a new paradigm has been instituted, the whole perspective of science necessarily shifts accordingly. The scientists world changes. 25 Therefore, a switch in paradigms is appropriately called a revolution. 26 The changes instituted by a new paradigm take on a global level. Here Kuhn is not talking about a world-wide change, but an all encompassing shift in the way science is done. Not only do paradigms provide the basis for how scientific puzzles can be solved, but also determine what shows up as a scientific problem. They become the model from which all normal science 24 Even old holdouts will eventually talk the talk of a new paradigm, may be fully persuaded by it, and even use it without the accompanying, necessary gestalt switch conversion. He may use the new theory nonetheless, but he will do so as a foreigner in a foreign environment, an alternative available to him only because there are natives already there. His work is parasitic on theirs, for he lacks the constellation of mental sets which future members of the community will acquire through education. Ibid., p Ibid. p Kuhn s idea that the world changes is not met without its own heap of controversy. Here I would make a Heideggerian explanation (and Kuhn, I think, would not disapprove), that the earth does not literally change, but the relationship the scientist maintains with it has. Kuhn: Led by a new paradigm, scientists adopt new instruments and look in new places. Even more important, during revolutions scientists see new and different things when looking with familiar instruments in places they have looked before. When Heidegger s hammer suddenly breaks, its unsuitability for the task at hand becomes apparent. Other familiar items may show up as something else, i.e. a thing good for hammering. An example might be of a brick in the garden simply pick it up and continue your hammering. Kuhn: What were ducks in the scientist s world before the revolution are rabbits afterwards. World, in the Heideggerian sense of the word, changes but is always grounded in earth (to be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 3). 26 Ibid., pp

20 flows. A change in paradigms signals a scientific revolution whereby the inextricable mixture 27 of theories, methods and standards that accompany a paradigm shift to match the new paradigm. So great is the shift that paradigms are said to be incommensurable. Of utmost importance to Kuhn s theory is the idea that the practice of normal science effectively allows for novelty and paradigm shifts to occur. While normal science does not directly aim at this goal, and even seeks to suppress novelties, it nonetheless produces the novelties which initiate paradigm shift. In this way traditional pursuit prepares the way for its own change. 28 The structure of science ensures its own advancement. 2.3 Where Kuhn Goes Wrong The now familiar criticisms lodged against Kuhn finds their roots in Dudley Shapere s review published just two years after the original publication of Structure. Shapere discusses the way in which Kuhn s account of science leads to relativism and the negation of progress. 29 The criticism of irrationality may be inferred. As characterized by Kuhn himself, critics contend that: the proponents of incommensurable theories cannot communicate with each other at all; as a result, in a debate over theory-choice there can be no recourse to good reasons; instead theory must be chosen for reasons that are ultimately personal and subjective; some sort of mystical apperception is responsible for the decision actually reached. More than any other parts of the book, the passages on which these misconstructions rest have been responsible for charges of irrationality Ibid., p Ibid., p Dudley Shapere, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Paradigms and Revolutions. Ed. Gary Gutting. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980), pp See also: Dudley Shapere, Meaning and Scientific Change, Scientific Revolutions. Ed. Ian Hacking. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp This second article focuses more on relativism as found in Paul Feyerabend, but Shapere believes that Kuhn s view follows the same wicked route. For Shapere s critique of Kuhn, see especially pp of the same essay. 30 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp

21 If theories and paradigms are incommensurable, 31 then theory-choice cannot be rational. Without recourse to objective criteria by which to judge particular theories and paradigms, then the traditional notion of science as Truth seeking is undermined. Moreover, if science is not truthseeking, then when might a paradigm shift be considered progressive rather than regressive? What is more, the fact that theory/paradigm choice is dependent upon personal and subjective reasons makes Science a wholly relativistic discipline. Shapere s criticism begins with Kuhn s claim of incommensurability, that the differences between successive paradigms are both necessary and irreconcilable. 32 Recall that paradigms come with their own sets of methods, standards and instrumentation for carrying out science. Since paradigms disagree as to what the facts are, and even as to the real problems to be faced and the standards which a successful theory must meet they cannot be compared in any systematic way. Opposing paradigms are like apples and oranges. When choosing an orange over an apple, or vice versa, one s only recourse is to subjective values. One cannot convince another that oranges are tastier by simply asserting their subjective feelings about oranges, although one may be persuaded by the other s enthusiasm. Similarly, Shapere thinks that the adoption of a new paradigm cannot be based upon good reason of any sort. 33 It is only after a paradigm has been instituted that the decision appears to be a good one. Indeed, what counts as good reason is determined by the decision itself. 34 If one chooses the orange over the apple, then tastier becomes a good reason after the fact. 31 The extent to which paradigms are incommensurable is another point of contention among scholars. In this instance I resolve to let sleeping dogs lie. 32 Ibid., p Dudley Shapere, Meaning and Scientific Change, p Ibid. 17

