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6 Technical Note Level Kent Street PO Box 76 Millers Point Sydney 2000 Australia t f d Project title cc Newcastle Coal Infrastructure Group, Coal Export Terminal Stage 2F Job number File reference /TN/008 Prepared by Raymond Lowe Date 2 March 2015 Subject i Signal Sighting Committee Minutes and Report Signal B106.4 (78) 12th February Introduction 1.1 Document Purpose This document has been produced as a record of discussions and the decisions made by the signal sighting committee on the 12 th February 2015 regarding the position of B106.4 (78) signal on the Up Kooragang Branch. 1.2 Sighting Committee Attendance Refer to the ARTC Signal Sighting Attendance List Form, dated 12 th February 2015, and the signed Signal Sighting Form C361SSF023 Rev Pre-Walkout Brief During the previous signal sighting for B106.4 (78) signal, conducted on 29 th January 2015, read-through issues were identified with NCIG departure road Signals 64, 66, 68 (future) and (future) in the background of Signal B106.4 (78). The signal sighting committee concluded that a fence would be required to be built to obscure Signals 64, 66, 68 (future) and (future). At the time of the second sighting committee for B106.4 (78) held 12 th February 2015, the preliminary design of the fence revealed that not all signals can be obscured due to insufficient track centres between Departure Road 1 and the UP Kooragang Branch. The maximum constructible extent of the fence, based on a minimum 3.0m clearance to the nearest running rail #1, will not obscure signal 68 when signal B106.4 (78) (in its original design position of km) is first visible when the train driver is under the fly-over bridge structure. #1 In accordance with the ARTC Heavy Haul Infrastructure Guidelines and ETM-07-01, the minimum clearance from track centre for the fence structure is 4.3m, which exacerbates the constructability constraints identified in the preliminary design using 3.0m clearance to the face of the nearest running rail. Refer to Section 3.4 Post Meeting Note. Due to the constructability risks with the fence, as well as the fact that the preliminary fence design resulted in Signal 68 being visible during the initial sighting of B106.4 (78), the project decided to investigate the option to relocate Signal B106.4 (78) back approximately 140m closer to the flyover to reduce the read H:\PROJECTS\NCIG 2F DD\SSF\SIGNAL 78 SIGHTING\ TN-008 SIGNAL SIGHTING REPORT - SIGNAL B106 4 (78) - 12 FEB 2015.DOCX Arup F0.15 Page 1 of 8

7 Technical Note March 2015 through problem without the installation of a fence. The initial suggestion was to move it such that the signal is positioned 125m from the entry to the flyover to provide adequate sighting. The main issues with the repositioning of signal B106.4 (78) towards fly-over (away from points) were highlighted as follows: The existing design position of Signal B106.4 (78) is 300m from 160 points which is at the limit of the preferred maximum distance that signals associated with points should be from the points. Moving the signal further away will not be in accordance with SDS-01 Principle Whilst the immediate read-through problem will be eliminated, the NCIG departure road signals will still become visible when the train is under the fly-over bridge structure, and will be passed by drivers as they travel along the UP Kooragang Branch. 2.0 Walkout and Sighting 10am 12th February 2015 Note: The original design position for Signal B106.4 (78) was km. The required (optimal) sighting distance for 45kph is 125m. 2.1 Signal B106.4 (78) at km (140m from original position) At this position the signal is visible from the entry to the flyover, 125m away. However, due to the curvature of the track on approach to the fly-over from KCT, whilst the signal will become visible much further back (approx. 300m), it then becomes obscured again by the fly-over abutment, before returning to sight. This was deemed unacceptable by the train operator representatives. Moving the signal closer to the original design position at km (away from flyover) only worsened the situation. 2.2 Signal B106.4 (78) at (180m from original position) At this position there were no sighting issues and the signal was visible from approx. 200m away from the flyover bridge (the worst case position) such that the signal will be continuously visible and not obstructed by the fly-over abutment. It was observed that the NCIG Departure Signals 64 and 66 are visible part-way through the flyover underpass. It was agreed on site that positioning Signal B106.4 (78) at km was acceptable, taking into consideration that the NCIG Departure road signals become visible when the train is under the flyover bridge. The driver s advised that with the signal in this position, drivers could potentially stop in advance of the flyover. SPAD mitigation measures for some of the train operators require trains to stop 50m before the signal, and to slowly crawl up to the signal. H:\PROJECTS\NCIG 2F DD\SSF\SIGNAL 78 SIGHTING\ TN-008 SIGNAL SIGHTING REPORT - SIGNAL B106 4 (78) - 12 FEB 2015.DOCX Arup F0.15 Page 2 of 8 Technical Note

