Moral and Aesthetic Virtue ALISON HILLS THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY PROCEEDINGS OF SENATE HOUSE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON THE WOBURN SUITE

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1 THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY TH SESSION VOLUME CXVIII PROCEEDINGS OF SENATE HOUSE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON THE WOBURN SUITE CHAIRED BY HELEN BEEBEE EDITED BY GUY LONGWORTH Moral and Aesthetic Virtue ALISON HILLS

2 proceedings of the aristotelian society 138th session issue no. 3 volume cxviii moral and aesthetic virtue alison hills university of oxford monday, 23 april the woburn suite senate house university of london malet street london wc1e 7hu united kingdom This event is catered, free of charge & open to the general public contact mail@aristoteliansociety.org.uk the aristotelian society

3 biography Alison Hills is Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy at St John s College, University of Oxford. Her research is in Moral Philosophy. Her PhD was on Kant s moral theory, in particular, on whether Kant shows that we have reason to be moral. She also has interests in metaethics (especially moral knowledge) and normative ethics (especially Kant s moral theory). She has also written on applied ethics, about whether our intentions have any moral significance, and about the moral status of animals. Her most recent book, The Beloved Self (OUP), addressed the conflict between egoism and morality, and whether we can justify claims that we have reasons to be moral. editorial note The following paper is a draft version that can only be cited or quoted with the author s permission. The final paper will be published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Issue No. 2, Volume CXVIII (2018). Please visit the Society s website for subscription information: aristoteliansociety.org.uk.

4 moral and aesthetic virtue alison hills IN WHAT WAYS, if any, are aesthetics and ethics related? In what way, if any does competence in aesthetics contribute to good moral agency? These are large questions on which previous philosophers have strongly disagreed. Kant thought ethical and aesthetic judgements had a completely different basis (aesthetic judgements based on pleasure; ethical ones on reason); Hume thought they were much more similar, both founded in non-cognitive attitudes. Plato disagreed with himself, on the one hand arguing that a love of beauty is precursor to proper moral motivation (an idea taken up by Iris Murdoch); on the other, banning the poets from his Republic to prevent them from spreading misleading and dangerous ideas. Here, I will concentrate on a narrower set of questions: to what extent does a conception of virtue, similar to moral virtue, play a role in aesthetics? If there is a kind of aesthetic virtue, how does it relate to moral virtue? Even these are difficult to answer fully. I will argue that an idea of aesthetic virtue, similar to moral virtue, is important in aesthetics, but aesthetic virtue does not typically contribute to moral virtue and there can be tensions between the two. I will only be able to defend this view briefly here. There has been interest in aesthetic virtue before but not very much, especially compared with the vast literature on moral virtue. 1 The best known recent work is by Peter Goldie. His account of aesthetic virtue is inspired by Aristotelian virtue ethics, and has two defining features. 2 First, that the concept of virtue is foundational and other important concepts in ethics, right action; in aesthetics, the nature of art and of aesthetic appreciation - are defined by it. Second, virtue itself is defined in terms of human flourishing: a life of virtue is a good, distinctively human life. Goldie argues that the human good involves artistic activity and appreciation of art, just as much as it involves moral agency, and thus that aesthetic virtues (as well as moral virtues) are essential to human flourishing. He intends to use this idea of aesthetic virtue to characterize art and to explain its value: art is valuable because it is the product of aesthetically virtuous activity. Dominic Lopes, in response, rejects Goldie s Aristotelianism, sketching a recursive account of aesthetic virtue, following a conception of moral 1 Other recent work on aesthetic virtue include Woodruff (2001), Roberts (2018). 2 Goldie (2007, 2008, 2010) 4

5 alison hills moral and aesthetic virtue draft paper virtue drawn from Thomas Hurka and G. E. Moore. 3 This view starts with the recursive claim that having a pro-attitude towards what is intrinsically good, is itself intrinsically good. If beauty is intrinsically good, then pro-attitudes towards beauty taking pleasure in it for its own sake, admiring it for its own sake, promoting it for its own sake and so on - are intrinsically good; and we can define aesthetic virtue (specifically, the virtue of good taste) with a pro-attitude, for its own sake, towards a beautiful state of affairs. Claims about intrinsic value are defended by means of an isolation test : imagine first, a world containing only a beautiful state of affairs, and second, a world with only a person of good taste (but no beautiful states of affairs on which to exercise it). Does either world seem good? Lopes, somewhat cautiously, suggests that both do. And this supports his view that both beauty and the attitudes towards beauty comprising aesthetic virtue are valuable. Matthew Kieran has written about specific aesthetic virtues (especially creativity) and specific vices (particularly snobbery, which I discuss briefly below). 4 He does not give a general account of aesthetic virtue, or discuss the relationship between moral and aesthetic virtue, but in the background there seems to be a conception of aesthetic virtue similar to mine, where aesthetic virtue involves responsiveness to aesthetic reasons, with cognitive and non-cognitive components. In this paper, I sketch a general account of moral virtue (in section 1), distinguishing it from virtue ethics, and explaining its importance. In section 2 I develop a parallel account of aesthetic virtue, rather different from that of Goldie or Lopes. My own view is that artistic activity can contribute to a good life, but this is not essential to or definitive of virtue. Like Lopes, I think of aesthetic virtue as involving responses to aesthetic value (though not just beauty, and, I would add, responses to aesthetic reasons too). But I disagree with some aspects of the neo-moorean conception of aesthetic virtue. In particular, I am not committed to the recursive claim in its general form; nor to the claim that beauty has intrinsic valuable (it is consistent with my view, and I think quite plausible, that it has extrinsic non-instrumental value); nor that that value is to be promoted (the neo-moorean view includes a form of consequentialism). Finally in my view, virtue involves right judgement, as well as appropriate non-cognitive attitudes. Section 3 discusses the relationship between moral and aesthetic virtue; I consider whether cultivating aesthetic virtue might be a good route to moral virtue; or whether there is an essential tension between the two. 3 Lopes (2007) 4 Kieran (2010, 2012, 2014a, 2014b). 5

