PROPOSAL: Aristotle s Physics, A Critical Guide Edited by Mariska Leunissen, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

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1 PROPOSAL: Aristotle s Physics, A Critical Guide EditedbyMariskaLeunissen,TheUniversityofNorthCarolinaatChapelHill A. Project description The importance of Aristotle s Physics: Throughout his life, Aristotle was deeply committedtothestudyofnaturalphenomena:aboutonethirdofthesurviving Corpus Aristotelicuminvestigatesandexplainsthemotionsandattributesofthingsthathaveanature, that is, of things that have an internal principle of change and rest. The Physics an intellectual masterpiece in itself and one of the mostly widely read Aristotelian treatises forms Aristotle s most fundamental treatise in his studies of natural philosophy. In this treatise,aristotleinvestigatestheprinciplesandcausesofallnaturalthingsingeneral,and,in the course of doing so, defines a large number ofkey conceptsof his natural philosophy, suchasmotionandchange,spaceandtime,matterandform,causalexplanation,luckand spontaneity, teleology and necessity. In addition, Aristotle specifies in the Physics the methodological guidelines for how one should study nature if one wants to gain scientific knowledgeofit,whichincludesthefamousbutstillill-understoodrecommendationtostart from things that are more known and clearer to us and to work from there to what is moreknownandclearerbynature.inthisway,thephysics laysoutaristotle sconceptual apparatus and methodological framework for all of his natural philosophy, including his psychology,biology,andotherinquiriesintothemorespecificandmorecomplexsegments ofthenaturalworldpreservedinaristotle sremainingnaturaltreatises. ThePhysics isnotjustrelevantforaristotle snaturalphilosophy,however;sincetheobjects ofmetaphysicsdonot,forthemostpart,existindependentlyoftheobjectsofphysicsand canthusonlybestudiedthroughthose,thescienceofmetaphysicsoftenhastorelyonthe sameconcepts,definitions,andapproachesasarepresentedinthephysics. The purpose of this volume: BecauseofthefoundationalroleofthePhysics foraristotle s naturalphilosophyandmetaphysics,interestinthephysics amongscholarsofaristotle(and of ancient philosophy more generally) has been consistently high. Somewhat surprisingly, eventhoughthephysics hasinspiredarichscholarlyliteratureintheformofbotharticlesand monographs,thereexistsonlyonevolumeofcollectedpapersthatfocusesexclusivelyonthe Physics:L.Judson(1991),Aristotle s Physics,A Collection of Essays (Oxford:ClarendonPress). However, since the publication of this volume the field of Aristotle-studies has changed considerably, both in terms of its understanding of key concepts in Aristotle s philosophy and in terms of its preferred methods for gaining such understanding. It is time for a reassessment. Thepaperscommissionedforthisproposedvolumeaimtomakeoptimaluseofthesenew insightsandapproaches,andtherebytopushforwardthescholarshiponaristotle sphysics. ThefourteenpapersonAristotle sphysics inthisvolumeareexpectedtoengagewiththese changedperspectivesonaristotle inatleastoneofthefollowingthreeways: 1

2 (1) Reassessing the key concepts of Aristotle s natural philosophy. First, some of the papers will provide a challenge to existing interpretations of some of the key concepts of Aristotle s Physics (such as nature, cause, art, chance, and motion) and argue for alternative understandings. Thesepapersdonotonlydrawfromthelatestresearchinthefield,butalso exhibitagreatersensitivitytowardstherichnessandcomplexityofaristotelianconceptsas wellastowardstheextenttowhicharistotlebuildsonandreshapeshisconceptsindifferent explanatory contexts. Instead of just studying the main concepts of Aristotle s natural philosophy in the immediate context in which they are first introduced in the Physics and tryingtoprovideaunifiedaccountoftheirdefinitionsandroles,thepaperspresentedinthis volumealsopayattentiontosomeofthe(methodologically)laterusestowhichtheconcepts are put in other(natural) treatises, provide explanations of why these other uses require conceptual changes, and answer the meta-question about why Aristotle needs the specific understandingsof,forinstance,hisconceptsofnatureandcauseforhisnaturalphilosophy asawhole. (2) Reconstructing