8 Technical Note March 2015 Figure 1 Signal B106.4 (78) (at km) viewed from worst-case position on the curve approaching flyover (future) B106.4(78) ( km) B106.4(78) ( km) (future) Figure 2 - View from 15m in front of signal B106.4 (78) (at km) with original design position ( km) also indicated H:\PROJECTS\NCIG 2F DD\SSF\SIGNAL 78 SIGHTING\ TN-008 SIGNAL SIGHTING REPORT - SIGNAL B106 4 (78) - 12 FEB 2015.DOCX Arup F0.15 Page 3 of 8 Technical Note

9 Technical Note March Post Walkout Discussions 3.1 B106.4 (78) Signal at Original Design Position ( km) with Fence A fence obscuring all signals was deemed (at the previous sighting committee meeting on 29th January 2015) to be an acceptable solution if B106.4 (78) is to remain in its designed position at km. However, the preliminary fence design shows that Signal 68 will still be visible when B106.4 (78) is first sighted from under the fly-over bridge. It was agreed that this could still lead to driver confusion, so as it stands the fence is not an acceptable solution. The fence design is being further developed by Aurecon Hatch. Once complete, the final understanding of the visibility of other signals will be advised to the sighting committee members. 3.2 Reposition B106.4 (78) Signal to km The following issues were discussed in relation to positioning Signal B106.4 (78) at km without fencing: Issue Comments Resolution Sighting Distance Sighting distance is greater than 200m (requirement was 125m for 45kph) Accepted OK Continuous sighting on approach At km there is uninterrupted sighting. Due to the curvature of the track the signal would be obstructed on approach if it is Accepted OK NCIG Departure Signals visible on approach (when train driver is under the flyover) and when train stopped at 78. Train travelling on UP Kooragang having passed signal 78 at clear or caution, but then seeing Red aspects from NCIG departure signals to the left. This could lead to driver confusion and/or conditioning to passing near signals at danger. Adequate Standage for train at Signal 78 to be clear of 101 points. Distance of Signal from Points positioned any closer to 162PTS. Other signals aspects can be seen in the distance but driver route knowledge and brightness of immediate signal 78 will be adequate to mitigate against driver acting on the wrong signal. One driver commented that in an ideal world a fence to obscure the NCIG departure signals would be constructed in addition to relocating the signal, however, the absence of a fence was accepted. The next relevant signal on the Up Kooragang Branch is Signal 82 (shunt) and Signal 84 (main), which are beyond the junction with NCIG departure roads on the other side of the Hunter River bridge. Driver Route Knowledge will mitigate risk of confusion as no other signals are expected for this line once Signal 78 has been passed. The distance from proposed km to 101 points ( km) is in excess of 2000m. Even with a train stopped before the flyover bridge (100m before the signal) there will still be adequate standage to clear 101 points. Proposed Signal position is approx. 480m from 162 points, well beyond the preferred maximum distance of 300m. A waiver will likely be required. Figure 3 - Issues and Resolutions - Positioning Signal B106.4 (78) at km Accepted OK Accepted OK Accepted OK Follow up required. H:\PROJECTS\NCIG 2F DD\SSF\SIGNAL 78 SIGHTING\ TN-008 SIGNAL SIGHTING REPORT - SIGNAL B106 4 (78) - 12 FEB 2015.DOCX Arup F0.15 Page 4 of 8 Technical Note