6 alison hills moral and aesthetic virtue draft paper i. moral virtue Ethics is a practical subject: it concerns how we ought to act. Actions are evaluated as (morally) good or bad, (morally) right or wrong. But we are also interested in evaluating people as good or bad, their judgements, motivation, their settled dispositions to act in particular ways for particular reasons, in short, their character. Consider Kant s famous example of two shopkeepers: both give their customers right change, but one does so in order not to cheat his customers; the other for the sake of his reputation, to make sure they come back to his shop. Obviously these two are not on a par, morally, even though they both do the right thing. There might not even be a noticeable difference in their tendency to perform right actions, if the second is sufficiently anxious about getting a bad name. The difference is in their moral judgements and in their motivations. One has (morally) right motivations and makes good moral judgements. His actions are not merely right, but are morally worthy: right actions for the right reasons. If he is acting from settled dispositions (i.e. he is disposed to perform morally worthy actions) then he is morally virtuous. The morally virtuous shopkeeper is the better person. He is praiseworthy and admirable, in a way that the other is not. Note that the virtuous shopkeeper doesn t have to ignore commercial considerations entirely. He may be well aware that giving customers the right change is good for business and want his shop to do well. But these non-moral motivations must be shaped and constrained by what is morally right. We can recognize and respond to moral value and moral reasons, in a variety of ways. To have moral virtue is to do respond well in all those ways: it is the orientation of the whole self towards moral value and moral reasons. It is a set of dispositions relating to: 1. Action: the virtuous person characteristically does right actions. 2. Non-cognitive attitudes: the virtuous person characteristically has the right motivations, right feelings and emotions, in direct response to moral reasons and value. She cares about the right things, takes pleasure in the right things, in the right way. 3. Cognitive attitudes: the virtuous person characteristically has the right moral beliefs in direct response to moral reasons and value. As I have argued elsewhere, this means that she has (and uses) moral understanding. All three kinds of response can be displayed at the same time, as in morally worthy action. But they do not have to. Moral virtue can call for an 6

7 alison hills moral and aesthetic virtue draft paper appropriate response through your motivations, feelings and judgements even when action is not possible or appropriate. For instance, a virtuous person may be angry or disgusted by injustices of long ago, and correctly describe them as such, even if she cannot do anything about them. We often talk about specific moral virtues: justice, beneficence, courage, for instance, as well as moral virtue in general. These may be regarded as the right kind of orientation towards specific kinds of moral value or reasons. For instance: A beneficent agent characteristically helps those in need, cares about them and is motivated to help them because they are in need, and judges it is right to help them because they are in need. A courageous agent characteristically takes on dangerous or frightening situations for the sake of a (morally) good cause, is motivated to do so because she cares about the cause, and judges it right to do so for the same reason. A perfectly morally virtuous agent will be fully oriented towards moral value and reasons. Of course all of us fall short of that, and there are many different ways to do so. You can do the wrong thing, to the wrong people at the wrong time; care about the wrong things, or the right things but too much or too little. You may make the wrong moral judgements, or the right judgements, but for the wrong reasons. Most of us go more or less wrong along all three dimensions. Moral virtue is important because it is important not just to do the right thing but to be oriented properly towards moral value. Character matters too. We mark this by feeling guilt or shame when our motivations and judgements go wrong: it would be appropriate for the mercenary shopkeeper to feel guilt, and it would be appropriate for us to find him worthy of blame and not very admirable, even though he did the right action. 5 It is not part of my view that moral virtue is the fundamental concept in ethics. Nor do I think that a life of moral virtue necessarily a happy life or a life that is characteristically human. Moral virtue may make you happier, but it need not; and there is no reason to think of virtue as any more distinctively human than vice. 5 In my view, it is better to reflect on character traits in real life, and our judgements and reactive attitudes to them to determine whether character is morally important, than to attempt to decide its value in an utterly unrealistic situation, as in the isolation test for intrinsic value favoured by Moore. 7

