Understanding Bitzerʼs Rhetorical Situation Jonathan David BROWN* Abstract Lloyd F. Bitzer, the world-renown rhetorician, identifi es three main constituents of the rhetorical situation that are invaluable to the fi eld of rhetoric. Therefore, to understand the complex facets of rhetoric, it is necessary to interpret the constituents that make up the rhetorical situation and how they apply to rhetoric as a whole. This essay attempts to briefl y examine Bitzerʼs (1999) three constituents of the rhetorical situation and analyze them in conjunction with other theories in modern rhetoric in order to bring about a deeper understanding of the rhetorical situation and its implications to rhetoric. Keywords: rhetoric, rhetorical situation 1. Introduction Rhetorical situation does not mean merely understanding the context in which a discourse is located; it does not refer to the setting in which the interaction between orator/author, audience/reader, message, and purpose takes place; it does not necessarily depend on a persuasive situation; nor is it embedded in an historical context. Rather, as Bitzer (1999) argues, A work is rhetorical because it is a response to a situation of a certain kind (p. 219). However, in order to accept that rhetoric is in fact related to situation, we must fi rst recognize that:... a work of rhetoric is pragmatic; it comes into existence for the sake of something beyond itself; it functions ultimately to produce action or change in the world; it performs some task. In short, rhetoric is a mode of altering reality... by the creation of discourse that changes reality through the mediation of thought and action... (Bitzer, 1999, p. 219) Bitzer (1999) therefore argues that, by saying rhetoric is situation, the following may be surmised: Rhetorical discourse exists as a response to situation, just as an answer exists as a response to a problem. A situation is rhetorical only to the extent that it brings about discourse able to engage in situation and change its reality.
Discourse is rhetorical only to the extent that it functions as an appropriate response to a situation that necessitates its involvement. The situation dictates the rhetorical response just as the question dictates the answer or the problem dictates the solution; it is always the situation that is the source of rhetoric, neither the orator/author nor the persuasive intent. Viewing rhetoric as situation has helped to shed light on the complexities of rhetoric, but as rhetorical situation is itself intricate, it is necessary to interpret its constituents and how they apply to rhetoric as a whole. This essay attempts to briefl y examine the three constituents of rhetorical situation as identifi ed by Bitzer (1999) exigence (need/demand), audience (reader/listener/viewer), and constraint (outside infl uence) by analyzing them in conjunction with other theories in modern rhetoric in order to bring about a deeper understanding of the rhetorical situation and its role in the fi eld of rhetoric. 2. The Exigence Constituent Lloyd F. Bitzer (1999) defi nes each constituent not based solely on terms but by the role they play in rhetorical situation. According to Bitzer, any exigence is an imperfection marked by urgency; it is a defect, an obstacle, something waiting to be done, a thing which is other than it should be (p. 221). However, Bitzer also points out that not all exigencies are part of a rhetorical situation. Only those that can be modifi ed through discourse may be considered an element of a rhetorical situation. Though not termed as exigence, other rhetoricians have offered a similar concept, generally referring to the exigence of the rhetorical situation as purpose. Gee (1987), Habermas (1993), Scott (1998), and Toulmin (1993), to name just a few, suggest that the orator/author always has a reason for creating discourse, and an audience always has a purpose for listening/reading. From this perspective then, the purpose is to essentially modify an exigence. As mentioned previously, Bitzer (1999) states that an exigence can only be considered rhetorical if some kind of change can be brought about through discourse. Both Burke (1963) and Foucault (1993) reiterate this notion but from a slightly different perspective. Their focus is more on the modifi cation or change rather than the exigence itself. These authors, as well as others (see Bryant, 1993; Corder, 1993; Gee, 1987; Harris, 1990; Polanyi, 1993), claim that change occurs as a result of communication. They go on to elaborate that both audience and orator/author will be altered as a result of interlocution in speaking/writing as well as in listening/reading. Therefore, if an exigence cannot be changed, there is, essentially, no reason (purpose) to speak/write or, for that matter, listen/read. According to Jakobson (1960), there are relationships between orator/author, message, and listener/reader [see Figure 1]. Lindemann (2001) further explains that it is within these relationships that exigence or purpose can be observed. The sender (orator/author)-message relationship implies a purpose because, if an orator/author is speaking/writing a particular message, according to Gee (1987),
