Gruber 1 Blake J Gruber Rhet 391: Argument Theory Dr. Hovden 15 April 2011 The Enthymeme in the Postmodern Era: A problem or solution to argument in a highly contextualized world? Since the time of Greek Antiquity scholars, philosophers, and rhetoricians alike have pondered the notion of absolute Truth, seeking the epistemological origins of definitive knowledge and those Truths themselves. Rhetoric and argumentation served as a method for uncovering both cultural and metaphysical claims to truth; the enthymeme, often referred to as the elided syllogism, functioning as, the very body and substance of persuasion (Rhetoric I, 1). However, the contemporary rise of postmodernism and its highly contextualized notion of relativity pose problems towards this type of inquiry; mainly that the postmodern ideal rejects absolute Truth entirely arguing rather that individuals have different notions of truth based on their unique experiences. Scholars contest the postmodern critique claiming rhetoric and argument still retain some of their classical functions. The enthymeme in particular deserves attention; its suppressed premise requires audiences to fill in the enthymematic gap with what is often referred to as endoxa, the common ground of a community that become relevant in actual arguments (Walton and Macagno, 12). Given the emphasis postmodernist s place on the common ground, the enthymeme poses a number of theoretical questions in regards to arguing in the postmodern world. First and foremost, is the enthymeme a legitimate way to argue across contextual boundaries? Literature reviews of both the postmodern critique and the enthymeme, followed by a discussion of endoxa and a more general theoretical discussion relating these
Gruber 2 concepts to a debate between Perelman and Toulmin, will attempt to reveal an answer to this question on a potential solution for the problems facing contemporary argumentation. Before considering the enthymeme as a form of argument that potentially deafens the postmodern critique, the postmodern critique itself must be explained. Contemporary argumentation theory has yet to confront adequately the problems posed for it by postmoderinsm Post-modernists question in principle the existence of knowledge, and deny that there is any unique value to rational as opposed to other forms of justification (Harris, 31). Because argumentation traditionally functioned as a tool for discovering truth and lends itself as rational, whether that be declarations of truth/truth or in decision making, the denial of rationality as an indicator of value renders argument useless. However, as Harris discusses, If post-modernism displaced rationality then the possibility of reaching consensus would disappear, and as he demonstrates within academic debate, individuals can still reach consensus (Harris, 31). Thus, there must be a point to argumentation regardless of the abolishment of any notion of Truth, and rationality may still exists amongst relativity. A variety of communications scholars have addressed the issue of, The impossibility of having certain knowledge about the Other (person, organization, culture, society), because, If it is accepted that there are no stable foundations for analyzing slippery language and shifting symbols, which is the only data we ever have, then there is no guarantee of the certainty of anything at all (Parker, 553). Harris puts a unique spin on this debate, Post-modernism, when considered in practice, is best understood not as an alternative to modernism, but as a methodological critique of modernism (Harris, 35). Critiquing has become a solution that appears favorable to justifying contemporary argumentation. For example, Lenore Langsdorf writes in response to the
Gruber 3 postmodern critique, All of our discourses should be- to some extent, and in a variety of wayscritiques of the power and domination likely to be present in them. That s a very central role for argumentation, for it calls for situating argumentation in the midst of postmodernity (Lansgdorf, 15). Both of these authors argue that if argument can no longer be used to evaluate some definitive notion of truth, it can still be used to critique peoples claims on the context and authority that might be influencing them, essentially turning the tables on the postmodern critique by using argument as a method for discovering the very contextual influences postmodernism suggests eliminate truth. Langsdorf goes further by introducing the hermeneutic model as a methodology for this practice, Thick argumentation allows of only tentative and temporary stasis, within an openended process of plurivocal, interactional, interpretive, and argumentative inquiry. Postmodern critique does not diminish the value of this practice of thick argumentation in the service of inquiry (Langsdorf, 325). Her reference to thick argumentation suspends argument to the confined space and time it occurs in, arguing in terms of relativity that all valuations made are in fact only temporarily true. This type of argument must be tentative and fluid allowing for the fluctuation relativism demands. She subscribes thick argumentation as method for critiquing authority and in doing so claims one can arrive at this momentary truth. Charles Willard argues for a similar critique of authority, in this case in the form of expert opinions, Expert testimony thus attempts to translate technical facts into a general public language. Translation is a misleading term. Expert testimony rarely translates equivalency or resemblance are not always available to link esoteric discourse with popular discourse (Willard, 227). The reliance on expert testimony in the postmodern era arises simply due to the complexities of the