8 alison hills moral and aesthetic virtue draft paper ii. aesthetic virtue Is there a role for virtue in aesthetics? It might seem rather unlikely. First, aesthetics is not obviously a practical subject it all, it is essentially about looking (or listening) rather than doing anything in particular. A notion of virtue that is centrally (if not exclusively) concerned with right action might not seem a good fit. But it is a mistake to think that aesthetics is not practical: creating works of art is aesthetic action, and even appreciating them is an activity. Choosing to engage with certain works of art (going to galleries or concerts for instance), is an action, as is directing your attention in particular ways once you are there. So is recommending works to others, and explaining why they are worth attending to. So there is plenty of aesthetic action. But are there standards of right and wrong, good and bad action that can and do constrain aesthetic agents, as moral agents must be constrained by the needs, interests and rights of others? Aren t artists completely free to produce whatever works of art they choose (and in unusual circumstances where they are not free, because they have, for instance, promised a work of a particular kind, aren t the constraints moral not aesthetic)? But if that is correct, then what role is there for virtue as, in part, a disposition to do (aesthetically) right actions? Moreover, don t people legitimately have different aesthetic preferences, and take pleasure in different types of works of art? Isn t there widespread disagreement over which works of art are good. It seems that a great variety of different (sometimes conflicting) responses are appropriate to works of art, depending on your taste and interests, and there is no such thing as right cognitive and non-cognitive responses to works of art. Similarly, we might wonder whether there are right and wrong attitudes for an artist to take towards her art. When confronted with a great work of art, isn t the only thing that we care about the work itself? Frequently we know little or nothing about the artist. We don t know whether she was motivated by money, or fame, or artistic rivalry. And it is not clear that any of that matters, compared to our response to the work itself. If so, there is no need, and no space, for a conception of aesthetic virtues for an artist. In fact, there seems to be a similar distinction in aesthetics as in ethics, between judgement of the action as right or good, and an assessment of the person, her motivations, judgements and reasons for action. 8

9 alison hills moral and aesthetic virtue draft paper Consider first art criticism, and the practice of back-scratching or log-rolling. When asked to review a book or recommend a book of the year, critics sometimes praise books written by their friends, or books from their own publisher (and their friends and co-publishers return the favour later). This practice is widely condemned: readers are quite rightly indignant and blame the critic when they discover what she has done. And of course, one might do so on the basis that such evaluations are mostly wrong: it results in praise for books that are undeserving and misses out on rewarding books that are much better. This might be right; but these critical judgements might not actually be false. Perhaps there are critics whose friends write very good books. Still, it seems that, if they are recommending the book on the basis of an acquaintance with the author or a financial interest in the success of a publisher, this is the wrong sort of reason for an aesthetic judgement. Compare a critic who praises books even when their authors are obscure, and points out the flaws in the works of her friends. She is plainly more admirable and worthy of praise than the back-scratcher. She cares about aesthetic value and aesthetic reasons more than financial considerations, and perhaps even her friendship (or at any rate, she is not willing to alter her judgement for the sake of the friendship), and her aesthetic judgements are based on aesthetic reasons, on the features that make the books good (or bad). Aesthetic judgements should reflect the agent s own aesthetic understanding. 6 Now consider a musician who writes and performs her own work, but has recently changed the style of her composition, in such a way that turns out to be extremely popular. Her old fans accuse her of selling out. In part, the accusation is about the change in direction, which the old fans do not like. They regard the new work as (aesthetically) worse. But that is not all. Fans may be disappointed by later work; they may (wrongly) feel that she owes it to them to continue in the same vein. But selling out suggests that the reasons for the decline in quality is explained by the musician s motivations: it implies that she cares more about making money or about fame than the quality of her work. Fans are not just disappointed but indignant and resentful, responding with the kinds of reactive attitude very similar to moral blame. The criticism particularly stings, and, the musician is likely to defend herself by arguing that the change was a legitimate decision to explore new aesthetic territory, made for genuinely aesthetic reasons. We can see this interaction as the fans and musician trying to come to a shared aesthetic understanding, with the fans aesthetic blame communicating their judgement of aesthetic quality and their disapproval of non-aesthetic motivations playing the lead role in producing works of art (just as morally virtuous shopkeepers legitimately 6 Hills (2017) develops a conception of aesthetic understanding. 9