ʼ Habermas (1993), Scott (1998), Toulmin (1993), and many others, he must have a purpose for that message. 1. Context 3. Sender 2. Message 4. Receiver 5. Channel 6. Code Figure 1: Roman Jakobsonʼs Communication Model (1960) The exigence is not plainly evident within Jakobsonʼs model, but its existence is manifested through the receiver (listener/reader)-message relationship. Lindemann (2001) clarifi es this when she discusses the importance of an author considering what the audience needs to know in order to understand the message a need implies there is some sort of fl aw or problem. If this is taken into account when considering Bitzerʼs (1999) defi nition of exigence, it is clear exigence exists within the receivermessage relationship. 3. The Audience Constituent Bitzer (1999) states that rhetorical discourse creates change by causing an impact on people who can function as mediators of change (p. 221). Bitzer goes on to clarify that a rhetorical audience cannot simply be a reader, hearer, or viewer but must consist of those who can be infl uenced by discourse and can actually create change through their actions. This is important to note when examining other rhetorical theories and their views on audience. There are many who believe all communication brings about change (see Lindemann, 2001; Habermas, 1993; Harris, 1990; Scott, 1998); according to Bitzer then, it is only logical to assume that such a view is implying all audience to be rhetorical. For example, Lindemann (2001) uses the term audience to express the author-reader relationship. However, her idea that an author must predict what an audience needs indicates that she presumes an audience acts on an authorʼs text. Likewise, Harris (1990) states that rhetoric in science has two principle objectives: 1) to achieve consent, and 2) to galvanize dissent. Scientists wishing to be approved for a grant use rhetoric to accomplish both of these objectives approval of funds and creation of a new concept, theory, or idea that will inevitably be challenged. When applying for a national grant, scientistsʼ proposals must undergo a rigorous examination. This means scientists who hope to get their proposal approved must 1) convince the reviewers their research is signifi cant; 2) show they are not only capable of conducting the research but are the best candidates to do so; 3) assure their research will bring something new and of value to the scientifi c community; 4) persuade that their strategies and models are the best approach
for completing the research; and 5) prove the environment in which they work is suitable for carrying out the research. Harrisʼ (1990) entire position rests on the premise that the audience can be convinced, shown, assured, persuaded, and given proof. The implication is therefore this: if the audience is not convinced, shown, assured, persuaded, and given proof, then the scientist does not achieve consent nor galvanize dissent; in other words, rhetoric in science does not occur. Clearly then, Harris not only accepts that audience plays a role in rhetorical situation but implies audience is vital to bringing it about. 4. The Constraint Constituent Constraint, the fi nal constituent of rhetorical situation, is any person, circumstance, object, or anything else connected to the situation that may have the ability to constrain the audienceʼs decisions and actions that are necessary to bring about a change. Bitzer (1999) identifi es common sources of constraint: Standard sources of constraint include beliefs, attitudes, documents, facts, traditions, images, interests, motives, and the like; and when the orator enters the situation, his discourse not only harnesses constraints given by situation but provides additional important constraints for example, his personal character, his logical proofs, and his style (p. 222). Though Bitzer views many sources as potential constraints, others identify constraint specifi cally within the orator/author-listener/reader relationship. Lindemann (2001) states, authors can never completely knowʼ their readers but have many options for defi ning the roles an audience may assume in reading a text (p. 14). This inability to know a reader, or, I should add, a listener or viewer, could be caused by a number of Bitzerʼs (1999) sources of constraints. According to Lindemann (2001), numerous elements of the process of writing are presented to the reader, but it is very diffi cult to balance these different elements effectively. This in itself is not necessarily a constraint; it is that which causes unbalance, a speakerʼs or authorʼs failure to adjust the subject to the needs of audience (Lindemann, 2001, p. 19), where possible constraint lies. As observed above, the majority of theories in rhetoric show purpose as having two parts the oratorʼs/authorʼs and the listenerʼs/readerʼs and that these two purposes continually shift and act on each other. Because this shift involves both oratorʼs/authorʼs and listenerʼs/readerʼs purpose, constraint is very probable; however, as Booth (1963) suggests, ultimate responsibility is in the hands of the orator/author to accommodate these shifts or keep things balanced. If this is indeed the case, constraint seems to be more prevalent in the orator/author. But it also must be recognized that the oratorʼs/authorʼs constraint would not occur without the listenerʼs/readerʼs involvement in some way.
