158 NOTES 7. Cf. Terence Irwin s argument about the dependence of the Republic on the Symposium and Phaedrus (1995, ). 8. For discussion of the

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1 NOTES Introduction 1. On the translation of eros as love, see Ludwig (2002, 7 10); Ferrari (2006, 269 n. 1); Kraut (2008, 286); contrast Halperin (1985, ); cf. Dover (1978, 39 54; 1980, 1 2) for further discussion. As we shall see from Socrates s descriptions of eros, the Greek eros need lack nothing of the care, excitement, or propensity to idealize the beloved by which we typically characterize romantic love (cf. Ludwig [2002, 7 8 n. 6]). Furthermore, although eros in Greek, like love in English, can have nonhuman objects for example, we can refer to an eros or love of fame or truth and although Socrates at times uses the term eros in this manner, we shall see that Socrates distinguishes and privileges a precise meaning of eros as romantic love for another human being in his must sustained discussions of eros. 2. Romeo and Juliet II (Shakespeare 1993, 917). 3. Romeo and Juliet I (ibid.). 4. Fragment 130, translated by Willis Barnstone (2006, 101). For discussion of the theme of bittersweet love in ancient Greek poetry see Carson (1986, especially 3 9). See also her Eros the Bittersweet, which begins: It was Sappho who first called eros bittersweet. No one who has been in love disputes her (1983, 3); cf. Sappho Fragment Of course, Socrates is also famous for his knowledge of his own ignorance, which raises a question about how his knowledge of ignorance is related to his knowledge of eros, a question I am not able to take up in this study. Despite my disagreements with his argument, which I detail in my review (Levy 2011), David Leibowitz s interpretation of the Apology offers an account of Socratic ignorance that accords well with my interpretation of Socrates s knowledge of eros (2010, especially 69 70, ). For alternative approaches, see Gould (1963, 58 63) and Rosen (1968, ). Except where noted, all references to Plato s text are to the Stephanus numbers as found in the Burnet edition (1901 5); within references, I abbreviate the Republic as Rep., the Symposium as Symp., and the Phaedrus as Phdr. 6. Bloom (1987, ; 1993, 13 35); cf. Ludwig s (2010) more recent discussion of the analogous case of friendship in the light of postmodern thought.

2 158 NOTES 7. Cf. Terence Irwin s argument about the dependence of the Republic on the Symposium and Phaedrus (1995, ). 8. For discussion of the relevance of the question of the limits of reason in political life to contemporary scholarship on Plato s politics, see Allen (2006). 9. Throughout I focus on the understanding of Plato s Socrates, that is, on the understanding of the character presented in the Platonic dialogues, which I do not assume to be an indication of the historical Socrates or necessarily of Plato s own views. Of course, some will wonder whether there is a single Platonic Socrates as opposed to many different Socrateses, each ref lecting a different stage in the development of Plato s thought, for example. It is my hope that this study can actually help determine whether we can read Plato as having a single consistent presentation of Socrates, at least as regards his understanding of eros. If readers who are already convinced of one or another of the now common developmental accounts of the dialogues wish to take my study to be focused only on the Socrates of Plato s so-called middle period, I have no objection, since I focus on dialogues attributed to that period. But, as far as I can tell, there is no good reason to distinguish the Socrates of this period from the others, and none of the arguments for such a development that I have come across has begun from anything resembling an adequate interpretation of the details of any of the dialogues. For a superb critical overview of the history of attempts to date Plato s writing of the dialogues in general, see Zuckert (2009, 1 5 and nn. 1 9); see also Rosen (1968, xi xxxiv) and Howland (1991); for criticism of Vlastos s very influential effort at this dating in particular, see Kahn (1992) and Nails (1993, ). 10. For an overview of the main apparent differences between Socrates s treatment of eros in the Republic and the erotic dialogues as well as an overview of the major attempts to explain these differences, see Ludwig (2007, ); cf. Price (1989, 62 63). See also Stanley Rosen s discussion of the treatments of eros as they relate to the difference in the presentation of philosophy in these dialogues (1965, ). 11. For further differences between the Phaedrus and Symposium see Shorey s rather extensive list (1903, 19), although he asserts, without evidence as far as I can tell, that these differences pose no difficulty to a rational literary interpretation. 12. This line of argument in modern Plato scholarship seems to have its roots in Anders Nygren s Agape and Eros (1953); cf. Vlastos (1973, 6 n. 13). For an overview of the different scholarly positions on the subject, see F. White (1990, 396 n. 1) and Timothy Mahoney (1996, 1 3, nn. 2, 4 6). 13. Vlastos s criticism is quite radical, since he faults Plato not only for subordinating the love of an individual to love of something higher, but also for believing that the love of an individual is dependent upon that