10 alison hills moral and aesthetic virtue draft paper want to keep their shop commercially viable, but not at the expense of honesty, aesthetically virtuous artists legitimately may want to make a living, but not at the expense of the aesthetic quality of their work). And in response the musician explains her motivations for her new creative turn, trying to get the fans to understand what she is doing and why. Alternatively, she may recognize the charge as apt, and feel shame about the quality of her work, and guilt about compromising her artistic aims. 7 In these examples, we assess the agent s actions: did the critic recommend the right books? Did the musician write good music? We also assess their aesthetic judgements and the reasons for those judgements: were they using aesthetic understanding to make a judgement, were their judgements based on the wrong features of the works of art (how much they cost, whether they will be commercially successful, whether they were produced by friends)? And finally we assess their feelings and motivations: do they care enough, and in the right way, about the aesthetic qualities of the artworks, have they been too much (in the wrong way) influenced by other motivations. Those who carry out the (aesthetically) right action, who are motivated in the right way, whose judgements are properly formed, do aesthetically worthy actions, and if acting on settled dispositions, they are aesthetically virtuous. They are more admirable and more praiseworthy than those who fail along one or more of these dimensions. Towards those agents who fall short, we feel disappointment, blame, resentment, indignation and so on, depending on the nature and seriousness of the error. Virtue is the orientation of the whole self towards value and reasons. Aesthetic virtue is the orientation of the self towards aesthetic value and aesthetic reasons. It is a set of dispositions relating to: 1. Action: the aesthetically virtuous person characteristically does aesthetically right actions Aesthetically virtuous agents characteristically create valuable works of art and appreciate those works of art (and other examples of beauty or aesthetic value e.g. natural beauty). The non-virtuous fall short by creating works that lack value, or appreciating the wrong works in the wrong way. It is a part of this conception of aesthetic virtue that there is a viable conception of aesthetic value so that some works have value and some do not but this is consistent with a wide variety of views about the nature of that value (it may be objective, subjective, relative, and so on). 7 The function of aesthetic blame (and similar reactive attitudes) as communicating aesthetic understanding (and encouraging a shared understanding) parallels Fricker s account of moral blame as communicating moral understanding (Fricker 2016). 10

11 alison hills moral and aesthetic virtue draft paper Of course, successful aesthetic action, whether creative or appreciative, is not easy and perhaps not even available to everyone. To create valuable works of art, you need talent, and perhaps also (depending on the type of artwork) proper training. Even appreciation of certain kinds of works of art might require an education in art history. This seems very different from morally right action, since to tell the truth, keep your promises, and refrain from killing people, calls for no special talents, no special training and no particular knowledge. The importance of natural talent and indeed education in creating works of art, is a matter of dispute. Perhaps both are essential to certain types of work, in certain genres. But in any case, creating works of art is one, but not the only manifestation of aesthetic virtue. You do not need special skills to respond to aesthetic reasons in more everyday ways: in how you dress, or decorate your house, which books you read and which music you listen to. To appreciate some kinds of artwork might require training or an education in art history, but you are not required to engage with those, or you can begin to acquire that education and training and so open up to yourself new opportunities for exercising the virtue. This is just like moral virtue: if you train as a doctor, you will open up more opportunities for exercising moral virtue, because you will be able to help people in (medical) need as you could not before. But there are other acceptable ways of being beneficent. Other skills can complement aesthetic and moral virtue, then, but it is normally possible to have and exercise the virtues with no more than the ordinary everyday skills that we all possess Non-cognitive attitudes: the aesthetically virtuous person characteristically has the right motivations, right feelings and emotions (including pleasure and appropriate aesthetic experiences), in direct response to aesthetic reasons and aesthetic value. Aesthetically virtuous agents may feel (for instance) a specific kind of disinterested pleasure in beauty; and be motivated to create or appreciate valuable works of art because of their value (not e.g. because they are expensive, or admired by the elite). Artists and critics can legitimately want to make a living (or even become famous), this may supplement but should not override their aesthetic motivations. Non-virtuous agents have the wrong sorts of motivations. A snob for instance, wants to go to the opera at Covent Garden not because of her great love of Rigoletto, but because she aspires to be part of a social elite. 9 8 Lopes (2015), Ridley (2016) 9 Kieran (2010). 11

12 alison hills moral and aesthetic virtue draft paper A poseur wants to fit in with some particular social group, so pretends to enjoy the music, art and literature associated with it. Sometimes snobs and poseurs are accused of inauthenticity as are artists who sell out and critics who scratch backs and it might be thought that this is what is really wrong with them, rather than a lack of virtue. But that isn t quite right, or at any rate when understood properly, the two accusations are not all that different. For after all, one can be an authentic snob, that is, one may genuinely care about being part of a social elite, and take real pleasure in doing the things that they do. One can sincerely desire (and take pleasure in) being commercially successful and famous. It may well be the case that some sell-outs, backscratchers, snobs and poseurs are not being true to themselves, in some sense. Deep down, they really care about (aesthetic) value. But there is no reason to think that they are all like that. Some of them, deep down, do not care enough, or in the right way, about aesthetic value. That s precisely the problem. It is only if we understand authenticity as being true to an ideal self a self that really does care about aesthetic value and reasons that we can understand snobs and so forth as inauthentic. And the ideal self in question, to which they need to be true, is one oriented towards value: a self of aesthetic virtue. 3. Cognitive attitudes: the virtuous person characteristically has the right aesthetic beliefs (knowledge, understanding), in direct response to aesthetic reasons and aesthetic value. Aesthetically virtuous agents make judgements of aesthetic value on the basis of the qualities that make the artwork (or other object) valuable. They have aesthetic understanding: they understand why the object they are creating or appreciating is good (or not). In an artist, this understanding can be implicit, manifested in her creative decisions; in a critic, it can be manifested in making the right recommendations. But in either case, critics and artists can be called upon to defend their actions, to show that they were made for the right (aesthetic) reasons. And it is not unreasonable to expect an aesthetically virtuous agent to be able to explain, to some extent, what matters aesthetically. This is, after all, a way of orienting oneself to aesthetic value and aesthetic reasons too Hills (2015) argues that awareness of moral reasons as reasons is a component of moral virtue, and thus (contra Murdoch 1970) virtuous judgement is not like perception. Susan Wolf (2015, 2016) argues that aesthetic agency, unlike moral agency, does not involve responsibility in the sense of answerability for what one has done (or why); I think it clearly does, though we perhaps should not always expect to understand an artist (or even a critics) reasons for her judgements, if we are less attuned to aesthetic reasons than they are. 12