ʼ 5. Conclusion Essentially, it would appear the majority of constraints are a result of the oratorʼs/authorʼs inability to effectively read his/her audience; however, as we have seen, the key to audience is purpose, which is the product of exigence. This not only demonstrates the three constituents of rhetorical situation are intertwined and rely on one another but that a better understanding of exigence can create a clearer understanding of audience, sequentially bringing about insight into constraint. This understanding cannot occur, however, without recognizing how they relate to one another. Thus, exploring Bitzerʼs three constituents of rhetorical situation within its own realms, i.e., in tandem with other theories of rhetoric, has not only helped to bring about a better understanding of each constituent but also of the constituentsʼ relations to one another. It is discerning the subtle relationships of these different interpretations that brings about an improved clarity of rhetorical situation as a whole and consequently of its implications in rhetoric. Reference Bitzer, L.F. (1999). The rhetorical situation. In S. Caudill, M. Condit, and J.L. Lucaite (Eds.), Contemporary rhetorical theory: A reader (pp. 217 225). New York: Guilford Press. Booth, W.C. (1963). The rhetorical stance. College Composition and Communication, 14 (3), 139-145. Bryant, D.C. (1993). Rhetoric: Its function and its scope. In T. Enos & S.C. Brown (Eds.), Professing the new rhetorics: A sourcebook. (pp. 267 297). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall Burke, K. (1963). Defi nition of man. Hudson Review, 16, 491-514. Corder, J.W. (1993). Argument as emergence, rhetoric as love. In T. Enos & S.C. Brown (Eds.), Professing the new rhetorics: A sourcebook. (pp. 397 411). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall Foucault, M. (1993). What is an author? In T. Enos & S.C. Brown (Eds.), Professing the new rhetorics: A sourcebook. (pp. 178 193). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall Gee, J.P. (1987). What is literacy? Teaching and Learning, 2, 3-11. Habermas, J. (1993). Intermediate refl ections: Social action, purposive activity, and communication. In T. Enos & S.C. Brown (Eds.), Professing the new rhetorics: A sourcebook. (pp. 105 125). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall Harris, R.A., (1990). Assent, dissent, and rhetoric in science. Rhetoric Society Quarterly, 20 (1), 13-37. Lindeman, E. (2001). A rhetoric for writing teachers. New York: OUP. Jakobson, R. (1960). Linguistics in poetics: Closing statements. In Ed. T. Sebeok (Ed.), Style in language (pp. 350 377). Cambridge: MIT Press. Polanyi, M. (1993). Scientifi c controversy. In T. Enos & S.C. Brown (Eds.), Professing the new rhetorics: A sourcebook. (pp. 194 203). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall Scott, R.L. (1998). On viewing rhetoric as epistemic. In J. Lucaites, C.M. Condit, and S. Caudill (Eds.), Contemporary rhetorical theory: A reader (pp. 131 139). New York: Guilford.
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