3 NOTES 159 individual s possession of some quality or other (e.g., beauty) (1973, 31); cf. James Rhodes s discussion (2008, 45). The denial that love depends on the beloved s possession of some loveable attribute would seem to result in love s being absolutely mysterious, since it means that there is simply no feature of the beloved or the beloved s relation to the lover that explains its being loved, a result sure to be in discord with the virtually universal sense of lovers that their beloveds are distinguished by being worthy of their affection (cf. Schindler 2007, ). See also White (1990, and n. 11), for discussion of the different scholarly views on this subject. Still, Vlastos s more general point about the Symposium, that it appears to present the objects of love not only as not limited to persons, but as having far higher objects than persons (1973, 28), does not depend on his radical criticism, and this view of love is likely to seem rather unerotic to many. 14. She also criticizes Vlastos for too quickly conflating Socrates s view of eros in the Symposium with Plato s and overlooking Alcibiades s account, which shows Plato s awareness of eros for other people for their own sake (1986, ). 15. Gerald Mara makes a similar distinction between the Phaedrus and Symposium, although he does not follow Nussbaum s conclusion about the dating of the two dialogues (1997, 22, 266 n. 64). See also Ferrari s remark about the different stance toward contingency taken by the two dialogues (1987, 132). 16. All translations of Plato are my own, although I often follow Bloom s translation of the Republic (1968), and James Nichols s translation of the Phaedrus (1998). 17. Hackforth (1952, 14); Vlastos (1973, 27 n. 80). 18. Gerasimos Santas (1988, 58 72) and A. W. Price (1989, 64) make more tentative arguments of the same sort. See Nichols (2009, nn. 3 9) for an excellent overview of the different interpretations of Plato s diverse statements about madness. 19. I discuss this controversial point further in chapter See Griswold (1986, 144), and my discussion of Socrates s demonstration of the soul s immortality in chapter See Sandra Peterson s clear and commonsensical defense of an approach to interpreting Plato that attends to Socrates s diverse interests in his diverse interlocutors to explain his apparently bad arguments and contradictory statements (2011, 5 12). 22. Cf., for example, Santas (1988, 41 47); Price (1989, 35 49); Benardete (1993, ); Ludwig (2002, n. 84); Ferrari (2006, 258); Rhodes (2008, 46). Closer to my interpretation on this point are Harry Neumann s account (1965, 44), as well as that of J. Moravcsik (1971, ), although, among other differences from my interpretation, neither emphasizes the limitation of love to other persons. Neumann reduces the love of other individuals to the pursuit of fame in a way

4 160 NOTES I believe is unwarranted by the text (1965, 44), and Moravscik backs away from the suggestion that eros is absent from the higher stages; suggesting instead that, though eros is still at work in the later stages of the ascent, it no longer functions as a guide, although this would not explain why Socrates would think it unimportant to mention that one also loves the beautiful itself (1971, 294). Finally, see Leo Strauss s conclusion about the ladder of love (2001, 241): there is no eros except for living human beings. Many of Strauss s observations about the Symposium anticipate my own, although his final interpretation of the dialogue is hard to grasp since he lets many of his suggestions about Socrates s teaching stand in apparent tension with one another, and does not fully clarify the relation between the suggestions: for example, a few lines after the line just quoted, he adds, Yet the whole, and especially the vision of the beautiful itself, belongs, as is explicitly said, to the erotic things. So, in a way, there is an eros beyond the eros of bodies or connection with bodies... Erotics transcends love of one s own and love of the beautiful and is as such eros of the good as such, as is, indeed, also said (ibid.). Thus, I do not claim that Strauss s interpretation agrees with my own. 23. Donald Levy argues that Vlastos should have made this his criticism of Plato s view of love (1979, 289). 24. Moravcsik (1972, 294); Strauss (2001, 248). 25. It is true that Socrates s comment at 222c d could seem to imply that Alcibiades does in fact regard Socrates as a lover, but even if one takes this comment (which is surely playful) as a statement of Socrates s true view of Alcibiades, it is far from the strong protest against Alcibiades s claim that Socrates was not a lover that one would expect from Socrates if he were truly and fully a lover. Taken at face value, Socrates s comment could just as well suggest that Alcibiades, despite his awareness of Socrates s lack of eros, still hopes to be loved by Socrates. See 222e-223a for Alcibiades s view of the purpose of Socrates s comment. 26. Cf. Charmides (154c), where Socrates, who is by no means insensitive to Charmides s beauty, is able, unlike everyone else, to study the reactions of others to Charmides s beauty rather than falling in love with Charmides himself. Consider also the speed with which Socrates recovers from his passion after he is overcome by Charmides s beauty ( Charmides 155c d). Cf. Christopher Bruell s interpretation (1977, ). 27. In the Western tradition, Socrates is hardly unusual in presenting love as a source of such belief, although the manner in which he understands it to be a source may be peculiar. See, for example, Pope Benedict XVI s encyclical, Deus Caritas est : here, Benedict quotes the Socratic description of eros as divine madness and argues that eros tends to rise in ecstasy towards the Divine (2005, part 1, sections 4 5, italics in original). See also Bury s discussion of the erotic aspect of religion or the religious aspect of Eros (1909, xlviii li).

5 NOTES For approaches to Socrates s apparently theological remarks about eros similar to Hyland s, see Taylor (1926, ); Rosen (1968, ); Sallis (1975, ); Griswold (1986, ); Nussbaum (1986, ); Santas (1992, 306); Cobb (1993, 73); Mitchell (1993, 122); Howland (2011, 151). Paul Friedlander s chapter, Demon and Eros, begins more promisingly; he writes with evident sarcasm: modern interpreters are too enlightened to take Plato s statements on this subject [demons and eros] very seriously (1958, 32), and he then appears to try to take these statements more seriously himself. But while his chapter has much to say about Socrates and the divine, it does not seem to take up the suggestion that eros and/or demons are also the source of everyone else s relation to the divine, and he ultimately seems to conflate eros and demon with the intellectual ascent to the truth (40, 51 53). Cf. Gould s similar interpretation (1963, 44 45). 29. Hyland s acceptance of contemporary assumptions about what should be considered philosophic language or what is properly a subject of philosophy is all the more striking when compared to his excellent introduction, in which he criticizes postmodern readers of Plato for assuming that Plato s philosophic writing presents its teaching in the same manner as later philosophical writing does (2004, 1 15). Cf. David Bolotin s (1987, 39 40) and Mark Lutz s (1998, n. 12) discussions of the arbitrariness of interpretations that do not take seriously Socrates s remarks about the gods. 30. Although it is not the focus of their work to the same degree that it is my own, Ronna Burger (1980, 54 55), Seth Benardete (1991, ), Lutz (1998, 86 87, n. 6), and Nichols (2009, 61 61, 120) all seem to take Socrates s remarks about the religious power of eros more seriously than do other commentators; Burger, Benardete, and Lutz also note some of the doubts Socrates raises about the beliefs that eros arouses. James Arieti takes Socrates s theological remarks about eros with sufficient seriousness to note their contrast with his usual rationalism and the doubts he raises about them, but he concludes from these observations that Socrates is joking in his praise of eros rather than that Socrates is making a serious statement about eros and these beliefs (1991, , ). Eros religious power seems more central to Strauss s account (2001, , 217, 235, 251, 273). 31. Perhaps, on the basis of the references to his Symposium course in the note above, one can interpret Strauss s description of eros as nature s grace in this rather literal manner (1959, 40). 32. This is not to say I can show the full basis for Socrates s doubts about the truth of these beliefs. Doing so would require a more extensive and circumspect treatment of the dialogues than I am capable of. Here, I can provide primarily some literary evidence that Socrates does not simply accept the truth of these beliefs. 33. Cf. Euthyphro (6a b), where Socrates expresses his difficulty accepting customary Greek beliefs.