10 Technical Note March Conclusion The original design position of Signal B106.4 (78) at km with a fence only partially eliminating read through to the NCIG departure road signals is not acceptable. Alternative fence designs are being investigated. The repositioning of Signal 78 to km, without a fence to obscure signals, is an acceptable option and was agreed by the signal sighting committee subject to this Report being circulated for review and subsequently being attached to the signal sighting form. 4.0 Post Meeting Notes 4.1 Fence Structure Clearance In accordance with ARTC Heavy Haul Guidelines and ETM the minimum clearance from the adjacent track centre is 4.3m. The fence investigations will be based on this requirement moving forward, rather than 3.0m to the face of the nearest running rail as used previously. 4.2 LED Signal Details Existing Signals The existing signals are Westinghouse RM4 Standard Range Mainline type with Sighting Distance >= 0.5km in accordance with ARTC Type approval Signal Description and Type NG64 (Westinghouse Standard range - as per ARTC Type approval ) Green RM4 MS:GCFB-25B-AU 10V Yellow RM4 MS:YCFB-43B-AU 10V Red RM4 MS:RCFB-25B-AU 10V NG66 (Westinghouse Standard range - as per ARTC Type approval ) Green RM4 MS:GCFB-25B-AU 10V Yellow RM4 MS:YCFB-43B-AU 10V Red RM4 MS:RCFB-25B-AU 10V Figure 4 Existing Signal Types New Signals The new signals to be installed are of Siemens RM4 Medium Range type in accordance with type approval (Invensys) IR-126. The nominal sighting distance for the medium range is 500m and are equivalent (equivalent of Westinghouse RM4 Standard Range Mainline). Therefore the new NG68 will have similar brightness to existing NG64 and NG66 signals. The main difference is the horizontal spread where the older signals will have horizontal cut-off whereas the newer signals will have a more conical beam. [Ref #1]. NOTE: A new B106.4(78) signal will be installed when the Up Kooragang Branch is slewed Ref #1 phone conversation with Wayne McDonald from Siemens Rail Automation Technical Team. Signal Description and Type B106.4 (78) 120v AC - Siemens RM4 medium range LED unit NG68 12v DC - Siemens RM4 medium range LED unit v DC - Siemens RM4 medium range LED unit Figure 5 New Signal Types H:\PROJECTS\NCIG 2F DD\SSF\SIGNAL 78 SIGHTING\ TN-008 SIGNAL SIGHTING REPORT - SIGNAL B106 4 (78) - 12 FEB 2015.DOCX Arup F0.15 Page 5 of 8 Technical Note

11 Technical Note March Stopping Distances The proposed position of Signal B106.4(78) at km will meet the braking distance requirement from the warning signal B107.0(76) with 3-aspect signalling. This has been determined in accordance with ARTC standards ESD-32-01, ESD and SDS03. Parameter Position of Signal B106.4(78) Position of Signal B107.0(76) Distance between signals Gradient (worst case) Line Speed Value km km 774m 1/320 falling 45km/h Figure 6 Braking Distance Parameters With reference to ESD Appendix E Train Braking Tables (50km/h, 1/100 falling) the worst case braking distances are: GW30 Curve (super freighter) : 688m GW11 Curve (empty coal train): 514m H:\PROJECTS\NCIG 2F DD\SSF\SIGNAL 78 SIGHTING\ TN-008 SIGNAL SIGHTING REPORT - SIGNAL B106 4 (78) - 12 FEB 2015.DOCX Arup F0.15 Page 6 of 8 Technical Note

12 Technical Note Track Plan Showing Original ( km) and Alternative ( km) Positions for B106.4 (78) Signal H:\PROJECTS\NCIG 2F DD\SSF\SIGNAL 78 SIGHTING\ TN-008 SIGNAL SIGHTING REPORT - SIGNAL B106 4 (78) - 12 FEB 2015.DOCX Arup F0.15 Page 7 of 8