Aristotle s methods for the study of nature. Second,someofthepaperswilltryto provide a reconstruction of the methods Aristotle uses and/or describes for the study of nature.scholarsworkingonaristotlehavebecomeincreasinglyinterestedintherelationship betweenaristotle s geometric-style theoryofscientificdemonstrationandinvestigationas presentedintheposterior Analytics andhispracticeinthenaturaltreatises,andalthoughmuch workhasbeendoneonthemethodologicalconnectionsbetweentheposterior Analytics and Aristotle s biology(i.e., his study of living nature), the connections with his Physics remain largelyunexploredterritory.thepapersinthisvolumeaimtoworktowardsclosingthisgap in the existing scholarship by offering interpretations of(a) what it means according to Aristotletoinvestigatethingsphysikôs i.e.,inthemannerofanaturalscientist;(b)howthis method relates to other methods available to a philosopher(such as semantic analysis or dialectic) as well as to the scientific method outlined in the Posterior Analytics; and(c) how methodologicalconcernsstemmingfromtheposterior Analytics drivetheinvestigationsinthe Physics. (3) Determining the boundaries of Aristotle s natural philosophy. Third, some papers will concern themselves with the boundaries(and the extent to which these boundaries are crossed) betweenaristotle snaturalphilosophyandhismetaphysics.inrecentyears,therehasbeena growing awareness among scholars of Aristotle that Aristotle s full views can rarely be pluckedoutofsinglepassages,orevensingletreatises.thishasledtomodificationsinhow webelieveoneshouldconductconceptualanalysis inaristotle(e.g.,astakingintoaccount the different uses to which concepts are put in different parts of a science, as described under item number 1 above), but it has also highlighted problems concerning Aristotle s division of the sciences and his requirement that principles that belong properly to one science cannotbe used in the generation of knowledge in another science(unless the two sciencesaresubordinatedtoeachother).forthisvolume,theissueconcerningtherelation betweenthedifferentsciencesarisesmostprominentlywithregardtoaristotle sconceptof the Unmoved(or Prime) Mover the origin of all motion in the universe which he 2

3 introducesinphysics VIII.SincethisUnmovedMoverisadivinebeingthatispureformand iswithoutmatter,itistechnicallyspeakingnotpartofthephysicalworld,butratherbelongs toaristotle s firstphilosophy ormetaphysics.thepapersinthisvolumeexaminetheways in which Physics VIII divides up the science of nature and his metaphysics, and how his account in the Physics relates to a similar, but also importantly different discussion of unmovedmoversinmetaphysicsxii. B. Audience Theproposedvolumeaimstobringtogethercutting-edgeresearchpapers,writtenbysome ofthebestscholarscurrentlyworkingonaristotle snaturalscience,andtherebytoproduce avolumethatreflectstherecentdevelopmentsinthefieldbutalsoopensupnewavenuesof inquiry. The primary audience for this volume will be scholars and advanced graduate studentsinancientphilosophy.thevolumewillbeanessentialreadingandkeyresourcefor all those working on Aristotle. However, the volume will appeal more broadly to scholars workinginancientphilosophyaswellastothoseworkinginthehistoryandphilosophyof (natural) science, given the centrality of the notions and methods discussed in Aristotle s Physics for his entire philosophy and their influence on the development of natural philosophyinlaterantiquity(includingtheneo-platonicperiod)andintheearlymodern period. C. Timetable The papers commissioned for this volume are all original and have not been published elsewhere. Authors will submit the first complete drafts of their papers to the editor by March 15, 2013, after which they will receive comments. The drafts will be revised during thesummerof2013,andthecompletemanuscriptwillbesubmittedtocupforreviewno laterthanseptember1 st,2013.themanuscriptshouldbereadyfortheproductionprocess sometimeduringthefallof2013. D. Information about the editor and the contributing authors Mariska Leunissen, the proposed editor forthis volume, is currently assistant professorof philosophyattheuniversityofnorthcarolinaatchapelhill.fromfall2007tospring2011 she was assistant professor at Washington University in St. Louis, and from fall 2010 to spring2011sheheldaresidentialfellowshipattheharvarduniversity scenterforhellenic studiesinwashington,d.c.sheistheauthorofexplanation and Teleology in Aristotle s Science of Nature (CUP2010;oneofthreefinalistsfortheJournal of the History of Philosophy 2011book prize),co-editorofinterpreting Aristotle s PosteriorAnalyticsin Late Antiquity and Beyond (Brill, Leiden2010),andhaswrittenseveralarticlesonAristotle stheoryofdemonstration,natural science,andcharacter. 3