6 162 NOTES 1 The Republic s Blame of Eros 1. All unspecified references to Plato s line numbers in this chapter are to the Republic. Note that a few lines after Socrates attributes an eros for learning to potential philosophers, he appears tacitly to distinguish this eros from eros proper or from the eros of erotic men (485b7 8). 2. Socrates s attribution of eros to the lowest part of the soul in Book Four is consistent with his generally hostile stance toward eros throughout the dialogue (439d6), but he does not appear to say anything further about eros here that can help us understand the reason for this hostility. 3. If evidence is needed for the common-sense observation that communism of women and children as well as the coed naked gymnastics that follow from Socrates s demand for sexual equality undermine ordinary erotic attachments, see Phaedrus (250e 251a, 254a 255a, 256d) and Symposium (192d e, 206c 207a, 208e). See also Ludwig (2007, ). 4. Nendza (1988, 345, ). 5. For example, see Bloom (1968, ); Sallis (1975, ); Saxonhouse (1978); cf. Zuckert (2009, ). 6. For example, see Sallis (1975, 378); Saxonhouse (1976, 211); Nichols (1984, 252, 254). Compare Ludwig s account of the tension arguments, which he follows only partially (2007, ). 7. See Bruell (1994), especially 266 n. 5, 271, 274. The following chapter is much indebted to his argument about the structure of the Republic ; I hope here to develop and verify the link suggested on 274 between the sexual legislation and philosophy. I also have made much use in this chapter of unpublished notes from a class on the Republic taught in 1988 at the University of Chicago by David Bolotin; it is hard to discover anything in my interpretation of the Republic that he did not in some way anticipate, which is, of course, not to say he would agree with my interpretations. 8. That Socrates already has philosophic rule in mind at the beginning and throughout his discussion of the sexual legislation is indicated both by his reflection on the limits pertaining to the sharing of thoughts a reflection he makes immediately before entering into the legislation (450d 451b) and by his suggested rationalizations of the city s otherwise irrational views of the ridiculous, noble, and sacred, which he makes throughout the discussion (452d6 7,e1; 457b4 5; 458e3 4); these rationalizations, by supplanting traditional or common-sense views with those based on benefit, reflect the philosophic view of the superiority of the good to the noble (505a b; cf. 504d4 5, 493c1 6). 9. See Strauss (1964, 116). 10. See Julia Annas s very forceful argument that Plato here is in no sense a forerunner of modern proponents of women s liberation (1999). 11. Compare the later use of nature in the Republic according to which what is natural would never come into being (501b1 4; cf. 473a1 2 and cf. 597a4 9 with c1 d3). This use refers to what we might call ideals,

7 NOTES 163 which exist by nature, but which transcend humanity s capacity for implementation. Such ideals seem to be objects of human aspiration, but even their goodness is quietly called into question by Socrates s remarks concerning possibility and goodness in his discussion of communism (458a1 b3), as I discuss below. Socrates introduces such ideals only after conspicuously failing to defend the naturalness of communism; he turns to them only after his regime has failed the more rigorous standard of possibility (cf. 472d 473b). 12. Saxonhouse (1976, ; 1978, 888 n. 2); Nendza 1988, ). 13. Annas (1999, 268). 14. See also 460b1 3, where Socrates speaks of rewarding the young who excel in war with women but not men. 15. Saxonhouse (1976, 195, 207). 16. Strauss (1964, 118). 17. Saxonhouse (1976, 199). 18. See Laws (785b and 789eff.) for evidence that Plato could think the role of bearing children may be quite time consuming for women. 19. Bruell (1994, 274). 20. In his argument for the practicability of Socrates s proposals in the Republic, Miles Burnyeat notes that Herodotus knew of a tribe that held its women and children in common (1999, 304), but from Herodotus s brief discussion of this tribe, it is by no means clear that they practiced anything like the strict laws regulating coupling that Socrates proposes, which would be necessary to destroy thoroughly the private family; it is not even clear that this tribe practices anything more than the promiscuity that Socrates discusses prior to his description of the city s marriage laws (Herodotus 4.104). 21. One might object, for example, that food is truly good for a starving man who lacks all access to food. It is more precise, however, to say food would be good for that man, if he could attain it, but, since he cannot attain it, food strictly speaking cannot provide any good for him. When we think of the food as good for the man, we think of it as something the man can attain. 22. See also Burnyeat s discussion of Plato s denunciation of impractical idealism (1999, ). 23. Cf. Sallis s similar interpretation (1975, ). 24. This tension between the city s concern for excellence and its concern with unity also appears in Socrates s use of a community of pleasure and pain as opposed to a shared view of virtue or nobility in his discussion of the unity provided by communism: the standards for the city concerned with unity must be lowered (462b4 6; cf. 403c4 7; Nendza 1988, 345). 25. Strauss (1964, 118). 26. Ibid., The above argument has indicated in particular the unnaturalness of the unity Socrates proposes to justify communism, and it casts doubt on the