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14 LIMIT OF W ORKS T.P T.P T.P LIMIT OF W ORKS CONSTRUCTED AS PART OF TEMPORARY DEVIATION DOWNKOORAGANGBRANCHLINE T.P m NCIGARRIVALROADNo. 3 NCIGARRIVALROADNo. 2 NCIGARRIVALROADNo. 1 TOKCT TO HUNTER RIVER BRIDGE T.P T.R.S m 66 SIGNAL SIGNAL 68 SIGNAL T.R.S T.P SIGNAL 78 SIGNAL T.P SIGHTLINE T.R.S SIGHTLINE m UP KOORAGANGBRANCHLINE ALTERNATE 78 SIGNAL m FLYOVER BRIDGE T.R.S L T.P FROMKCT NCIG DEPARTURE ROAD No. 1 NCIG DEPARTURE ROAD No. 2 NCIG DEPARTURE ROAD No m SCALE 1:750 PRELIMINARY NOT FOR CONSTRUCTION Client: Drawn NS Designed Signed Date NS 12/02/15 Signed Date NCIG COAL EXPORT TERMINAL- STAGE 2F RAIL AREA Project No. Scale H Sheet Size A1 12/02/15 PRELIMINARY ISSUE Rev. Date Revision Details Drn Ver. App. NS Aurecon Hatch ABN Military Road (PO Box 538) Neutral Bay New South Wales 2089 Australia Telephone: Facsimile: NCIGStage2F@aureconhatch.com A person using Aurecon Hatch drawings and other data accepts the risk of: 1.Using the drawings and other data in electronic form without requesting and checking them for accuracy against the original hard copy versions; 2. Using the drawings or other data for any purpose not agreed to in writing by Aurecon Hatch. Verified Approved Signed Signed Date Date KOORAGANG BRANCH LINES SIGNAL LOCATIONS - FLYOVER AREA Drawing No. 1:750 HW03-SK-R-0072 A1 Rev. A mm

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17 Technical Note Level Kent Street PO Box 76 Millers Point Sydney 2000 Australia t f d Project title cc Newcastle Coal Infrastructure Group, Coal Export Terminal Stage 2F Job number File reference /TN/006 Prepared by Raymond Lowe Date 2 March 2015 Subject i Signal Sighting Report Signal B106.4 (78) 29th January 2015 Version 2 Updated to ARTC Comments (Document Checking) Signal Sighting Date: 29 th January 2015 Signal sighting for Signal B106.4(78) was conducted with sighting viewed from the part finished new alignment of the Up Branch line (no track or ballast installed). There are no obstructions to viewing the signal from the flyover (approx 300m) right to the signal. However, there are significant read through issues with the following signals in the background: Signal 64 (existing Departure Road 1) Signal 66 (existing Departure Road 2) Signal 68 (new Departure Road 1 installed Stage 4) Signal (new Departure Road 1 installed Stage 4) Signal sighting (and photos) was conducted from approx 200m back from signal, approx 100m after the flyover. As the track has not been built we viewed from approx position and did not traverse up and down the line for different angles along the curve. The figure 1 below shows the approx positions of signals. The highlighted yellow line is the approximate sight line which highlights the read-through issue with signals in the background. Signal 64 could also be a problem when first coming out of the fly-over due to the curvature of the track. C:\USERS\RAYMOND.LOWE\DOCUMENTS\PIAB\ NCIG-2F SIGNALLING DETAILED DESIGN\( ) TN-006 SIGNAL SIGHTING REPORT - SIGNAL B106 4 (78)- (0.0.A).DOCX Arup F0.15 Page 1 of 4

18 Technical Note March 2015 Figure 1 Site Plan Initial Actions: AH to investigate erection of barrier behind Signal 78 to block out view of signals behind it. There is very limited space between the UP BRANCH and DEPARTURE ROAD 1. Design to consider repositioning of signal. The photos below are all taken from approx 200m from signal 78. Note that the photo for sighting of 78 is at a slightly different angle to the remainder. Figure 2 Signal Sighting Board at Position of Signal 78 C:\USERS\RAYMOND.LOWE\DOCUMENTS\PIAB\ NCIG-2F SIGNALLING DETAILED DESIGN\( ) TN-006 SIGNAL SIGHTING REPORT - SIGNAL B106 4 (78)- (0.0.A).DOCX Arup F0.15 Page 2 of 4