13 alison hills moral and aesthetic virtue draft paper Aesthetic virtue is the orientation of the self towards value and reasons. Just as in the case of moral virtue, we can express specific virtues, like honesty and courage, as instances of this general idea. They are orientations towards particular kinds of aesthetic value, overcoming specific obstacles to doing so or temptations to do otherwise. 11 Honesty: an honest artist endeavours to make her art truthful, despite commercial advantages to doing otherwise, even though it may be easier or more comfortable to lapse into stereotypes or clichés; she is motivated to do so because she cares about aesthetic value and judges it right to do so for the same reason. Courage: a courageous writer is characteristically willing to take risks to explore a new aesthetic form, to transgress social norms, to defy political authorities, is motivated to do so because she cares about aesthetic value, and judges it right to do so for the same reason. A critic can likewise be honest and courageous in her aesthetic judgements and recommendations, despite temptations to do otherwise and obstacles in her path. 12 To see just how difficult such obstacles can be, consider the career of Dmitri Shostakovich, who composed his most important works in the Soviet Union at a time when artists were imprisoned and even shot if their work was considered ideologically suspect. Shostakovich himself was denounced twice. First, a piece in Pravda, widely thought to be written by Stalin himself, vitriolically condemned his opera, Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk, which had previously been very popular. Many critics who had praised the work hurried to fall in with the Party line. During the Second World War Shostakovich returned to favour and his Seventh symphony 11 Foot, following Aquinas, characterizes virtues as correctives to temptation to err (Foot 1978, p. 9). 12 Are there two distinct groups of aesthetic virtues, the virtues of the artist, focussed on creation and of the audience or critic, concerned with appreciation? Some previous writers on aesthetic virtue have given that impression (Goldie 2010). I do not think this is the most illuminating way to conceive of them. Both consist in proper orientation towards aesthetic value. The artist s own aesthetic judgements which guide her through her creation are not of a different kind than those of the critic or audience. The pleasure each takes in beauty is similar; so are other non-cognitive responses, though these are also shaped by their different relationship to the work (from the artist, proper pride, or guilt, shame or frustration in failure; from the audience, admiration and praise or disappointment, blame and indignation). Similarly, a morally virtuous bystander will make the right judgements and have the right non-cognitive attitudes but will not necessarily do a great deal, but the virtues of a bystander are not essentially different from those of a moral agent, rather, moral virtue for both consists in proper orientation towards moral value and moral reasons, expressed in different ways. 13

14 alison hills moral and aesthetic virtue draft paper was movingly performed during the Siege of Leningrad. But in 1948, his music was considered insufficiently Russian, he was dismissed from his post at the Moscow Conservatory and spent nights in the corridor outside his apartment with a packed suitcase so that his family would not be disturbed by his arrest. In the end, he was spared. After that, he became cautious, on the one hand writing work for the public - uncontroversial film scores for money, work that he hoped would return him to official favour - and, on the other, in secret, pieces which met his own aesthetic standards, including string quartets heavily influenced by (the officially un-russian) Bach. Shostakovich was not heroic. He was willing to compromise artistically, as in his Fifth symphony, composed in a more traditional and therefore more officially acceptable, style. But at the same time, he strove to make that work as good as it could possibly be (even, according to some, smuggling into it covert dissidence); and in secret he followed his own artistic judgement. He struggled, more or less successfully, to maintain honesty as an artist and faith in his own creative vision when doing so called for immense and unusual courage. iii. the relationship between aesthetic and moral virtue What is the relationship between aesthetic and moral virtue? Since honesty and courage are, I have argued, virtues in aesthetics, and there are so many similarities between ethical and aesthetic virtues one might have the suspicion that they are not really distinct, and in fact aesthetic virtues just are moral virtues, manifested in the sphere of art and appreciation. 13 On the other hand, if moral and aesthetic virtues are not identical, one might think that virtue in one sphere could contribute to virtue in another. It need not be the only route, nor need it be a sufficient means, but perhaps one might be able to cultivate aesthetic virtue as a means to moral virtue. 14 Why would aesthetic virtue be helpful for moral virtue? There are some reasons to think that aesthetic virtue could be a means to moral virtue. Developing aesthetic virtue means developing good judgement, appropriate emotional responses and acting well. To do these well, you need to cultivate certain qualities of mind and habits. For instance, you need a strong will, to persist in carrying out your intentions despite temptations or challenges. To develop good aesthetic judgement, and to create good works of art, you need to have a powerful imagination, to think of how best to achieve your artistic goals to develop new styles of 13 Goldie (2010) suggests that the same courage and honesty apply both to art and morality. 14 This is suggested by Eaton (1992, 1997) 14