Gruber 4 contemporary world, but the problem stems from highly technical terms not always being translatable to layman s terms. Reminiscent of the way one can never truly understand the other, there becomes a necessity to critique the influence these authorities have due to a general lack of understanding between the parties. Beyond critiques of influence, other scholars offer another way to situate argument amidst postmodernity, leaving it pragmatic and open-ended. Much like Langsdorf s process of thick argumentation, Robert Cox puts forth that, Argument must locate public, mutually understandable terms, to situate its critique; it cannot abandon these because they may have been corrupted. To refuse to do so- to view the taint of corruption as fixed - is to fall victim to the very essentialism that postmodernity critiques. Argument assumes the openness and instability of the identity of terms as the very condition of transformation and change (Cox, 11). This reflection also flips the postmodern critique against itself, as postmodernism renders symbols, the basis of language, unstable. Cox argues It is this instability that makes argument necessary for actual understanding in contemporary discourse. Cox s main point then is that, By locating argument as a collective performance of situated agents, we may inscribe a place for critical practice, one that still bears relevance to a world marked by fragmentation and contingency, and Argument, therefore, becomes pragmatic and open ended (Cox, 8-10). Rowland makes similar claims to the benefit of argument as a pragmatic tool as well, If full knowledge is unattainable, a focus on pragmatically justifiable problem solving tools can help us to find the most effective solutions for any given problem. If no perfect society can be created, then we may use argument to ameliorate societal problems (Rowland, 363). The openended component comes into play with the concept of temporary stasis, as Parker writes on the
Gruber 5 aim of argumentation in the contemporary, Truth/knowledge in the sense I am sketching becomes the attempt to sustain inter-subjective agreement- not the end of enquiry but a temporary consensus on what is important in a particular situation at a particular time (Parker, 557). The use of temporary stasis is reflected amongst all of the scholars definitions, because it becomes necessary when dealing with relativistic philosophies. As Roland puts quite nicely, Defined in this manner, rational argument is the most useful general problem solving tool available to humans (Rowland 362). In summary, the postmodern critique offers a variety of problems for argumentation in the contemporary domain. Mainly, the notion of relativity and that symbols, truth, and morals differ amongst societies based on the unique perspectives individuals develop through specific experiences within their community. It is the impossibility of ever truly understanding the other that poses problems to argument with the aims of uncovering truth. Although the postmodern critique certainly cannot coexist with any form of absolute Truth, communications scholars agree that argument still has purpose. One purpose turns argument into a method of critique aimed at uncovering the authority influences residing over any claim, which functions ideally given postmodern s emphasis on these particular influences for every individual. Second, argument should still be used as a pragmatic tool to discover the best means for resolving any situation. If perspectives are so thoroughly entrenched in some particular context then argument is necessary if anyone is to ever reach any form of agreement amongst all the differences in the world. A final point maintained by all the authors previously discussed is the concept of temporary stasis, or what is discovered through argumentation is specific to that particular place and time and remains open ended and accepting to change. Although theorists have ascertained ways for