4 Thescholarswhohaveagreedtocontributetothisvolumewereallselectedonthebasisof theirindividualexpertiseinthefieldofaristotle snaturalscience.all includingthemore juniorscholars havepublishedpreviouslyonaristotle snaturalscience,eitherintheform ofarticlesbutalsoofmonographsoreditedvolumes.asagroup,theyrepresentthecurrent diversity in Aristotelian scholarship in terms of their distribution in gender, geographical locationoftheirhome-institution,nationality,andrank. Thisisthefulllistofcontributorstothevolume: James AllenisProfessorofAncientGreekandRomanPhilosophyattheUniversityof Pittsburgh,U.S.A. Robert BoltonisProfessorofPhilosophyatRutgers TheStateUniversityofNewJersey, U.S.A David CharlesisColinPrestigeFellowandResearchProfessorinPhilosophyatOriel College,OxfordUniversity,U.K. Ursula CoopeisProfessorofAncientPhilosophyandFellowofCorpusChristiCollege, OxfordUniversity,U.K. Andrea FalconisAssociateProfessorofPhilosophyatConcordiaUniversity,Canada Devin Henry is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at The Universityof Western Ontario, Canada Sean KelseyisAssociateProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofNotreDame,U.S.A. James G. LennoxisProfessorofHistoryandPhilosophyofScienceattheUniversityof Pittsburgh,U.S.A. Jacob Rosen isjuniorresearcherinphilosophy(topoiexcellencecluster)atthe HumboldtUniversity,Berlin. Diana QuarantottoisProfessoreAggregatoattheUniversityofRome,Italy Margaret ScharleisAssociateProfessorofPhilosophyatReedCollege,U.S.A. Stasinos StavrianeasisAssistantProfessorattheUniversityofPatras,Greece Charlotte WittisProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofNewHampshire,U.S.A. 4

5 E. Chapter titles and abstracts Therewillbefourteenchapters,plusanintroduction.Eachpaper,withtheexceptionofthe introduction, will be maximally 8500 words long. The complete manuscript will be maximally125000wordslong. Introduction Author: MariskaLeunissen(TheUniversityofNorthCarolinaatChapelHill,U.S.A.) Chapter : The Method of the Natural Scientist Author: JamesG.Lennox(UniversityofPittsburgh,U.S.A.) Abstract: Thispaperdiscusseswhatitmeans,precisely,tocarryoutamethodos physikôs, i.e.inthemannerofanaturalscientist.thepapertakesofffrompassagesinphysicsi1,on the Soul I1,andMetaphysics VI1thatdiscussthenaturalmethodofinquiryandthewayin which the mathematician differs in his method from the student ofnature(although both studythesameobjects,thefirststudiestheirattributesasseparablefromthoseobjectsbyan effortofabstractionandasunchangeable,whereasthelatterstudiesthemasenmatteredand as subjected to change). I shall explain what is meant by the teleological integration of matterandformofnaturalobjects(buildingontheintroductionofthisconceptinlennox 2008), and show what the methodological consequences are of taking such a position towards natural objects for the student of nature. In the next part of the paper, I range aroundinthevariousnaturaltreatisestoshowwhatsuchamethodlookslikeinpractice. Chapter 2 The Role of Semantics in Natural Science Author: DianaQuarantotto(UniversityofRome,Italy) Abstract: InPhysicsbookIAristotlebeginshisinvestigation aboutnature (peri physeos) aninvestigationwhosestatusandpossibilitywereconsideredcontroversial,atleastfrom theperspectiveoftheeleaticclaimthatbeingisoneandimmovable.thebeginningofthis investigationisforusparticularlydifficulttounderstand.itisunclearhowexactlyaristotle understood the problem of becoming and being as presented by his predecessors, and therefore what Aristotle s own solution amounts to. Moreover, it is unclear what the field andtheobjectsoftheinvestigationthemselvesare,thatis,whethertheyactuallybelongto thescienceofnature,giventhataristotlepaysconsiderableattentiontolanguageandmakes frequent use of linguistic analysis. On