19 Technical Note March 2015 Figure 3 Signal Sighting Board at Signal (bollard in place of 78) Figure 4 Signal Sighting Board at Signal 68 (bollard in place of 78) C:\USERS\RAYMOND.LOWE\DOCUMENTS\PIAB\ NCIG-2F SIGNALLING DETAILED DESIGN\( ) TN-006 SIGNAL SIGHTING REPORT - SIGNAL B106 4 (78)- (0.0.A).DOCX Arup F0.15 Page 3 of 4

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21 ARTC Risk Assessment - Context Setting CONTEXT SETTING 1. Background The NCIG 2F signalling stage 3 works involves the slewing of the Up Kooragang Branch to it's final alignment under the new NCIG fly-over. There are no route layout changes during this stage to be commissioned March The stage 4 commissioning on May 2015 will bring into operation the new NCIG arrival fly-over tracks. Two of the existing NCIG arrival roads will be decommissioned with being converted to form an additional departure road (NCIG Departure Road 1). Signal sighting for signal (signal 78) at it's original design position of km was conducted on 29 Jan At this time it was concluded that read-through of two other existing signals (64 and 66) and two additional stage 4 signals (68 and 176.8) will not be acceptable for operation without the background signals being screened by a fence. These signals are associated with the NCIG Departure Roads. At the design position of km the signal is 275m from the first set of points (162PTS) it is protecting. Due to site constraints, the project is uncertain as to whether or not a fence can be built in time to provide for the stage 3 commissioning, nor if it will provide the acceptable level of screening. A subsequent signal sighting was conducted onto investigate an alternative position for the signal. The signal sighting concluded by proposing a new position for signal at km. This new position will be 455m from 162PTS. ARTC Standard SDS 01 states: "Preferably the first set of power worked points should be within 300 metres of the protecting signal and the last preferably within 750 metres." An engineering waiver is required for the derogation to this standard. NOTE: Signal 78 is the ID used in the Circuit Book and data design. Signal is the ID used on the signal name plate and control system Phoenix Screens. In reports and documentation the two names may be used interchangeably. 2. Risk Statement To assess the safety/operational risk associated with the positioning of signal 106.4(78) at km. 3. Risk Assessment Objectives To determine the risks and any appropriate controls required with the placement of signal in the proposed location considering it's distance being more than the preferred maximum. The risk assessment will support the engineering waiver submission for derogation against ARTC standard SDS Critical Success Factors of the activity/proposal being assessed The positioning of Signal 106.4(78) is required for the NCIG 2F stage 3 commissioning March to realign the Up Kooragang and Down Kooragang Branches into their final alignments. 5. Scope (inclusions and exclusions) Signal sighting for the new position has already been conducted by the signal sighting committee and therefore does not need to be risk assessed during this process. The position of this signal at km will be on a permanent basis following the Stage 3 commissioning. 6. Stakeholders Use 'Worksheet #6' to input further detail 7. Stakeholder consultation Use 'Worksheet #6' to input further detail 8. Assumptions The signal sighting committee has accepted the proposed position of signal 106.4(78) at km. 9. Constraints Continued construction of the new NCIG arrival flyover tracks and formation will occur after the Stage 3 commissioning. 10. Boundaries/interfaces 11. Qualifications/conditions 12. Reference documentation and standards ARTC SDS 01. NCIG 2F Signalling Stage 3 Signalling Plan Version Other clarifying commentary At present Aurecon Hatch are investigating and designing for the construction of a fence to screen the background signals. Due to track alignment, limited track centres and ground conditions, it may not be practical or possible to build a fence for the signal to be installed in it's design position ( km). Consideration has also been given for a temporary solution (to operate for 5 weeks between stage 3 and stage 4 commissionings) of positioning the signal closer to the points and signals 64 and 66. The position would require right hand mounting of the signal to the rail and would result in signal 106.4(78) not 'crossing' in front of the other signals as the train approaches the signal on the curve after the flyover. This option has been considered unacceptable from a signal sighting perspective due to the signal. The project is therefore proceeding in parallel with the waiver approval process to allow positioning of the signal at km in order to eliminate read-through issues. ARTC_SFAIRP_Risk_Assessment_Signal 106.4(78) Ver0.3