Gruber 6 argument to maintain its prominence in discourse, they have not suggested any method of effectively arguing across these contextual barriers, which brings the enthymeme into this conversation. A broader understanding of the enthymeme must be discussed before the application of it in postmodern argumentation can be touched on. The enthymeme originates in Aristotle s The Rhetoric, and, Ever since Aristotle the term enthymeme has been associated in some manner or other with the syllogism, the concept adduced by Aristotle to explain the nature of all reasoning and proof (McBurney, 50). To be clear, the syllogism is a form of propositional logic in which the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion should the syllogism be valid, the simplest form using two premises to arrive at a single conclusion. The elided or truncated syllogism then leaves out or suppresses one of the premises, or rarely even the conclusion. However, as McBurney reveals, Aristotle s dense definition of the enthymeme has produced debate over exactly what the enthymeme is and how it should be regarded. This debate has spanned ancient history and continues currently amongst scholars, in fact, Sir William Hamilton distinguished 17 different meanings of the term enthymeme, speaking to the breadth of definitions (Smith, 115). The suppressed premise remains one of the prominent areas of conflict amongst scholars when discussing the enthymeme. Although the most universal definition understands the enthymeme as, an elided syllogism and [that] this elision is the only differentiation between the syllogism and the enthymeme, others debate whether Aristotle intended such a simplistic distinction between the two (McBurney, 66). The implicit/incomplete nature of the deductive structure is not the defining characteristic of the enthymeme for Aristotle, but rather a corollary deriving from what Aristotle
Gruber 7 regards as a more fundamental property (Rocci, 425). As Rocci demonstrates, it cannot be debated that there is usually an unstated premise in enthymematic argumentation, but the importance of it and how it is supplied by the audience can be called into question. For example Hitchcock notes, it is generally implausible to postulate this sort of unstated premiss, and that the inclination to do so stems from the mistake of identifying definite consequence with logical consequence (Hitchcock, 32). Hitchcock s argument rests on advanced logic, and really adds little to this discussion other than that the suppressed premise may actually not be suppressed when considered within logic. The importance of the suppressed premise to this paper lies in that, Scholars usually contend that one of the premises or the conclusion is suppressed because the audience is expected to supply the missing part from common knowledge (Smith, 115). Given that the main critique of postmodernist s arise in truths originating through a person s unique experiences, this common knowledge becomes particularly important. The problem with enthymemes is that if the nonexplicit assumptions in an argument are supposed to be propositions used by the arguer (as opposed to just the propositions needed to make the argument structurally correct, according to some standard), reasonable people can have differences of opinion on what the nonexplicit assumptions are supposed to be (Walton, 93). However, one could argue with the emphasis post modernism places on different perceptions and truths due to contextual effects, the enthymeme could then be used to essentially cheat these differences allowing people to fill the gap with the premise that makes the most sense to them while arriving at the same conclusion. Yet, as Walton describes, If given carte blanche to fill in any proposition needed to make the inference structurally correct, we may insert assumptions into the text of discourse that the speaker or audience didn t realize were there, doesn t accept, or
Gruber 8 didn t even mean to be part of the argument (Walton, 94). This reflects the debate between Perelman and Toulmin on assessing the strength of an argument and whether it falls in the adherence of the audience or the probability of the claims being made, respectively, but that will be touched on later. Regardless, as Rocci distinguishes, The premises of the enthymeme have a second characteristic that ensure the grounding of the inferential processes of argument in the socially situated intersubjecive process of communication- a grounding that is the distinctive trait of rhetoric in the Aristotelian view (Rocci, 425). The trait she refers to is the aristotelian notion of endoxa or common ground. Endoxa lies at the heart of postmodernity as well as the enthymeme, and it too must be discussed more generally before this inquiry can proceed. In Aristotle, the adjective endoxos refers to propositions that are in the common opinion and, as a consequence, are generally accepted within a community (Rocci, 425). In order to maintain this definition within the postmodern an alternative to the epistemic analysis of common knowledge can be used, to define it in terms of belief. Belief does not imply truth In this sense, something is common knowledge if everybody believes that it is true, everybody believes that everybody [believes] that it is true and so forth. This characterization represents what could be called the doxastic view of common knowledge (Walton and Macagno, 4). This is a particularly formidable definition of common knowledge in the face of the relativity and denial of knowledge postmodernism presents, and relates back to the notion of temporary stasis similarly used to preserve argument. To expand upon the definition, They [endoxa] are presumptions or propositions accepted in absence of better opinion, and susceptible to prejudice or fallacy (Walton and Macagno, 12).