these issues, several interpretations have been proposed:forinstance,thataristotleconfusestherealmsoflanguageandthoughtandthe realmofreality;orthataristotleisarealistandthinksthatlanguagemirrorsrealitydirectly and perfectly; or eventhat Aristotle is an ante-litteram phenomenologist. This paper tackles this issue heads on by means of an analysis of Physics I 2-3 where this problem is most glaring. I shall argue that Aristotle s critique of the Eleatic thesis that being is one and unchangeableiscarriedoutfromasemanticandpropositionalpointofview:itisthrough the generation of semantic meaning and the use of propositional structures that Aristotle demonstratestheimpossibilityforbeingtobeoneinthesenseproposedbytheeleatics.in 5

6 addition, I shall offer some considerations of what role semantics plays according to Aristotleinthemethodofinvestigationintothescienceofnature. Chapter 3 Aristotle s Account of Substantial Change in Physics I 5-8 Author: DevinHenry(UniversityofWesternOntario,Canada) Abstract: This paper will explore Aristotle s account ofcoming-to-be in Physics I 5-8. Aristotle saccountcanbedividedintotwoparts.thefirstpart(physicsi5-7)developsthe basic theory according to which all coming-to-be involves three principles, an underlying subjectandapairofcontraries(formandprivation)whichrepresentthetwo poles ofthe change.thesecondpart(physicsi8)defendsthisaccountagainsttheeleatics,whoargued thatcoming-to-beisimpossiblebecauseitrequirestheexistenceofnon-being.inthispaper I shall explore two controversial aspects of this theory. First, I will challenge the longstandingassumptionthataristotlethinksthatallchangerequiresanunderlyingsubjectthat endurestheprocessandremainsasaconstituentofthefinishedproduct.specifically,ishall argue that Physics I 7 does not commit Aristotle to the view that substantial generation requires a persistent subject. Second, I shall showhow Aristotle s responsetothe Eleatics defends the account of non-being from Plato s Sophist using the conceptual machinery developedintheanalytics.thisissomethingthathasnotbeennoticedbyscholars. Chapter 4 Aristotle s Definition of Nature as a Second-Level Potentiality Author: StasinosStavrianeas(UniversityofPatras,Greece) Abstract: This paper offers a new interpretationof Aristotle s definition of nature in Physics bookiibyexamininghowtheclaimsthatprecedethisdefinitionpavethewayforit andbyaddressingcertainconcernsrelatingtothenecessityandsufficiencyofthecriterion proposed in this definition. I argue that Aristotle s description of the substratum as an ungenerated potentiality that is essentially related to what will be the result of the change leadstoanunderstandingofnaturenotasanefficientcause,but(followinganinterpretation proposed already by Simplicius) as a second-level potentiality responsive to principled processesthatconstitutecompleteactivities.theargumentproceedsinthreesteps.first,i turn to the analysis of the nature of elemental bodies in order to show that their passive principle of motion qualifies as being a nature. This means that their movement must be conceivedasacompleteactivity,giventhattheelementsareactiveprinciplesoftheirmutual transformations and not in need of a further active principle determining their respective motions.ithenarguethatananalysisofartisticprocesses whichareincompleteactivities leadsnecessarilytoaseparationoftheprincipleofchangeandofthethingchanged.finally, Iturntolivingbeingsandshowthatsuchaseparationofagentandpatientofchangedoes notapplytothem.consequently,botharistotle sargumentsinthephysicsandhisaccountof generationinthegeneration of Animalsallowlivingbeingstobepatientsaswellaspossessors oftheirownprincipleofchangeandrest. 6