15 alison hills moral and aesthetic virtue draft paper artistic expression, and when faced with a work of art, to develop aesthetic understanding by grasping what the artist was trying to do and to whether alternatives would be better or worse. Discernment, sensitivity, strength of will, imaginatively exploring alternatives to the most obvious options, are plainly skills that play a role in moral virtue too. 15 Sometimes there are very direct parallels, as when you have to employ strength of will so as to do the right thing, rather than follow self- interest, or what is more convenient or socially acceptable. In a few cases, in order to understand the artwork itself, you need to have a moral sensitivity. Martha Nussbaum emphasizes the importance of moral discernment for the proper appreciation of the novels of Henry James and similar works of literature. 16 So one might hope that this strength of will, and similarly, discernment, sensitivity and the appropriate use of imagination, could be developed through the creation and appreciation of art, and then applied to moral value and moral reasons. Moreover, aesthetic virtue might be easier to attain than moral virtue. Aesthetic value is or at any rate can be both quite obvious and immediately attractive. In other words, the cognitive and non-cognitive resources that we need to respond are not difficult for us to acquire. By contrast, it can be very difficult indeed to determine what the morally right action is, and doing it can require considerable sacrifice. So moral virtue can be cognitively and non-cognitively more demanding, and perhaps aesthetic virtue could be a helpful stepping stone on the way. Finally, the stakes are typically lower in aesthetics than ethics. If you make a mistake in aesthetics, make a bad judgement or have the wrong sort of motivations, you might end up a snob or a poseur; you might end up over-praising your friends or making some very bad art. You are not going to kill anyone, or violate their rights. So art might be a good training ground for morality, if you could develop moral virtues through cultivating aesthetic virtues, you could become (morally) good without hurting anyone on the way. Of course, it is true that you can express moral virtues in the aesthetic sphere. Artists can have obligations to their patrons or their fans, having promised to deliver certain kinds of works. This is a moral obligation and a (morally) just artist will fulfil it. And there are very significant analogies between aesthetic and moral honesty. Truthfulness is a value in aesthetics and ethics, so there are specific virtues directed at it. There are similar 15 Iris Murdoch emphasizes the perceptual discernment and loving the good as similarities between good ethical and aesthetic attitudes (Murdoch 1970). 16 Nussbaum (1990). 15

16 alison hills moral and aesthetic virtue draft paper difficulties standing in the way. It is not always in your own interests to be truthful. Sometimes it takes hard work to uncover the truth and it is simply easier to settle for something less. There can be social pressures to be less than honest, when others do not want to hear the truth or have interests in a deception being maintained. There can be commercial pressures not to tell these unwelcome truths to paying customers. Honest agents have the settled disposition to be truthful in the fact of all of these obstacles. For similar reasons, it can be dangerous or frightening to do the right thing, so courage is a virtue in ethics and aesthetics. But it is perfectly obvious that aesthetic and moral virtues cannot be identical. Great artists and great critics are not always (morally) good people, and the morally best people are not always good artists, or even particularly appreciative of art. In part, this may be explained by the background conditions required for aesthetic (but not moral) virtue outlined earlier, the skill, training and historical knowledge needed for aesthetic virtue. But that is not the only significant difference between the two. Each is the orientation towards value and reasons, but a different kind of value and reasons in each case. Moral courage is an orientation towards moral value and is concerned with doing morally right actions in the face of fear. Aesthetic courage is an orientation towards aesthetic value and concerned with aesthetically right action. Aesthetic and moral honesty are both directed at truthfulness, but it is not, or not obviously, the same kind of truthfulness at issue in ethics as aesthetics. I said earlier that Shostokovich strove for honesty as an artist, where that meant pursuing his own artistic vision rather than conforming to Stalin s preferences. In that sense, his secret compositions were more truthful than those he wrote for public consumption; but this does not mean that the latter were deceptive in the typical sense of morally dishonest, involving deliberate and intentional misrepresentation. Similarly, an artist may lack aesthetic honesty for producing a work of art that is sentimental or riddled with cliché, without asserting any falsehoods. Moreover, historical fiction is permitted a great deal of historical inaccuracy (in the portrayal of historical events or characters, for instance) in the service of expressing a different kind of truth. These virtues are directed at different kinds of value, and call for different responses: different motivations (moral and aesthetic), different sorts of judgement, made on the basis of different sorts of reason. Moral and aesthetic virtues are not identical. But they are fundamentally similar. And this distinguishes aesthetic virtue from the virtues associated with particular roles, for instance, such as the virtues of a businessman, or of a police officer, or of a jewel thief. For these virtues are set by the standards internal to the role, and are not necessarily directed at genuine value. Thus a virtuous businessman might courageously test the limits of 16