Gruber 9 Certain problems affect the integrity of endoxa itself prior to the problems endoxa encounters within the enthymeme. Walton and Macagno explain, The main problem lies in the determination of what is endoxon and what is simply opinion, or popular point of view (Walton and Macagno, 13). This problem resembles the problem of fully understanding the other, but is distinct in that it considers what should even be considered endoxa or what constitutes as context. A pertinent question arises from this problem as too just how far the personal experiences lends itself in postmodernism, should context be considered at the individual or community level? The working definitions of endoxa requires more consensus amongst a community, challenging relativity by bringing the common ground to the community level versus the individual level. However, even if endoxa can be distinguished, arguing from the common opinion has also been defined as the logical fallacy of ad populum. If such arguments can be fallacious in some instances, a very careful look needs to be taken at the question of how they can be justified in cases where they are not fallacious (Walton and Macagno, 13). Perhaps this justification can be grounded in postmodernism itself, because of the importance it places on the common ground. Its merit as a grounds for valuation are undeniable because fallicious or not, endoxa determine the cultural acceptability of the conclusions argued for (Rocci, 429). Keeping endoxa in mind one must ask then, how does the enthymeme function in modern argumentation? One interpretation of the enthymeme in contemporary argumentation has been as visual argument. Finnegan considers photographs as modern enthymemes, the enthymeme leaves space for the audience to insert its own knowledge and experience To extend this notion to the photograph, the viewer of the photograph fills in the blank with the assumption that the image
Gruber 10 is real Thus, photographs, and especially documentary photographs, may be considered to be visual arguments insomuch as they embody the possibility of the naturalistic enthymeme (Finnegan, 143). This consideration seems applicable to postmodernism, but what really becomes intriguing about the enthymeme is its potential to argue across contextual boundaries. Postmodernists would concur with Rocci in her citing that, It has been frequently observed that argumentation strategies differ across cultures, and evaluate judgments concerning the logical soundness, acceptability, reasonableness or persuasiveness of argumentation produced by people belonging to other cultures vary accordingly (Rocci, 410). A statement easily applicable to the theory of postmodernism. However, concerning the enthymeme, Rocci also notes, In a great many [practices] the opening stage of an argumentative exchange of views will remain largely implicit, because it is generally tacitly assumed that the required common ground exists (Rocci, 429). Placing the enthymeme within this framework allows it to function freely and practically, but what happens when that common ground or endoxa differs even amongst a single audience, or when a message is intended to reach different audiences, or when that common ground simply doesn t already exist? Aden more specifically addresses this issue on the enthymeme as a form of postmodern argumentation in his essay on David Duke. Aden s argument hinges on Charles Willard s notion that, Argumentation scholars should explore the multiple interpretations of argument made possible by the existence of multiple frames of reference in the postmodern age (Aden, 54). Aden equates television broadcasting, the form most contemporary individuals receive most of their news in, as a form that, mirrors that [form of processing] posited by Aristotle in his explanation of the deductive
Gruber 11 reasoning form he labeled an enthymeme, recalling that Aristotle himself states, This deductive form of reasoning is best suited for a mass audience since the uneducated argue from their everyday knowledge (Aden, 55; Rhetoric I, 156). Relating this back to the contemporary argument, Aden writes, In a postmodern age, elements of an argument can be omitted easily since audience members possess and/or believe in a larger number of commonly accepted facts or, already said fragments. Moreover, enthymemes- especially in postmodern culturesencourage individual interpretations (Aden, 56). Essentially Aden s research demonstrates that modern public figures can use the enthymeme to their advantage by assuming that the audience will take for granted this filling in the blank based on their common knowledge. He demonstrates this through an analysis of David Duke, a former KKK member, who used enthymematic rhetoric to appeal to the heavily racist South while still maintaining himself as a respectable public figure to the rest of the nation. It is exactly this use of the enthymeme this paper is concerned with. Despite the clearly problematic example Aden posits, could arguing in this fashion ever be considered legitimate in an age where arguments rely so heavily on contextual considerations? Aden furthers his analysis by stating that, Public discourse is articulated in shorthand and relies on audience members knowing how to decode what is not said because, ironically, it has already been said (Aden, 64). The already been said resting in the audiences subconscience in the form of endoxa previously discussed. He raises some problems with this type of argumentation though, beyond the self-evident problems with Duke s racism, Two concerns, in particular, bear attention. First, speakers who use truncated arguments possess plausible deniability because of what is left unsaid. Second, audience members who fail to acknowledge
