What are the Strengths and Weaknesses of Phenomenology? Have Phenomenological Approaches Helped Us to Understand Neolithic Monuments Better? The idea of phenomenology has its origins in philosophy rather than archaeology. It was a new conceptual approach to the world initially attributed to the work of Edmund Husserl, further explored by philosophers including Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. The concept has been introduced to the study of archaeology in a response to heavily empirical methods becoming the norm. Major proponents of phenomenological archaeology include Christopher Tilley and Michael Shanks, while many others have been critical of the approach. This essay will examine the strengths and weaknesses of phenomenology and, its place in archaeology. It will make a judgment on its use in interpreting the archaeological record, in particular reference to the interpretation of Neolithic monuments. It will come to a conclusion based not solely on the views and arguments of academics but the first-hand phenomenological study of long barrows. Dermot Moran (2000:4) suggests that suggests that phenomenology rejects systematic approaches, rather than offering an alternative example of one, claiming it to be a practice rather than a system. This highlights an issue that will often be levelled at the concept. It can be argued that such an ill-defined and subjective attempt to understand the past has little to no bearing on our knowledge of past human societies. However, there are benefits to employing these methods. One such strength of phenomenological archaeology is that it can offer a view of monumental structures that cannot be attained through a purely empirical or scientific approach. Tilley (2005: 202), a key supporter of phenomenological approaches, strongly argues in support of this point, claiming that a purely scientific account of a monument, place or collection of artefacts is both inhuman and very impoverished. Tilley is clearly radical in his assertions that traditional archaeological methods do not, and cannot, provide us with the understanding that is necessary to study monuments, places and artefacts in
their context as human-made pieces of material. To fully examine the strengths and weaknesses of phenomenology in interpreting the archaeological record, it must be applied individually to more specific aspects of the discipline, rather than being applied with a blanket approach. In order to ascertain whether this theory is useful to archaeologists it must be examined in terms of the interpretation of not only landscapes and monuments, but also other elements of the archaeological record such as rock art and artefacts. A phenomenological approach to art One area of material culture that can be subjected to a multitude of different interpretational methods is rock art. This particular strand of prehistoric art presents very different challenges to portable artistic pieces. Unlike a figurine found during excavation, they cannot be placed in stratigraphic sequence, nor can they be as easily placed into context with other pieces. It is clear that a purely scientific method of study, although occasionally useful for extrapolating data using methods such as carbon dating of pigment, cannot give the whole picture. Furthermore it is the case that these techniques, despite being hugely useful, are rarely feasible options. Richard Bradley (2009: 206-7) notes that a common method used in the study of this type of material culture is the cross-referencing of images that appear alongside other similar images found on alternative media, including associated pottery and metalwork. Bradley talks of this method being employed in the study of Southern Scandinavian rock art, in using the symbolism that is present on multiple media to draw conclusions about the society and its workings. These images can be interpreted as representational of not only the physical activities that would have been carried out in the society but also the worldview of its people. Tilley (1999:135-154) too writes in some detail about studying Southern Scandinavian images, but appears to have a rather different focus for his work. After classifying each of the designs present on the rock paintings, he sets about analysing the spacing between each of the designs and the ones that appear to be
inextricably linked. He also gives much attention to the positions and paths one must take to see the art as he believes it would have been intended for viewing. He points out that the experience of seeing the art in the modern world leads to the wrong experience, as approaching them from the modern road present at the site results in the viewer seeing the art from the wrong direction. Consequently the modern visitor s experience is completely removed from that of the Bronze Age spectator. This approach is clearly thinking about different questions to a more traditional one, and it highlights some strengths of phenomenology, in that it can undoubtedly force archaeologists to consider not only the images and their contents but also their placing. It raises questions not only about why this place was chosen, but it also brings to the fore issues of agency, with the way the images are presented having an impact on the way people would walk around the site and interact with the paintings. This argument is explored further in Tilley s 2010 work, Body and Image, in which he argues for a refocusing on the kinaesthetic rather than the iconographic when interpreting rock art. Tilley goes as far as to assert that employing the same approach to rock art as one might to a painting on canvas is to ignore the very materiality of the medium. He goes on to state that a purely phenomenological study of imagery is grounded in the kinaesthetics of bodily movement (2010: 17-20). Although the kinaesthetics of art on immovable canvases is an interesting aspect of the paintings, it is clear that a study involving exclusively this, as does a purely phenomenological one, would be dangerously incomplete and almost worthless if not used in conjunction with a more traditional focus on the content of the images. If one shifts the possible subject of a phenomenological study from rock art to, for example, the monumental artworks present on the walls of the great Assyrian palaces, then its flaws are amplified. If the same methodology was applied to the sculptures in Ashurnasirpal II s palace as are applied to the rock art of Scandinavia, then the direction of the narrative shown would lead to a clear kinaesthetic movement (Collins, 2008:35). Some meaning could indubitably be gleaned from the relationships between classes of designs within the sculpture.