7 Chapter 5 The Representation of Nature Author: SeanKelsey(UniversityofNotreDame,U.S.A.) Abstract: Elsewhere I considerthe contentof Aristotle s definition ofnature(first half of Physics II 1); here I propose to consider its function. Why does Aristotle think it importantto define nature(tosay what nature is )?Whatmileagedoeshehopetoget fromtheparticulardefinitionheoffers?whatusedoesheputitto?thesequestionsarise becausewhenaristotleappealstothedefinition whichhedoesnotoftendoinphysics II it is usually to remark that certain things fall outside the purview of natural science(e.g. 198a35-b1).Butthedefinitioncanhardlyfunctionmerelytosettletheextensionofτὰφύσει ὄντα;onthecontrary,itiselicitedfromthisextension(192b8ff.).moreover,aristotledoes not appeal to the definition at least not explicitly in those contexts in which we would mostexpecthim to do so,namely, when explaining and defending the mostcharacteristic anddistinctiveaspectsofhisconceptionofnatureandnaturalscience:e.g.inthesecondhalf ofphysics II1(formandmatterarebothnature exceptionsare193a29-30andb3-4,where itisvirtuallyidle),inphysics II2(thescienceofnaturemusttreatofbothformandmatter), and in Physics II 8(nature is a final cause an exception being a snatch of reasoning at 199b13-25,thatdoesadverttothedefinition,albeitbriefly).Inaword,thedefinitionappears less foundational than we expect. This suggests that something is amiss(perhaps with the appearance, perhaps with the expectation); the idea of the paper is to try to get to the bottomofthis. Chapter 6 Aristotle s Conception of Four Causes Author: RobertBolton(RutgersUniversity,U.S.A.) Abstract: MuchworkhasbeendoneonAristotle sunderstandingofhistheoryoffour causes,especiallyregardingtheirontologicalstatus thatis,whetherthesecausesconstitute real causes or should rather be considered as mere epistemic reasons why. This paper examinesaristotle stheoryofthefourcausesfromamorepragmaticperspective,namely: Why does Aristotle need four causes? What conception or conceptions of a cause is Aristotleworkingwithandwhatinterrelationsamongthecausesdoesheintroduceinorder tomakethisnotion(whichatleastfirstseemsratherforeigntous)intelligible? Chapter 7 Chance as a Byproduct of Natural Teleology Author: JamesAllen(UniversityofPittsburgh,U.S.A.) Abstract: Chance, which Aristotle sometimes divides into two species, luck(tyche), operativeintherealmofhumanagency,anditscounterpartinthebroadernaturalworld,the automaticorspontaneous,figuresprominentlyinhisdefenseofnaturalteleology.hisown positionissomethingofabalancingact.accordingtoaviewwidespreadatthetime,lucky events are the result of divine intervention in the natural order. Tyche or Fortuna was worshipedasagoddesswhoactsonbehalfofherfavorites.thoughthedivineexistsandis a cause in Aristotle s universe,there is noplace init for divinemeddling by supernatural agentsofthiskind.againstthisview,aristotleisconcernedtoshowthatchance,ifthereis suchathing,mustbepartofthenaturalorderandexplicablewithintheframeworkofthe four causes. Of more pressing concern to him, however, are the views of some of his 7

8 philosophicalpredecessors,whoseethecosmicorderandthebeneficialarrangementsthat are everywhere in evidence within it as products of chance, above all members of the biological species, which are organic unities in which mutually dependent functional parts contributetothegoodofthewhole.theseare,ofcourse,preciselytheitemsthatcanonly, according to Aristotle, be understood teleologically, with the aid of final causes. Chance, then, is the alternative to final causal explanation, which Aristotle is determined to reject. This is not, however, because he agrees with others who maintain that nothing occurs by chance because everything has a cause of some sort. Instead, on the interpretation of Aristotle sownaccountofchanceasacausebyaccidentdefendedhere,itisan inevitable byproduct of final causation and unintelligible apart from it. If Aristotle is right, chance events are a marginal exception to the teleological rule that prevails in nature, and at the sametimeaproofofit. Chapter 8 The Ontology of Artifacts in Aristotle s Physics Author: CharlotteWitt(UniversityofNewHampshire,U.S.A.) Abstract: InthePhysicsAristotledistinguishesartifactsfromnaturalbeings,notingthat thelatterhaveaninternaloriginofmotionandrest,whichartifactslack.still,itisstriking that artifacts are frequently used as examples in the passages of the Physics that introduce important ideas like matter and form, which suggests that they areontologically similar to natural substances at least in some respects. However, most commentators agree that artifacts do not count as substances, although there are significant differences in the explanations given. Some argue that artifacts lack the unity of true substances(kosman), others think that it is an artifacts