Gruber 12 their understanding of the already said may perpetuate their own cynicism (Aden, 64). Essentially, if the audience fails to be active listeners, by not critiquing the authoritative ideals engrained in them through endoxa, then there is far too much potential for rhetoricians like Duke to take advantage of the enthymeme. Are the audiences of the contemporary world engaging enough to handle critiquing gilded arguments such as enthymemes? Is it important the audience even realizes how an argument is functioning, or is their mere acceptance of it enough? The following will tie this discussion to the works of Perelman and Toulmin who become particularly relevant to assessing the enthymeme in a postmodern world. Chaim Perelman and Stephen Toulmin, two of the most notable contemporary communications theorists, foresaw the problems of argumentation in contemporary discourse, particularly with the application of Aristotle s body of work to the modern argument. In an effort to preserve the relevancy of Aristotle s Rhetoric in modern argumentation, each produced a remedy to make Aristotle applicable to the fluid form of argumentation realized today in the form of Toulmin s The Uses of Arguments and Perelman s The Realm of Rhetoric. Their methodologies diverge on their assessments of argument strength and the aims of argumentation. Toulmin maintains Aristotle s focus on logic and probability in argumentation through his modernization of the Aristotelian method known as the Toulmin Model, he argues, Inferring, in a phrase, does not always involve calculating, and the canons of sound argument can be applied alike whether we have reached our conclusions by ways of a computation or by a simple leap or in a sense one still uses logic to assess argumentation although it may not be in the traditional form (Toulmin, 5). Perelman, on the other hand, calls for a symposium of Aristotle s ethos, pathos, and logos arguing, The aim of argumentation is not to prove the truth of the conclusions
Gruber 13 from premises, but to transfer conclusions the adherence accorded to the premises (Perelman, 21). A strong argument for Perelman rests in simply how well it sits with the audience, or achieves adherence. Each methodology reflecting the fact that, Modern argumentation theory has been deeply characterized, since its inception in the late 1950s, by the need of finding soundness criteria for an argument to be called reasonable. (Rocci, 415). Although Toulmin s model still holds probability central to argument, he introduces fields to deal with context, What things about the modes in which we assess arguments, the standards by reference to which we assess them and the manner in which we qualify our conclusions about them, are the same regardless of field (field invariant), and which of them vary as we move from arguments in one field to another (field dependent) (Toulmin, 15). In essence, Toulmin uses field as a way to maintain probability within his model while still dealing with the problems encountered when arguments cross different fields. Yet, he does not place the emphasis on the field, but rather in the probability a claim has within that field. Despite both theories engaging context, their measures of valuation still differ. As Conley notes, If Perelman is right about the way arguments work, then it would appear that the success of an argument is dependent on the ability of speakers and audience to apprehend and interpret connections and differences If it works, it works because it fits it is right it illuminates and gives the impression that it is adequate to the occasion, to the issue, and, of course, to our understanding (Conley, 182). While Toulmin concurs, the real evaluation of arguments depends on the field dependent substantial evaluation of the backings by the experts of the field, he also emphasizes it is the attainable probability within this field that should ultimately be used to identify the strength of an argument (Rocci, 432). The differences in
Gruber 14 valuation create a dichotomy: does a strong argument simply achieve adherence amongst its audience, or must it also possess some sort of truth value to be considered useful or valuable? Now the implications of this dichotomy on the enthymeme as a form of contemporary argumentation amidst the postmodern can be grappled with. Considering Perelman first, the aims of argumentation then are to make the audience agree with the premises and conclusion one posits. Taking into account enthymematic argumentation, Perelman s valuation of argument lends itself to exceedingly ambiguous enthymemes such as David Duke s. For if the only purpose is to achieve adherence, and a rhetor is faced with exceedingly variant endoxa amongst an audience, wouldn t a particularly vague enthymeme lead to the most adherence amongst an audience? At the same time an argument cannot be too vague or it wont make any sense. Of course argumentation in this style becomes problematic when used deviantly, take for example Hitler and the rise of the Nazi party. It can