However, if a single wall stood at the time of study, and the content of the images was not a primary concern, then the entire purpose of the art would be missed. This is a key weakness of phenomenology, as it can be prone to placing emphasis on something that, without the original context of the piece, could be misconstrued. This is even more important where the images presented are of an abstract nature, as they would have been interpreted in a specific way by contemporary observers, while to the modern observer they are merely meaningless symbols. If this is the case, then a kinaesthetic and phenomenological approach could place far too much importance on features that would have been secondary to the actual content of the images. Issues such as this would be especially prevalent for sites such as the cup-and-ring site that was the focus of Sara Fairén-Jiménez s 2007 article on Neolithic rock art. She looks not only at the site in question, but records its distance to other important features in the landscape while cross-referencing it with other similar sites a method often lacking in phenomenological works (Fairén-Jiménez, 2007: 284-295). A phenomenological approach to artefacts Not only is phenomenology concerned with the larger, more lasting remnants of the past, it has also been applied to artefacts; collections of smaller pieces of material culture that are so often studied without context. The engagement of phenomenology with objects is complex and often highly theoretical, with much discussion being preceded by a delineation of what it means for humans to be in the world, with the self and the world being two distinct but inextricably linked concepts. Both of these concepts are deemed pivotal to understanding humans relationships with objects. It engages not only with how humans interact with objects in day-to-day life, but also how they perceive those objects, exploring further how these subconscious perceptions influence the agency that the objects themselves hold. Julian Thomas (1996:64-70) applies elements of Heidegger s ideas to an archaeological context in an attempt to explain why objects are perceived so variably by different individuals. He claims that humans
perceptions of objects are dependent on a combination of the context surrounding the object in previous encounters, and the context of the object in each subsequent interaction. Although it is important to remember many of the theories that phenomenology presents when interpreting objects, it can be argued that the approach can get bogged down in its philosophical basis, clouding the interpretation of objects in their archaeological context, and almost entirely ignoring the physical aspects of the objects themselves. Although the study of objects is a complex one, and the question of objects agency, that is, the effect that they have on humans in a two-way human-object relationship, is a key one when studying pieces of material culture, a phenomenological approach appears to get so tied up in the minutiae of individuals interpretations of - in particular - symbolic material that it does not allow for a rounded record of what an object is. To that end, when discussing the aesthetics of a marble sculpture displayed in the British Museum, Shanks and Tilley claim that as the aesthetic qualities of the artifact are supposedly immediately perceptible, context and critical analysis become relegated to optional supplements (Shanks and Tilley, 1992: 73). This seems to somewhat suggest that objects, once out of their original context, cannot be subjected to a phenomenological study, as it is their new context that would govern how they are perceived and experienced. Although it is not a new idea that objects should not be considered in singular contexts of either thought or practice, as Ian Hodder points out (1989: 262), it is clear that despite the fact that post-processual ideas of symbolism and thought rather than pure functionality are hugely pivotal, a phenomenological approach is unhelpful in the study of artefacts, offering much in the way of critique but very little in furthering knowledge and understanding of the objects and their contexts. Phenomenology of Landscape and Monument The most prevalent area of phenomenological study in archaeology is of landscape and monuments such as long barrows. Landscape phenomenology is
not confined to archaeology, and has been used to create a view of both a symbolic landscape and a physical landscape onto which cultural meaning is projected (Wylie, 2007: 154). Due to the nature of archaeology as a study of the humanly-altered landscape in its wider context of natural landscape, this is an important idea to bear in mind. One excellent example of a phenomenological study of a Neolithic monument in its landscape is Chris Tilley s walking of the Dorset Cursus. This study was the first of its kind, being a true application of phenomenological thinking to the archaeological landscape. Tilley s essay is an in-depth description of the observable and the surprising during the walk along the cursus. It is however, in a departure from pure phenomenology, littered with recorded data taken from more scientific studies of the monument s surroundings (Tilley, 1994: 172-196), perhaps indicating that the phenomenology, although useful for allowing one to experience perhaps a similar journey to a Neolithic traveller, is less useful when not put alongside the hard data about the chronologies and characteristics of the associated monuments. One obvious difference between Tilley s method of studying Neolithic monuments and that of someone such as Richard Bradley, among others, is that Tilley s approach can only deal with the final