inability to reproduce that is key(katayama), and still othersthinkitisthefactthatartifactsarenotself-regulating(shields).inthispaperifocus on the context of Aristotle s discussion of artifacts in the Physics to show how truly problematic the idea is that artifacts are not substances at all and to try to develop a compromiseinterpretation.beingasubstancecomesindegrees,andartifactsaresubstances toadegree. Chapter 9 On processes Author: DavidCharles(OxfordUniversity,U.K.) Abstract: My aim is to setout and engage with theongoing debateonthenatureof processes, considering the views held by Kosman, Broadie, and Coope on one side and Ross,Heinaman,andmeontheother.Ishallfocusonprocessesascontinuants,understood asunfoldingsthroughtime,andcomparethemwithothercontinuants(suchassubstances andactivities).inadditiontophysicsiii1,ishallalsoconsiderpartsofmetaphysicstheta. 8

9 Chapter 0 Infinite divisibility and the topology of change: Physics V VI Author: JacobRosen(HumboldtUniversity,Berlin) Abstract: InPhysicsV VI,Aristotleattemptstoprovideatheoryofcontinua:boththe temporallyextendedsort(changes)andthespatiallyextendedsort(bodies,lines,etc.).the treatise was historically influential, but its mathematical basis has been superseded by differential calculus and set theory; nowadays it is famous for its testimony about Zeno's paradoxesofmotion,butreceiveslittlesystematicattentioninitsownright.itrytoattainan overview of the treatise from two angles. First, its deductive structure. The text shows ambitions of being a mathematical treatise with definitions, axioms and theorems; but its actualorganizationisnotsoneat(forexample,severalclaimsarearguedforintwodifferent waysintwodifferentchapters)anditissometimeshardtodeterminewhatissupposedtobe derivedfromwhat.itrytoproducesomeorder.second,itsconnectionswiththerestofthe corpus. In some ways the treatise makes an isolated impression, offering distinctions and claimswhichdonotevidentlyserveanylargerpurposeinaristotle'sphilosophy.yetonthe other hand, it promises to provide an important link between mathematical and (meta)physical issues-- as Aristotle tells us in GC I 2, it makes a great differenceto one's theoryofgeneration,perishing,andalterationwhetherornotoneisanatomist,andphysics V VI is his most sustained argument for, and elaboration of, an anti-atomist picture. I consider where the treatise is implicitly or explicitly relied on in other works, as well as lookingtoseewhereitsresultsareoverlookedorcontradicted. Chapter Aristotle s Account of Change and Virtues in Physics VII 3 Author: MariskaLeunissen(TheUniversityofChapelHill,U.S.A.) Abstract: InPhysics VII3,Aristotlearguesthatqualitativechange,whichisoneofthe fourstandardmodesofchangehedistinguishes,onlybelongstothingsthatareaffectedin and by themselves by perceptible things. Somewhat surprisingly, he also claims that conditions suchasthevirtuesofthebodyorsoul donotbelongtothecategoryof quality and do not come to be as a result of qualitative change, but that they are rather somekindofperfections (Ph VII3,246a13)that existinvirtueofaparticularrelation (Ph VII 3, 246b8), thereby seemingly introducing a fifth type of change. In this paper, I will analyzearistotle saccountofthevirtuesinthephysics andshowhowitoffersaphysiological andnaturalisticexplanationforhisaccountofhabituationinthenicomachean Ethics. Inthis treatise, it is argued that, even though human beings are by nature able to receive moral virtues, those virtues do not come to be by nature, but are made perfect through habituation(ne II1,1103a23-26),andthatthechangethattakesplaceduringhabituationis different from the one involved in the realization of natural capacities(which constitute qualitativechanges)aswellasfromtheoneinvolvedinlearningaskill(whichdonotrequire thedevelopmentoftherightmotivations,astheacquisitionofvirtuedoes;seene II1-4). Only in the Physics, however, do we learn what kind of change is involved in moral development. 9