8 164 NOTES naturalness of the communism only insofar as communism requires one to give up the private (which it does to a large but not exhaustive extent: private honors remain). I infer the unnaturalness of the communism in particular from Socrates s failure to argue for its naturalness. As I shall explain below, Socrates s admission in Book Ten that decent men will not be able to refrain from mourning for lost loved ones also suggests the impossibility of communism (603e7 9). 28. Ludwig (2007, ). 29. Ibid., 216; cf. Sallis (1975, 377). 30. Socrates indicates this division by beginning the first part of his discussion with the reference to breeding the best with the best (not mentioning those in their prime) and by marking its end with let us go through the next point, after which he turns to the discussion of the appropriate ages for breeding (459d7 9, 460d8). It could seem that Socrates digresses from this outline by discussing the guardians child-care center within the first part (460b7 d5), which specifies more details of the child-rearing than are required by Socrates s introduction to this section, where he refers only to rearing the children of the best and not those of the worst (459d9 10). But he introduces both the beginning of the discussion of the child-care center and that part of the discussion following the discussion of rearing some children and not others by connecting them to the preceding with the expression oukoun kai (460b7, c8). I explain below the relevance of the child-rearing discussion to the first part of the discussion as a whole. 31. Thus, however, one interprets Socrates s defense of communism as promoting the city s unity, any claim, such as Josiah Ober s (1998, ), that Socrates seeks the absolute homogenization of the guardian class must be heavily qualified such homogenization is manifestly not his only aim here. 32. See also Laws (740d). 33. Compare also Socrates s later suggestions that all great labors belong to the young and that older men would be unlikely to share in the madness that may afflict youths when they first get a taste of dialectical refutations (536d3, 539c5 6; cf. 561a8 b1) with Socrates s depiction of eros as madness in both the Republic and Phaedrus (573a c; cf. 403a10; Phdr. 245b5ff.), and with the arduous toils eros demands of the lover according to the Phaedrus and Symposium ( Phdr. 252e5ff.; Symp. 208c6 d2). 34. Ludwig (2007, ). 35. Consider also Socrates s remark immediately prior to his discussion of these affairs, in which he seems to suggest that those whom we say it is necessary for us to educate to be guardians must be able to know the forms of each virtue (402c1 6); that is, Socrates singles out the group of concern to him here as those who may attain a knowledge of virtue that appears to surpass what could be expected of all but the rulers. Bolotin makes a similar suggestion regarding Socrates s reference to love affairs, which he apparently supports by noting the general change in what the

9 NOTES 165 musical education is to depict, for it moves from the imitation of the gods and heroes speeches to imitations of only the good character of soul (1995, 90 91; cf. 401a5 b3 with 398a8 b4). 36. Bolotin (1995, 92). See also 589c7 d2, where Socrates s corrected suggestion indicates the superhuman status of the law. 37. Cf. Bruell (1994, 277 n. 18). Socrates s discussion of mourning in Book Ten occurs within the context of his return to the subject of poetry, and while many commentators have noted the change or apparent change in Socrates s stance toward poetry between Books Three and Ten, the change in Socrates s treatment of mourning has been much less discussed. Kenneth Dorter does note that in Book Ten Socrates adds something to his earlier treatment of mourning (2006, 322), but Dorter sees only the addition of an explanation of what occurs in the soul of the mourner, not what Socrates first calls attention to, that is, that the decent will mourn. As my argument will explain, an inadequate consideration of Socrates s two treatments of mourning will lead to an incomplete interpretation of his criticism of poetry, but the focus of my argument is only on mourning. The interpretation of his treatment of poetry in the Republic would require a much more extensive study. For discussion of the change in Socrates s stance toward poetry in Books Three and Ten, see Annas (1981, ); Nehamas (1982, 48 54); Reeve (1988, ); Ferrari (1989, ); Moss (2007, , 437); Allen (2010, 44 47, ). 38. That Socrates in Book Ten implicitly repeats the claims that death is nothing terrible and that the decent should be self-sufficient by putting the claim that human things are unworthy of seriousness in the mouth of law only and not reason suggests that these claims are simply inadequate, even for the philosopher (cf. 604a10 11 with 604b9ff.). See also Ahrensdorf s arguments against the rationality of Socrates s reasons for opposing mourning (2009, ). 39. See Nettleship (1925, 95 96); Irwin (1977, ); Bolotin (1995, 87); Howland (1998, ). For further discussion of the guardians unphilosophic virtue, see Lutz (1997). 40. Cf. 518d9 e3 where Socrates disparages all virtues save that of prudence, which, in the context, is the virtue necessary to philosophy and not political life (cf. 519b7 c6), and see Bruell s explanation of this passage (1994, 271). 41. Bolotin (1995, 92). 42. Nettleship (1925, ), Murphy (1951, ), White (1979, 256), Annas (1981, ), Nehamas (1982, 66 68), Reeve (1988, , ), Ferrari (1989, 124, ), Pappas (1995, ), Dorter (2006, ), and Moss (2007, ) all present Socrates s criticism of mourning in Book Ten as a criticism of its irrationality, but they do not attend to the irrational or self-contradictory beliefs of the mourner, which Socrates traces to his irrational attachment to virtue, and thus they show neither why mourning must be irrational nor the