monument, ignoring reasons for its creation and usage. An example which highlights what this can overlook can be taken from Bradley s (1998) discussion of the proposed reasons for the shape of long barrows. In this discussion he explores such suggestions as Sherratt s claim that they represented the preceding longhouse structure (Bradley, 1998: 40). Conversely, Tilley deals primarily with what remains of the surrounding landscape, attempting to understand the experience of walking the monument in the Neolithic, while lacking the potential information of the motivation behind the surrounding monuments that the Neolithic observer would have likely had. It has been strongly suggested, in particular by Andrew Fleming, that researcher bias could have a marked impact on the reliability of conclusions drawn from phenomenological research. In A Phenomenology of Landscape Tilley walks through a series of morphologically irregular megalithic structures, and
ascertains from their positioning, spatial relationships to the sea and to other markers in the landscape, and even from the heterogeneity of the structures themselves, that they were intended to mark out points along a path that would have been of great importance to the Neolithic people of the area (Tilley, 1994: 87-110). Fleming forcefully refutes Tilley s claims about the structures, pointing out the ongoing debate over their morphology, which Tilley stresses supports his claim. Fleming goes on to criticise Tilley s questionable reasoning in stating that a relationship is suggested when a tomb is alongside and against an outcrop despite measurements for alongside and against ranging from a few hundred metres to sweeping vistas at a distance of 12km (Fleming, 1999: 120). Clearly, Tilley s methodology and justifications for his conclusions are not irrefutable, and this results in relatively little more being known of the monuments. Fleming (2006) further disparages phenomenology and its use in archaeology in a paper focusing on landscape archaeology. He talks of phenomenological texts including Tilley s The Materiality of Stone and Cummings and Whittle s Places of Special Virtue: Megaliths in the Neolithic Landscape of Wales among others in no uncertain terms. Using this sample of books to represent a new rising tide of what he terms post-processual landscape archaeology (2006: 268), he facetiously offers the view that this category of works should come with a health warning that they contain poetry, extended literary evocations of the remote past, uncaptioned photographs and drawings, photo-collages, unsourced vox pops and personal musings, and a good deal of rhetoric (2006: 267). Although Fleming clearly uses hyperbole to put his view across, the basis of these accusations is sound. Through the use of evidence that cannot be disproven, and the embracing of subjectivity, the ideas that phenomenologists proffer are protected from intense scrutiny, but must surely lack the validity necessary to truly embellish our understanding of the past. Following on from this, it has been pointed out that phenomenology, being born from philosophy, can almost be moulded and tweaked to deflect potential criticisms, as one can cite a plethora of philosophers conflicting ideas to refute
accusations levelled at the technique. Barrett raises this issue (2009:279) in his noticing of Tilley s apparent loyalty to the ideas of both Husserl and Heidegger, whose views had marked differences. Barrett goes so far as to assert that by subscribing to both men s arguments, the lack of precision present in the phenomenological approach protects it from scrutiny, as its theoretical basis is so ill-defined. It can be argued that an approach seemingly founded upon an ever-shifting base cannot be reliable enough to extrapolate data from. There are other examples of archaeologists attempts at similar phenomenological studies, including Duncan Garrow s (2007) journey between two key Neolithic sites: Hurst Fen, and Kilverstone. Unlike Tilley s walking of the Dorset Cursus, Garrow had no archaeological traces to follow, instead electing to make the journey in the most appropriate manner possible. He walked, as far as possible, as the crow flies. However this journey was deemed mostly unsuccessful in helping to build a picture of the past, as there was little to connect the modern traveller to that of the Neolithic. Garrow states that in order to understand the landscape in a more archaeological manner, it was necessary to examine surviving sites rather than infer from the journey itself (2007: 45-48). Clearly, phenomenological study of landscape can only go so far in the face of modern landscape alteration. In an attempt to determine whether the phenomenological experience of being at Neolithic monuments in their landscape can have a meaningful impact on one s understanding of it, I visited a number of the Neolithic long barrows in the Cotswolds. Walking up to and around one of the region s largest barrows, Toot s barrow, there was little that was immediately evident, even though the barrow was a clear alteration of the landscape. Despite its presence as a large feature on an otherwise flat piece of land, there was no overwhelming sense of grandeur apparent. Its position slightly off-crest of the hill it sits upon inspired a recognition and admiration of its well-considered location, however I did not feel linked to the experiences of its Neolithic creators and users. This raises questions