22 1.0 Risk No Risk Category: 1. Safety 2. Assets 3. Financial 4. Environment 5. Regulatory 6 Reputation 1 Assets 1.1 Hazard or scenario or circumstance Increase in time available for communication and procedural errors where points may be operated in error under emergency working conditions. 1. RISK IDENTIFICATION 2. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION 5. VALIDATION AND CLARIFICATION Current Current Current risk Caused by Leading to an Outcome Existing Control Control type Responsible Party / Comments Has this workshop consequence likelihood level adequately addressed this Comments / clarification risk? Increased walking distance required by driver to signalling location and points when needing to operate the points under emergency working conditions. Most Likely (Credible) Outcome Train will proceed over trailing points locked in the wrong direction causing damage to point equipment. Worst Case (Credible) Outcome Train will proceed over trailing points locked in the wrong direction causing minor low speed derailment. Operational procedures for the emergency operation of points requiring authorisation from Signaller. Operational procedures for driving at low speed when passing signal at danger. Provision of walkway to reduce walking time Provision of procedures and marker boards to allow trains to be authorised by the signaller to move ahead closer to points when signal has failed at danger. Administrative Administrative Engineering/ Design Engineering/ Design 3.1 BENEFIT 3.2 COST 3.3 Decision 3.4 Responsible Party 3.5 By when Minimal Moderate Investigate Project 01-May-15 Moderate Moderate Reject Minor Unlikely LOW - 2D 3. PROPOSED ADDITIONAL RISK TREATMENT 4. RESCORE TO REFLECT SFAIRP SFAIRP TEST Revised Revised Revised Proposed Additional Control Control type consequence likelihood risk level Minor Unlikely LOW - 2D Yes 5.1 Do the decisions make sense? Yes Provision of walking route is dependent on the condition of the final walking route. Provision of moving ahead procedures will require additional development time and costs which will not meet the Stage 3 project requirements. It will also have not a significant impact on the risk levels. SDS01 States: Preferably the first set of power worked points should be within 300 metres of the protecting signal and the last preferably within 750 metres. In this situation, signal 106.4(78) protects three sets of points: 162PTS (trailing): 455m away from proposed location. 160PTS (facing): 485m from proposed location. 161PTS (trailing): 594m from proposed location. Although the preferred distance of 300m for the first set of points is exceeded, the preferred distance of 750m for the last set of points is not exceeded. The standard has therefore deemed it reasonable to have driver's walking up to 750m to operate points in emergency situations. 1.0 Risk No Risk Category: 1. Safety 2. Assets 3. Financial 4. Environment 5. Regulatory 6 Reputation 2 Assets 1.1 Hazard or scenario or circumstance Train running through open or wrongly positioned points under normal working. 1. RISK IDENTIFICATION 2. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION 5. VALIDATION AND CLARIFICATION Current Current Current risk Caused by Leading to an Outcome Existing Control Control type Responsible Party / Comments Has this workshop consequence likelihood level adequately addressed this Comments / clarification risk? EOL key used to operate points where EOL key has been removed from EOL box after train has passed protecting signal that was not at danger. Most Likely (Credible) Outcome Train will proceed over trailing points set in the wrong direction causing damage to point equipment. Worst Case (Credible) Outcome Train will proceed over facing points locked in the wrong direction colliding with another train. Operational procedures for the emergency operation of points requiring authorisation from Signaller. Distance between EOL box (mounted on 162 location) and point machine Administrative Engineering/ Design 3. PROPOSED ADDITIONAL RISK TREATMENT Proposed Additional Control Control type The walking distance from EOL box to 162B points is approx. 150m. At 1.4m/s (5kph), this will take 107 secs. Even under worst case conditions of a train travelling at 15kph, the train will travel 450m in the same amount of time. The future line speed will be 45kph. 3.1 BENEFIT 3.2 COST SFAIRP TEST 3.3 Decision 3.4 Responsible Party 3.5 By when Major Major Rare 4. RESCORE TO REFLECT SFAIRP 4.0 Revised consequence 4.1 Revised likelihood Rare LOW - 4E 4.2 Revised risk level LOW - 4E Yes 5.1 Do the decisions make sense? Yes Due to the distance of the point machines from the EOL boxes, it is rare that an EOL operator will be able to walk to the closest point machine (162B point) before an train approaching train travelling at 15kph reaches the points. The distance from the EOL box to 162B point machine is approximately 150m including the crossing of 2 tracks. Assuming a walking speed of 5kph, a slow moving train travelling at 15kph will be able to travel 450m in the same amount of time taken to walk to the machine. The sighting distance along the Up Kooragang branch from 162B point machine greater than 100m even with a train stopped at signal 68 obstructing the view of the Up Kooragang approach. It should be noted that normal line speed will be 45kph. Also refer to comments for Risk 1. Pg. 1 of 3 ARTC_SFAIRP_Risk_Assessment_Signal 106.4(78) Ver0.3