17 alison hills moral and aesthetic virtue draft paper the laws of tax avoidance. But this is not real courage, directed at something genuinely valuable, as aesthetic courage is. Thus aesthetic virtues are not merely the virtues expressed in artists and audience respectively. If there are such deep connections between moral and aesthetic virtues, and there are analogues in aesthetics of honesty and courage, do all moral virtues have aesthetic analogues? It is not obvious that they do, or if they do, that they have the same importance in aesthetics as ethics. Justice and beneficence are plainly two of the most important moral virtues. And neither has a perfectly natural analogue in aesthetics. Certainly if one considers distributive justice, a matter of fair distribution within a group of people, it is not clear that there is anything similar in aesthetics. On the other hand, if we consider justice as a matter of treating people fairly, it is perfectly clear that audiences and critics can be more or less fair in their response to works of art, and artists can treat co-creators or collaborators fairly. Similarly, whilst the moral virtue of beneficence can be applied to art an artist can give away her paintings for instance it is not so clear what a distinctively aesthetic beneficence would mean. Perhaps helping others to engage with art through generous artistic collaboration, or helping others to understand and appreciate art. 17 What about the hope that sensitivity, discernment and strength of will directed towards one kind of value and reasons will somehow turn into sensitivity, discernment and so forth towards another? This depends on whether what one is cultivating is a general disposition that can be applied across domains, or a set of skills that are local and specific. This is in part an empirical question which I cannot settle, but it does seem more plausible that the latter is the case, that is, that one acquires sensitivity towards aesthetic value, responsive to aesthetic qualities, not sensitivity to value (in general) applied to aesthetics. Even within aesthetics, sensitivity is typically local: you can develop a fine sensitivity towards visual arts even towards one kind of visual art, e.g. Impressionism by becoming good at recognizing the qualities and defects typical of Impressionism. But that does not mean that you are thereby sensitive to the aesthetic qualities of classical music, or modernist poetry, or even other kinds of visual art. To create or appreciate a variety of genres of art, literature, music etc, you need to cultivate sensitivities and discernment relevant to each. And moral sensitivity is another kind entirely, and needs separate development. Is strength of will a better candidate for a general disposition which can be successfully manifested across different domains? Perhaps, but even 17 Are there moral analogues to all aesthetic virtues too? It is not obvious that there are, but a leading candidate creativity is not in my view a virtue in most cases (and insofar as it is, is important in ethics too). 17

18 alison hills moral and aesthetic virtue draft paper here it seems perfectly possible to be strong-willed against certain sorts of temptations, to overcome particular challenges, for the sake of particular goals or for certain reasons; but not in general. Nor do I think that it is always true, that aesthetic value is easier to discern than moral value, and that we are more likely to want to pursue it. Great art, literature and music do not always have a superficial appeal; they too can be cognitively and non-cognitively demanding. So it is the exception, rather than the rule, that developing aesthetic virtue will contribute to moral virtue. What about the converse: can aesthetic virtue actually detract from moral virtue? Certainly it can appear so. Consider the artist Gauguin (as described by Bernard Williams). Shrugging off the demands of his children, he abandons his family to go to Tahiti to paint. Gauguin develops his artistic virtues and produces great paintings, morally, he does not improve (if anything, the opposite). Is the ideal of aesthetic virtue a kind of Nietzschean creative genius, convinced of the overwhelming significance of his own work, devoted to it absolutely, entirely indifferent to anyone else, to any of their needs or interests? Orienting yourself perfectly towards one kind of value surely precludes orienting yourself properly towards another kind. No one can face in two directions at once. And so moral and aesthetic virtue may be incompatible. One might be tempted to see this as a problem that arises in theory, not practice, at least not among those who rightly do not regard themselves as artistic geniuses. Perfection is unreachable for most of us in any case. Ideal moral virtue is not something we can sensible expect to achieve. Nor is ideal aesthetic virtue. If we cannot achieve either of them, then it surely does not matter that we cannot achieve them both at the same time. But the tension arises in more mundane settings: that the pram in the hallway is the enemy of promise is a cliché for a reason. But I think it is worth separating two different tensions here. One is the tension between devoting yourself to art (and nothing else) and devoting yourself to morality (and nothing else); the other is the tension between creating art and fulfilling your moral obligations (e.g. to one s children) in a particular cultural and political setting. The first is in principle impossible. But singleminded devotion is not required by moral or aesthetic virtue, even ideal or perfect virtue, in my view. Virtue requires orientation responsiveness to value and reasons. But not to the exclusion of thoughts or interests in other directions. Recall that a virtuous shopkeeper is permitted to want his shop to stay afloat and even be profitable; just not by exploiting or cheating his customers. Similarly, an aesthetically virtuous musician even an ideally virtuous one - may legitimately want to make a living, 18