of the legitimacy of visiting the remains of these monuments as a method of understanding them. A notable feature of the barrow in the modern day is the numerous dips along it - evidence of antiquarian excavation. It can be said that this interference dramatically changes the experience of being at the barrow - shifting focus away from the factors that would have indicated its importance to the Neolithic people to whom it was contemporary. There is also a danger in interpreting monuments from the mind-set of an archaeologist, as prior knowledge of the wider landscape of monuments and the inherent thought processes that many researchers would undoubtedly share will hugely shift the interpretation of the earthwork. One piece of evidence that was highly notable became apparent after brief discussion with two local visitors to the site. The two men in question had been living near, and visiting, the site of the barrow regularly for over 20 years, and yet were not even aware that the mound was archaeologically significant at all. This evidence is potentially misleading however, as it could be said that there must be something bringing them back to this place repeatedly perhaps the same sense of place that moved the barrow s creators to place it on the site in the first place. Alternatively it could be argued that its irrelevance to them indicates a multitude of other factors. For example if a phenomenologist noted this indifference, they may extrapolate that the surroundings were important in the placement of the barrow, and the surroundings would have been the focus, with the barrow relegated to a more consequential role; commanded by the landscape rather than commanding the landscape. These various interpretations highlight how the innate subjectivity of phenomenology could serve to amplify preconceptions or agendas of the researcher in question, rather than allowing them to react to data that should shape their theories. Nympsfield barrow also proved difficult to place into a Neolithic context, due in part to a changed surrounding area, and in part down to its heavily excavated
remains. Darvill s comparison of the barrows of this area, including Nympsfield, and another example I visited - Uley - gives a much better understanding of the monuments in context. The cross-examination allows for a broader understanding of the construction and usage of these monuments, as Darvill paints a clear picture of where the barrows have similarities and differences not only in construction, but how their characteristics compare with the majority (Darvill, 1987: 52-55). This gives a stronger indication of their place within the wider context of a Neolithic society. Although it is difficult to interpret much of the barrows from a phenomenological perspective, it proved to be useful in understanding the physical experience of these monuments when entering the interior of Uley long barrow. Figure 1: View of the interior of Uley Long Barrow from the entrance.
Figure 2: View of the entrance to Uley Long Barrow from the interior. Metric data and descriptive text, even when in conjunction with supplementary data, cannot give the same level of understanding as being in the monuments and experiencing the same physical aspects of the structure as the Neolithic people would have. To conclude, phenomenological approaches in archaeology have a number of strengths, and raise questions of interpretive approaches that elsewise may go overlooked and weaken our knowledge and understanding of past societies. They also, however, have perhaps an alarming number of weaknesses. Phenomenology as a concept is undeniably subjective, taking a directly perpendicular interpretive direction as opposed to the aspirations of empiricism present in the works of processualists such as Binford. Bender (1998: 5) suggests that this should not be seen as a problem, but rather embraced, saying one cannot be objective but, rather than float on a sea of relativity, one can position oneself so as to ask questions and propose interpretations that seem relevant to contemporary concerns. However, this suggestion can be argued to be an attempt to paint over the cracks in the approach, and although embracing the inherent subjectivity is clearly the most efficient reaction, it does not add much in the way of credibility to the interpretations.
This essay has discussed the use of phenomenology in interpreting art and artefacts as well as the area where it has been most extensively employed: landscapes and monuments. It is clear that although it raises some interesting questions about the interpretation of rock art, it is far from a replacement for traditional approaches, but can be used effectively to supplement and question mainstream techniques and interpretations. Its use in artefact analysis is more questionable, as it seems to get bogged down in complex theory and offers little more to the understanding of artefacts. The question of whether these methods can further our understanding of Neolithic monuments can be, and will be, further disputed. They are certainly of use to the individual conducting the research, as my personal research informed me, but the pure subjectivity of the approach means that on a larger scale they are less significant in understanding the monuments. They produce data that is open to being misinterpreted, due to the lack of possible empirical disproval, and this could be extremely damaging if taken to be true without necessary critical thinking being employed. Phenomenology does appear to have a place in archaeology, and although critics such as Fleming have made a number of valid points against it, that does not necessarily result in it not having a place within the discipline. It must however be understood in terms of its benefits and flaws, and only considered in combination with other approaches, to give the fullest possible picture of the past.
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