23 1.0 Risk No Risk Category: 1. Safety 2. Assets 3. Financial 4. Environment 5. Regulatory 6 Reputation 1.1 Hazard or scenario or circumstance 1. RISK IDENTIFICATION 2. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION 5. VALIDATION AND CLARIFICATION Current Current Current risk Caused by Leading to an Outcome Existing Control Control type Responsible Party / Comments Has this workshop consequence likelihood level adequately addressed this Comments / clarification risk? Most Likely (Credible) Outcome Worst Case (Credible) Outcome Rail Site Safety Training Individual Minor Possible LOW - 2C Yes The extended walking route to the proposed position of the signal ( km) is no more hazardous than the route to designed position of the signal ( km). 3. PROPOSED ADDITIONAL RISK TREATMENT Proposed Additional Control Control type SFAIRP TEST 4. RESCORE TO REFLECT SFAIRP 4.0 Revised consequence 4.1 Revised likelihood 4.2 Revised risk level 5.1 Do the decisions make sense? 3 Safety Increased risk of slips, trips and falls for driver walking to operate points. Increased walking distance required by driver to signalling location and points when needing to operate the points under emergency working conditions. Minor injury to driver Provision of walkway Driver becomes incapacitated and is unable Provision of procedures to allow moving ahead closer to re-enter the cab to to points when signal at danger. operate train Engineering/ Design 3.1 BENEFIT 3.2 COST 3.3 Decision 3.4 Responsible Party 3.5 By when Minimal Moderate Investigate Project 01-May-15 Administrative Moderate Moderate Reject Minor Unlikely LOW - 2D Yes Provision of walking route is dependent on the condition of the final walking route. Provision of moving ahead procedures will require additional development time and costs which will not meet the Stage 3 project requirements. It will also have not a significant impact on the risk levels. 1.0 Risk No Risk Category: 1. Safety 2. Assets 3. Financial 4. Environment 5. Regulatory 6 Reputation 1.1 Hazard or scenario or circumstance 1. RISK IDENTIFICATION 2. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION 5. VALIDATION AND CLARIFICATION Current Current Current risk Caused by Leading to an Outcome Existing Control Control type Responsible Party / Comments Has this workshop consequence likelihood level adequately addressed this Comments / clarification risk? Most Likely (Credible) Outcome Worst Case (Credible) Outcome There is only one straight route from this signal Elimination There is no bi-directional move from signal 106.4(78) across 16 Not Significant Rare LOW - 1E Yes This risk is not applicable in this instance as there is no turnout route from this signal. 4 Safety Driver forgetting route after passing signal 106.4(78) in normal operation. Increased distance of signal from points There is only one route from this signal. 3. PROPOSED ADDITIONAL RISK TREATMENT 4. RESCORE TO REFLECT SFAIRP Proposed Additional Control Control type SFAIRP TEST Revised Revised Revised consequence likelihood risk level 3.1 BENEFIT 3.2 COST 3.3 Decision 3.4 Responsible Party 3.5 By when 5.1 Do the decisions make sense? Yes Pg. 2 of 3 ARTC_SFAIRP_Risk_Assessment_Signal 106.4(78) Ver0.3