10 166 NOTES precise character of its irrationality. Compare Stephen Halliwell (1996, 345), who notes that without an analysis of the emotions evoked by tragic poetry, one need not assent to Plato s argument for its irrationality. 43. Starting at 473c9 d6, Socrates indicates that there will be no end to evils for men (cf. Strauss 1964, 127), and it would be unreasonable for men not to feel badly in some way while suffering evils. See also Ahrensdorf (2009, ); contrast Nussbaum (1986, 386). 44. Bolotin (1995, 87). 45. Cf. 603a1 8 where Socrates claims that it is another part of the soul than the calculating part that opposes measure, but even here he admits that this part still opines ( doxazon ), and thus belongs to the opining part of the soul. See N. R. Murphy s discussion of lines , according to which Socrates s criticism of the aspect of soul that poetry affects is a criticism of an aspect of the calculating faculty (1951, ); see also Nehamas (1982, 64 66). 46. The defectiveness of the law s reasons in general is implied by the Socrates s tacit distinction between law and reason immediately prior to his indication of the law s reasons for opposing mourning (cf. 604a10 b1 with 604b9ff.). 47. Cf. Benardete (1989, ): Benardete notes the way the first and third claims belong together, as do the second and fourth, and he also shows something of the tension between these claims. However, I disagree with both his interpretation of the exact meaning of the third claim and his subsequent discussion of the significance of these claims. To be brief, it seems to me that Benardete does not give due weight to Socrates s attribution of these claims to law and not to reason. 48. By itself, the claim that human things are not worthy of great seriousness could mean that nothing is worthy of great seriousness, but this is certainly not a reason that the law would have for opposing mourning, since the law teaches one to be serious both about the law and virtue and about the gods (cf. 589c7 d2). 49. Ferrari s treatment of Socrates s criticism of poetry in Book Ten, according to which the audience of tragic poetry is lulled into a dreamlike state (1989, ), accords well with my interpretation of the idleness of the part of the soul that seeks lament, which is the part of the soul that is attracted to tragedy. 50. Perhaps even more important, the mourner, in acknowledging his loss, also recalls his once blissful devotion to his lost loved one, and as we shall see in chapters 2 and 3, this recollection too would be accompanied by hope. In this regard, compare Judith Butler s recent analysis of the experience of mourning, which focuses on the way mourning makes us aware of the importance of our relationships, with those we have lost (2004, 19 49). Furthermore, although Butler does not focus on hopes as Plato does, and she seems far more inclined to see in mourning an opportunity for self-knowledge than to see irrationality (2004, 28), her analysis nevertheless brings out the incapacity of those

11 NOTES 167 in mourning to know exactly what they have lost, and suggests a connection between this incapacity and the mourner s attachments to others (22 23). 51. It may be helpful to reiterate the evidence that such hopes and concern with virtue belong to the decent mourner. The first claim of law, along with Socrates s indication that these men cannot know what is necessary and thus involuntary, shows that these men believe in and are concerned with the possibility of supernatural assistance, which implies gods of some form or other. The third claim of the law and Socrates s indication that these law-abiding men are concerned with assessing how well they have done show their concern for virtue. The direct link between a concern for virtue and divine hopes is nowhere made perfectly explicit (although see 605b7 c4, which I interpret below, and see above all 361b5 d3, and the request of Glaucon and Adeimantus at the outset of Book Two more generally); by suggesting such a link, however, we can both indicate a connection between the otherwise divergent first and third claims of law, as well as understand the attractiveness of mourning to the decent man as Socrates describes him. By suggesting a link between the concern for virtue and the hope for divine assistance, I mean to make no claim about the cause or source of that link, which, as it seems to me, Plato does not indicate here. See also Stauffer (2001, ). 52. Contrast Adam (1902, 2:413). Here, I follow the better attested text rather than Adam s or Burnet s edition, reading eidolopoiounti instead of eidolopoiounta at 605c3. This reading, in addition to having the advantage of following the better supported text, brings out more clearly Socrates s objection to poetry in this passage. Adam objects to reading eidolopouiounti, since by attributing image-making to the audience rather than the poets, it neglects Socrates s criticism of poets as image-makers. However, it seems to me that Socrates here shows why the poets images are harmful, which becomes clear only when one sees that the poets images inspire their audience to create certain false images of their own. 53. In their brief discussions of the Republic s treatment of mourning, both Nussbaum and Henry Staten find that Plato opposes mourning for the sake of either a perfection characteristic of gods (Nussbaum 1984, 71; 1986, 157), or the transcendence of concern for all mortal objects (Staten 1995, 3 5). That is, both take Plato to oppose mourning out of a hope for some superhuman happiness. Their interpretations depend on their taking the reasons Socrates first gives in Book Three for his opposition to mourning as his final reasons. If they had seen that the arguments Socrates first makes against mourning actually articulate one side of the irrational beliefs characteristic of mourners, as I argue, they would have seen that Socrates opposes mourning for nearly the opposite reason: it strengthens the irrational beliefs on the part of the mourners that give them the hope to transcend mortality.