easily be argued that scapegoating and discriminating against specifically the Jewish population became a type of endoxa amongst the Nazi party, but how did this endoxa originate? This endoxa was fairly uniform across the population of the Nazi party, and thus really only exemplifies problems with relying solely on adherence. Although this problem becomes quite pertinent when examining ambiguous enthymemes, Hitler s argument itself did not function enthhymematically across different endoxa, taking WWII as evidence that most had problems with his party. However, the implications of arguing for solely adherence rise to the surface, mainly that engaging in ambiguous enthymematic argumentation can lead to particularly negative outcomes for society if most fail to discern exactly how and why they are filling an enthymematic gap. Yet,
Gruber 15 when considering Duke s use of enthymemes as a tool to reach multiple contexts, the power of enthymeme becomes much more apparent making it more attractive as an argumentative form. However, the possibility of even being able to argue across contextual boundaries comes into question when considering Rocci s statements that the common ground amidst an audience is usually assumed by a rhetor before engaging that audience. The breadth of context an ambiguous enthymeme can bridge may not be as vast as hoped when this analysis began, because when considering just how different cultures tend to be it would be challenging to find an enthymeme applicable enough to fit or create adherence amongst different cultures. But then again, look at Obama s recent political campaign that most definitely resembles enthymematic argument. Using words like Hope, Change, and Yes we can, Obama effectively sparked a surge around the globe. Perhaps a positive message makes it much easier for people to accept an argument, yet even this sort of ambiguous enthymeme causes problems. It most definitely realized adherence, given his subsequent election, but people also filled in Obama s enthymeme with a variety of premises. Hope and Change can mean an infinite number of things to different people, and the current distaste for the President, from conservatives and many liberals alike, indicates the issue with this form of argumentation apparent in a sense of mistrust amongst the audience so ardently in favor of the Change campaign. Thus, appealing to adherence alone seems far too problematic as a backing for the ambiguous enthymeme as legitimate, although in Perelman s view it might serve arguments purposes, but what about placing the enthymeme within Toulmin s framework? To begin with, the very notion of arguing across contexts directly conflicts with Toulmin s concept of field dependence. Field dependence assumes an argument remains within
Gruber 16 that field if the probability or logical connections change from field to field, however the ambiguous enthymeme could be viewed as a field invariant argument when attempting to use it to span different contexts. This may conflict with Toulmin s ideology if people fill the enthymematic gaps differently because as previously stated that would be sufficient for labeling it as a field dependent argument. Yet, looking back on the Obama example one could argue his campaign falls in the field of politics, and as such the ambiguous enthymeme can be examined within an individual field. One could argue that even within a field such as politics there may be a variety of endoxa amongst the audience members, and as such enthymematic gaps within this field will likely be filled in with different bits and fragments of information for different people. In terms of probability, Obama s enthymemes allowed people to arrive at their own individual probability assessments based on however they filled in the argument. Yet, when Change really wasn t realized through his administration, individuals likely realized the relativity of a term as ambiguous as Change. Using probability as an assessment for argumentation like Toulmin suggests really limits the applicability of the enthymeme as a tool for arguing amongst different contexts and perspectives. For if everyone is arriving at the same conclusion through different means, than how can a uniform probability be applied to a claim when probability is based in the logical connections between the claims, warrant, and backing within an argument? The point of Toulmin s model is the preservation of probability by distinguishing fields, thus arguing between fields diminishes the value of a claim in respect to Toulmin. Clearly the enthymeme fails to function legitimately when juxtaposed to the valuation schemes of Toulmin, and although it appears sufficient to Perelman, the problems with adherence alone as a valuation make it problematic. When viewed through Perelman s adherence, the