22 Given an era of crisis, the theory that ultimately triumphs does not succeed based upon a convincing rational argument. One scientist will not persuade another by appealing to his own subjective opinion regarding the five scientific values (accuracy, consistency, fruitfulness, breadth of scope, and simplicity). A simplicity-lover does not trump a fruitfulness-abider. Arguments touting consistency cannot go to battle with those of accuracy. Kuhn likens the process to one of political revolution wherein the populace is converted with rhetoric rather than reason. Therefore, the choice between theories is at the very least a-rational, and more strongly, irrational. Because paradigms are incommensurable, there are no objective standards, i.e. good reasons, applicable to theory-choice. The paradigm itself sets the standards. One cannot determine which paradigm solves more problems, solves problems more completely, or deals with the facts better. Accordingly, judgments of good science cannot be made between two paradigms, but only from within the paradigm by its own standards. Since there are no objective criteria, the various scientific truths uncovered by different paradigms are not comparable either. It is impossible to say whether one paradigm is scientifically superior, whether it comes closer to the truth. Scientific truths are relative to its framework the paradigm in place. Hence, Kuhn s dreaded relativism. If Shapere is correct, then Kuhn will find himself with yet another problem. Quite obviously, relativism with respect to truth undermines the idea that Science is aiming (or should be aiming) at Truth. 35 Without this notion of truth, the idea of scientific progress falls apart. Shapere notes that a change in paradigms does not signify the accumulation of more facts or knowledge. Rather, it is mere change. 36 Furthermore, Kuhn: What occurred was neither a decline nor a raising of standards, but simply a change demanded by the adoption of a new paradigm. 37 Kuhn 35 At least when one thinks of truth in the traditional sense (correspondence theory). Later, I will argue that Kuhn s view makes more sense if we think of truth in terms of Heidegger s aletheia. 36 Dudley Shapere, Meaning and Scientific Change, p.54. My italics. 37 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p.108. My italics. 18

23 concedes his view of science entails the rather disturbing conclusion that science is a process whose successive stages are characterized by an increasingly detailed and refined understanding of nature, but that nothing that has been or will be said makes it a process of evolution toward anything.. despite our being deeply accustomed to seeing science as the one enterprise that draws constantly nearer to some goal set by nature in advance. 38 Progress is change in response to, perhaps even adaptation to, the scientific community. Through the choice of a new paradigm, the community of scientists bears a considerable amount of responsibility for guiding the course of science. If there were only objective standards to consider when choosing a theory, then scientists and philosophers could rest a bit easier. Theories would be judged according to specific criteria in a checklist of sorts. The process of determining which theories are best and most promising would run like a routine checkup. Simply tally the score and reward the winner no dispute there. But Kuhn s whole thesis relies on its inclusion of the subjective aspect; without it, his view is no different from the traditional one. 39 The subjective aspect suggests that theory-choice is culturally relative. During a period of crisis, the community of scientists is faced with a number of competing theories to choose from, including the old ones. The theories are evaluated and selected based upon the five fundamental scientific values. However, the order in which a particular scientist ranks the importance of each value will depend upon her personal history. One may be drawn to simple, elegant theories over those offering an overarching scope. Another may favor accuracy above all else. A third, fruitfulness; and so on and so forth. It is even conceivable that a particular scientist s values may waver over time or with respect to specific kinds of problems. The point is that each individual 38 Ibid., pp Husain Sarkar, Group Rationality in Scientific Research. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p

24 scientist s beliefs, which determine theory-choice and thus the course of science are a result of their place in history and society; in a word, their culture. If Shapere (and others) are correct, then Kuhn s view, while an interesting one, bears no weight upon the champions of science. If anything, it marks out what science should avoid. Embedded with relativism, irrationality, and a questionable idea of progress, Kuhn s view seems not at all respectable from a scientist s perspective. Indeed, the central theses presented in Kuhn s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions seem to undermine the very foundations of the scientific enterprise. 20

25 CHAPTER 3: THE HEIDEGGERIAN VIEW 3.1 Introduction Heidegger holds an unusual opinion of science that is often considered antithetical. Heidegger makes no bones about his derisive view, but I shall lay these concerns aside for others to contemplate, especially as they relate to this thesis. 40 Although it is not my goal to pass any evaluative claims upon Kuhn s work however implicit or explicit they might be found to be I think Heidegger would be very dissatisfied with the aim of this project. Still the point here is that 1) relevant parallels between Kuhn and Heidegger s thinking abound, and thus 2) Kuhn s view might find a good line of defense through a more explicitly Heideggerian approach, and if so, 3) Kuhnian science begins to make more sense and seems less antithetical to science as it wards off the claims of relativism and charges that his view implies a denial of scientific progress. The comparison is not only permissible but perhaps even desirable for Kuhnian science. Note that my aim is not to demonstrate through textual analysis that Kuhn does in fact maintain the idea of truth as aletheia. Aletheia will not be found buried beneath the surface of his prose, at least not here. Some textual analysis will be given in order to demonstrate that Kuhn s view is at least open to this addition. I intend to show that Kuhn s defense becomes more sensible and thus strengthened if we consider the notion of truth as aletheia to be at work, whether Kuhn recognizes it or not. Now it is time to take a brief pause from science and ease our way into Heidegger and the work of art. The path may feel like a winding detour at first, but after the synthesis presented in 40 An interesting project, I think. Heidegger has been criticized for his seemingly dogmatic allegiance to the primitive and the pastoral, to poetry and the arts. While he does give good reason for doing so that is, he believes that the disclosure offered by science and technology is one of Gestell, or enframing, whereby man forgets that he has forgotten the true nature of being his unwavering loyalty is perhaps a bit overzealous and could benefit from moderation. 21