12 168 NOTES 54. Cf. 605e6, where the object of the praise to which Socrates refers is not perfectly clear. He indicates that we see a man whom we would be ashamed to resemble, but, instead of disgust, the sight produces joy and praise. Thus, Socrates most likely indicates that the praise is of the otherwise shameful deeds of lament. At 605d4 5, Socrates indicates that we praise the poets for making us suffer with their heroes; then at 605e6 he suggests the praise is of the suffering itself; finally, at 606b3, it is of the suffering man. It is thus not a stretch to say the praise is of the man for his suffering. 55. Halliwell (1996, ). 56. As Socrates makes clear, the pity is both for others and for oneself (606b5 8), but pity comes to sight first as a feeling for others (606b3). 57. The decent man is always seeking lament (604d9, 606a3 5), even when no loss has recently occurred, and thus he apparently also seeks to lament possible future losses, which would include that of his own life. 58. See also note 47 above for another more direct way in which mourning would lead to hope, which chapters 2 and 3 will clarify. 59. Cf. Apollo s comment that Achilles accomplishes nothing by dragging the corpse, although Achilles does not seem to understand this ( Iliad 24.52). 60. For the connection between funerals and hopes for divine assistance in the afterlife in Homer, and Socrates s awareness of this connection, see Iliad with Republic 386d4 5 and 387a All translations of Homer are from Lattimore (1951). 62. See Bolotin (1995, 85) and Ahrensdorf (2009, 161). 63. Cf. Adam (1902, 1:133). Adam admits that heat meant courage to the Greeks, but he denies that this is what is meant here, arguing that fear is being likened to heat because heat softens iron. This is to miss the obvious contrast Plato intends between the initial shivering (in fear) and the subsequent heat. For another indication that Plato thinks heat, or bold hopes, may arise (in part) from fear, see Phaedrus 251a3ff. 64. For more extensive treatments of this theme, see Bolotin (1995, 85 87); Ahrensdorf (2009, ). 65. David McNeil, focusing on Socrates s insistence that the god be wholly simple and never lie, observes: This argument is strange in many ways. It undermines the Oracle at Delphi... It makes a liar of Socrates with his daimonic sign and his dream messages of the Phaedo, the Apology, and the Crito. Strangest of all, in denying the god access to the medicinal lie, the same kind of lie the rulers will use later, it either does not consider the idea that every human being is foolish when compared to the god, or it accepts this possibility but denies that the gods are friends to any human. I believe it is difficult to overestimate the significance of the fact that in the Republic the ruler and lawgiver can and must lie for the good of the city, but the god is forbidden to lie for the sake of any human being (2001, ). 66. Strauss (1964, 98).

13 NOTES In preparation for chapter 2, consider McNeil s suggestion that permitting divine madness (as it is described in the Phaedrus ) in the city would mean allowing threats to the legitimacy of the philosopher-kings, because divine madness could yield potentially legitimate alternate visions of how to best imitate the divine (2001, ). 68. Strauss (1964, ). 69. In arguing for the possibility of the city, Burnyeat writes: If we, if Glaucon and Adiemantus are persuaded [of Socrates s proposals] which they are that is sufficient proof that somewhere sometime the persuasion could work (1999, ). But the ability to persuade two young men and some Plato scholars of the goodness of Socrates s proposals is a far cry from the ability to persuade a city full of parents to abandon their children, which Socrates notes would need to be done, and which Burnyeat does not address. 70. For further discussion of the impossibility of the city, see especially Strauss (1964, ); for examples of the different commentators who have made similar observations about the impossibility of Socrates s proposals, see Bloom (1968, , 409); Sallis (1975, , 451); Saxonhouse (1978, ); Nichols (1984, 252, 254, ); and Howland (1998, ). See Howland for a discussion of the broad range of interpretations of the Republic on the question of the city s possibility (1998, and nn. 12 and 13). 71. For an explanation, see Bruell (1994, 267, 273). 72. The precise meaning of winged is not clarified, so far as I can tell, in the Republic ; the discussion of wings in Socrates s palinode in the Phaedrus may be of some help. 73. Cf. Mara (1997, ). 74. The impoverished aspect of eros is made a theme in Socrates s speech in the Symposium ( Symp. 203b1ff.). 75. Cf. Gerald Mara s similar account of the tyrannical man s descent from a democratic father (1997, ). 76. In our discussion of Socrates s palinode in chapter 2, we will consider uncorrupt eros. For now, we need only see that it is not all eros that leads to the tyrant s criminality, but only a certain corrupt eros. 77. Burkert (1985, 56, 62, 73, 97, , ). 78. Mara s suggestion that tyrannical eros seeks self-created fullness or a complete condition of self-sufficiency accords well with my suggestion that this eros is accompanied by a mad desire to rule even over gods (1997, 189, 204), but I emphasize that this madness has at its root erotic sexual desire for another human being. 79. Bloom (1968, 419); Benardete (1989, 194). 80. I here take the pronoun hai to refer to opinions (574d7), as there is no other substantive in the context that makes sense. If the hai be meant more ambiguously, it is not a mistake to include opinions within its meaning, for Socrates has already indicated that corruption involves a change of both desires and opinions (573b1 3).