Gruber 17 enthymeme used ambiguously may be able to generate more adherence than a particular claim would. However, the different types of context an enthymeme attempts to address must be fairly relatable. Arguing in this fashion does allow for people to arrive at conclusions through their own unique processes, but at what cost? Toulmin s work suggests the cost would be an abolition of probability within statements. For Toulmin, the logical connections between the claims in an argument become the source of a probability assessment, and so if people fill in the suppressed premises within an argument differently the connections between these premises clearly must change. This raised the need for Toulmin to introduce the concept of fields, the notion of fields alone really regards using ambiguous enthymemes to argue across fields as useless. Clearly, the enthymeme fails to be a legitimate tool to accommodate various endoxa when viewed through the works of Perelman and Toulmin collectively, but even when examining the enthymeme in regards to scholars notes on the postmodern critique it fails to be legitimized. The two ways communication theorists claim argument is still relevant in a relative world is through critiquing power influences and as a pragmatic tool. Using intentionally ambiguous enthymematic argument works conversely against these claims for keeping argument pertinent. Allowing individuals to fill in enthymematic gaps on their own accord coincidently turns this type of enthymeme into an authority itself. First, it fails to address the different authority influences present within an audience and the claims being made because these gaps are filled intuitively within the mind and are never truly expressed by every individual. As a result, if everyone fills in an enthymeme their own way and arrive at similar conclusions, they are being influenced by the ambiguous authority of the enthymeme itself. Furthermore, this diminishes using argument as a pragmatic tool. If the suppressed premise supplied by the audience varies
Gruber 18 whatsoever from person to person, than agreement or consensus is never really reached, and consequently the best decision can never be arrived at. Ambiguous enthymeme in this fashion wouldn t allow even the appropriate topics to be addressed in full if used as a pragmatic tool (Note the Obama campaign again and its subsequent lack of Change ). The ambiguous then enthymeme really reenforces the postmodern critique rather than suppressing it. Clearly, using the enthymeme to purposefully allow individuals to fill in the suppressed premise differently goes against everything scholars fighting the postmodern critique have claimed. The enthymeme used this way likely defeats the classical purposes Aristotle intended for the enthymeme. Although Aristotle regarded the enthymeme as the very body and substance of persuasion, he could not have intended such a form of blind persuasion the ambiguous enthymeme allows. Rather, Aristotle s notion of the enthymeme rested in that the common person used their common knowledge to assess argumentation, thus the enthymeme served as a useful tool to appear to the masses. However, in a world where endoxa and common knowledge vary frequently even within communities, the enthymeme can simply not function the way it was intended to. Enthymemes in this way fall under fire of the postmodern critique, for they cannot lead to any type of knowledge claims, a temporary stasis included, and they mean different things to different people, the point of leaving them indefinite. Thus in the midst of postmodernism the enthymeme, especially when used ambiguously, hardly functions as a legitimate way to argue across contextual boundaries, although it is possible for it to function as bridge across contexts. Yet, when used in this fashion it more closely exemplifies the very problems the postmodern critique observes for argument in the postmodern world.
Gruber 19 This analysis demonstrates that the enthymeme cannot function as a legitimate way to argue effectively to audiences with variant endoxa. Although doing so is possible, it can ultimately be rendered as useless when considered with the postmodern critique. Postmodernism s challenge to rhetoric arises in the notion that truth doesn t exist based on relativity, and people having their own unique versions of truth. However, communications scholars combat this critique stating argumentation must be used to critique these authorities affecting our truths, and it still maintains its value as a pragmatic tool in the face of all this difference. The enthymeme functions through an audience filling in a suppressed premise with their common knowledge to complete the argument. Common knowledge is ultimately the endoxa within a community, or those things that are accepted and believed by the community. Thus, one could posit that the enthymeme may be able to function as a way to argue effectively amongst different endoxa, but as demonstrated, doing so diminishes the value of argumentation as the postmodern critique itself suggests. Argument in the postmodern certainly becomes challenging as people beliefs and views tend to become increasingly different as time goes on, but cheating these differences by arguing through ambiguity is simply not a legitimate way to address this problem. It is these very differences that make clear and specific argumentation necessary to understand other individuals and their beliefs. Cheating this may temporarily create adherence amongst different audiences, but ultimately will end in disaster when these audiences realize they were adhering to very different things. Thus, in terms of argument in the postmodern, strides must be made at better understanding the other in an effort to make the world a more livable place. We must not give up on the possibility of progress, but neither must we believe that progress means the same thing to everyone (Parker, 561).
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