26 Chapter 4, I hope to have found a Heideggerian shortcut straight through the heart of Kuhnian science. 3.2 The Origin of the Work of Art Perhaps the only uncontroversial thing to say about Heidegger is that his philosophy is mainly concerned with Being. Heidegger thinks that all of Western philosophy has made an error in thinking about ontology in terms of the particular entities, beings, rather than Being. By reexamining the history of philosophy, he attempts to correct the mistake and provide a new way of reflecting upon ontology. The path made from a history of ontology towards a new understanding of ontology runs parallel to the road from the history of science towards a new understanding of science. 41 The Heideggerian route lies not far from Kuhn s. 42 Especially germane to Kuhn s work is Heidegger s philosophy on the work of art. Heidegger s investigation into art is not one of aesthetics, but primarily one involving the work of art. The artwork works, but in what way? Heidegger thinks that the work of art opens up the Being of beings such that it is a deconcealing of the truth of beings which happens in the art. 43 Art, says Heidegger is truth setting itself to work. 44 The truth that art sets to work is that of aletheia. 41 One notable difference appears that is worth mentioning. Heidegger is making a normative claim about how we should think about ontology. Kuhn, on the other hand, vehemently denies any sort of normative claims, implicit or explicit, within Structure. Given the parallels between the two, and the arguments presented against Kuhn to that end, it seems a fair case to say that Kuhn s philosophy might very well contain a normative element. This debate, however, extends beyond the scope of this thesis. 42 Although I suppose Heidegger was first, so if anything Kuhn wrought his path not far from where Heidegger s lay. 43 Martin Heidegger, The Origin of the Work of Art, Poetry, Language, Thought. Trans. Albert Hofstadter. (New York: Harper Collins, 2001), p Ibid. 22

27 Heidegger offers the example of the peasant shoes depicted in Vincent van Gogh s A Pair of Shoes (1885) to help explicate his claim. 45 The peasant simply wears the shoes without reflecting upon them. They are an item which appears as ready-to-hand equipment for their owner who normally proceeds about life without concern for them until they fail in their usefulness, as when holes permit the entrance of wind and rain. For a fleeting moment the inadequate shoes show up as present to hand, a different and deficient mode of encountering objects in which items appear separate from their usefulness or relation to their perceiver. In Heideggerian terms the perceiver is Dasein quite literally, being there. 46 For an item to appear separate from Dasein is for it to appear merely as earth, outside of Dasein s interpretive projection, what Heidegger calls world. 47 It only takes a moment before the shoes reappear as ready-to-hand, this time as an item needing repair. 45 Art historian Meyer Schapiro has famously noted that the peasant shoes in the painting are Van Gogh s own, and thus, do not belong to a peasant. See Meyer Schapiro, The Still-Life as a Personal Object A Note on Heidegger and Van Gogh, Theory and Philosophy of Art: Style, Artist, and Society. (New York: Braziller), pp While some find this to be a contentious bone for Heidegger s philosophy of art, I think that if anything it serves to show that interpretation of the world (Heideggerian sense of the word) is inescapable. It is irrelevant what the actual painting depicts if that is how it is working i.e. as peasant shoes. Babette Babich offers a defense of Heidegger s interpretation of Van Gogh s shoes in From Van Gogh s Museum to the Temple at Bassae: Heidegger s Truth of Art and Schapiro s Art History, Culture, Theory & Critique, 2003, , especially p For all intents and purposes of this paper, Dasein can be thought of as any being for which there is a world, i.e. human beings. Dasein s primary mode of being is being-in-the-world, that is, Dasein is always in relation to world. 47 A more in-depth discussion of these two terms appears a bit further down. 23

28 Figure 1, Van Gogh, A Pair of Shoes, (1885) 48 The peasant s world consists of all that is ready-to-hand to her, including her shoes. We can gain access to the peasant s world through Van Gogh s painting. The painting opens up the peasant s world for us: From the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the toilsome tread of the worker stares forth. In the stiffly rugged heaviness of the shoes there is the accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge through the far-spreading and ever-uniform furrows of the field swept by a raw wind. On the leather lie the dampness and richness of the soil This equipment is pervaded by uncomplaining anxiety as to the certainty of bread, the wordless joy of having once more withstood want and trembling before the impending childbed and shivering at the surrounding menace of death. This equipment belongs to the earth and it is protected in the world of the peasant woman. From out of this protected belonging the equipment itself rises to its resting-within-itself. 49 The peasant, however, knows all of these things without pausing to notice or reflect upon them. 50 For her the equipmental quality of the shoes arises out of their usefulness, the abundance of an essential being of the equipment [that which we call] reliability. 51 From this reliability the Martin Heidegger, The Origin of the Work of Art, p Ibid. 51 Ibid. 24