14 170 NOTES 81. This is especially well evidenced if we follow the better attested reading at 574d6 7, tas dikas poioumenas, rather than Burnet s preferred tas dikaias poioumenas, for in this case, the target of eros bodyguard is those opinions that act as judges (see Bloom 1968, n. 4): eros needs to be guarded from beliefs that condemn it. 82. See also 577e2 3, where Socrates says the tyrant s soul will always be full of confusion and regret. 83. See Adam (1902, ); Benardete (1989, 206); Ludwig (2007, 229); and Scott (2007, 139). 84. Note that reason is ultimately necessary, in addition to better desires and legal restraint, for removing the desires hostile to law (571b6 7). 85. Cf. Newell (2000, 82): Newell finds in tyrannical ambition both the longing to transcend the human condition and the all-too-human desire for exclusive mastery and possession, which accords well with my account, although I emphasize the way these two concerns support one another in the case of the tyrannical individual domination over others serving to convince him of his superiority to the gods whereas Newell focuses on the tension between the two concerns. 86. As we shall see in chapters 2 and 3, democratic individuals would also have difficulty giving themselves fully to their erotic feelings or having full erotic experiences, but at least those who suffer this defect are not said to be inclined to become tyrannical individuals. 87. In this connection, see also 578a10 12, where Socrates indicates that no one mourns more than the tyrannical man. 88. This suggestion is dubious for other reasons as well. Socrates introduces here, with no prior preparation, the idea of an immortal soul or mind (585b12 c5), and with no explanation of how a mind, which because of its connection with what is always the same, must itself be always the same (585c4 5), can change from a state of ignorance to knowledge. Furthermore, Socrates s argument includes the odd and apparently unnecessary claim that the being of what is always the same shares in being no more than in knowledge (585c7 8), which implies that if no such unchanging being is known, it does not exist. Regarding this last point, contrast Ferrari (2002); Ferrari, assuming that the undisputed aim of the argument at 585b e is to show that satisfaction of the soul is superior to bodily satisfaction, finds himself forced to emend the text, because otherwise, on his reading, the sentence in question is simply not relevant (2002, 384). 89. If Socrates s suggestion that the greatest anticipatory pains arise from the cessation of pleasure is not to be taken strictly which is suggested by his indication that the actual cessation of pleasure is not so painful but is rather to be taken as pointing to anticipation of the end of that on which all our pleasures depend, that is, life, Socrates would also point to a desire for life apart from any consideration of its pleasantness. This desire would in turn explain why death is not typically desired as a relief from what Socrates describes as an otherwise painful condition.

15 NOTES The Phaedrus s Praise and Blame of Eros 1. All unspecified references to Plato s line numbers in this chapter are to the Phaedrus. 2. See also Nussbaum s suggestion that Plato does not criticize straw men (1986, 202). 3. For Socrates s qualification of his earlier criticism, see 234e9 235a1, 235a3 4. As he also does in his later criticism, Socrates s leaves it up to Phaedrus to determine the adequacy of Socrates s remarks; by doing so he can better gauge Phaedrus s attachment to the speech as a whole (cf. 235b1 5 with 234c6 7), and encourage Phaedrus to reexamine the speech. 4. Note also that with this formulation Socrates is not clearly asking for an explicit definition and that he leaves the question without explicit answer. Cf. Ferrari s similar remarks (1987, 47). 5. Benardete (1991, 176); Burger (1980, 78). 6. See Burger (1980, 23), where she notes Lysias s use of merely mechanical connectives to structure his speech, which allow its easy division into separate points (at 231a6, b7, c7, e3, 232a6, b5, e3, 233a4, c6, d5). Burger agrees with my claim that the speech has a concealed structure, but she seems to consider the large central portion of the speech a loose enumeration (ibid.). 7. Cf. Nussbaum s discussion of how one might understand the appeal of Lysias s speech in contemporary terms (1986, ). 8. Throughout my interpretation of Lysias s speech, I refer to its intended listener as the beloved despite the fact that he is allegedly not loved by the nonlover; disregarding the fact that the nonlover, if he is not altogether a liar, seems to be merely a rather lukewarm and calculating lover, the term beloved is appropriate, because the target of the speech is treated as if he has lovers (whom he ought to reject). 9. Cf. the use of misfortune ( atuchesai ) at the opening of the speech (231a1). 10. Note the ambiguity in the speech s other references to benefits as to whether the nonlover is concerned to provide them for himself or for his partner (231a5 6, b6 7, 233c1); 234a2 3 is an exception, but again no indication is given of what goods the nonlover offers, and 234b4 5 quickly returns us to the selfish nonlover. 11. At this point we should note that the previous four arguments each appeal to the nonlover s virtuous character (232a5), his friendship (232b3 4, 233a1 4), or both (232d4 5 with d7 e2). See especially the claim of argument eight that the nonlovers attain sexual favors through virtue (232d4 5). 12. Note also the third argument s complete omission of even the pretense on the part of nonlovers to offer strong friendship (cf. 231c1 2). 13. See also Nichols s similar claim about the appeal of Lysias s speech (2009, 98 99).

16 172 NOTES 14. Perhaps this, that Lysias s defense of a nonlover aims at turning the nonlover into a beloved, is what Socrates means when he suggests that the earlier love poets, who praised their beloveds, surpassed Lysias (235c2 d3). See Benardete (1991, 118). Cf. 255e2 3, where Socrates describes the desire to reciprocate love as nearly the same as love. 15. The predatory aspect of the nonlover is, of course, moderated in Lysias s speech, because the speech is given by something of a friend who offers friendship, and Lysias s speech is, today, all too easily imagined as coming from a relatively unerotic but sexually attracted friend who would limit the harm he inflicts on his partner. But insofar as such a friend feels goodwill along with his sexual attraction, he blurs the distinction between himself and the lover and to this extent deviates from the speech s defense of the nonlover. See also Griswold s suggestion that Lysias s non-lover is really a concealed lover (1986, 49). 16. Griswold (1986, 57 58); Benardete (1991, 120). 17. Note, however, that the second of three qualities attributed to friendship is unsurpassed goodwill ( eunoustaton ) (239e4): the speech quietly indicates what its argument overlooks. 18. Cf. Benardete (1991, 124); Burger (1980, 37). Socrates s treatment of moderation in this speech will receive further discussion below. 19. Griswold (1986, 55). Cf. Socrates s later suggestion that the first prophetic speeches came from an oak tree (275b5 6). 20. Sallis (1975, 123). 21. Griswold (1986, 56). 22. Burger notes the antierotic character of the Muses, describing them as those who punish their own lovers with death and grant favors only to those who do not succumb to their charms (1980, 35). 23. Socrates tells this story in response to Phaedrus s suggestion that life should be lived for pleasures without preceding pains (258e1 5). 24. The bewitchment depends on idleness of thought (259a3 4); cf. my treatment of Socrates s view of idleness in the Republic above. 25. Socrates here includes among the Muses Muses concerned both with erotic matters and philosophy (259d1 7), whereas he later gives the Muses credit only for poetry, attributing erotic madness to Aphrodite and Eros (265b4 5). Perhaps Socrates only means that love and the speeches of philosophy (cf. 259d6) can offer the same dangerous bewitchment as music proper. 26. Griswold (1986, 59). 27. One may wonder whether sexual desire divorced from any eros would include any care for beauty (cf. Symp. 206b7 e5 and 209b2 3 with 207c9 208b9 where beauty drops out of the account of eros, and Socrates is dissatisfied). 28. Benardete draws attention to this distinction making a somewhat different point (1991, 122). 29. Griswold (1986, 63).