10 Chapter 2 Aristotle on the Boundary between Physics and Metaphysics Author: MargaretScharle(ReedCollege,U.S.A.) Abstract: Posterior AnalyticsI28maintainsthatasinglescienceisascienceofonekind (87a38-40),sothestrictnessoftheboundarybetweenonescienceandanotherdependson the strictness of the boundary between one kind and another. Physics VIII argues for the distinction between two kinds of substances natural substance and immovable substance that mark off the boundary between physics and metaphysics. Physics II.2 characterizesthedistinctionbetweenphysicsandmetaphysicsbythefactthattheformeris concernedwithcompositesofmatterandform,whilethelatterconcernsseparableform(s). PhysicsII sdistinctionrestsongroundsanalogoustothosefoundintheargumentofphysics VIII. I argue that Physics II s conception of the distinction between composites and separable form(s) depends on the impossibility of something s being its own nature. That would be tantamount to something s being in itself primarily, which would require something to be container and contained with respect to the same contents(physics IV.3 210b8-23). Likewise, Physics VIII s distinction between natural and immovable substance rests onthe impossibility of something s being both agent and patient with respect to the same motion. I thereby argue that there is a philosophically rich a priori issue at stake in Aristotle s distinction between science and metaphysics, and I show how this issue distinguishedaristotlefromhisforemostpredecessors,platoandparmenides. Chapter 3 Aristotle s Account of Self-Motion in Physics VIII Author: UrsulaCoope(OxfordUniversity,UK) Abstract: InPhysicsVIII5,Aristotlesetshimselfthequestion:ifathingmovesitself,in whatwaydoesitdoso?hearguesthatwhenathingmovesitself,thereisonepartofitthat isthemoverandanotherpartofitthatismoved(257a12-13).inmypaper,ishallexamine, in detail, Aristotle s arguments for this claim and shall discuss some questions about their largersignificance.inparticular,shallexaminethefollowingthreequestions:(i)theextent towhicharistotle sviewsaboutself-motiondepartfromorareconsistentwithplato s.(for instance,accordingtoonelater,neo-platonistview,aristotle sargumentsdependonthefact thatthekindofmotionheisconsideringisthemotionofabodilything somethingthatis infinitelydivisible soaristotlecouldagreewithplatothatasoulmightbeabletoacton itselfasawhole.)(ii)whetheraristotle sargumentfortheexistenceofself-motiondepends onaparticularaccountofmotionorchange(andifso,whataccountitpresupposes).and (iii) whether Aristotle s argument provides any resources for distinguishing between a genuineself-moverandapairofthings:anexternalunmovedmoverandthemovedthing whosemotionitcauses. Chapter 4 A Scientific Study of Eternal Motion in Physics VIII Author: AndreaFalcon(ConcordiaUniversity,Canada) Abstract: Thestandardinterpretationisthat Physics VIIIisanargumentintwostages from the eternity of motion to the existence of a prime mover which is eternal and unmoved.interestinglyenough,thisisnotquitewhatwearetoldintheopeninglinesofthe De Motu Animalium. There, Aristotle makes contact with Physics VIII. He tells us that the 10

11 investigationconductedinphysicsviiiunfoldsintwostages.butthetwostageshehasin mindarenotthosepresentedinthestandardinterpretation.rather,theyarethoseoutlined at the outset of the second book of the Posterior Analytics. More directly, his investigation beginswiththequestion ei esti (isthereeternalmotion?).onceitisestablishedthatthereis eternalmotion,thisinvestigationcontinueswiththequestionti esti (whatiseternalmotion?). Atthissecondstage,Aristotlelooksforascientificdefinitionofeternalmotionbyengaging insearchforitscauses.anditisinthiscontextthatafirstprincipleofmotionthatisnot itselfsubjecttomotionisintroduced.thelatterenterstheexplanationofeternalmotionas thefirstunmovedmover.thatinphysics VIIIAristotleis,atleastinprinciple,committedto the method outlined in the Posterior Analytics is not sufficiently appreciated. Many, if not most, scholars still agree with G.E.L. Owen, who opened his immensely influential article TithenaitaPhainomena (1961) 1 withthefollowingstatement: thereseemstobeasharp discrepancybetween themethodof scientific reasoning recommended in the Analytics and those actually followed in the Physics. I propose a close textual study of the argument advancedinphysics VIIIItoestablishtowhatextentitreflectsthetheoryofscienceoutlined intheposterior Analytics. 1 Owen,G.E.L.(1961), TithenaitaPhainomena,in:S.Mansion(ed.),Aristote et les problèmes de méthode. Papers of the Second Symposium Aristotelicum.Louvain,1961,