24 1.0 Risk No Risk Category: 1. Safety 2. Assets 3. Financial 4. Environment 5. Regulatory 6 Reputation 1.1 Hazard or scenario or circumstance 1. RISK IDENTIFICATION 2. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION 5. VALIDATION AND CLARIFICATION Current Current Current risk Caused by Leading to an Outcome Existing Control Control type Responsible Party / Comments Has this workshop consequence likelihood level adequately addressed this Comments / clarification risk? Most Likely (Credible) Outcome Worst Case (Credible) Outcome Driver Route Knowledge Training Operation of the layout and Interlocking. Individual Engineering/ Design The next main signal 106.5(84) at km is 1266m away f When Signal 104.6(78) has a proceed aspect, all other visible signals will be at Danger. Not Significant Possible LOW - 1C Yes The full signal sighting considerations has been separately considered and reported by the signal sighting committee. Whilst it has been considered and was discussed during this risk assessment workshop, it has not been risk assessed exhaustively. 5 Safety Confusion with adjacent signals Incorrect operation 64,66,68 and which will be of train after passing visible before reaching the next signal Signal 106.4(78) for the Up Kooragang Branch Route knowledge allows driver to disregard other signals Driver unnecessarily brakes to red aspects of other signals. 3. PROPOSED ADDITIONAL RISK TREATMENT 4. RESCORE TO REFLECT SFAIRP Proposed Additional Control Control type SFAIRP TEST Revised Revised Revised consequence likelihood risk level 3.1 BENEFIT 3.2 COST 3.3 Decision 3.4 Responsible Party 3.5 By when Screening of signals 64,66,68 and Isolation Moderate Moderate Investigate Project 01-May-15 Not Significant Rare LOW - 1E 5.1 Do the decisions make sense? Yes Screening of background signals should be investigated based on operational feedback. 1.0 Risk No Risk Category: 1. Safety 2. Assets 3. Financial 4. Environment 5. Regulatory 6 Reputation 1.1 Hazard or scenario or circumstance 1. RISK IDENTIFICATION 2. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION 5. VALIDATION AND CLARIFICATION Current Current Current risk Caused by Leading to an Outcome Existing Control Control type Responsible Party / Comments Has this workshop consequence likelihood level adequately addressed this Comments / clarification risk? Yes Most Likely (Credible) Outcome Worst Case (Credible) Outcome Major Rare LOW - 4E 6 3. PROPOSED ADDITIONAL RISK TREATMENT 4. RESCORE TO REFLECT SFAIRP Proposed Additional Control Control type SFAIRP TEST Revised Revised Revised consequence likelihood risk level 3.1 BENEFIT 3.2 COST 3.3 Decision 3.4 Responsible Party 3.5 By when 5.1 Do the decisions make sense? Yes Major Rare LOW - 4E Pg. 3 of 3 ARTC_SFAIRP_Risk_Assessment_Signal 106.4(78) Ver0.3

25 Stakeholder Consultation and Risk Assessment Attendees Risk Assessment Subject Title 1. Assessment Process Repositioning of Signal 106.4(78) to km Date: 19th February 2015 Location: Arup Sydney Office Facilitator: Lorna Small 2. Name & Signature Organistion Position Telephone Signature Raymond Lowe Arup Signalling Project Engineer Tony Vidago Arup Project Director Lorna Small David Stuart-Smith Arup Arup Rail Safety & Assurance Manager High Voltage and Traction Infrastructure Leader Stakeholder Review of Risk Assessment The draft Risk Assessment ver 0.1 was circulated to Attendees and Stakeholders on dd/mmm/yyyy. The following feedback was received from these respondents. 4.Stakeholder Feedback on draft Risk Assessment Name Organistion Position Feedback Comment Accepted / Rejected / Modified Tony Vidago Arup Project Director Lorna Small Arup Rail Safety & Assurance Manager David Stuart-Smith Arup High Voltage and Traction Infrastructure Leader Lewis Wright Aurecon Hatch Project Manager 4. Approval Name Signature Organistion Position Report Version Date Risk Assessment Workshop prepared by: Raymond Lowe Arup Project Engineer /2/15 Risk Assessment reviewed by: Tony Vidago Arup Project Director Risk Assessment endorsed by: General Manager, <corridor or division>