19 alison hills moral and aesthetic virtue draft paper even a good one. She may reasonably want to spend time, money and attention on her family. She would be less than virtuous if she allowed these interests to distort her creation of appreciation of art; but she would not be more virtuous if she did not have them at all. If that is right, even ideal moral and aesthetic virtue may be consistent with one another. Tensions can still arise, and are more likely to do so in societies arranged in some ways rather than others: where access to works of art, literature, music and forms of natural beauty is more difficult and more expensive, it will be more difficult to cultivate aesthetic virtue; if all care-giving is dependents on family or charities, without any institutional assistance, it will be harder to carry out your moral obligations and at the same time develop aesthetic interests. So the tension between moral and aesthetic virtue can be lessened, if not resolved completely, by attending to the political question, of how one s society is arranged. Our goal should be a social and political system that allows and encourages us to cultivate moral and aesthetic virtue at the same time. conclusion I have argued that there are deep similarities between aesthetics and ethics: both are practical subjects directed at value, which calls for a range of responses: action, and cognitive and non-cognitive attitudes. Virtue is full orientation towards value and is more admirable and praiseworthy than mere right action. Similar obstacles stand in the way of virtue in ethics and aesthetics: self-interest, social pressures, financial concerns, fear of humiliation or worse. And there are similar specific virtues in each, notably honesty and courage. Moral and aesthetic virtue are fundamentally similar, but they are not identical, nor is one a means to the other. Aesthetic virtue has had much less attention than moral virtue, but not for good reason, and there is much more to be said about it than I have been able to touch on here. Just a few questions that deserve further discussion include the nature of aesthetic agency: does it require responsibility, voluntariness, and freedom in the same way as moral agency? Is aesthetic understanding or aesthetic knowledge or something else - the appropriate cognitive state in aesthetic virtue? Which noncognitive attitudes are appropriate? Are the reactive attitudes like blame, guilt and resentment the same in moral and aesthetics? If so, do they have the same function? I hope future work on aesthetic virtue will addresses these questions, as well as to consider in general the role and significance of virtue in aesthetics. 19

20 alison hills moral and aesthetic virtue draft paper references Eaton, M Integrating the Aesthetic and the Moral. Philosophical Studies 67: Eaton, M Aesthetics: The Mother of Ethics?. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 55: Foot, P Virtues and Vices in her Virtues and Vices (OUP): Fricker, M. (2016), What s the Point of Blame? A Paradigm Based Explanation. Noûs, 50: Gaut, B Mixed Motivations: Creativity as a Virtue, Philosophical Aesthetics and the Sciences of Art: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 75, pp Goldie, P Towards a Virtue Theory of Art. British Journal of Aesthetics 47 (2007): Goldie, P Virtues of Art and Human Well-Being. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplement LXXXII (2008): Goldie, P Virtues of Art Philosophy Compass 5/10: Hills, A The Intellectuals and the Virtues. Ethics 126 (1):7-36. Hills, A Aesthetic Understanding. In Making Sense of the World: New Essays on the Philosophy of Understanding. : Oxford University Press. Hume, David 1985: Of the Standard of Taste. In Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, pp Indianapolis: Liberty Classics. Hurka, T. 2001: Virtue, Vice, and Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kieran, M The Vice of Snobbery: Aesthetic Knowledge, Justification, and Virtue in Art Appreciation. Philosophical Quarterly 60: Kieran, M For the Love of Art: Artistic Values and Appreciative Virtue. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 71: Kieran, M. 2014a. Creativity, Virtue and the Challenges from Natural Talent, Ill-Being and Immorality. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 75: Kieran, Matthew 2014b Creativity as a Virtue of Character in Scott Barry Kaufman and Elliot Samuel Paul (eds.), The Philosophy of 20

21 alison hills moral and aesthetic virtue draft paper Creativity (New York: Oxford University Press), pp Lopes, D Virtues of Art: Good Taste. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplement LXXXII: Lopes, D Aesthetic Experts, Guides to Value. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 73 (3): Murdoch, Iris The Sovereignty of Good. London: Routledge Nussbaum, M Finely aware and richly responsive : literature and the moral imagination in her Love s Knowledge (OUP): Ridley, A Why Ethics and Aesthetics are Practically the Same, The Philosophical Quarterly, 66: Roberts, Tom (2018). Aesthetic virtues: traits and faculties. Philosophical Studies 175 (2): Wolf, Susan (2015). Responsibility, Moral and Otherwise. Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (2): Wolf, Susan Aesthetic Responsibility. The Amherst Lecture in Philosophy 11: Woodruff, D. A Virtue Theory of Aesthetics. Journal of Aesthetic Education 35 (2001):