17 NOTES Or parts, depending on which text one follows; the choice is between polumeles and polumeres, but either one implies a unified hubris that has the parts or limbs. 31. If one takes the alternate reading, what has been said is somehow clearer than what has not been said, the statement still raises the question of what has not been said. 32. Benardete (1991, 122) and Mara (1997, 213) make similar suggestions. 33. It is true that the definition of love appears to refer to it as a desire without reason, but this does not necessitate that the opinion opposed to love be rational (I shall argue that Socrates presents in this speech both a rational and an irrational opposition to love). Furthermore, what is said to be without reason does not seem perfectly clear in the Greek. That is, the without reason ( aneu logou ) that would seem to modify desire is placed immediately before the reference to correct opinion, thus reading, aneu logou doxes (238b7 8). I know of no rule in Greek according to which without reason could be proved not to modify opinion, and its placement immediately before the mention of correct opinion then certainly raises the question of the rationality of correct opinion. None of this is to deny that the concealed lover intends on the surface to imply that love is desire that lacks reason and that the opinion opposed to this desire is moderate. 34. Consider Socrates s later emphasis on this one definition for his speech about love, where he is treating both speeches together as one (263d2 3 in context). 35. Socrates refers both to the place and the nymphs as the source of his divine suffering, and we may perhaps explain this by saying Socrates spends the day in an unusual place, taking time off from his usual conversations (230c6 d5), and under such relaxing influences, and in response to Phaedrus (cf. 238d5), who appreciates such stylistic flourishes, Socrates is led to speak in an unusual manner. 36. Cf. Benardete (1991, ). 37. Cf. Symposium 182b7 c4, where Pausanias notes that tyrannies oppose philosophy, eros, and exercise, because they fear proud thoughts and strong friendships. See also Benardete (1991, ); the following account is indebted to his observations regarding the opposition between moderation and manliness, although I do not necessarily follow his reasoning, nor do I interpret the speech as being about politics as he seems to do. 38. Burger (1980, 37); Benardete (1991, 124). 39. To see the lover s need for the beloved s justice, compare the beloved s expectation that lovers keep (harmful) oaths, an expectation on which he bases his gratification, with the view of oaths of the former lover who has intelligence (240e9 241b6). 40. Cf. Griswold (1986, 65 68). 41. Cf. Gorgias 485d3ff.; Republic 487d3 5.

18 174 NOTES 42. Contrast Ferrari (1987, 106): Ferrari suggests that lovers, according to this speech, apparently intent on thwarting themselves, work to render the object of their desire less desirable, but here, Socrates has indicated bodily qualities that may be attractive and that also serve to make the beloved less independent. 43. Burger (1980, 37); Benardete (1991, 125). 44. The beloved is also described as adorned with alien colors and adornments (239d1 2); this could be a reference to Phaedrus s carrying a book, which Socrates claims renders him attractive (227d2 5, 228d6 e2). Cf. 275a4, where books are described as alien markings. 45. Griswold (1986, 64). 46. See Ferrari s outstanding analysis of the mixture of pleasure and pain involved in falling in love according to the palinode (1987, ). 47. Note that the speech now introduces madness instead of hubris in its characterization of love. Perhaps the presentation of love here is meant somehow to accord with or prepare that of the palinode; perhaps hubris is also not so opposed to intelligence as madness is. 48. The lover is said also to be influenced by shame (241a6 7). Out of shame he will not dare to say he has become other nor to uphold his past oaths, but the failure to uphold his oaths is explained subsequently as the result of a rational calculation (241b1 3), and thus the shame seems to apply especially to daring to say he has become other. It is not that he does not dare to admit that he was once a lover, but that he will not admit he no longer is one. It seems that the former lover, while not considering love simply good, is aware of its power and feels shame at condemning it, as Socrates himself subsequently professes to do (243b4 7, d3 4). 49. Cf. Nichols (2009, ); Nichols notes the contrast with Lysias s portrayal of the lover who moves on to another lover, but she takes Socrates s former lover s need to stay away from his former beloved as a sign that he is still a lover, whereas, as far as I can tell, the text indicates only that one who has become free of love remains, at least for a time, at risk of returning to love. Moreover, Nichols takes the former lover to be protecting his presumed self-sufficiency, rather than his recently obtained intelligence and moderation. 50. Nichols (1998, 43 n. 70). 51. Tomas Calvo draws a similar conclusion about Phaedrus s failure to understand the speech based on a different interpretation of the speech (1992, 55). 52. Griswold (1986, 71); Benardete (1991, 127). 53. Consider also his attribution of the speech to Phaedrus (242d11 e1, 243e9 244a1). See also Calvo s similar argument (1992, 49 50). 54. Nichols (2009, 96). 55. For more extensive discussion of Socrates s daimonion see Strauss (1983, 45 47); Pangle (1987, ); Bruell (1999, 48, 112). For a variety of different views, see the published exchange between Vlastos, Thomas